













THE  
ENGLISHMAN'S LETTERS

RELATIVE TO  
THE TRADE BETWEEN *℞.*  
GREAT BRITAIN

AND  
THE EAST-INDIES.

IN WHICH  
THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS OF THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY,  
AND  
THE RIGHTS OF THE PRIVATE MERCHANTS.  
UNDER THE ACT OF 1793,  
ARE DISCUSSED.

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
1802.



# EAST INDIA PRIVATE TRADE

## LETTER 1.

*To the Proprietors of East India Stock.*



IT is not likely that you should be inattentive, either to the critical situation of your affairs at this important time, or to the conduct of your Court of Directors in their management of them. There is, however, an inactivity in a body constituted as ours is (for I am also a Proprietor of India Stock) which requires to be stimulated occasionally ; or else there is an overweening confidence in our Directors that it is equally necessary to guard against. I shall therefore dedicate a few observations to you, from time to time, in hopes that they may be found not altogether unworthy of your notice.

It is a difficult, as well as a delicate point, to adjust precisely the balance of interference between the constituent and the constituted body ; if it preponderate with the former, it may lead to tumult and confusion ; if with the latter, it is apt to degenerate into contempt of authority, and impatience of control. I think it may be safely asserted, and will be generally assented to, that of late the Proprietors have been the ascending scale ; and that a sort of complaisant confidence has been placed in the Directors, which, in addition to their political and patronal consequence, has given them greater weight than is either requisite or proper. The time

has been, and that not long ago, when the influence of the Proprietors was much greater than it is at present; and it is much to their credit to aver, that it has never been exerted but on important occasions, and always with great benefit to their affairs. If the doctrine of confidence, which has been of late strenuously supported, had been adopted in the case of shipping, we should have had a hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year more at least to pay for freight than we have at present; if it had been adopted in the case of recruits, we should have had to pay for the establishment of a depôt in the Isle of Wight, of many thousand pounds a year; if it had been implicitly adopted in the case of increasing our capital, we should have had two millions added to our stock, for no other purpose than to please the Directors, who wanted to please the Minister; and the same influence, if it had not been wisely checked, would have induced this Company, in the year 1796, to have volunteered an advance of two millions to Government, without interest, for the whole term of our Charter; and which we now find we have so much occasion for in the course of our own affairs.

With these instances fresh in our memory, and many others which might be adduced, I hope we shall not, from a false delicacy, trust implicitly to our Directors in the business of Private Trade, which is now in discussion, and agitates and heats the minds of all who attack or defend it. I am aware that it is a popular ground for the Directors to take, and they, too, are aware of their advantage. They have already boasted of their independent principles, and of their pure integrity in their support of the Company's Chartered Rights; and they

they have even accused their opponents of base ingratitude to that Company, by whose bounty they have been fed. Accusation is neither the best mode of supporting an argument, nor the best proof of the truth of it. On the contrary, it is a symptom of weakness, rather than of strength, and implies a design in the person who has recourse to it, to engage the passions, because he despairs of convincing the understanding. But whoever intends to wield this weapon would do well to consider that it is a two-edged sword, and cuts both ways.

In answer to the accusation, which has been made in the spirit of party, and not of truth, it is a sufficient refutation of it to observe, that the Company's Chartered Rights are neither infringed nor endangered; that if a general and national benefit can be proved to be obstructed by partial privileges, those privileges must give way, and that those who are, or have been, servants of the Company, consult the interest of that Company better by endeavouring to remove the shackles of Private Trade, than those who wish to impose them; that, therefore, if there be any ingratitude in taking a part in this important question, the crime of it is as chargeable on those who wish to suppress, as on those who wish to support the Private Trade; for the imputation, if it means any thing but an outcry, means that it is injurious to the Company to encourage this trade; on the other hand, those who engage in its support contend, that it is a benefit both to the Company and the nation.

Since, however, some of the Directors in Parliament have thought it would aid their cause to boast of their motives, and the disinterestedness of their actions, and to impeach the conduct of their opponents, they



could not complain, if it provoked an inquiry into the validity of their vaunted claim. But it is not my intention to imitate an example I disapprove, or to change the argument and divert the mind from principles to persons.

My plan, in the letters which I shall take the liberty of addressing to you in future, is to inquire dispassionately into the nature of the Private Trade ; to trace it from its origin to the present time ; to consider its consequences both in India and England ; to examine whether the regulations and restraints which the Court of Directors formed and imposed upon it, from time to time, were wise and necessary, or injudicious and impolitic ; to take a view of the situation of the trade of foreign nations, and to investigate the rights, and privileges, and interest of our own Company. In a word, I mean to enter into so full a discussion of this subject of Private Trade, as shall bring the whole of it fairly before you, and enable you, if my ability (with the assistance of my friends) prove equal to my intention, to judge of its good or ill effects on your affairs, and whether you should join with your Directors in suppressing it, or comply with the petition of the merchants in encouraging it on a wise and liberal scale.

AN ENGLISHMAN

*Jan. 9, 1802.*

## LETTER II.

*To the Proprietors of East India Stock.*

BEFORE I enter upon the subject of this day's address, I beg to be indulged with a few words more on the doctrine of confidence. It is only to lay before you what passed at the General Court on the 28th of May last, relative to the *unanimity* of the Directors on that occasion, and to leave it to your own reflection whether that will increase your confidence in the executive body. At that meeting the Directors in general seemed impressed with the idea, that the declaration of their unanimity was to act as magic on the Court, and to silence all opposition: one honourable Director said, "it was  
 " the most extraordinary proceeding he ever witnessed  
 " in that Court, for forty-three individual Proprietors,  
 " most of them engaged in private trade, to set up  
 " their opinions against the judgment of the Directors.  
 " Let the Proprietors recollect the weight of the word  
 " *unanimity*; the twenty-four Directors were *unanimous*"-- (Woodfall's Reports); and afterwards, that the *thirty Directors* were of one opinion. Several other Directors expressed sentiments of the same tendency, and clearly intimated that they considered themselves as a band of *thirty unanimous Directors*! six of whom, to be sure, were *Ex* for a few months in rotation, in order to satisfy the form of the law by which the Company's charter is held. Many Proprietors were sturdy enough to doubt this boasted unanimity; and they were well founded in their suspicions, for when the subject came soon afterwards into the House of Commons (12th June, 1801,) Mr. Dundas, speaking to it, said, "What

“do you tell me of your *unanimity*? Me, who have read all your written opinions: this may do very well for the Court of Proprietors; but I know you were *NOT unanimous*; I know that the highest authority among you, your Chairman, is of an opinion diametrically opposite to that of the majority.” [Vide Mr. Impey’s Speech in General Court.] And this was very true; for the Chairman was shortly after this debate driven, I may say, from his seat for this very opposition, and for nothing else. Having stated these extraordinary facts, which are too well founded to be controverted, I leave them to your consideration without a comment.

I shall now, in pursuance of the plan I proposed in my letter of the 9th instant, proceed to inquire into the nature and origin of the Private Trade of India; and in doing this I must trespass on your patience, by taking a short review of the commerce of India at an antecedent period.

It is well known that, by the wise policy of the Mogul emperors, merchants from all parts of the world were encouraged to come into their dominions for the purpose of trade, and that they brought with them little else than ready money or bills to purchase the commodities of India. This encouragement was particularly necessary in a country which had no mines of gold or silver of its own, and depended for its wealth on the influx of specie brought by the merchants to pay for its manufactures. They carried this system of indulgence to commerce so far as to permit several European nations to establish factories in India, under the authority of a grant, called a *firmaun*. In Bengal there were  
factories

factories belonging to the Portuguese, the Danes, the Dutch, the French, and the English; and the agents of these factories purchased from the native merchants the various sorts of articles which were required for the European markets.

When this trade was first established, after the discovery of the passage of the Cape of Good Hope, it was carried on by companies of different European nations, not because monopoly ever was considered the most favourable mode of commerce, but on account of the danger, risk, and expence, which attended the trade at those early periods, and which were more than private individuals could incur, or durst venture. At one time two companies were formed in England, which afterwards became united, and were granted the exclusive privilege of trading to India.

The trade of that country lay open, as has been observed, to the merchants of every nation, whether they came by sea or land, and the native merchant or manufacturer was at free liberty to sell his goods to whom he pleased. Thus the competition of purchasers in India encouraged its manufactures and agriculture, and increased the stock of wealth in the country to so prodigious a degree, that when the English Company became the sovereigns of it, they thought it an inexhaustible mine, and ordered, in the year 1768 (*vide General Letter, 12th January, 1768,*) 500,000*l.* to be sent home in specie; and, after remitting supplies to China and their other settlements, to reserve a million in the treasury at Bengal. But, alas! those wise Directors were soon wakened from this golden dream, as we shall see hereafter.

In the year 1765, the grant of the *Dewanny* was made to the Company, and they became, in fact, from that time, the sovereign of Bengal, Bahar, and Orissa ; and here I beg to mark the era when their change of situation should have made a change of councils. Sovereign and merchant are two distinct characters, which in my humble opinion have never been thoroughly understood by the Court of Directors, or at least they have never acted as if they had sufficiently discriminated them. Before they were possessed of the *Dewanny*, and whilst they acted like all other merchants in India, they provided their investments for Europe by means of specie, and the produce of some few articles which were sent from England, and by money advanced to them by their servants in India, and free merchants, the produce of their industry, for which they gave them bills of exchange at 2s. 6d. the current rupee, payable in England. The Company granted these bills for two substantial reasons, both useful to themselves : first, to supply their own deficiency of means to provide their investment ; and secondly, to prevent this money going into the hands of foreign companies.

This is a very remarkable circumstance, and should be particularly noticed ; for to this source may be traced the origin of what was denounced *Clandestine Trade* ; and has been since changed into *Private Trade*. The servants of the company, civil and military, and the free merchants, had no means of remitting the fortunes they had acquired, and reaping the fruits of their industry, but through the Company's treasury, or that of some foreign company ; and if they had been denied both those means, they must have remained in India all their

their lives in possession of fortunes they could neither enjoy themselves, nor bequeath to their friends in England. Such a state of banishment no masters had a right to impose after their servants had entered their service without its forming a condition of it ; and if they were to commit such an act of injustice, they must be aware it would be evaded. The fact proved to be so with the English East India Company ; their Directors did commit this act of injustice ; it was evaded by every servant they ever had ; they knew it, they were implored to redress the injury, and they promised to do it, but they never did : many of those very servants became Directors, joined in the same measures, and I believe I should not go too far if I were to add that some at this very day are reprobating what they themselves from necessity had practised.

No sooner had the Company become possessed of the Dewanny, than they directed that no bills of exchange should be granted, or money received for certificates, unless in cases of absolute exigency, and that the rate of exchange should be lowered to 2s. 3d. and 2s. 1d. the current rupee (*vide General Letter, 17th May, 1766,*) and in January 1768, they ordered the surplus revenue to be employed in providing their investment, but they said, “ as they could not expect so sudden an extension of it, they had come to the resolution to have “ 500,000*l.* brought home in specie by the return of “ the ships then under dispatch.” By such severe regulations and restrictions as those were the servants and the free merchants *forced*, (for I contend no man would consent to the banishment of remaining in India all his life) to seek other means of remitting their fortunes

to England. The means which presented themselves were foreign companies, or private traders of foreign countries, the French, the Dutch, the Danes, the Imperialists, the Portuguese; and whether these companies or traders provided goods on their own account, with the English money paid into their hands for bills on Europe, or whether goods were shipped on account of the individuals in their ships, or through the privilege of the Captains and Officers of English ships, all the purchases made by these advances were *clandestine trade*; for these means were all equally forbidden.—This was the *origin* of what is now called *Private Trade*, that is, in other words, all the trade with British capital which the Company did not import, or allow to be imported into England, but which, for the most part, does now come here with great advantage to the Company and the public. In my next I shall consider its tendency and effects, the impolicy of the measures which *created* it, and the advantage or disadvantage to the Nation and the Company.

AN ENGLISHMAN.

London, January 16, 1802.

### LETTER III.

*To the Proprietors of East India Stock.*

IN my letter of the 16th instant, I shewed that it was the wise and enlightened policy of the Emperors of India to give every possible facility to its trade, and every encouragement to its merchants, by which its wealth, its manufactures, and its agriculture were promoted to the highest degree. It is superfluous to remark, that  
a country

a country which had no mines of its own, must have been enriched by the produce of the soil and the manufactures of its inhabitants ; it was, therefore, highly necessary in the English East India Company, when they became sovereigns, to follow, as far as circumstances would admit, the wise example of their predecessors. Unfortunately for them, the Company came into possession of these kingdoms, when, from many concurrent causes, they were falling into decay, and many sources from which money flowed into them were dried up. This should have excited them the more to revive the languid spirit of commerce ; to animate the labourer and the manufacturer to fresh exertions of industry, and to increase the productive labour of the country. Whatever might be the cause, a different spirit certainly prevailed in the councils of the Directors of those days ; for, instead of opening new channels of wealth, they stopped that by which their own used to flow, and they stopped another of foreign Companies to a certain degree, namely, to the amount of those remittances which they forbid to be made through their own treasury. They would have gone much further, if their orders could have been obeyed, and have had 500,000*l.* sent home in specie, besides an enormous supply to China and their settlements in India.

In four years after they became sovereigns of the country, all these visionary schemes vanished. Commerce decayed, the revenues failed, and distress besieged them on every side. Their plan of commerce in particular was so bad, that, in the year 1769, one of their oldest servants, at that time resident at the Durbar, the ancient capital and centre of Bengal, writes thus—

*“ I well*



“ *I well remember this country when trade was free, and*  
 “ *the flourishing state it was then in; with concern I*  
 “ *now see its present ruinous condition, which I am con-*  
 “ *vincd is greatly owing to the monopoly that has been*  
 “ *made of late years, in the Company’s name, of almost all*  
 “ *the manufactures in the country. Let the trade be made*  
 “ *free, and this fine country will soon recover itself, the*  
 “ *revenues increase, and the Company procure as large an*  
 “ *investment as they can spare money to purchase; and*  
 “ *these purchases will prove a benefit to the country, in-*  
 “ *stead of tending to its ruin, as they now do to demon-*  
 “ *stration.*”—(Mr. Becher’s letter to the Governor,  
 7th May, 1769.)—These sentiments of Mr. Be-  
 cher, the Resident at the Durbar, were confirmed by  
 the Select Committee, to whom they were referred;  
 and the Company’s records from that time teem with  
 instances of the mismanagement of the trade of India.  
 At one time the Company would have native agents at  
 their factories, called *Gomastabs*; at another time *Py-*  
*kars*; at another, contractors, called *Dadney merchants*;  
 in short, they were constantly fluctuating in their plans  
 of commerce, and are not yet agreed upon them. One  
 thing, however, is plain, that in all their systems the  
 spirit of monopoly prevailed, and the freedom of trade,  
 which was so much encouraged in the Mogul Govern-  
 ment, was obstructed and fettered by the regulations  
 and restrictions of the Court of Directors.

Having resolved to increase their investment to a  
 great extent, and to appropriate a part of the surplus  
 of their territorial revenue to this purpose, the Direc-  
 tors would not receive any money from individuals, ei-  
 ther in or out of their service; and at the same time  
 that

that they shut the door of remittance to their servants and free merchants, they imposed the severest penalties on any one who should remit their fortunes through any foreign channel. The French were now re-established in their factories after the last treaty of peace at Paris (in 1763); the Dutch and Danes had not been disturbed in theirs, and all these nations were holding out every temptation in their power to induce the English to remit their fortunes through their treasuries. The sums which they received from the English for remittance enabled the foreign nations to purchase goods for their investments, and prevented their sending specie from Europe to that amount. This, as I have before stated, constituted what the Directors call *Clandestine Trade*; and what people in England, from not knowing the nature of it, conceived to be a trade purloined, as it were, from the Company's investment, and smuggled into Europe, to the detriment of their exclusive privileges; but it will be seen, from this description of it, and the fact is, it only enabled foreigners to purchase those articles in India, to which they had, and still have, the same right as the English Company, namely, the right of a *Firmaun*, with a British capital furnished on the spot, instead of foreigners sending so much specie from Europe. As far as it tended to encourage the manufactures in India it was of service to the Company in the character of Sovereigns, by affording their subjects the means of paying the revenue; and in fact it did them no harm as merchants, for the demand of the markets in Europe was great enough to take off all the goods which were imported from India by all the European Companies. The principal injury

it did them was, the preventing of so much specie coming into India ; this they either did not know, or did not regard, for all their ideas were engrossed about increase of investment. But be the effect what it might, they owed it all to their own impolicy and injustice ; and if they had understood their true interest at that time a whit better than they do at this, they might, in their collective wisdom, then have devised means for remitting those private fortunes through their own cash ; by so doing they would have increased the productive labour of their subjects in India, prevented foreigners from benefitting by those remittances, and forced them to send specie to India, of which the Directors were at this time draining it through every floodgate they could open.

Let us now consider the effects of this trade in India and Europe. It is plain that the employment of the inhabitants of any country is its true source of wealth ; and in India, it has been shewn, that from its commerce alone it derived its superabundant riches ; the Directors, therefore, ought to have turned all their thoughts to the encouragement of it, and they were continually urged to do so by the representations of their servants on the spot. Every feasible plan that could have been devised for removing all restraints on trade should have been listened to ; and, as they were told by Governor Verelst, such regulations should have been made, “ as  
 “ would leave the fair, industrious merchant at full li-  
 “ berty, and in the undisturbed enjoyment of that free-  
 “ dom which is the support and life of commerce in  
 “ every country, but more particularly essential in this,  
 “ as its commerce from the most accurate calculations is a  
 “ clear

*“ clear and intrinsic gain to it, to the whole amount of its annual exports.”*—(Verelst’s Minutes Sel. Com. 11th August, 1796.)

If such would be the effects of the encouragement of trade in India, let us look at them in Europe. The avidity with which the commodities of India have been sought after from time immemorial by all other nations induced different States of Europe to establish companies to purchase and bring them from that country to their own; and it is not saying too much to affirm, that the English Company would have found a market for all the goods they could have purchased by the joint produce of their surplus revenue and the money of individuals; for their own sales were never hurt by the imports of foreign Companies, who had received the aid of those remittances which the Company had rejected. If, then, there be a demand in the markets of Europe, for all the goods which can be sent from India, whether by the Company or individuals, it is evidently the interest of the Company to permit individuals to provide such goods, and send them to England. As sovereigns of India, it is a self-evident proposition. As merchants here, it does not hurt them; and the benefit to the nation is as demonstrable as that the increase of commerce is an increase of wealth.

AN ENGLISHMAN.

London, Jan. 20, 1802.

## LETTER IV.

*To the Proprietors of East India Stock.*

IN a former letter I have endeavoured to explain the origin of what was called *Clandestine Trade*, and is now known by the name of *Private Trade*; but lest I should not have been sufficiently explicit, and as it is essential to the right understanding of any argument to define the terms of it, I will recur to the subject, and treat of it a little more at large. In this discussion truth is my only object, and I have no other view than to bring it before you, as far as lies in my power, undisguised, and to prevent your being misled by names to which ideas are associated different from their real import.

I have already set forth the causes which induced the Court of Directors to prohibit the receipt of money into their treasury from individuals, either for certificates or bills of exchange; and I have shewed, that by this prohibition they deprived their servants, both civil and military, and free merchants, of the customary means of remitting their fortunes to England.—The treasuries of other companies, and individuals, as I have before observed, lay open to them; and in the alternative to which the Company's orders had unjustly reduced their servants, they had recourse to foreigners for the remittance of their fortunes which had been, otherwise, useless to them, unless they remained in India all their lives. This recourse was generally had through houses of agency at Calcutta, and those houses made their agreements with foreign merchants

in

in various forms which mercantile experience dictated as the safest or most beneficial. For these reasons it was called by the Court of Directors, and not unjustly, a *Clandestine Trade*; not because the goods were either clandestinely procured in India to their detriment, for the foreign companies had an equal right with them to any articles of India produce or manufacture, nor because the goods were clandestinely brought into England (for what we have to lament is, that they never came here), but because part of those goods was provided by an English capital, which their own impolitic measures had forced into a foreign channel.

This capital, of course, increased as the numbers of individuals, and their means to make money, increased; and the Court of Directors have always been eager to complain, but slow to redress the grievance. Their own exigencies have been the sole cause of their opening their treasury for the remittance of private fortunes; for when, in process of time (and that a very short one) they found their revenues inadequate to their multiplied expences, and that it was impossible to defray them and provide an investment too for Europe, they borrowed money for this purpose, and thus were obliged again to open that channel of remittance which they had unjustly shut. In the further progress of changes which, from the varying circumstances of time took place in India and the Company's affairs, it was found there were many articles of trade in which the Company did not deal that afforded means of commerce to the free merchants who were settled there, and might be transported to England with great advantage to both countries. These articles, which may

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properly

properly be called the surplus produce of India, were what the merchants there dealt in, and constitutes what is now called the *Private Trade*.

The jealousy of the Company about the monopoly, and those mercantile habits which, Adam Smith observes, draw men almost necessarily, though perhaps insensibly, to prefer the narrower principles of exclusive trade to the more liberal policy of an extended commerce, prevented the Court of Directors from adopting such measures as this policy would have dictated; and instead of considering in what manner this trade might be encouraged, and brought into the Port of London, they regarded it with apprehension as a rival to their exclusive privileges, and from this fear forced it into foreign conveyances. The Legislature, however, viewed this trade in a different light, and saw that it was not only beneficial to India, where it augmented the productive labour, and of course the revenue of that country, but that it would be highly advantageous to this, by the duties it must pay, by the additional industry it must create, and by making London the mart of its sale instead of foreign parts.

On this principle Government wisely acted in 1793, when they renewed the charter of the Company; and by the Act of Parliament which was then passed, the Legislature changed the state of the exclusive privileges which had been originally granted to the Company.—This act conferred on private merchants *the right*, not only of exporting goods from England to India to a certain amount, but also *the right* of importing Indian commodities to England. From the spirit in which this right was conceded, and from the words in which it is expressed

expressed, it appears evidently to have been the intention of the Legislature to give every reasonable facility to a trade which they justly conceived must be so beneficial to India and England, and which they as justly imagined might be so conducted as to put an end to all those complaints and bickerings which were for ever inflaming the counsels of the Directors, and, by depriving foreigners of the aid of a British capital, force them to employ their own. This was the plan devised with wisdom for the destruction of clandestine trade, in which it promises to be completely successful, and to afford most important advantages to the Company and British India, if the false alarms of the Directors are not permitted to over-rule the judgment of Parliament.

On this single hinge turns the whole dispute between the Directors and the Private Merchants. The Merchants contend that instead of all that facility being granted to their trade, by which alone they could enjoy the rights that had been granted to them, the Directors had thrown insuperable obstacles in their way. The Directors, on the other hand, acknowledge in some degree the justness of these complaints, but rest their vindication of what is past on those circumstances of the war, which they could neither prevent nor control.—In regard to the future, they assert that the facilities which the Merchants demand for carrying on this trade are full of danger to their Chartered Rights, and lead in their effects to Colonization, and ultimately to the annihilation of the Company. These are such exaggerated fears, that they scarcely merit a serious answer; they have, however, been very ably answered and fully refuted; and it now remains to be proved, whether the



narrow policy of the Court of Directors, or the enlarged and enlightened principle of the Legislature, shall prevail. If it should, unhappily, be the former, it will have a most pernicious effect in India, and it is not within the compass of my understanding to conceive how the Company are to employ the manufacturers and realise their revenues, for they certainly have not the means, at present, of procuring any considerable investment for themselves, nor is it likely they should have for some years to come. If, therefore, a necessity on their parts prevent their procuring an investment of any considerable amount, and a mistaken policy prohibit other persons employing the manufacturers of India, what is to become of that country? In my poor opinion, to overlook all the immediate evils that must ensue, and to see only the danger of colonization and revolution, is like looking at a prospect through the reversed end of a telescope; you may imagine, that you have placed the object at a greater distance, but it is as near to you as ever—all the effect of this incongruous conduct will be, to make it more difficult to apply a remedy to an instant and dangerous complaint.

AN ENGLISHMAN

*London, Jan. 23, 1802.*

## LETTER V.

*To the Proprietors of East India Stock.*

IT appears to be necessary to examine, without further delay, into the *Origin* of the ELEVEN PROPOSITIONS *relative to Private Trade* (styled a BASIS only, by the Chancellor of His Majesty's Exchequer) and the disposition with which the Directors appear to have offered them in place of the Resolutions annexed to their Report. You will recollect, that at the General Court, on the 28th May, the Report and Resolutions were approved almost by acclamation; that argument was said to be exhausted, and conviction so manifest and decided, as to leave nothing further to be done, but to act without delay upon the principles those Resolutions detailed. Yet when that Report came to be considered by the Board of Commissioners with the instructions which Mr. Charles Grant had prepared to accompany it to India, it was found that the opinions of the Court of Directors were not opposed only by discontented, interested, and ungrateful servants, but that men in the highest offices of the State, and distinguished characters in Parliament, entertained the same sentiments, and differed as widely from the conclusions so hastily adopted in Leadenhall-street. The best proof of this is, that no orders on the subject have at this distant day (27th January, 1802) received the sanction of Government to be transmitted to India. Was the General Court right then in rejecting all further advice? I trust that, in candour, the most ardent at that meeting, will now acknowledge that the proposition of

their opponents was not so totally destitute of common sense and discretion. Another circumstance which occurred at that time is well deserving your attention, and that is, the anxiety the Directors affected to feel for the *dignity* of the Proprietors in their circular letter of the 1st of June. Had that feeling positively existed, would it have been possible that they should have designedly left you totally in ignorance from that day to this, in respect to the state of this important question? If such a marked neglect does not satisfy you in what degree of respect you really stand with these gentlemen, who profess to hold their offices by your favour, there is an influence operating which has not the Constitution of this Company for its guide, or there is an infatuation prevailing equally inimical to it. Had they acted as most accountable agents would have done, I should not have to depend upon other public channels to enable me to state—that after long negociation, after repeated efforts, and after finding the Board of Commissioners not to be moved from their opinion; (“that this business  
“involved more than merely commercial considerations;  
“embracing points of great political importance, deeply  
“affecting the interests of the State,”) the Directors desisted from their ineffectual attempts to transmit these impolitic orders to India, and changed the course of their negotiations from the Board of India Commissioners to the Treasury.

As the meeting of Parliament approached, their apprehensions were increased; they found they had but one alternative; the claims of the merchants were so just, that the Treasury would not protect them unless they came forward with some concessions, and granted

to the Private Traders some of those facilities which they hitherto had denied. When Sir William Pulteney's motion was on the point of being made in the House of Commons, they reluctantly declared to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that they would confirm Lord Wellesley's plan for the two ensuing seasons, and for a further experiment they offered these eleven propositions as a basis : at least such was the account given by the Minister in his place : and in consequence the House saw no occasion to appoint a Committee to examine into a matter that was compromised. I do not now find fault with this compromise, as it was understood in the House ; but there will be reason to question it presently.

I must stop here to beg you will review the conduct of your Court of Directors. They came with supplication even to the General Court, for they individually canvassed most of the members in favour of their Report, and they obtained the instruction they wished. Having thus a positive duty to discharge, at their own request, for the performance of which they were responsible to you, what have they done ? Why, insensible of your rights, though bound as much as duty could bind a public body, they have treated you with total inattention, and instead of executing what you had positively directed them to carry into effect, they have, as soon as they found opposition from Government, offered a concession, without even asking your consent, or referring to you for your approbation ; and although it is in a point that they solemnly declared would eventually be attended with ruin to the Company. Where are your privileges, where are your rights, if the Di-

rectors are justified in such conduct as this? Look to the tenor of the orders the Directors were desirous of sending to India in June last, and the solemn declarations they made in favour of them: but now they are willing to give up those opinions, and to adopt, with certain qualifications, the plans of their opponents; yet, you, whose property and whose charter they are sporting with, are not even to be informed of what's going forward, or to have an opportunity of making your election, whether your affairs shall be conducted under the regulations you and they so lately preferred; or whether the reasons they can now assign are sufficient to convince you, as well as them, that what you so peremptorily resolved, had better be rescinded. If this sort of conduct shall find its advocates, it is a very powerful evidence indeed, that there is too much reason to believe Sir William Pulteney was correct when he stated this Company to be over-ruled by an Aristocracy of thirty.

Such was the origin of these eleven propositions; their tendency and effect I shall not say much of; because, whatever there might be in them to make the House of Commons believe that they intended a fair experiment between the British and India built ships, there is a mysterious circumstance attending this transaction, which you have a right to call upon your Directors to explain, for it at present exposes them to the imputation of not having been sincere in any such intention. Mr. Addington, Lord Glenbervie, indeed the House in general, understood that these eleven propositions contained only the terms of an *experiment*, by which it would be tried whether British ships were preferable

ferable to India ships for the trade in question ; not a single member entertained an idea, as far as can be learned from the debate, that all India built ships were to be excluded totally from this navigation, except under contracts in conformity with the eleven Resolutions : but this appears to have been the design of the Directors, even before they knew what the sense of Parliament might be ; for after the Chairman and Deputy had held a conference with the Minister on the morning previous to the debate on Sir William Pulteney's motion, they called a *secret Court* of Directors, and of that secret meeting they have very lately given us the following record :

' At a secret Court of Directors, held on Wednesday, the 25th of November, 1801, the Chairman acquainted the Court that the Deputy and himself waited on the Chancellor of the Exchequer this morning, and that at the conference some amendments were proposed to be made to a paper, containing the sentiments of the Special Committee, which the Chairs were yesterday desired to state to Mr. Addington. The said paper, as amended, was then read and approved, being as follows, viz. " The Committee conceive that the propositions herewith enclosed are calculated to meet the wishes of his Majesty's Ministers, and to form the basis of a final and satisfactory arrangement, but as much depends on the manner in which this arrangement shall be made known in India, the Committee presume, that the best mode by which it can be done, will be by paragraphs to India, to be approved of by the Board of Commissioners. In these the Court will acquaint

" Marquis

“ Marquis Wellesley, that they confirm the agreement  
 “ which he has made with the owners of Indian Ships  
 “ taken up for the Red Sea, for one voyage to Eu-  
 “ rope ; and that the same, in the discretion of Mar-  
 “ quis Wellesley, be extended to all the ships engaged  
 “ in that service, provided they, or the ships built to re-  
 “ place such as may have been lost or disabled, leave  
 “ India before the 1st of April 1803. But as his  
 “ Lordship cannot have received in India the whole  
 “ of the information necessary to enable him to form a  
 “ correct judgment on a subject which is of a most ex-  
 “ tensive nature, the Committee, in consenting to con-  
 “ firm the contracts entered into, cannot agree to ex-  
 “ tend the principle in the manner before proposed by  
 “ his Lordship. And the Court will therefore direct,  
 “ that no other teak, or India built ship, shall be em-  
 “ ployed on a voyage to Europe, except under, and  
 “ in conformity with the eleven Resolutions sanc-  
 “ tioned by the Court of Directors on the 17th  
 “ instant.”

‘ And the Chairman and Deputy were requested  
 to transmit a copy of the above paper to the Right  
 ‘ Honourable the Chancellor of the Exchequer.’

This Resolution, in the first place, abandons a point  
 that had been strongly and frequently insisted on, and  
 admits the paragraphs shall be sent to the Board of  
 Commissioners for approbation. So that they no longer  
 contend that it is purely a commercial question. In  
 the next place, it shews a great want of confidence in  
 Marquis Wellesley, and a strong disinclination to allow  
 a sufficiency of Indian tonnage for the seasons of 1802-3,  
 which was clearly promised in the House of Com-  
 mons,

mons, either in ships that had been in the Red Sea, or other Indian Ships *to that amount*. But lastly, it declares, to the astonishment, it must be, of every one, *that no other teak or Indian built ship shall be employed in a voyage to Europe, except under, and in conformity with, the eleven Resolutions*. This clearly shews that they were resolved to consider the eleven propositions as a *definitive arrangement*, although no such thing appears on the face of them; although the Chancellor of the Exchequer explained them differently; and although they knew the House of Parliament was that very day to give their opinion upon them. The time, the manner, and the contents of this paper are equally extraordinary; they are pointed out, that they may be explained, and I do hope, that you will at least agree with me in this, that whenever your Directors submit any thing to the Minister for the information of the House of Commons, they ought not to leave the Company subject to the imputation of having kept back any part of their case.

AN ENGLISHMAN.

*London, Jan. 27, 1802.*

## LETTER VI.

*To the Proprietors of East India Stock.*

IN my last I had the honour to state to you the origin of the eleven propositions, as well as the secret resolution of the Court of Directors respecting them.— I shall now proceed to lay before you a few observations on the debate which Mr. Woodfall reports to have  
taken



taken place upon those propositions ; and upon the subject of Indian Private Trade on the 25th of November last. The debate was opened by Sir William Pulteney, in a very masterly manner, explaining the different situations of the India Company, from its first establishment\* to the time it acquired territory and sovereignty in India ; and from thence down to 1793, when the Parliament thought it expedient that the Company should no longer enjoy the trade totally exclusive of all other British subjects ; but that a further term should be granted to them of the territories in India, together with their exclusive trade, *under certain limitations*.— This was a new compact between the Public and the Company, at a period when their exclusive rights were at an end ; and the principal condition in this new compact was, to convey certain rights to the British merchants in England, and those resident in India, under which they were to have a share in the trade between our Asiatic territories and the port of London. To this Act I beg to recommend your particular attention, that you may not be misled into a belief that you still possess an entire exclusive right to this trade, and that what the private merchants enjoy is through the favour and indulgence of the India Company ; whereas their right stands upon the very same foundation with your own ; and their complaint now is, that the Company do not perform their part of the compact, inasmuch as they obstruct the private trade, instead of granting it all those facilities which the merchants consider themselves entitled to. Sir William Pulteney thought their representations so well founded (and he is not a man who takes up any matter hastily) that after calling  
for

for a variety of papers, he acknowledged the Case to be deserving of serious investigation ; and we find, according to Mr. Woodfall, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer declared his opinion to be, “ that the Court of Directors had not given those facilities which, by the decision of Parliament, they were required to extend to the Private Trade.” Under such a circumstance of imputed neglect, is it safe, or is it just, for the Directors to come forward and say their chartered rights are infringed ? May not your charter rather be questioned on the ground of their negligence, and is it not the duty of this Company to shew a readiness to make amends for this error, rather than to enter into a contest where there is almost a general acknowledgment that they have been deficient in the performance of their part of the contract ?

It is stated by Mr. Woodfall, that the Chancellor of the Exchequer declared, “ that the assertion would be found to be groundless that British subjects were not allowed those advantages which were given to the foreign trader.” Yet how easy is it to shew, that the foreign merchant is not restrained from buying or selling any articles, *not totally prohibited*, while the British merchant is expressly forbidden to deal in almost all that would interfere with the Company’s investment—that the foreign merchant has the advantage of loading his own ships, and sailing at his own times, while the British merchant is not to be allowed to do either, if the Directors prevail in the present contest—that the foreign merchant sails at a lower freight, and lower charges, with the full benefit of all his own industry and expedition, while the British merchant is subjected

to a higher and arbitrary freight, and all his own personal diligence and exertion rendered of no avail to him. It is superfluous to state other, but inferior considerations ; these are sufficient to prove that the foreign merchant has many advantages over the British. The Minister appeared to be sensible of the state of ship timber in this country, and acknowledged “ that every plan for effecting a reduction in the price of it “ was deserving of the most serious attention ;” he also allowed, that “ the Private Trade was of very high “ consequence ; it presented new openings for the “ commerce, and new encouragements to the manu- “ factures of the mother country.” As to the objections, and the apprehensions of the Directors, he appears to have treated them with no great ceremony.— The argument about Lascars “ appeared to his mind “ extremely feeble and inconclusive.” As to colonization, “ he did not view the danger from this source “ in a light so strong as that exhibited in the Report ;” and he is said to have concluded with a declaration, “ that he was ready to support any fair proposition *for* “ *compelling* the Court of Directors to comply with the “ wishes of Parliament, as expressed in the Act of 1793, “ to grant to the private trade every *necessary* degree “ of facility.”

I should have been happy to have found any of the Directors of the Company entering into the merits of the case ; and arguing it upon such grounds, for a monopoly cannot exist unless it can be well defended : and abuse of persons, or general assertions, are not the means which convince an enlightened assembly. If any man should say to me “ that the merchants in India were “ children

“ children rising against their parents; servants labour-  
 “ ing to subvert the interests of their masters; and  
 “ that their claims were of an illegitimate description  
 “ against the chartered rights of a legitimate body,” I  
 should answer, let them be inquired into; the mer-  
 chants make no claims of such a description; and in  
 the opinion of many they are labouring to support, in-  
 stead of subvert, the interests of the Company: for  
 their claims are approved by numbers of those who are  
 best acquainted with Indian politics and commerce.

If any man should say “ that it was uniformly found  
 “ that the trade of the Company decreased, as that of  
 “ the private merchants advanced,” I should refer him  
 to the accounts published from the India House, which  
 prove the reverse; and that the trade of the Company  
 and Private Trade have progressively and mutually in-  
 creased.

If any man should say, “ that the foreign trade has  
 “ increased of late years more than ever,” I should  
 answer, examine your own Report, and you will find *all*  
 the Directors declaring the very contrary.

If any man should say, “ that these very men, in the  
 “ last year, acting as private traders, their investments  
 “ being on board private ships which sailed singly, they  
 “ reached India long before the Company’s fleet,  
 “ which was obliged to wait the completion of all their  
 “ cargoes, and sail in company with convoy, by which  
 “ means the private ships had not only forestalled the  
 “ markets there before their arrival, but bought up  
 “ new freights of India goods for remittance to Eng-  
 “ land, to forestal them here also,” I should answer,  
 that the ships of the merchants always sailed with con-

voy, but it was with the earliest convoy they could join; they could not, however, forestal the markets in prejudice to the Company, because the Company have their stated periods for sales by auction, and would not deviate from their system, whether they got to India a little sooner or a little later, and the generality of the private cargoes the Company do not deal in. And as to cargoes of India goods for sale in Europe, I should answer, that the merchants could not forestal the Company here, because all the ships come home with the same convoy, and the Directors themselves determined at what periods the private goods should be sold, which uniformly has been *after their own*. But why do the Directors in all such arguments as this carefully omit how much foreigners can forestal and rival them? of which more shall be said another day.

If any man should say, "That whenever permission was granted for the India built ships to come to Europe, the private merchants would not load upon the Company's ships, by which means their tonnage remained unoccupied," I should answer, that the records of the India House will shew the Governors have more than once been obliged to allow India built ships to come home, because the Directors had not supplied a sufficiency of British tonnage; that the Company's tonnage has not remained unoccupied from such a cause, but that the merchants solicit to be allowed the use of India shipping for very evident reasons, which have been too often detailed already to make it expedient to repeat them here.

If any man should find fault with Marquis Wellesley for giving leave to the Indian built ships to come to Europe

Europe in *fourteen days* after his arrival, I should answer that *if he did so*, he did it in consequence, not only of what he learned in India, but from that confirming all he had understood upon the subject while he was here, and a Member of the Board of India Commissioners, and that all the experience he has since had in four years convinces him he was right, and every servant abroad agrees with him, as well as the late and actual President of the India Board at home; but the most extraordinary part of this case is, that it turns out to be mere assertion; for instead of fourteen days, Marquis Wellesley was in Bengal five months before he granted permission to a single ship; he arrived on the 17th of May, 1798, and his first orders on this subject are given on the 5th of October following.

If any man should say, “that a French agent had offered the Company ten per cent. over and above the cost of their investments in India, and to bring the same home in French bottoms;” and ask, “How then could any private trader supply France with India goods cheaper than the East India Company?” I should answer, that no such agreement was ever made; that probably an old Director was the best able to explain this matter, as one was sent upon such an embassy to Paris, but returned with only a long bill for the charges of his hospitality. The French, in short, learnt all they wished or all they could; and then coolly dismissed the Ambassador with an apology, which, if report says true, was sufficiently mortifying. But I should also state, that with ten per cent. added to the prime cost, if the French exerted the diligence, and practised the economy of private merchants, they would even

then have come into the market as cheap as the English East India Company, over whom they would also have had a farther advantage in respect to duties.

If any man should say, “ that he had the fullest  
 “ proofs of many of the documents which found their  
 “ way to England being actually fabricated in England,  
 “ and sent out to India in order to find their way back  
 “ in an authentic shape,” I should answer, that if he were a Director of the Company, there was a duty he had laid himself under, which called loudly upon him to exhibit those proofs, and bring down on the parties all the indignation of the Company ; and until he had done that, he had no right to credit for such general assertions in any other place. That such things exist is not within my belief, but if a man in office voluntarily and publicly declares he has *the fullest proof* of such occurrences, his constituents may very reasonably add, *You ought then to exhibit them* ; at least so say I as one of them.

AN ENGLISHMAN.

*London, Jan. 30, 1802.*

## LETTER VII.

*To the Proprietors of East India Stock.*

AS the question between the Directors of the East India Company and the Private Merchants respecting the trade of India is more and more developed, it must necessarily force itself upon your attention in common with the rest of the public. All are beginning to feel its deep importance to the prosperity of this great commercial

commercial empire ; and however temporary events and interests may suspend its discussion by Parliament, nothing can finally prevent its decision by that great ultimate tribunal, but a cordial accommodation between the contending parties on the principles of the Act of 1793, from which the Company, as well as the private merchants, derive all their rights.

Before that statute the right of the Company to the Indian trade, as against the British merchant, whether in India or England, was perfectly exclusive ; the Legislature, actuated by a narrow and short-sighted policy, had endeavoured to extinguish that commercial spirit, which animates Englishmen in whatever climate of the globe they may reside. To remedy this great and growing evil was one of the principal objects of national policy in framing the Act of 1793. The period was favourable to these efforts ; for by the convulsions that shook the Continent of Europe, and by the war that had broken out, the foreign commercial system was deranged ; the monopoly of the East India Company was expiring ; and it was hoped by limiting that monopoly for the future, and by granting a license to private commerce both to and from India, under the shelter and protection of the Company, that not only all British wealth might be again diverted from foreign channels, but the manufactures, revenues, and navigation of the British empire in India and Europe, might be sensibly increased by this new accession of commerce.

To ensure the attainment of these salutary ends the Parliament, by the Act of 1793, introduced, under limitations, a new party and a new interest into the



Indian commerce ; this new party was the whole body of private British merchants resident either in our European or Indian empire ; this new interest was primarily the commercial interest of those merchants, but ultimately the commercial and financial interest of the State. The ancient exclusive privileges of the Company were renewed to a certain point only ; the monopoly, or rather the pre-emption of the most valuable and important articles of the trade was continued to them ; and lest the introduction of the private merchants might serve as a handle for the infringement of their just rights and the foundation of illicit traffic, the whole of the new trade was subjected, practically, to the superintendence and direction of the Company : But on the other hand, lest their jealousy and uncontrouled power might induce and enable them to stifle this infant commerce, a paramount superintendence of the Private Trade is given to the Commissioners of the Board of Controul, as trustees for the public, and to them the merchants are directed to look in the first instance for remedy against any infringement of their rights by the India Company. Doubts have been entertained by men conversant in legal and political topics as to the extent of the powers vested in the Board of Controul for the protection and support of the Private Trade ; to these doubts I wish at present principally to draw your attention, because, on the one hand, if Parliament has already established a tribunal adequate to the determination of controversies between the Company and the Private Merchants, the decisions and acts of that tribunal should supersede the necessity of an application to the Legislature ; if, on the other hand, the powers already

ready

ready vested in the Board of Controul are inadequate to their end, it is full time for Parliament to interfere, to explain and amend their own act, and bestow such additional powers as may suffice to shelter and encourage the trade they have established for the benefit of the country.

A right without a remedy is an absurdity in Legislation, and almost a contradiction in terms; that certain rights are vested in the private traders by the Act of 1793 it is impossible to deny; they are detailed in almost every section from the 81st to the 101st. After a perusal of these I say it is impossible to deny that the private traders possess many valuable rights; and that the remedy for the infringement of them is an order from the Board of Commissioners, is equally clear, for it is specially provided by the Act.

But it is in the power of the Directors to comply with all the provisions of the statute, and yet utterly to frustrate its policy and annihilate the Private Trade by vexatious and cumbrous regulations. They direct the periods at which the ships conveying the Private Trade shall sail both from England and India; they distribute the cargoes at their pleasure. Let us for an instant suppose them obstinately bent to exert this power for the most pernicious purposes; let us suppose them resolute in disposing the cargoes of the private merchants in the most inconvenient manner, and unreasonably delaying the dispatch of the private ships; have the merchants no remedy? Must this commerce, sanctioned and encouraged by the Legislature, perish without hope of redress?

In my opinion the Legislature has not been so improvident ; though it was impossible for any Act of Parliament to provide specially for every possible case, it has given general powers to the Board of Commissioners sufficiently extensive to counteract any contumacious resistance of the Company to the British commerce. I know that in the cases I have supposed no special power is given by the statute to the Commissioners to order the distribution of the cargoes or the dispatch of the vessels, but I contend that they have a general power by the Act to superintend the Private Trade, as ultimately interwoven with the general prosperity of the British empire, with its manufactures, commerce, navigation and revenues ; and that such orders as they may issue on these subjects for the advancement of the policy adopted by the Act of 1793, are binding on the Directors.

AN ENGLISHMAN.

*London, Feb. 3, 1802*

## LETTER VIII.

*To the Proprietors of East India Stock.*

IN the conclusion of my last letter I contended that the Commissioners for the affairs of India are vested by the Act of 1793, with a general power to superintend the Private Trade, and that their orders on this head are binding on the Court of Directors. I admit that the whole “*exclusive*” trade of India is vested in the Company by the 71st sect. of the Act of 1793, “*subject, nevertheless, to the several li-*  
“*mitations*”

“imitations, conditions, and regulations in the Act  
 “contained;” that by the 16th section, “nothing in  
 “the Act contained shall extend to give the Board of  
 “Commissioners power to issue or send any orders or  
 “instructions which do not *relate to points connected*  
 “*with the Civil or Military Government, or Revenues*  
 “*of the British territories or possessions in India.*”—

On the other hand, it must be conceded to me, that by the 9th section the Board of Commissioners are vested with full power and authority to superintend, direct, and controul all acts, operations, and concerns, which in any wise relate to, or concern *the civil or military Government or Revenues* “of the Company’s territories in  
 “the East Indies;” under which of these clauses, acts and orders operating on the Private Trade arrange themselves is the sole question.

The genuine construction of the 16th section I take to be, that the Board of Commissioners shall not interfere with the trade of the East India Company, but that they shall be allowed to carry it on in the manner which they shall judge most profitable to themselves : It is derived from the Act of 1784, framed long before the Private Trade was thought of, and is calculated to fix this strong line of limitation to the powers of the Commissioners, that they shall not *in any case* under pretence of political interests interfere with the private affairs of the Company. Can it be contended that the Private Trade is within the same line of distinction? Are the Commissioners prohibited *in any case* to interfere with that? So far from it that in many cases they are expressly directed to interfere, and are in the strictest sense constituted the trustees of the public for the pro-

tection of that trade against the Company. It is impossible that the 16th section should have any relation whatever to the Private Trade, unless the Legislature who first framed that limitation in the year 1784, can be supposed to have foreseen a trade which had its origin in 1793.

If I were asked, whether any particular matter were within the jurisdiction of the Board of Commissioners, I should regulate my answer by inquiring, not whether it was a commercial matter, but in the words of the statute, "whether it related to points connected " with the civil and military Government, or the Revenues" of British India. Does not the Private Trade relate to those points? Is not its encouragement or depression inseparably connected with the increase of the manufactures, wealth, population, and revenues of our Eastern territories? I think all men must agree in a proposition so self-evident, and over all such matters the Act of 1793 has given to the Commissioners a clear authority.

The late President of the Board of Commissioners, under whose auspices the Act of 1793 was framed, has declared his decided sentiments, that the great question which is at present agitated relative to the permission of Indian shipping in the Private Trade, is within the policy of that statute, by asserting in a letter read in Parliament, that "if the difficulty which had now occurred, " had come under consideration, there could be no doubt " that it would likewise have been expressly provided " for in the Act."

The present Board of Commissioners must entertain a similar opinion, for they say in their letter to the Court

Court of Directors of the 2d June last, “ the proposition, extended as it is, fixing permanently and finally the condition of the Private Trade, and confining it solely to British ships, appears to us to involve in it much more than merely commercial considerations, and to embrace points of great political importance, which may in their consequences deeply affect the interests of the State.” That the Directors are not very consistent in an opposite interpretation of the law may reasonably be presumed from their repeatedly submitting their orders on this subject to the Board, which, if not subject to their controul, is quite superfluous, as no orders but such as are alterable by the Board, are required to be laid before them by the statute. Nay; they seem finally to have adopted a similar opinion by their Resolution of the 25th November last, which is among the papers lately submitted to the Proprietors, in which they state, “ that the best way to make their arrangements on this subject known in India, will be by paragraphs *to be approved by the Commissioners.*”

It is certainly incumbent on the Board of Commissioners to be thoroughly convinced that authority over this subject is delegated to them by Parliament before they venture to exercise it; but, having once attained that conviction, I do most earnestly hope, as a proprietor and as a friend to the East India Company, that they will not shrink from their duty, but that they will set themselves thoroughly to investigate the question, and settle it in such a manner as will best reconcile the interests of all. If doubt or diffidence should obstruct this salutary exercise of their powers, Parliament must be

be the final arbiters, and how far the interposition of Parliament is favourable to the interests of the Company, and what thanks the Proprietors owe to the Executive Body for referring a matter which it is yet in their power to accommodate, to that Tribunal, future experience, added to the past, will, I fear, soon teach us.

In my next I shall consider the question, how far the interference of the Legislature on this subject can be considered as any violation or infringement of the Company's charter.

AN ENGLISHMAN

*London, Feb. 6, 1802.*

## LETTER IX.

*To the Proprietors of East India Stock.*

IN my last I detailed to you my reasons for thinking that, as the Legislature have indisputably vested certain rights in the Private Traders, independent of the will of the East India Company, it has likewise delegated to the Commissioners for the Affairs of India powers fully adequate to the enforcement of them on the part of the public. But if this on full consideration should turn out to be a *casus omissus*, if it should appear that Parliament have given to the merchants of this country and of British India privileges absolutely essential to the conduct of their trade, but have pointed out no specific mode of redressing the violation of them, it seems to me a proposition almost too clear for argument, " that it becomes the duty of the Legislature to sup-  
" ply the acknowledged defects in the Act of 1793,

" h

“ by explaining and amending it, to assert and establish those rights which, though clearly created, were left unprotected by that statute, and to establish the Private Trade between Great Britain and India on a foundation never again to be shaken.”

But, say the Directors, the Legislature have no right to explain and amend the Act of 1793 ; it is a breach of the charter of the East India Company. The Chairman tells Mr. Addington, in his letter of the 7th of November 1801, that though “ he is sensible that the East India Company are strongly implicated with the public Government of the country, and that it may appear ungracious on their part to oppose legal rights in the rigid letter of their compact to any reasonable change which the public interest may seem to require ;” yet in another part he says, “ To undefined claims, urged before the Legislature on grounds of political expediency, the East India Company, I apprehend, are compelled to oppose their rights, founded on a deliberate compact with the public, after a laborious and minute discussion, confirmed by Parliament.”

This is speaking a very bold language ; whether it be equally prudent, the event must determine. What is it but declaring that though “ the measure proposed be reasonable, and the public interest seems to require it,” yet the Minister dares not support it in Parliament against the power of the East India Company ; that they will shelter themselves under the rigid letter of their compact, will raise an unanimous clamour that their chartered rights are invaded, and will assail the public ear with an argument, which I quote  
literally



literally from the Chairman's letter, " If the rights of  
 " the Company may be narrowed, they may also be  
 " overturned, and it must be understood in future that  
 " those who form compacts with the State, hold what  
 " they have understood to be rights during the good  
 " pleasure of Parliament ?"

That this line of conduct might probably be pursued by the Directors in the present case, was foreseen by Mr. Pitt during the last session of Parliament from some symptoms that broke out in a conversation, which took place in the House of Commons on the 12th. of last June. How that great Statesman treated it may be worthy the attention of the Proprietors, and perhaps even of the Directors. You will find in Mr. Woodfall's account of what passed on that day the following passages of Mr. Pitt's speech : " He found it was the  
 " intention of some Gentlemen to endeavour to raise  
 " clamour, as if the charter of the East India Com-  
 " pany and the rights they held under it were attack-  
 " ed ; but that would not do : the question, whether  
 " the subjects of this country in India should be per-  
 " mitted to carry on their own commerce in their own  
 " shipping, had nothing to do with the charter or rights  
 " of the Company." Such is Mr. Pitt's opinion, and perhaps on examination we may find it is equally found-  
 ed in reason, in law, and in policy.

It is true that by the Act of 1793, the general superintendence of the Private Trade was vested in, or rather confided to the Company ; but it should be recollected that this was a trust reposed in them, for the joint benefit of themselves and the public, not an arbitrary power to be exerted according to their capricious  
 discretion :

discretion : One end pursued by the Legislature in that provision was, I admit, to preserve the monopoly of the Company in certain articles of merchandize from invasion, and to protect the revenue from fraud, but no other end, which they no less anxiously looked to was, the encouragement and promotion of the Private Trade by every practicable facility and liberal indulgence, and this latter object they considered as it really is, equally conducive to the prosperity of the nation and of the East India Company.

The Directors are so totally occupied by their attachment to their own rights, that they seem to have quite forgotten those of the Private Merchants. These latter have a right to an assignment of their tonnage by the East India Company in such vessels as may best contribute to the success of this valuable branch of commerce, by the lowness, as well of their freight as of other charges appurtenant to their voyage ; they have a right that their convenience should be consulted as far as it is practicable in the shipping of their cargoes and dispatch of their ships. I know not on what principle it can be contended that the privileges of the merchants are less sacred than the prerogatives of the Company. If it should finally appear that the Directors have been in an habitual and systematic course of violating the rights of others, given and secured by the same Act which constitutes their charter, and the preservation of which forms one of the conditions of it, with what face can they stand up in the House of Commons and complain of an infraction of their charter, were even such an infraction attempted ? I am afraid it might be asked, what right they had to stand upon the rigid letter of a com-

part

part which they themselves had first broken, or to call for the protection of that public, whose commerce, equally legal with their own, they had wantonly or oppressively impeded?

Even allowing the Directors to state their case in their own way, and in the view most favourable to themselves, I cannot at all agree in their conclusions: Were I even to admit that the power in question, of controuling at will the Private Trade, had been purchased of the public for a valuable consideration, yet “ if the public interest requires a change,” I am far from thinking the Legislature would not be justified in limiting that power, or, if necessary, in abolishing it. Can I need any argument for the support of that opinion, when it is known to be the constant practice of Parliament, in Inclosure and Canal Bills, and many others, to divest men even of their private estates “ because the public interest requires it?” Or can it be necessary for me to cite the daily instances of this nature that are passing before our eyes in a country where it has been an universally admitted principle, time out of mind, “ that all private interests, whether of individuals or bodies corporate must yield to those of the public?”

If any clear indisputable interest of the public demanded that the East India Company should be deprived of their house in Leadenhall-street, or of the whole of their commercial privileges, few men, I think, can doubt that it would become the duty of Parliament to pass a law, stripping them of either, or both. I am far from thinking that such a case may probably, or even can occur; I am asserting the principle in its full extent. But if such an event were to happen, the  
Company

Company would certainly be entitled to a full indemnity for whatever loss they could shew themselves to have sustained, from that public to whose interests theirs had been sacrificed.

So in this case, if the merchants can satisfy Parliament that public interest calls for a modification or curtailment of the powers hitherto exercised by the Company over the Private Trade, their conviction of that fact will fully justify any Act of Parliament passed to modify or curtail those powers. On the other hand, if the Company can shew any loss or detriment that will arise to them from such a measure, to the satisfaction of Parliament, justice requires that they should be adequately indemnified.

Far from imagining that any loss or detriment can arise to any one from the emancipation, if I may so call it, of the Private Trade, I am convinced that incalculable benefits would spring from it even to the Company; that the population and wealth of British India would be increased, that the produce and manufactures of that country and this would reciprocally stimulate and extend each other, and that the revenues both of the Company and the Crown would be thereby proportionally augmented; but if the Directors can shew any actual or probable loss to arise from the measure, or any franchise of theirs that is invaded, let them state it, let them estimate it, and they may safely rely on the generosity, as well as justice of the Legislature for an ample recompence.

But what is this chartered right which the Directors hold up as a shield against Parliament, and which they call so loudly on the nation to unite with them in sustaining?

taining? As far as I understand the question, I cannot otherwise define it, than as a power to exercise arbitrary oppression over the Private Trader, to the inevitable ruin of his commerce, without the smallest advantage to their own. For although it is evident that the manner in which the private trade has been hitherto conducted by the Company has been highly vexatious to the merchant, the Company themselves do not pretend to have derived any benefit from that vexation. The mode of providing the freight, of distributing the cargoes, of protracting the ships' sailing, has been, it is true, inconvenient and burthensome to the trader, but so far from drawing advantage from that inconvenience, the Company have been equally sufferers by the expence and trouble they have incurred by it. Do they demand indemnity for desisting from unprofitable tyranny? It is surely sufficient answer to such a demand on the part of the merchants, that if the Company cease to inflict sufferings, they will at the same time cease to suffer themselves.

But if the facts I have stated be accurate, it would be more just that the Company and the Private Merchants should change sides, and that the latter should rather inquire of the former, what indemnity is due to them from the Company for sacrificing the commercial interests of the country to a narrow and bigotted spirit of jealousy, for doing all in their power to cramp and fetter trade committed by the Legislature to their fostering care, for being perpetual defaulters in providing the statutable tonnage they are bound to furnish; for enhancing the freight in some cases beyond all bounds and in others assigning it in miserable dismantled vessels.

selfs, equally incompatible with the intentions of Parliament and the prosperity of the trade.

The Directors of the East India Company are much deceived if they imagine they can succeed before Parliament in setting up a claim to the Government and Commerce of India, as if it were a private inheritance, to be managed upon any weak and ruinous principles they may chuse to lay down to themselves. The Company and the Public are partners even in the exclusive trade, and though the same parties may be considered jointly interested for a time in the territories and revenues of the British Empire, yet in the Public is the sovereignty paramount and final reversion. The Directors are no less trustees for the general commercial interests of the Nation than of the Company, and whether they injure one or the other, they equally violate their trust. I am weary of hearing them dinning in our ears their zeal for the Company as contradistinguished from the nation, as if the interests of the one were separable from those of the other ; as if it was in their power to make a bonfire of the surplus trade of India as the Dutch do of their spices ; as if they thought it either just or practicable to sacrifice the whole commerce of the country to the monopoly of the East India Company.

I repeat again, no detriment has arisen, or can arise, or has been stated to arise to the Company from the Private Trade ; as to the apprehensions of colonisation, which most men of understanding believe to be absolutely chimerical, if there be really any grounds for them, Parliament are the best judges of them and of

the means of obviating them. This is merely a political question, on which the Directors cannot for an instant pretend a right to decide. The great question relative to the employment of India shipping is partly political, partly commercial, but the commercial part bears relation to the general trade of Great Britain, and not that of the Company. Whether the subjects of this empire shall be permitted to carry on a traffic authorised by Act of Parliament, and bring that portion of the Indian commerce which the Company's capital cannot embrace, into the Thames, instead of its being consigned to foreign ports, is the true point at issue. It is a point of too much importance to be given up to the Aristocracy of Leadenhall-street, however extensive their power and patronage may be; the private trade even at this time occupies more than 15,000 tons of shipping, and produces five millions sterling annually. It needs no strong spirit of prophecy to foretel that if the India Company will not voluntarily permit the means to be used for bringing this immense mass of wealth into England, the Legislature will speedily compel them.

AN ENGLISHMAN.

*London, Feb. 13; 1802*

LETTER.

## LETTER X.

*To the Proprietors of East India Stock.*

IT is necessary to call your attention to the few documents which the Court of Directors allow to be officially communicated to you on the question of Private Trade. I have already made some remarks upon their Resolution agreed to at a Secret Court held on the 25th of November ; and I shall to-day lay before you a letter from the Chairman (who is considered to speak the sentiments of the Court of Directors) of an earlier date, addressed to the Chancellor of his Majesty's Exchequer ; its contents are very curious, and the observations that naturally suggest themselves upon a perusal of it would lead me much beyond the limits I can expect in a daily publication ; I shall, therefore, satisfy myself for the present with submitting to you the letter itself, with a few remarks upon the earliest part of it.

You will perceive that it was written under the apprehension of this subject being discussed in the House of Commons ; and the Chairman feels it his duty to press on the attention of Mr. Addington, how impossible it appears that any satisfactory result can be the consequence of such a mode of proceeding, and on what he grounds this opinion is not stated ; but it cannot be on past experience, even with respect to the Company ; because, in the most complicated and difficult stages of their existence, they have been brought before Parliament, where they have sometimes been seasonably relieved in their distresses ; sometimes they have been



restrained from pursuing measures manifestly prejudicial to the interests of themselves and the public ; and at others they have been compelled to adopt a line of conduct evidently beneficial to the general interests they are entrusted with. If such consequences have frequently resulted already from parliamentary inquiries, what is it that makes such a mode of proceeding in this instance so clearly inefficient ? Have not preceding occurrences been equally, or indeed more, complicated than the present ? And do we not daily see the most intricate cases come before the House of Commons in every branch of commerce and legislation dependant on this Government, where they are discussed in Committee with unremitting patience, with the most circumspect impartiality, and with the happiest effect ? I trust, that instead of agreeing to the Chairman's opinion, which is founded neither upon particular or general experience, but which hastily impeaches the competency of Parliament, many of you will agree with me, that this subject can be investigated no where so fully, so fairly, and so effectually, as it will be by the Legislature itself. The parties will then have nothing to influence their Judges, but the real merits of their case ; the question will no longer have any thing of personality attached or imputed to it ; nor will any of those who are to decide upon it be governed by the influence of private friendships or interests, or of favours received, or favours expected.

The disingenuous manner in which the claims of the merchants are represented in this letter, the alarm which it endeavours to create in the mind of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and the various insinuations  
with

with which it is filled for the purpose of prepossessing the opinion of the Minister previous to the discussion of Sir William Pulteney's motion in the House of Commons, cannot escape your observation ; but I propose to make some further comments on those points in a few days ; and in the mean time I entreat most earnestly that you will read with particular attention this curious letter.

AN ENGLISHMAN.

*London, Feb. 21, 1802.*

" SIR, *7th Nov. Mansfield-street, Saturday Evening.*

" I YESTERDAY evening received an intimation from Sir William Pulteney, of his intention to give notice in the House of Commons on Monday, that he should on the Wednesday following make a motion on the subject of East India Affairs.

" Were I to consult my own personal case, I should rejoice that the very complicated subject, the claims of Private Traders to and from India, were to be discussed in the House of Commons, of which I have not the honour to be a Member ; but as Chairman of the East India Company, I have felt it my duty to press on your attention, how impossible it appears that any satisfactory result can be the consequence of such a mode of proceeding. To undefined claims urged before the Legislature on ground of political expediency, the East India Company, I apprehend, are compelled to oppose their rights ; founded on a deliberate compact with the public, after a laborious and minute discussion, confirmed by Parliament. The rights of Private Traders, and also the mode in which those rights shall be enjoyed, form a

part of that compact, and these stipulations are minutely detailed and ratified by the Act of 1793. If these shall be violated without the consent or concurrence of the East India Company, I profess myself at a loss to conceive, how any rights can remain to them or to other bodies of men, dependant upon the public faith. The exclusive trade to and from India has been secured to the Company for a limited period by the plighted faith of Parliament, subject to limitations and restrictions minutely specified in the Act of 1793. These were adopted under the impressions of public interests and private rights, which Ministers and Parliament received at that period. The term is not at present half expired ; and if, from a different view of public or private interests, the rights of the Company may be narrowed, they may also be overturned ; and it must be understood in future that those who form compacts with the State, hold what they have understood to be rights during the good pleasure of Parliament.

“ You, Sir, who must be strongly impressed with the great exertions made by the East India Company, and a large expenditure of their property incurred, during the arduous contest in which the nation has been engaged, will, I flatter myself, concur in thinking that the first dawn of Peace, and of opening prospect of re-establishment of their affairs, necessarily deranged by their efforts in the public service, is a time rather ungraciously chosen for this attempt. I need not suggest to your enlightened mind the danger which may result to the government of India, now become so important a part of the Empire, by a too curious inquisition into the present state  
of

of their affairs, just emerging from the distress of an eight-years war.

“ At the same time I am sensible that the East India Company are strongly implicated with the Public Government of the Country, and that it may appear equally ungracious on their part to oppose legal rights in the rigid letter of their compact to any reasonable change which the public interest may seem to require ; but it cannot escape your observation, that the changes made on such a principle must be the result of mutual and friendly discussion ; and I believe I speak the sentiments of the Court of Directors in professing myself ready to concur in any measure which may, after discussion, appear consistent with the higher and more important public interest—the safety and security of the British Possessions in India. While the Government of these Possessions shall be conducted on the present plan, which I presume to think wisely chosen by the Legislature, the financial property of the Company must be essential to their safety, and this cannot exist if the beneficial commerce shall be transferred to others, and the burthens only thrown upon the Company.

“ I cannot close this letter without returning you my thanks, for the candid and even friendly manner in which you have been pleased to receive my observations, in the various conversations with which I have been honoured. If, therefore, I again presume to trouble you, I request it may be attributed to its true cause, the anxiety which my public situation inspires, and to a sincere desire that any arrangements which the public

interest may really require, should not be impeded by the manner in which the business shall be conducted.

“I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed)

“CHARLES MILLS.

“*Right Honorable Henry Addington, &c. &c.*”

## LETTER XI.

*To the Proprietors of East India Stock.*

IT is much to be lamented, that in debating the subject of Private Trade, any mode of argument should be resorted to which is not candid and liberal, and founded on the fair principle of ascertaining what plan for conducting it is really most beneficial to the East India Company and to the Nation. But it is still more to be regretted that the Court of Directors should be the party to deviate from such a rule, and one cannot well conceive an adequate cause for their being betrayed into any thing like partial reasoning, or disingenuous representation. Nevertheless, such a spirit has manifested itself, and is particularly apparent in the letter from the Chairman to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which I introduced to your notice in my last address, and on which I shall now take the liberty to make a few comments.

After asserting, that it is impossible any satisfactory result can be the consequence of bringing the matter into Parliament, he says, “To *undefined* claims urged before the Legislature on ground of *political expediency*, the East India Company are compelled to op-  
“ pose

pose their rights, founded on a deliberate compact with the public." This is, surely, not only an unfair but an unjust representation of the case ; for, the claims of the merchants are clearly *defined* to be founded on that very Act of 1793, to which the Chairman refers in a few lines farther ; and, instead of being urged on the general grounds of political expediency, they are preferred for the particular purpose of obtaining redress from the Legislature on a specific subject, on which they alledge, *and the Directors have acknowledged it*, that the beneficent intentions of Parliament towards them have been frustrated by the Court of Directors.

The Chairman then proceeds, " The rights of Private Traders, and also the mode in which those rights shall be enjoyed, form a part of that compact, and these stipulations are minutely detailed and ratified by the Act of 1793." How different is this from the language he used not three lines before ! Instead of *undefined claims*, here are rights acknowledged by mutual compact ; and here the parties are placed, as they ought to be, on the same ground, namely, on that of an Act of Parliament, and the intent and meaning of his Act are the principal cause of appeal to the Legislature.—The letter continues, " If these stipulations shall be *violated without the consent or concurrence* of the East India Company, I profess myself at a loss to conceive how any rights can remain to them, or to other bodies of men, dependant upon the public faith." If they be violated, *it must be without the consent of the East India Company*, for otherwise I am at a loss to conceive how they can be *violated at all* ;  
and

and if Parliament ever should violate the rights of one set of subjects, which, by the bye, is neither a very respectful nor a very loyal supposition, it will be a pretty sure sign that no such thing as right will be left o the rest.

The Chairman goes on, " If, from a different view  
 " of public or private interests, the rights of the Com-  
 " pany may be narrowed, *they may also be overturned* ;  
 " and it must be understood in future, *that those who*  
 " *form compacts with the State, hold what they have un-*  
 " *derstood to be rights, during the GOOD PLEASURE of*  
 " *Parliament.*" This is a petulant and ill-advised sentence. It has more the style of a person who had heated his imagination with reading the *social contract*, and was pleading for the rights of compact founded on that wild system, than the language of the head of a public body in England treating on the power of its Parliament.

If, from a different view of public or private interests, and from a change of circumstances the Legislature think it more conducive to the general welfare of the nation to alter the relative situation of the Company, it will assuredly do so ; it *did* so, in the commercial treaty with America ; and shall any Corporation presume to say, because it does so, it has any idea of *overturning the rights of every chartered body in the kingdom* ? the insinuation is indecent, and the expression very objectionable ; in the present instance it is still more, for it is unjust too. It was not in the contemplation of the merchants to desire the rights of the Company might even be *narrowed* ; they only request their own may be secured, and such further indulgence granted as Parlia-  
 ment .

ment in its wisdom may think proper, *consistent with the exclusive privileges of the Company.* The acception of the phrase "*good pleasure*" (which concludes the sentence above quoted,) as it is there used, implies something of a sneer, and infers that any thing which is so held, is enjoyed at the precarious will of another. This sort of language applied to a British Parliament, and addressed to a British Minister, is very indecorous, and shows either a want of knowledge of the nature and power of Parliament, or a want of respect for its authority. If by "*good pleasure of Parliament*" be meant *the will* of Parliament, all our rights are held by this tenure. "*The power and jurisdiction of Parliament,*" (says Sir Edward Coke) *is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined either for causes or persons within any bounds.*" "*It hath,* (says Judge Blackstone,) *sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving, and expounding of laws concerning matters of all possible denominations.*" And when a body of merchants shall make a respectful appeal to this high power, and pray it to exercise one of its essential functions, shall this Constitutional Act be represented as an attempt to violate the law, and shall that power be reviled as if it were an instrument in the hand of the Minister to be used at his arbitrary will, or, in the phrase of the Chairman, at his *good pleasure*?—Whoever dictated this language, did not consider what was due from the Chairman of the East India Company, to the Minister of the King, and to the British Parliament.

In pretty much the same style the letter proceeds :

" That



“ That the first dawn of peace and of opening prospect  
 “ of re-establishment of their (the Company’s) affairs,  
 “ necessarily deranged by their efforts in the public  
 “ service, is a time rather ungraciously chosen for this  
 “ attempt.” To this ironical, and so far improper passage, I take leave to observe, that the Directors, in their memorial addressed to the Lords of the Treasury in May 1797, state in direct terms, that this very trade, which the Chairman now presents as a violation of their rights, *has already led to consequences most beneficial to the British nation.*” In another part of it they say, “ *its advantages cannot come within calculation;*” and they express great anxiety to have it settled then, because they apprehend *a decrease of the Indian trade to England when peace shall take place;* hence it would appear that at one time the Directors are all eagerness for this plan, and speak of it as the greatest benefit which can be conferred on the Nation and the Company; at another time, and that in the short space of four years, their Chairman deprecates it as an outrageous attack on their rights, and on those of every Corporation in the kingdom. At one time, peace is the period of all others when this plan will be most advantageous; at another, peace is the worst, or in the Chairman’s words, the most ungracious period that could have been chosen. According to these different opinions, the merchants will find all times unsuitable to the Court of Directors, and such a contrariety of sentiments affords the strongest plea for the merchants to appeal to the steady wisdom of the Legislature.

The letter continues, “ I need not suggest to your  
 “ enlightened mind *the dangers which may result to the*  
 “ *Government,*

“ *Government of India by a too curious inquisition into the present state of their affairs, just emerging from the distress of an eight years war.*” This is a hint to alarm the Minister, no doubt ; but it is a hint that should alarm us Proprietors a great deal more ; for, as we certainly do not possess so enlightened a mind, especially on this subject, as the Chairman gives the Minister credit for, it is natural for us to wish for a little of that illumination which the Chairman, doubtless, can confer upon us : And if a too curious inquisition into the present state of our affairs be dangerous, I own I am rather curious to know in what the danger consists. If they be in such a state that it is dangerous to look into them too narrowly, they must be in a very extraordinary state indeed. In the ordinary occurrences of life, and particularly in mercantile affairs, the more narrowly they are looked after the better ; and the usual remedy for danger is to look with special care into them, and to see what means can be applied to remove the disorder. But it would seem, from this expression of the Chairman, that there are degrees of inquisitiveness and that you may inquire to a certain step, but on no account must you proceed further ; for if you are *too* curious, you will ruin every thing. It is a great mercy that our affairs are in the hands of such enlightened men as our present worthy Chairman and his coadjutors, who know exactly where inquiry should stop, and can say, “ thus far shalt thou go, and no further.” But are they sure that this mode of reasoning will satisfy the Proprietors, and that some of the unenlightened may not say, if there be such imminent danger as you state, tell us what it is ? We do not think danger is to be overcome

overcome by shutting our eyes to it. We rather think the safer course is to meet it manfully, to oppose it with all our force, to examine into its nature and extent, to inquire into its cause, and guard against its effect. In a word, if the Company's affairs are in a dangerous state, it is high time they should be looked into, and I so far differ with the Chairman, that I think, in such a state, the inquisition can *not* be too curious.

The last part which I shall notice in this memorable letter is this—"the financial property of the Company " must be essential to their safety," no doubt, "and " this cannot exist *if the beneficial commerce shall be " transferred to others, and the burthens only thrown " upon the Company."* What is here meant, I freely acknowledge is beyond the powers of my comprehension. I hope it is far otherwise with the enlightened mind of the illustrious statesman to whom it is addressed. I have always understood the beneficial part of the trade was that which, by way of pre-eminence, is called the *Company's investment*; and that the great advantage of their exclusive privilege was, that these goods were absolutely denied to others, and preserved inviolably for them. I have also understood, that the trade for which the merchants solicit is, that *in which the Company do not deal*; and that the express condition on which they are allowed to trade at all is, that they shall not interfere with the Company's investment. How then is this transfer of property to be accounted for? It has never, to my knowledge, made any part of the petitions of the merchants to be indulged with a share of the Company's investment, or to infringe, in any

any degree, their exclusive privileges. Where or whence has this exchange of property been conjured up? Surely the Chairman does not mean that the merchants are now in possession of all the beneficial commerce, and that the burthens are thrown upon the Company; for, then the Directors are to blame in suffering such an invasion of their rights, and such a fraud on their property; and so they will be, if it ever should happen. Whatever the meaning may be, the expression is most extraordinary, and requires the explanation of an abler head than mine: *Davus sum, non Oedipus.*

AN ENGLISHMAN.

*London, Feb. 27, 1802.*

## LETTER XII.

*To the Proprietors of East India Stock.*

I AM glad at last to find some clew to account for this unexampled delay on the subject of Private Trade. Nine months have now elapsed since the Directors received their instructions from the Court of Proprietors, during which time you have not heard a syllable from your Executive Body respecting this long extended demur to the performance of your wishes as well as theirs. From other quarters something has been ascertained: it was shewn in the House of Commons on the 25th of November last, that the Directors, entirely unmindful of your orders, had taken upon themselves to enter into a negotiation with the Secretary of the Treasury; and that they had gone the length of sug-  
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gesting propositions (differing very widely from what you had approved), to be the basis of a future arrangement. The regularity of such a proceeding with reference to the Board of Commissioners, I shall not at present stop to examine. The clew to which I allude, is the second edition of Mr. HENCHMAN'S Observations on the East India Trade, which is just published; in the preface he says, "I am not aware that there is  
 " any probability of an amicable adjustment between  
 " the India Company and the Private Merchants,  
 " although some propositions, intended to answer that  
 " end, were not long ago brought forward by the Chancellor of his Majesty's Exchequer; coming from so  
 " high a quarter I have paid that respectful attention to  
 " them which they demanded; but I am sorry to say  
 " they appear to me, (especially when connected with  
 " a secret resolution of the Court of Directors on the  
 " 25th of November last) calculated only to embarrass and distress the merchant, and to load the Company with a multiplicity of engagements that must  
 " terminate in a large pecuniary loss;" and he gives a copy of the propositions, with the observations of the Agents upon them in his appendix. From this you may learn, that very strong objections are raised against those propositions; and from the delay it is not unfair to infer that some important difficulties have arisen in consequence. Having taken upon me of late to watch a little over the circumstances and progress of this business, I have perused those remarks of the Agents with attention; and as they appear to be deserving of your serious consideration, I have desired they may be annexed

nexed to this letter, together with the propositions to which they apply.

From this point I could wish to draw your attention to the trade of foreigners with the British settlements in the East Indies. However *ungraciously chosen*, the Chairman of the India Company may conceive the first dawn of peace to be for the regulation of the East India trade, it may appear to others, as it does to me, that since the Directors had delayed the arrangements that were wanted until peace came suddenly upon them, it is now the more indispensibly necessary that it should be speedily determined, on what plan this trade is in future to be prosecuted: at present the English merchants are held in suspense; are calumniated by the Directors; and are threatened with restraints that must lead them to other channels of commerce for the employment of their capitals; while the foreigners of every country are planning adventures to the British possessions in Asia, access to which is denied to none but the subjects of that Sovereign to whom the territories belong. How often have the India Company been called on to declare what part of the commerce of India they can monopolize: and, according to the spirit of their Charter, to give all reasonable facilities and encouragement to the Private Merchants to carry on the remainder? It is not my intention to go over that ground again, but, I wish to warn you, that whilst our Rulers are so dilatory, all our neighbours are not only fitting out their own ships, but even buying ours, for the purpose of entering into competition with Great Britain for the Trade of India. Every nation has already dispatched, or is on the point of dispatching, their

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ships

ships for that part of the world; and if, in the year 1791, after eight years peace, and under the apprehensions of the revolution, one sale at L'Orient could amount to 1,228,000 l. (for which we have the authority of our own Directors) what may not be expected at this time, when the French manufactures are in a state of ruin; and all importations from foreign countries have been prevented, by the vigilance and superiority of our fleets during the whole of the late war.

Besides these active competitors in Europe, we have another, whose friendship may be valuable, if the purchase is not too dear; and that is America—possessing all the energy and commercial enterprize of Englishmen, from whom they sprung, and by whose capital they have been supported, they are eagerly availing themselves of the terms of a treaty, dictated by the emergencies of the hour in which it was negociated, with a degree of diligence and activity highly creditable to them as merchants. Their ships are to be found in all parts of India in numbers, though not in magnitude equal to our own; and a marine is by these means creating, that will at a future day be formidable to any European State to which they may be inimical. At present their attention is directed only to commercial objects; they are occupied at China in the purchase of teas to be smuggled into England; at Bengal, in the conveyance of the valuable manufactures of that country to every port in the North or in the South of Europe, that is open to them; and at Bombay, in the transportation of cotton, even to this country, to give employment to the British weaver. It is a fact well ascertained, that within these few months many American ships

ships have been upon the coast of Malabar for cargoes of cotton, and made no scruple of declaring that they were intended for the English market; and this, while the British resident merchant is told that he must be interdicted from loading his ships in the same pursuit.

It is improbable that the Proprietors of East India Stock can much longer believe it is for their interest all this should be upheld and encouraged by their Directors. It is impossible that the Ministers of the country can much longer delay to apply an effectual remedy to a case so urgent and so clear.

AN ENGLISHMAN.

*London, March 6, 1802.*



# EAST INDIA PRIVATE TRADE.

*The following are the Papers referred to in the last Letter of the ENGLISHMAN.*

THE  
ELEVEN PROPOSITIONS  
*Read by His Majesty's CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER in the HOUSE OF COMMONS, as received from the Court of Directors.*

OBSERVATIONS  
*By the AGENTS upon the PROPOSITIONS.*

1. THAT in addition to the quantity of three thousand tons of shipping, now annually allotted to the exports of individuals from India, three, four, or five thousand tons more, or as much as may be wanted, shall be assigned.

2. That the shipping to be thus annually employed shall be wholly applied to the use of Private Traders, and shall neither be destined nor detained for political or warlike services in India, but sail from thence

1. WHATEVER quantity of tonnage is sent from England by the Court of Directors will always go to India at great uncertainty. It may be redundant, or it may be insufficient; and it cannot be ready at all times when the Merchants may find it beneficial to engage in an adventure to Europe.

2. The ships are hereby restrained to sail at fixed periods within *the fair weather season*. This Trade cannot be confined to the fair weather season with any hopes of success; it is by expedition and short voyages only

directly for the port of London, at fixed periods within the fair weather season.

only that the Private Trade can prosper. It is well known the Company have certain seasons for their own trade, and they seem determined to confine the Private Trade to the same periods; whereas it is equally well known one great advantage to private speculations is, that they can sail at any time that the weather will admit; and that they do and will sail almost at all seasons of the year. If underwriters are willing to insure the ships, and pilots and able officers are ready to navigate them, in order to insure success to commercial engagements, the times of putting to sea must be left to their prudence; otherwise all the benefit of expedition and œconomy is lost. It is by being free from such restraints that the Americans make a voyage to and from the East Indies within twelve months; while ships taken up by the Company, and subject to their fair weather seasons and other causes of delay, will be twenty, or four and twenty months, from the day they are engaged to the day they are discharged. No Private Trade can prosper under such discouragement.

3. That all commodities of the produce of the Continent, or of the British territories in India, shall be permitted to be laden on those ships, excepting only piece goods, which shall not be laden unless by special licence from the Company or their Governments abroad ; and saltpetre, which any of the Governments in India shall have the power to prohibit or restrain.

4. That the goods to be exported on private account be as now received into the Company's warehouses in India, and that the same care be taken in assorting them into cargoes, in due proportions of light and heavy goods, according to the deliveries into the warehouses, as is observed in forming the Company's own cargoes.

3. The Agents beg to state, that they understand the Merchants at present have liberty to trade in every article except tea, nankeens, and China raw silk, to which the Company now confine their monopoly ; and in regard to piece goods and saltpetre, the Agents conceive the Merchants can have no objection to the terms upon which the Directors propose they may be allowed to import those articles.

4. This article is replete with distress and inconvenience to every Private Merchant. He cannot form any probable idea of what light or heavy goods may be sent into the Company's warehouses ; the merchants being allowed no concert with respect to their cargoes, each person being expected to send in his goods, whatever they may be ; and whenever chance shall have, so decided, that a suitable quantity of light and heavy goods are collected together to complete a cargo, a ship may then be loaded ; for these ships are " to be wholly applied to the " use of Private Traders." (Vide Article 2d.) But if it should

should so happen, that any three or four Merchants should agree upon what they thought an assorted cargo, here is no assurance that such goods would afterwards be allowed to be laden on one and the same ship. The Company's officers might choose to dispose of these goods in different vessels, thereby defeating the object of the Merchants, and embarrassing them in their insurances, by not knowing in what ships their risk might ultimately be, and at what periods their correspondents in Europe might expect their consignments; for in such cases, which must occur from the proposed arrangement, much delay will intervene; and what may be sent into the Company's warehouses, as an assorted cargo, by several merchants in the month of July (and which, if left to the management of those individuals, would leave India in August) would be liable, from a different way of thinking in the Company's warehouse-keepers, to be detained till towards Christmas; and then only be transmitted in different vessels *during the fair weather season*, which conti-

nues to March. By this mode of proceeding the best concerted plans of commerce would be defeated, all industry and exertion checked, and the most earnest endeavours to get to an early market be rendered of no avail.

5. That these goods shall be brought to the Company's warehouses in London, and thence to their sales in the regular order, subject to the charge of 3 per cent. now allowed to the Company for landing, warehousing, and selling private goods.

6. That when the private goods provided for exportation from India shall not serve to fill all the ships sent out for them, the Company shall put gruff goods into these ships on their own account.

7. That no person shall be permitted to embark in this trade as Principal or Agent, except such as may lawfully engage therein, according to the provisions of the Act of the 33d of Geo. III. cap. 52.

5. To this there can be no objection, as it is conformable to the Act of 1793.

6. This article requires no observation from the Agents.

7. Merchants, natives of India, often engage in this commerce. Is it meant by this Resolution that they are to be prohibited from trading to London? for they are not expressly mentioned in the Act of the 33d George III.

8. This

8 That the ships to be employed in this service shall be built for the purpose, either in Great Britain or India, the Company contracting with those who shall undertake to build or be the owners of them, for their service during eight voyages; and that the construction of them shall be agreeable to a plan already adopted by the Company in England, for ships intended to carry their own gruff goods.

8. This proposition appears to be calculated to drive all teak or India-built ships from the Trade between India and London.--In the opinion of the Agents, the Merchants in India cannot find it convenient to contract with the Company for eight voyages. In the first place, the legality of such engagements is much questioned. In the second, it is an operation requiring a much longer term than any Merchant in India may wish to be bound down to. In the third place, they would be at an uncertainty as to the Commanders and Officers the Directors would approve; the orders to India, when seen, may explain this: in the fourth place, they would labour under great alarm for any facility that might be necessary, while their ships were in England; from the determined hostility of the Directors both to the Merchants and Agents--fifthly, they know not what construction it is that the Company has adopted for their own ships to carry gruff goods; or whether it would suit the Merchants to build such ships in the Ganges. At any rate such ships

ships would not be proper for the Trade of Bombay and rat. How, for instance, is Company to provide against the occurrence of circumstances similar to the present hour? Last year the crops of cotton, which is a very bulky article, entirely failed; of course ships destined for that purpose would not be occupied. This year, by the last advices, the cultivators of cotton have increased their plantations amazingly, and the appearances are very fair indeed; in consequence of this the Merchants may wish to send large quantities to London; but there are many other circumstances besides the plenty of cotton which may influence the Merchants; and of which the Directors cannot have timely notice to judge. In what quantity would they send out tonnage this year? In short it is impossible to decide in London, what tonnage the Private Trade of India may from time to time require; and great loss must be incurred by those who attempt it. Sixthly, it might often be difficult to fit out and equip ships according to the precise rules of the Company. Seventhly, in case of

of sickness or death, it would cause Merchants to be obliged to leave engagements, upon long periods, depending: or to dispose of them at great loss. Eighthly, it may be deserving of consideration on the part of the Company, how far it may be prudent for them to enter into contracts for ships for a great number of voyages, in a Trade that they have described to be so very precarious, as is set forth in Mr. C. Grant's report.

9. That, in order to ascertain the rates at which ships of this construction, built of teak, can be obtained for eight voyages certain in India, the Court will authorize their Governments there immediately to advertise for such a number of ships of the above description as are likely to be required, and to engage them for the Company, provided the freight demanded shall not exceed the rate of those lately contracted for in England.

9. It is a difficult matter to make the necessary remarks on this article; because the Directors have not stated the number of ships likely to be required; nor the rates at which they have lately contracted in England. How is it possible, indeed, to ascertain with any degree of certainty what number of ships may be wanted? It may vary considerably one year from another; yet the Company is to burden themselves with an established fleet of ships for a term much beyond their exclusive Charter. It is true also that the Company have lately engaged ships at 14l. per ton peace freight; but they have allowed those



those ships 3l. per ton in the building, and home demurrage (that is while they are unemployed) of three-pence per ton per day; these circumstances lead to an intricate calculation; and the Directors may state the value of them at one sum, individuals may rate them at another. What good purpose such a system was to answer to the Company is not our present inquiry: it is sufficient to shew that it evidently creates an additional difficulty in such a case as the present; whether the real freight is 16l. 17l. or 17l. 10s. per ton remains doubtful; but it is not so, that the Directors will so make use of this doubt as to turn it to the disadvantage of the Merchant.

10. Or ships already built in India may be tendered to the Governments in India, for two or more voyages, for the purpose of carrying the private trade, if they shall not exceed the rate of peace freight actually paid by the Company for ships of the like description this season; and provided they are in all respects approved by their Master-attendants or other proper officers in India.

10. This Article is calculated, like the preceding ones, to keep the India-built ships out of the trade. They are *to be ships of like description with those the Company have engaged this season.* Every one knows that India-built Ships differ so much from Europe-built ships, that under this requisition they may be all excluded from employ; and they are to be allowed a freight settled by that similarity

*Provided that nothing herein contained shall be construed to make void any contract or agreement into which the Company may have already entered; or, to prevent the Company from taking up hereafter, or contracting to build ships in Great Britain on equal or more advantageous terms than those of India.*

similarity. Here is room for endless cavil. They are next to be in all respects approved by their Master-attendant. So that here again their employ is to depend upon what orders the Company may please to issue to their Master-attendant; he already knows what their inclination is for the employment of these ships at all. Then follows a proviso, "That nothing herein contained shall be construed to make void any contract or agreement into which the Company may have already entered." Of this there is no possible means of forming any judgment. It evidently leads to some further check upon the free Merchants and their ships, but it is purposely involved in mystery.

II. That the above ships shall be re-let by the Company, without profit, to such Merchants as may be disposed to export Goods to India, or to import goods from India as above-described, charging to the exporter and importer respectively such proportion only of the total freight for the voyage as shall be due, according

II. "The above ships (this Article says) are *to be re-let by the Company, without profit, to such Merchants as may be disposed to export goods to India, or to import goods from India as above described.*" This is not the most usual mode of expression among Merchants, who, having ships engaged for a term of

to the proportion established  
by the Act of 33d Geo. III.  
cap. 52.

of years, advertise to take  
freight on board for their port  
of destination: And in fact it  
is intended in this instance ex-  
pressly to provide *against re-  
letting* the ship to the Mer-  
chants: instead of which, the  
Company will receive their  
goods, lade, and transport them  
at a fixed rate of freight, so that  
the Merchant has no command  
over the ship; knows nothing  
of the time of her dispatch, nor  
the ports she is to touch at, or  
what orders she sails under;  
and frequently he will not  
know, especially if he lives at  
a distance from Calcutta, what  
ship his goods may at last be  
put on board: but he will  
know, that there will be great  
delay in her departure and  
voyage; that he will have a  
heavier freight to pay than fo-  
reigners; and that he will suffer  
further inconveniences, and  
loss of time, before his goods  
are put up to sale, and his pro-  
perty at last realized; so that  
every step in his adventure  
(while he is restricted to ships  
hired to the Company and *not  
re-let* to the Merchant *in toto*  
as often as he is willing so to  
engage) is clogged by formal-  
ities, inconveniences, and de-  
lays

lays; is attended with expence that might be avoided; and is altogether subject to such hindrances, and disadvantages, as no trade carried on upon commercial principles for a profit can exist under.

It is therefore evident, under all circumstances, that these eleven Propositions can produce no other effect, than to indispose the Merchants of India towards the trade with London; and thereby re-establish the commerce of foreign nations with British capital to greater extent than ever.



REPORT  
OF THE  
DEBATES  
IN THE  
*HOUSE OF COMMONS*  
UPON THE  
TENTH, FIFTEENTH, AND EIGHTEENTH DAYS OF JULY 1806.  
ON THE  
*East India Budget.*

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LONDON:

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1806.



## ADVERTISEMENT.

**IT** is a fact universally felt and acknowledged, that few of the various objects which occupy the attention of both branches of the Legislature are of greater magnitude or importance to the National Welfare than those of India management, territorial and commercial. The growing Interest of this Country in Asia forms of itself an Imperial Administration.

Nevertheless, such is the complicated nature of Indian Government, so many are the objects it presents, and so voluminous the References and Accounts laid annually before Parliament in what are called the Budget Statements, that few of the Members not immediately interested or responsible, can ever be induced to attend a Budget Debate.

Our Affairs in the East have, however, now assumed an importance, which imperiously demands the attention of the Legislature and the Country, in as much as it is now admitted that a call must soon be made on the House of Commons to relieve the India Company by a large pecuniary Loan.

The Debates of last Session, which produced such different abstract views of this subject from several Speakers, the best qualified to lay them before Parliament, having been reported



in detached parts of the 7th Volume of Cobbett's Parliamentary Debates, it is expected that, previous to the intended farther proceedings in the approaching Session, the following connected Account of the three days discussion occupied on this subject, may be acceptable to the Public.

An Appendix is added in which will be found the four most material Accounts referred to in this Debate.

# REPORT

## OF THE

### DEBATES, &c. &c.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

*Thursday, July 10.*

ON the motion of lord Morpeth, it was ordered, That the several Accounts and Papers, which have been presented to the house in this Session of Parliament, relating to the Revenues of the East-India Company, be referred to the consideration of a committee of the whole house. The house having accordingly resolved itself into the said committee, Mr. Hobhouse in the chair,

Lord MORPETH rose, in consequence of the notice he had given, to submit to the consideration of the house, a Statement of the Financial Affairs of the East-India Company, a subject at all times of high importance to this country, but never more so at any period than at the present moment. In all the wide-extended affairs of government, there was not one which more peculiarly called for the vigilant superintendence and scrutiny of parliament, than the system of finance, upon which so materially depended the permanent prosperity of any government; and, though the statement he should this day have the honour to submit to the committee, would not of a nature so very flattering as had been made of late years, by some of his predecessors in the department he had the honour to fill; yet having devoted the short period, since he had filled his present situation, in endeavouring, with the utmost assiduity, to make himself acquainted with the real state of the Company's affairs, both at home and in India, with respect to their Debts, their Revenues, and Commerce, as well as the various Charges upon their Government and Trade in all its departments, he should lay before the com-



## MADRAS.

|   |  |  |  |                         |
|---|--|--|--|-------------------------|
| REVENUES.—Excluding the Revenues of Arcot and of the Provinces ceded by the Nizam on account of the early years, being in part Subsidy and in part Revenue Collections, the average receipts on the years 1801-2 to 1803-4, as by No. 4, is - - - |  |  |  | £.                      |
|   |  |  |  | <u>2,965,199</u>        |
| Being less than the average of the three years 1800-1 to 1802-3, in the sum of - - -  |  |  |  | 49,102                  |
| REVENUES, No. 6.—Estimated for 1803-4 - - -   |  |  |  | 4,888,895               |
| Actual amount - - -   |  |  |  | <u>4,653,401</u>        |
| Less than Estimate - - -  |  |  |  | 235,494                 |
| CHARGES, No. 6.—Estimated for 1803-4 - - -  |  |  |  | 5,018,157               |
| Actual amount - - -   |  |  |  | <u>6,136,845</u>        |
| More than Estimate - - -  |  |  |  | 1,118,688               |
| Add deficiency of Revenue to excess of Charges the Net Charge is more than estimated, by - - -  |  |  |  | <u>1,354,182</u>        |
| And the Net Charge for 1803-4 is - - -  |  |  |  | <u><u>1,483,444</u></u> |

## ESTIMATES, 1804-5.

|  |                       |
|--|-----------------------|
| REVENUES, No. 4. - - - - -   | 4,659,326             |
| CHARGES, No. 5. - - - - -  | <u>5,420,029</u>      |
| Net Charge - - - - -   | 760,703               |
| REVENUES estimated more than actual of 1803-4 - - -                | 5,925                 |
| CHARGES estimated less than ditto - - - - -                        | <u>716,816</u>        |
| Net Charge estimated for 1804-5 less than preceding year - - - - - | <u><u>722,741</u></u> |

## BOMBAY.

|   |  |  |  |                |
|---|--|--|--|----------------|
| REVENUES, No. 7.—An adjustment of these Revenues, as of these of the other Presidencies, should have been made on account of the addition to the two last years, by Treaty and Conquest. As the amount is not specified, the average must be stated on the gross receipts on the years 1801-2 to 1803-4, it amounted to |  |  |  | 408,062        |
| Which exceeds the average 1800-1 to 1802-3, excluding a small receipt from the ceded Countries  |  |  |  | 99,020         |
| REVENUES, No. 9.—Estimated for 1803-4 - - -   |  |  |  | 518,575        |
| Actual Amount - - - - -   |  |  |  | <u>558,650</u> |
| More than Estimate - - -  |  |  |  | 40,075         |

|  |                      |   |   |           |
|--|----------------------|---|---|-----------|
|  |                      |   |   | £.        |
| <b>CHARGES, No. 9.—</b>  | Estimated for 1803-4 | - | - | 1,478,881 |
|  | Actual Amount        | - | - | 1,642,978 |
|  | More than Estimate   | - | - | 164,097   |
| Deduct Excess of Revenue from Excess of Charge,<br>the Net Charge is more than estimated, by |                      |   |   | 124,022   |
| And the Net Charge of the year 1803-4 is   |                      |   |   | 1,084,328 |

#### ESTIMATES, 1804-5.

|   |            |   |   |   |   |           |
|---|------------|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| <b>REVENUES, No. 7.</b>                                       | -          | - | - | - | - | 731,391   |
| <b>CHARGES, No. 8.</b>  | -          | - | - | - | - | 1,873,933 |
|   | Net Charge | - | - | - | - | 1,142,542 |
| Revenues estimated more than actual, 1803-4                   |            |   |   |   |   | 172,741   |
| Charges estimated more than ditto                             |            |   |   |   |   | 230,955   |
| Net Charges estimated for 1804-5, more than preceding<br>year |            |   |   |   |   | 58,214    |

#### BENCOOLEN and other SETTLEMENTS.

|   |                     |   |   |   |   |         |
|---|---------------------|---|---|---|---|---------|
| <b>No. 10, A.—Revenues of Fort Marlbro' in the year</b> |                     |   |   |   |   |         |
|   | 1802-3              | - | - | - | - | 13,985  |
|   | Charges of ditto    | - | - | - | - | 122,132 |
|   | Net Charge          | - | - | - | - | 108,147 |
| <b>SUPPLIES from BENGAL to FORT MARLBRO', PENANG,</b>   |                     |   |   |   |   |         |
| &c. estimated for 1803-4                                |                     |   |   |   |   |         |
|   | -                   | - | - | - | - | 212,628 |
| <b>No. 18.—Actual Amount</b>                            | -                   | - | - | - | - | 304,056 |
|   | More than estimated | - | - | - | - | 91,428  |
| <b>No. 11.—Supplies estimated for 1804-5</b>            | -                   | - | - | - | - | 287,030 |

#### GENERAL VIEW.

Result of the Year 1803-4 collectively.

|                  |                  |   |   |            |  |
|------------------|------------------|---|---|------------|--|
| <b>REVENUES—</b> | Bengal by No. 3  | - | - | 8,060,993  |  |
|                  | Madras           | 6 | - | 4,653,401  |  |
|                  | Bombay           | 9 | - | 558,650    |  |
|                  | Total Revenues   | - | - | 13,273,044 |  |
| <b>CHARGES—</b>  | Bengal, by No. 3 | - | - | 5,434,291  |  |
|                  | Madras,          | 6 | - | 6,136,845  |  |
|                  | Bombay,          | 9 | - | 1,642,978  |  |
|                  | Total Charges    | - | - | 13,214,114 |  |

|  |   |   |   |         |
|--|---|---|---|---------|
| Net Revenue of the three Presidencies              | - | - | - | 58,930  |
| Deducted from Supplies to Bencoolen, &c. by No. 18 |   |   |   | 304,056 |

Leaves a Net Charge of - 245,126

Add Interest, &c. paid on the Debts

|                      |    |   |          |
|----------------------|----|---|----------|
| At Bengal, by No. 18 | -  | - | 957,727  |
| Madras,              | 19 | - | 334,179  |
| Bombay,              | 20 | - | *242,852 |

Total Interest - - 1,534,758

The Total amounting to 1,779,884

is the Sum in which the Charges and Interest exceeded the Produce of the Territorial Revenues.

From which deduct the Amount of the Sales of Imports, by No. 15 - - - - - 655,481

The Remainder - - 1,124,403

shews the Amount in which, in the year 1803-4, the Resources from Revenue and Sales of Imports were insufficient to defray the Charges, and the Interest on the Debts.

Amount advanced for the purchase of Investments, Payment of Commercial Charges, and in aid of China—

|                      |    |   |           |
|----------------------|----|---|-----------|
| At Bengal, by No. 18 | -  | - | 1,380,855 |
| Madras,              | 19 | - | 706,771   |
| Bombay,              | 20 | - | 193,844   |
| Fort Maillbro',      | 22 | - | 59,014    |

Total Advances for Investments 2,320,484

Cargoes consigned to Europe, in 1803-4, with Charges by No. 22 - - - - - 1,674,645

### GENERAL VIEW.

Result of the ESTIMATES for the Year 1804-5, collectively.

|                           |   |   |            |
|---------------------------|---|---|------------|
| REVENUES—Bengal, by No. 1 | - | - | 8,167,792  |
| Madras,                   | 4 | - | 4,059,326  |
| Bombay,                   | 7 | - | 731,391    |
| Total Revenues            | - | - | 13,558,509 |

|                          |   |   |            |
|--------------------------|---|---|------------|
| CHARGES—Bengal, by No. 2 | - | - | 5,956,208  |
| Madras,                  | 5 | - | 5,420,929  |
| Bombay,                  | 8 | - | 1,873,933  |
| Total Charges            | - | - | 13,250,170 |

\* This Sum includes 140,436*l.* paid the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund for Interest on the Securities in their Hands.

|   |   |   |                        |    |           |
|---|---|---|------------------------|----|-----------|
| Net Revenue of the three Presidencies   | - | - | -                      | £. | 308,339   |
| Deduct Supplies to Bencoolen, &c. by No. 11   | - | - | -                      |    | 287,680   |
|   |   |   | Remainder              |    | 20,659    |
| Deducted from Interest on Debts, by No. 16  | - | - | -                      | *  | 1,754,843 |
|   |   |   | The Sum then remaining |    | 1,734,184 |
| is the Amount in which the Charges and Interest are estimated to exceed the Revenues. |   |   |                        |    |           |
| Deduct Amount estimated to be received on the Sales of Imports, by No. 15             | - | - | -                      | -  | 602,763   |

The Remainder 1,131,421  
 is the Amount in which the Charges of Government and Interest on the Debts are estimated to exceed the Resources expected to be derived from the territorial Revenues, and from the Sales of Imports, in the Year 1801-5.

#### DEBTS IN INDIA.

|  |   |   |   |            |
|--|---|---|---|------------|
| Amount stated, to April 1803                                 | - | - | - | 21,881,571 |
| Deduct in the hands of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund | - | - | - | 2,012,343  |
| Net Amount of Debts, on 30th April, 1803                     | - | - | - | 19,869,228 |
| Amount on 30th April, 1804, by No. 16, of present Account    | - | - | - | 25,336,263 |
| Deduct Sinking Fund, as above                                | - | - | - | 2,800,056  |
| Net Amount of Debts on 30th April, 1804                      | - | - | - | 22,536,207 |
| Increase   | - | - | - | 2,666,984  |

#### DEBTS BEARING INTEREST.

|   |   |   |   |            |
|---|---|---|---|------------|
| Amount in April 1803  | - | - | - | 18,712,933 |
| Deduct in the hands of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund                        | - | - | - | 1,636,917  |
| Net Amount of Debts bearing Interest on 30th April, 1803                            | - | - | - | 17,026,016 |
| Amount on 30th April, 1804, by No. 16   | - | - | - | 21,276,466 |
| Deduct Sinking Fund, as above   | - | - | - | 2,244,532  |
| Net Amount of Debts, bearing Interest on 30th April 1804                            | - | - | - | 19,031,934 |
| Increase of Debt bearing Interest   | - | - | - | 2,005,918  |
| Amount of Interest payable on Debt owing in April 1803                              | - | - | - | 1,574,011  |
| Deduct Interest on Securities in the hands of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund | - | - | - | 126,360    |
| Net Amount of Interest payable on Debt owing 30th April, 1803                       | - | - | - | 1,447,651  |

\* Includes 166,454*l.* payable to the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund.

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| Amount payable on Debt, in April 1804, by | £.        |
| No. 16 - - - - -                          | 1,754,843 |
| Deduct Sinking Fund, as above - - -       | 166,454   |
| Net Amount of Interest, payable on Debt   |           |
| owing 30th April, 1804 - - - -            | 1,588,389 |
| Increase of Interest payable - - -        | 140,738   |

## ASSETS IN INDIA.

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| Consisting of Cash, Goods, Stores, &c. in              |            |
| April 1803 - - - - -                                   | 14,630,971 |
| Deduct Balance and Securities in hands of              |            |
| Commissioners of the Sinking Fund - -                  | 2,012,348  |
| Net Amount of Assets on 30th April, 1803               | 12,618,623 |
| Consisting as above, on 30th April 1804, by            |            |
| No. 21 - - - - -                                       | 17,252,399 |
| Deduct Sinking Fund, as above - - -                    | 2,800,056  |
| Net Amount of Assets, on 30th April, 1804 - - -        | 14,452,343 |
| Increase of Assets- - - - -                            | 1,833,720  |
| Deducting Increase of Assets from Increase of Debts,   |            |
| the State of the Company's Affairs, in this view, is   |            |
| worse in April 1804, than in April 1803, in the Sum of | 833,264    |

## HOME ACCOUNTS.

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| No. 25—Aggregate Amount of Sales                       |           |
| in 1804-5 - - - - -                                    | 8,044,392 |
| Less than the Year preceding - - -                     | 380,876   |
| The Sales of the Company's Goods were                  |           |
| less by - - - - -                                      | 609,991   |
| The Sales of Private-Trade Goods were                  |           |
| more by - - - - -                                      | 229,115   |
| Making the Net difference, as above - -                | 380,876   |
| The Sales of the Company's Goods were estimated        | 6,868,709 |
| The actual Amount was - - - - -                        | 5,267,578 |
| Being less than estimated - - -                        | 1,601,122 |
| The Receipts on the Sales of the Company's Goods were  |           |
| estimated at - - - - -                                 | 6,598,496 |
| They actually amounted to - - - - -                    | 5,730,133 |
| Being less than estimated - - -                        | 868,363   |
| The Charges and Profit on Private Trade were estimated |           |
| to amount to - - - - -                                 | 150,000   |
| The actual Amount was - - - - -                        | 90,536    |
| Being less than estimated - - -                        | 59,464    |



## GENERAL RESULT.

From the disappointment in the Produce of the Sales, with a large Payment in Bonds by the Purchasers, and from a greater Expenditure on Account of India and China than first intended, the Deficit would have appeared in the Cash Balance of this Year to a considerable Amount; but the Sum borrowed from Government, a Loan from the Bank, and an Issue of Company's Bonds, have so operated, that the Balance of Cash estimated to remain in favour of the Company on the 1st of March, 1805, to the Amount of - - 157,634 was found, by the actual Accounts of the Year to be 12,020 which was less than estimated, by the Sum of - - 145,614

## HOME ACCOUNTS.

ESTIMATE, 1805—6.

No. 23—Sale of the Company's Goods estimated to amount to - 6,301,114

## GENERAL RESULT.

Notwithstanding the Receipts from the Sales are estimated much higher than the Actual of the last Year, and the Expectation is stated of a Payment by Government of a Million, the various Demands upon the Treasury are so great for Freight and Demorage, the Repayment to Government of 500,000*l.* borrowed in the last Year, and on other Accounts, that the Balance on the 1st March, 1806, is estimated to be against the Company in the Sum of - - - 62,836

## DEBTS AT HOME.

|                                |   |   |   |   |   |                  |
|--------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|------------------|
| On the 1st March, 1804         | - | - | - | - | - | 4,788,865        |
| No. 23; on the 1st March, 1805 | - | - | - | - | - | 6,012,196        |
| Increase                       | - | - | - | - | - | <u>1,223,331</u> |

## ASSETS AT HOME.

|                                |   |   |   |   |   |                  |
|--------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|------------------|
| On the 1st March, 1804         | - | - | - | - | - | 19,168,736       |
| No. 23, on the 1st March, 1805 | - | - | - | - | - | 20,412,659       |
| Increase                       | - | - | - | - | - | <u>1,243,923</u> |

Deducting the Increase of Debt from the Increase of Assets, the Home Concern exhibits, in this view, an Improvement in the Year amounting to - - - 50,592

## CHINA AND ST. HELENA.

|   |         |    |
|---|---------|----|
| Balance at China, on 31st Jan. 1803, against                          | 260,900 | £. |
| Balance at China, on 29th Jan. 1804, in favour, No. 24 - - - - -      | 182,390 |    |
| Increase at China - - - - -   | 443,290 |    |
| Balance at St. Helena on 30th Sept. 1802, in favour - - - - -         | 105,194 |    |
| Balance at St. Helena on 30th Sept. 1803, in favour, No. 24 - - - - - | 105,382 |    |
| Increase at St. Helena - - - - -                                      | 188     |    |
| Total Increase at China and St. Helena - - - - -                      | 443,478 |    |

## GENERAL COMPARISON OF DEBTS AND ASSETS.

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| Increase of Debts in India - - - - -  | 2,666,984 |
| Increase of Debts at Home - - - - -   | 1,223,331 |
| Total Increase of Debts - - - - -   | 3,890,315 |
| Increase of Assets in India - - - - -   | 1,833,720 |
| Increase of Assets at Home - - - - -  | 1,273,923 |
|   | 3,107,643 |
| Add—Net Increase of Balance at China and St. Helena - - - - -   | 443,478   |
| Total Increase of Assets - - - - -  | 3,551,121 |
| Deducted from the Increase of Debt, will shew a Deterioration to have taken place on the whole Concern in this view, during the Years 1803-4 Abroad, and 1804-5 at Home, to the Amount of - - - - - | 339,194   |
| Add—Amount received in India, and included in the Quick Stock there, dated April 30, 1804, which formed part of the Cargoes afloat Outwards, in the Assets at Home - - - - -                        | 583,299   |
| Goods in the Export Warehouses in India on the 30th April, 1804, arrived in England, and included in Assets at Home - - - - -   | 43,619    |
|   | 626,918   |
| The Amount of the Deterioration will then be - - - - -  | 966,112   |

The Assets at Home exhibited an Increase in Value during the Year, in the Sum of 442,192*l.* from the Insertion of the Amount of the Claims of the Company on the Public, it having been calculated before it was under the Consideration of Parliament. As this Branch of the Concern is under Examination, upon Principles recommended by a Committee of the House of Commons, which will lessen its Amount, a further considerable Adjustment will hereafter be requisite.

## ABSTRACT OF ADDITIONAL ACCOUNTS.

BUDGET, 1805.—General View of Estimates, 1805-6.

|   |   |   |            |           |
|---|---|---|------------|-----------|
| Revenues of Bengal  | - | - | 8,763,220  | £.        |
| Madras  | - | - | 4,774,296  |           |
| Bombay  | - | - | 742,017    |           |
| Total Revenues  | - | - | 14,279,533 |           |
| Charges of Bengal   | - | - | 7,415,370  |           |
| Madras  | - | - | 5,650,182  |           |
| Bombay  | - | - | 1,580,292  |           |
| Total Charges   | - | - | 14,645,844 |           |
| Net Charge of the three Presidencies  | - | - | -          | 366,311   |
| Add—Supplies to Bencoolen, P. of Wales' Island, &c.   | - | - | -          | 265,800   |
| Total Surplus Charge  | - | - | -          | 633,111   |
| Add—Further—Interest on the Debts   | - | - | 1,823,040  |           |
| Interest payable to Commissioners of Sinking Fund, on Securities redeemed                   | - | - | 195,788    |           |
| Total Interest  | - | - | -          | 2,018,828 |
| Total Excess of Charge beyond the Produce of the Revenues, as estimated for the Year 1805-6 | - | - | -          | 2,651,939 |
| exclusive of Commercial Charges not added to the Invoices, amounting to 199,806 <i>l</i> .  | - | - | -          |           |

## DEBTS IN INDIA.

|  |   |   |            |            |
|--|---|---|------------|------------|
| Amount of Debt, 30th April, 1804, by No. 16.                               | - | - | -          | 25,336,263 |
| Deduct in the hands of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund               | - | - | -          | 2,800,056  |
| Net Amount of Debts on 30th April, 1804                                    | - | - | -          | 22,536,207 |
| Amount as to Bengal, January 1805, and Madras and Bombay, 30th April, 1805 | - | - | 28,197,499 |            |
| Deduct, Sinking Fund, as above   | - | - | 3,151,065  |            |
| Net Amount of Debts in 1805  | - | - | -          | 25,046,434 |
| Increase   | - | - | -          | 2,510,227  |

## DEBTS BEARING INTEREST.

|   |   |   |            |            |
|---|---|---|------------|------------|
| Amount in April 1804, by No. 16.                              | - | - | 21,276,466 |            |
| Deduct, in the hands of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund | - | - | 2,244,532  |            |
| Net Amount of Debts bearing Interest 30th April 1804          | - | - | -          | 19,031,934 |
| Amount on 30th April, 1805, generally                         | - | - | 24,221,706 |            |
| Deduct Sinking Fund, as above                                 | - | - | 2,616,739  |            |
| Net Amount of Debts bearing Interest 30th April 1805          | - | - | -          | 21,604,967 |
| Increase  | - | - | -          | 2,573,033  |

## II

|  |           |            |
|--|-----------|------------|
| Amount of Interest payable on the Debt<br>owing on 30th April, 1804, by No. 16 -       | 1,754,843 | £.         |
| Deduct Interest on Securities in the hands<br>of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund | 166,454   |            |
| Net Amount of Interest payable on<br>Debt owing on 30th April, 1804 -                  |           | 1,588,389  |
| Amount payable on Debt in April 1805 -   | 2,017,358 |            |
| Deduct Sinking Fund, as above -  | 195,788   |            |
| Net Amount of Interest payable on<br>Debt owing on 30th April, 1805 -                  |           | 1,821,570  |
| Increase of Interest payable -   |           | £. 233,181 |

His lordship, on the whole, did not think he went too far, when he said, that, in his opinion, the deficiency or excess of charge could not be taken at less than 3 millions. The Debts, bearing interest in India, he was aware, there might be danger of having called in, though the Directors had the power of protracting the payment for some time. Should this be the case, some extraordinary means might be necessary to be resorted to ; but of this there was no immediate appearance. It might be expected that he should be able to give some account of the measures proposed to be adopted for reducing the expenditure in India. It was well known, that government had lately been pretty much employed in devising measures of reform in the public expenditure, but it was deemed more expedient to wait till it was seen how far any schemes of the kind were practicable, before they should be gone into as to India. It would be the duty of the Commissioners for Indian Affairs, to call the attention of parliament to this subject, at as early a period as possible. It was not his intention to trouble the committee on the subject of the treaties with Scindea or Holkar, nor did he think himself even called on to give any opinion on that subject. He knew it was the opinion of others, that these treaties were honourable to the British character, and calculated to preserve pacific dispositions in India.—On the whole, though he admitted that the financial department in India did not wear the most cheerful aspect, and although he would be the last person in the world to raise sanguine hopes, which were not likely to be realised, still he thought it would be wrong to give any sanction to unmanly despondency. Our resources in the East were great, and, by proper management and economy, might still be brought to answer our highest expectations. He did not speak of that economy which would teach us to withhold a reward from merit, or to retrench in the becoming grandeur of the executive government—eco-

nomy which only tended to defeat the objects which it had in view—but that economy, which would teach us to act on principles of moderation, justice, and equity. His lordship concluded by moving his first resolution, shewing the revenues of the provinces in Oude in 1803-4. On the question being put,

Mr. JOHNSTONE expressed the high satisfaction which he felt at the fair and candid manner in which the noble lord had made his statement. He heartily concurred with the noble lord in the importance of the subject, of which, notwithstanding the house had uniformly treated it with so much indifference, the attendance that night furnished an additional proof. He could not, however, help thinking that the noble lord was himself somewhat to blame, in having so long delayed bringing forward the subject, the papers necessary to make the statements having been in this country for nearly twelve months; and it having been promised, in the month of February last, that the attention of the house should be speedily called to them. In looking at the accounts, which were as full and distinct as could well be expected, he could not help remarking, that though the period to which they applied was a period of war, a great part of the increase was for civil charges. He thought, without withholding any due reward from meritorious services to the company, the expences in the civil establishment might be greatly reduced. He hoped, with the noble lord, that we should always observe moderation and good faith in our conduct with the neighbouring states; but what concern that could have in diminishing our expences, he could not conceive. The noble lord had guarded the house against any apprehension they might otherwise have entertained, that the splendour of the executive government in India should be diminished. What did this mean? He could understand such an observation, if applied to the monarchies of Europe; but he contended that all our acquirements, all our wealth, and all our character in India, were obtained, without the least idea of maintaining any of the splendour alluded to by the noble lord. He considered, and he believed that it was generally considered, that the conduct of sir George Barlow, in the conclusion of the treaties, and in the economical regulations which he had instituted, was highly meritorious; and it surely would have been becoming in his majesty's ministers to have allowed him to carry into effect the arrangements which he had commenced. He detailed the circumstances attending the original appointment of sir George Barlow to the governor-generalship of India, with his subsequent recall; and contended, that the act on which his majesty's ministers had proceeded,

was intended to apply only to extreme cases, of which this was not one. For 22 years, it had never been deemed advisable to exercise the prerogative which the act established. The first appointment of sir George Barlow, on the part of his majesty's ministers, was a deliberate action. Refusing him whom the first minister of the crown (Mr. Fox) had formerly described as the man best calculated to be entrusted with the government of India, (Mr. Francis,) they appointed sir George Barlow. Notwithstanding that his measures even anticipated the hopes and expectations of his employers, he was, in twelve days afterwards, superseded without the shadow of a cause. He had heard it stated, that this removal took place because sir George Barlow was a servant of the company. However he might feel the propriety of placing a man of rank and consequence at the head of the government in India, in preference to one who might be better acquainted with the details of business; yet he thought that this principle might be pushed too far. If ever there was a case in which it ought to have been departed from, it was that on which he was speaking. He had also been told, that sir George Barlow was recalled, because he did not possess the personal confidence of ministers. Two noble lords, however, under whose administration the British interests in India had flourished, in the highest degree; he meant, lord Macartney, and lord Cornwallis; did not, he believed, enjoy much of the personal confidence of the administrations, which existed in England during the period of their government. Another whimsical reason for this recall, which, when he coupled it with some other extraordinary statements on different subjects, almost made him conclude, that the brain of the right hon. gent. who had used it, was full of paradoxes: Sir George Barlow was a most zealous supporter of the government in India, which that right hon. gent. approved; but he thought fit to remove him, lest the Court of Directors, who disapproved of that government, might, on that account, hereafter dislike sir George Barlow, although they had hitherto approved of all his acts. The statement of the accounts, by the noble lord, presented a gloomy picture: he hoped, that by care and attention, on the part of our government, it might yet assume a more lively aspect.

Lord HENRY PETTY replied to the observations of the hon. gent. who had not, he presumed to say, read the act of 1784 with attention, or he would have seen that the interpretation which he and others attempted to put upon it was unfounded. For, in the same clause in which the power of recalling a governor was vested in the Directors, it was also vested

in his majesty and council ; but this seemed to have been overlooked by the hon. member, who condemned the exercise of a power which was necessary to maintain the pre-eminence of the present state. That hon. member would have a dependent state governed without being subject to controul, and yet his brain was unwilling to admit paradoxes. It was asserted by the hon. member, that this power of recall was quite new and extraordinary; and that it never had been exercised since 1784; but it seemed to be forgotten, that the same power had been before exercised by the Directors. Then it had excited no complaint, but when his majesty ventured to use his undoubted prerogative, some gentlemen appeared to be anxious to raise a clamour against it, and, truly, because ministers thought proper to appoint a man of their own choice. But was any thing more natural than that the administration of the sovereign's government should choose a governor for any of the dependencies in whom they could confide? Were they not, by the statute of 1784, armed with that power? and did not their duty call upon them for the exercise of it? They were as responsible for the government of India, as for that of Ireland; and it would be as just to interfere with their appointment of a viceroy for the one as with that of a governor for the other. The governor, whose appointment had just taken place for India, would, he was persuaded, afford general satisfaction; and this persuasion rested upon the belief that that noble lord would carry out with him to India, those principles of moderation, economy, and a strict adherence to treaties, which the house had heard so distinctly laid down by his noble friend who opened the debate, and which formed the firmest basis of every good government. Under the administration of such principles, the noble lord, no doubt, however lamentable the deficiency at present might be; however much the hopes of the country, excited by the promises of the noble lord on the opposite bench (Castlereagh), had been disappointed; might still be able to restore the resources of India, and place its affairs on a regular, solid, and durable footing.

Lord CASTLEREAGH maintained, that the tendency of the revenues of India was to augment in the manner and proportion which he had described to the house, and that his predictions were falsified by events upon which it was impossible for any man to calculate, namely, by wars which he had not in his contemplation when he made the statement, to which the noble lord on the treasury bench referred. The noble lord vindicated the grounds upon which the late war in India was commenced, the manner in which it was conducted

by marquis Wellesley, and also the terms upon which it was concluded by sir George Barlow. The removal of this deserving individual from the government of India, the noble lord condemned in the most unqualified terms. That sir George Barlow's character was the subject of universal praise, was quite notorious, but he could adduce a testimony to his merits, of the very highest order; for he could state that it was the express wish of lord Cornwallis, before he went to India, that when he should have completed the object of his mission, sir George Barlow should be appointed to succeed him in the government. What could be the object of ministers in discharging sir George Barlow, so soon after his appointment, he felt it impossible, upon any rational ground, to estimate. As to the Debt of the India Company in India, his wish was, that it should travel home, and he was sure that their circumstances and credit here would be quite sufficient soon to discharge it.

Mr. FRANCIS after paying some compliments to the noble lord (Morpeth), for the fairness and perspicuity with which he had stated the result of the several accounts now before the house, addressed himself to the chairman, to the following effect:—That he had intended to confine himself to a few observations on the accounts, to which the noble lord had referred; but that, many extraneous topics having been introduced into the debate, particularly by the noble lord who spoke last (lord Castlereagh), he found himself obliged to take notice of some of those topics. A great deal has been said, without any direct relation to the India Budget, on the impropriety of the revocation of sir George Barlow. In the measure itself I have no concern, and, as I do not know the reasons on which it was adopted, I shall neither censure nor defend it. But I am sure that the arguments, which I have heard this night against it, are not at all conclusive. Nothing can be more clear and explicit than the power vested in his majesty by the act of 1793, to revoke any appointment of a Governor-General made by the Court of Directors. The act was proposed and introduced by lord Melville. The power gives the right, and the exercise of the right is trusted to the discretion of the king's ministers. Undoubtedly, it is not to be exercised capriciously, or upon ordinary occasions. It is reserved for particular cases and circumstances, on the exigency of which the crown, by the advice of a responsible council, is to judge. Does the noble lord mean to contend that parliament has given a power, which it was intended should never be exercised? But against whom or what can it be resorted to at any time? The answer is, against an act of the Court of Directors. It can apply to nothing else. At the same time, I am ready to admit, that a



wanton or interested application of the power, though according to law, would be just as abusive and criminal as an assumption of it against law. When you admit the trust, you must prove the abuse of it. The services of sir George Barlow are extolled, and the confidence which the Court of Directors repose in his attachment to the true interests of the India Company, is particularly insisted on. They consider him as a servant of their own in contradistinction to persons recommended by government. This is a new language, sir, considering the quarter it comes from. I have heard him spoken of in very different terms, by persons very high in the direction of the Company's affairs; and even with expressions of indignation, at the uniform support he gave to every measure of lord Wellesley, without exception; and particularly for never attempting to check him in the supposed exercise of independent authority, not warranted by law. Look at their own dispatches on this subject, published by themselves. Sir George Barlow is not mentioned by name, but he is charged by direct implication. They say, "he is certainly guilty of a dereliction of his duty, and must inevitably incur the displeasure of the Court of Directors." In another dispatch, they say that, "by suffering measures not regularly and legally instituted, to be carried into execution, he became partner in the illegality." They say that the council (that is, sir George Barlow) "had no right to abandon their part of the government." On the justice of these censures I offer no opinion. The Court of Directors were his judges, and they have pronounced upon his conduct. But it seems, the readiness with which he adopted the pacific system of lord Cornwallis, and the expedition with which he has concluded a pacification with Holkar and Scindia, is a great merit, and intitles him to be continued in the government.—Holkar, very lately, was considered as a mere fobber, and to be treated accordingly. He is now reinstated in his former territories, and Scindia has obtained possession of the country of our ally the Rana of Gohud, and of the royal fortress of Gwalior; without any right that I know of, to either of them. He might perhaps have claimed Gwalior under sir Arthur Wellesley's treaty of December 1803. But, if his claim was good then, why was he kept out of the fort till now? I would have preserved the peace with these people; but, having once made the war, I should have thought it the best policy not to have brought the Mahrattas back into Indostan, much less to have given them such a strong hold as Gwalior, in the centre of that country. A concession of that kind gives you no security for the continuance of peace; especially if it was made hastily and without sufficient deliberation. I do not mean to say that the terms of these treaties may not be just-

fied by necessity; that is, by the state of the finances of the Bengal government.—If so, it is to be lamented that sir George Barlow's situation did not allow him time and means to measure his steps with less precipitation. The Mahratta chiefs have very good intelligence, and know as well as we do, whether our concessions to them are voluntary or not. As to confidence in our justice or good faith, it is in vain to talk of it. My noble friend, who is now appointed to the government of Bengal will, I am sure, do every thing that can be done, consistently with prudence and safety, to satisfy the princes of India, and to establish the peace of that country on a solid foundation. I confide in his principles, and I think that every thing may be trusted to his sound discretion.—I come now, sir, to the accounts on the table, which properly belong to, and constitute the business of the day. The first thing to be observed, is that the statements from India come no lower than to the 30th of April 1804; consequently leave us very much in the dark about the actual state of the finances there. We might, and ought to have had them to April 1805, at least. The Indian Debt, as it stood above two years ago, was 25 millions sterling; and I think it may fairly be reckoned at 30 millions, more or less, at the present moment. The noble lord on the other side (lord Castlereagh) says he shall be happy to hear that this debt, or the greater part of it, is on its travels to England. In that hope, I believe, his lordship is very likely to be gratified. Above 17 millions and a half are payable in England, at the option of the holders of the securities. —How this demand, when it arrives, is to be received and provided for, is a question, which I am not able to resolve, and therefore I shall leave it to his lordship to settle it, as well as he can, with the Court of Directors. The Company's situation offers the probability of their being able to meet such a demand, otherwise than by loans in England, or by extending their capital to an equal amount. Now, by an estimate of profit and loss on their Sales here, for the year ending in March 1805, I see that their Payments exceed their Receipts by the sum of 418,540l. Here, then, is a deficiency to be made good, upon their actual Domestic Charges, and it may be an annual deficiency. Enlarging their capital, without a proportionate extension of trade, is only running into a debt, which does not furnish the means even of paying its own interest. I have so often objected in vain to the form and construction of the account of their Stock per Computation, that I shall not trouble the house with any further remarks on that subject. In my mind, they only deceive themselves, when they make out an apparent balance in their favour, by totally omitting their capital on one side, and by taking credit on the other for un-

productive articles, which, I could easily shew, amount to some millions.—The evidence on the table, though it falls short by two years of the actual state of the Company's affairs, is sufficient to shew whether I have been right or wrong in the opinions which I have maintained on this subject, for many years past. The last Indian injustice that can be done me now, would be to confound the prediction with the cause, and to charge me with the event, because I foretold it. On this night, my noble friend has stated the whole case fairly. ~~He~~ <sup>Mr.</sup> has told us the truth; and I have done nothing but tread in his steps, and follow his example.

Sir ARTHUR WELLESLEY rose and spoke as follows.—Sir; Before I proceed to consider the financial State of India, which is more properly the subject for discussion this night, I shall advert to the political subjects which have been referred to by other gentlemen. The honourable gentleman opposite (Mr. Francis) has asked, what right Scindeah had to the fortress of Gwalior, and the territory of Gohud, which have been ceded to him by the late treaty concluded by sir George Barlow? The hon. gent. must recollect that, subsequently to the treaty of peace concluded by Mr. Hastings with Mahdajee Scindeah, (the predecessor of Dowlut Rao Scindeah,) that chieftain attacked the Ranah of Gohud, and deprived him of all his territories. The family of Scindeah had remained in possession of those territories, and of the fortress of Gwalior, from that time, until the war which commenced in 1803; when the fort of Gwalior was taken, and the country of Gohud fell into the possession of one of the detachments under the orders of the Commander in Chief, Lord Lake.—Under the ninth article of the treaty of peace which I was the instrument of concluding with Dowlut Rao Scindeah, at the end of the year 1803, the territory of Gohud and the fortress of Gwalior, were to remain in the possession, and at the disposal of the British government. This will be obvious to any man who reads that article, or the conferences during the negotiations of the treaty, which are published; and indeed the operation of the ninth article upon this territory was acknowledged by Scindeah's ministers. The Governor-general, lord Wellesley, however, having adverted to the situation in which Scindeah was placed by the treaty of peace in relation to other powers in India, and particularly in relation to his rival Holkar, had deemed it proper to take into consideration the expediency of restoring to Scindeah the territory of Gohud and the fort of Gwalior. I was of opinion, that Gohud and Gwalior ought to be restored to that chief; and I believe that the instructions to the Resident with Scindeah upon this subject have been laid before the house of commons. The reason for which the cession was not made until the conclusion

of the late treaty by sir George Barlow, is referable to the state of Scindeah's councils from the middle of the year 1804, until a late period in 1805.

The cession was a matter of favour from the British government to Scindeah, and was to be so considered. The committee will observe, that it is so considered by sir George Barlow. But Scindeah's councils were so badly composed, and their conduct was so suspicious, from the period before mentioned, that no concession could be made to Scindeah, without incurring the risk of having it attributed to motives, which never ought to influence the conduct of the British government in India. For this reason the cession was not made by Lord Wellesley.—The hon. gent. seems to think the fortress of Gwalior important, as a defence of the Company's territories in that quarter. The fortress of Gwalior would defend and cover nothing, excepting itself: the Company's territories are not to be defended by fortresses, but by armies in the field. Fortresses are useful as points of support, and as magazines to these armies; and in this point of view Gwalior would be useful, if the object of the Company was, or was likely to be, the invasion of Scindeah's territories in Malwah. But it is of no use with a view to the defence of the Company's territories, unless garrisoned by a large body of troops, which body of troops would be more profitably employed in the field.—Upon the whole, the Committee will observe, that I consider sir George Barlow's treaty with Scindeah to have been consistent with the spirit of that which I was the instrument of concluding at the close of the year 1803; and that the late Governor-general, lord Wellesley, intended to have carried into execution that part of its stipulation which refers to Gwalior and Gohud. —Upon a former night I explained to the House, that I did not consider it to be a treaty of peace, as, in point of fact, we had never been at war with Scindeah since 1803. It is a treaty to amend and explain some articles of the former treaty of peace; and I conceive, that every article of it deserves approbation.

In respect to the treaty with Holkar, I do not conceive that there can be any objection to it. The hon. gent. (Mr. Francis) has asked, whether Sir George Barlow was not obliged to conclude that treaty by the financial distresses of the government. Approving, generally, of the treaty, and not knowing the instructions from home under which sir George Barlow acted, I do not conceive it necessary to look for the cause of his concluding that treaty, in any necessity arising from the state of the finances. The hon. gent. knows well, that when war has been carried on for three years in India, it is not very easy to procure money on loan; and I certainly do not mean to extenuate the financial difficulties and distresses which ex-

sted in the year 1805, as represented by the noble Lord, (lord Morpeth) and by the Papers on the table. These difficulties certainly existed; but in possession of such a revenue as is enjoyed by the British government in India, at the present moment, and in command of such large resources, I do not conceive that any temporary embarrassment, or difficulties of a pecuniary nature, could exist to such a degree, as to induce sir George Barlow to conclude a treaty of which he himself did not approve, and of which he should not think that his superiors in England would approve.

I have already said, that I was not disposed to dispute the Financial Statements made by the noble Lord, (Morpeth) as exhibited in the papers upon the table; but it must be recollected, that these statements refer to a period of most extensive warfare, which was carried on in all parts of India at the same time, and for which the preparations and exertions made were on a scale superior to any ever made upon any former occasion. There was not an officer in command of any detachment, who could prove, to the satisfaction of government, that any addition to the means already in his power would increase his capability of performing service, who did not immediately receive orders to make the increase which he required; and it will be found, that the service performed was proportionate to the expence incurred. With this recollection in our minds, it will not appear that a surplus charge, amounting, upon an average, to about two millions sterling, is very large for such a period, and for such exertions.

The subjects which require explanation in the state of the Finances of India, are—the Deficiency of the revenues, in comparison with the Charges (including the Interest of the Debts.)—and the great magnitude of the Debts. My wish is, to shew, 1st, the Real Situation in which the Finances of India will be in time of peace; 2d, the Real State of the Indian Debt in April 1805, (at the close of Lord Wellesley's government), and in April 1806; and, 3dly, to compare the Debt with the Assets, and shew in what manner it has been incurred.

It appears by the account, No. 2, presented on the 3d of June, 1806, page 91, that the Revenues of India, for the year 1805-6 were estimated at

|   |                  |
|---|------------------|
|   | £. 14,279,533    |
| • The Charges at  | - - - 14,645,844 |
| The Interest of the Debt at   | - - - 1,825,640  |
| The Commercial Charges not added to the invoices, at                | - - - 199,806    |
| The Supplies to Prince of Wales's Island, Bencoolen, and St. Helena | 266,800          |
| Making a total of Charge of   | - - - 16,935,490 |
| And leaving a Deficiency to be provided for by loan, of             | - £. 2,655,957   |

It must be observed, however, of this estimate, first, that the Revenues are not stated to be so high as they really are; and secondly, that the Charges are for a period of war, in which it must be acknowledged, that they would be higher than in a period of peace. If this be the fact, it cannot be supposed to be a very unsatisfactory state of affairs, that the Charges of a great empire, such as the British empire in India undoubtedly is, should exceed the revenues and resources by two millions seven hundred thousand pounds sterling in one year, in a period of very extensive warfare. This will be observed more forcibly, if the financial state of Great Britain, or of any other country in Europe, is adverted to.—But the duration of war ought not to be calculated upon; intelligence of peace has already been received, and the Finances in India must be viewed in reference to the state of affairs which must exist in consequence of the restoration of tranquillity.

In endeavouring to form an opinion of the Financial state of India, in a period of peace, it is necessary to ascertain what will be the Revenues in peace, and what the Charges.

In the year 1802-3, the Company were in possession of all the territories which they possess at present, excepting the territories acquired by the treaties with the Guickwar, and by the treaties of Bassem, and of peace concluded with the Maharrattas, in December, 1803. The produce of that year will form the fairest datum from which an estimate may be formed of the probable future resource. An average of any number of years cannot be taken; because, in 1801, the provinces in Oude were not in the Company's possession; because, in 1803-4, there existed a drought in all parts of India, which affected particularly the produce and revenues of the ceded provinces in Oude, and in some degree those of the provinces ceded by the Nizam on the Tocombudra and Kistna rivers, and those in the Carnatic;—and, because in 1804-5, the revenues of the ceded provinces in Oude must have been affected by the incursion of Holkar's armies.

The amount of the Revenues in 1802-3 will afford an estimate of what they will be in future in time of peace; although there is reason to believe, that they will considerably exceed that amount.

The Revenues in India in the year 1802-3, as appears by the accounts before parliament,

were - - - - - £. 13,464,537

— To this sum, in forming an estimate of the future probable resource of the government in India, must be added the new Subsidies, and the revenues of the territories gained by the Company since the year 1802-3, of which I will read an estimate:

*ESTIMATE of the late ACQUISITIONS  
Taking the REVENUE*

| REVENUE.   | Gross<br>Revenue. | Net<br>Revenue. | In, for<br>Rupees |
|--|-------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| <b>IN THE DOAB.</b>  |                   |                 |                   |
| Etawa . . . . .  | 13,91,818         |                 |                   |
| Furruckabad . . . . .  | 6,30,084          |                 |                   |
| Selharunpore . . . . .   | 3,42,351          |                 |                   |
| Ditto un ler Moradabad . . . .   | 5,99,015          |                 |                   |
| Ditto under the Resident at Delhi  | 5,50,273          |                 |                   |
|  | 35,13,541         |                 |                   |
| Deduct Tasseeldary, and other Al-<br>lowances, Pensions, Mofussil<br>Charges,—and Balances irre-<br>coverable, estimated altogether<br>at 20 per Cent. . . . . | 7,02,708          | 28,10,833       |                   |
| Sumroo Begun's Jagheer . . . .   |                   | 10,00,000       |                   |
| <b>WEST OF THE JUMNA.</b>  |                   |                 |                   |
| Agra, exclusive of the Pergunnahs<br>Dholepore, &c. at first reserved<br>to Scindeah, and now ceded to<br>the Company . . . . .                                | 10,64,255         |                 |                   |
| Districts settled by the Resident<br>at Delhi . . . . .  | 4,25,594          |                 |                   |
| Syer of Delhi, &c. . . . .   | 1,83,689          |                 |                   |
| Districts unsettled, suppose . . .   | 4,25,000          |                 |                   |
|  | 20,98,538         |                 |                   |
| Deduct 20 per Cent. as above   | 4,19,707          | 16,78,831       |                   |
| In Hindústan, Rupees of sorts  |                   | 54,89,664       | 52,77,08          |
| CUTTACK . . . . .  | 13,51,405         |                 |                   |
| Deduct 20 per Cent. as above . .   | 2,70,281          |                 |                   |
| Arcol Rupees . . . . .   |                   | 10,80,124       | 10,37,            |
| BROACH . . . . .   | 10,00,000         |                 |                   |
| Deduct 20 per Cent. as above . .   | 2,00,000          |                 |                   |
| Estimated equal to Sonat Rupees  |                   | 8,00,000        | 8,00,0            |
| Total of Revenue of Rupees of sorts  |                   | 73,70,788       |                   |
| Ditto in Sonat Rupees  |                   |                 | 71,07,9           |
| Sicca Rupees . . . . .   |                   |                 | 66,81,4           |
| Or Pounds Sterling . . . . .   |                   |                 | 835,1             |

1 from CONQUEST and SUBSIDY,  
lowest Scale possible.

| 1 SUBSIDIES.                       | Gross Revenue. | Net Revenue. | In Sonat Rupees. |
|------------------------------------|----------------|--------------|------------------|
| FROM THE QUICKWAR.                 |                |              |                  |
| Gift . . . . .                     | . .            | 2,00,300     |                  |
| . . . . .                          | . .            | 6,97,275     |                  |
| Revenue in the Attaveesy . .       | 60,000         |              |                  |
| — in Guzerat . . . .               | 66,000         | 1,26,009     |                  |
|                                    |                |              | 10,23,275        |
| FROM THE PEISHWAH.                 |                |              |                  |
| Grand Gross Revenue . .            | 15,72,974      |              |                  |
| 5 per Ct. as above 3,14,595        |                |              |                  |
| to Shumsheer                       |                |              |                  |
| Order . . . . . 4,00,000           |                |              |                  |
|                                    | 7,14,595       |              |                  |
| In Rupees of sorts . .             | 8,58,379       |              |                  |
| In Sonat Rupees . .                | . .            | 8,24,047     |                  |
| in the Attaveesy . . . .           | 6,50,300       |              |                  |
| in Guzerat . . . . .               | 1,72,300       |              |                  |
| Revenue in the Attaveesy . .       | 1,10,000       |              |                  |
| in Guzerat . . . . .               | 8,000          |              |                  |
| as supposed equal to Sonats        | . .            | 9,40,000     |                  |
|                                    |                |              | 17,64,047        |
| ADDITIONAL SUBSIDY.                |                |              |                  |
| by Rajah of Travencore . .         | . .            | . .          | 3,48,000         |
| Subsidies Sonat Rupees . .         | . .            | . .          | 31,35,322        |
| Or Sicca Rupees . . . . .          |                |              | 29,47,203        |
| Or, Pounds Sterling . . . . .      |                |              | 368,400          |
| Total Revenues Pounds Sterling . . |                |              | 1,203,584        |

### ABSTRACT.

| ACQUISITIONS. | Sonat Rupees. | Sicca Rupees. | Pounds Sterling. | Total Sterling. |
|---------------|---------------|---------------|------------------|-----------------|
| REVENUE . .   | 71,07,955     | 66,81,478     | 835,184          | £. 1,203,584    |
| SUBSIDIES . . | 31,35,322     | 29,47,293     | 368,400          |                 |



This will make the future Revenue of British India amount to 14,668,119*l*. In the commencement of the year 1802-3, a revision was made of all the establishments under the governments of India, with reference to a state of peace. It does not appear, however, that the establishments of European troops in particular, were reduced to a lower scale than that on which they ought to be left at all times, and on which they exist at present. Neither does it appear to be necessary to increase the number of European troops, beyond the number which were in India in the year 1802-3, in consequence of the additional territory acquired since that year. The native military establishments were fixed upon a scale, in the year 1802-3, calculated for the existence of peace in India; and the continuance of the war in Europe, under the circumstances in which the enemy stands in respect to his marine, does not appear to render necessary any addition to these establishments.

The actual charges of the year 1802-3, were higher than the amount at which they were estimated and fixed, with a view to peace. In October 1802, Holkar gained the victory at Poonah over the troops of the Peishwah and Scindeah, in consequence of which the government of Fort St. George immediately thought it necessary to assemble the troops acting under that presidency, which afterwards marched to Poonah early in 1803. The army at Bombay was likewise placed on the war establishment; part of it in the field; and both armies were considerably augmented.

My noble friend (lord Castlereagh) has calculated the Extraordinary Expenses, in the last six months of 1802-3, at 500,000*l*. above the Charges of the peace establishment; and in forming an estimate of the future Charges of India, in a period of peace, upon the actual Charges of the year 1802-3, it is proper to strike off 500,000*l*. of that amount. With this sum subtracted from them, the Actual Charges of the year 1802-3, together with those rendered necessary on account of the treaties of peace and subsidy, and by the acquisitions gained since that period, may be deemed fair data on which an estimate may be formed of the probable future Charges of British India in time of peace.

|   |   |   |   |             |
|---|---|---|---|-------------|
|   |   |   |   | £.          |
| The actual Civil Charges in 1802-3 were | - | - | - | 4,599,372   |
| The actual Military Charges were        | - | - | - | 6,360,614   |
| From which subtract                     | - | - | - | 500,000     |
| Remains                                 | - | - | - | 5,860,614   |
| Supplies for Bencoolen, &c.             | - | - | - | *196,848    |
| Making a total of Charge in 1802-3      | - | - | - | £10,656,834 |

\* These charges are greater by 19,662*l*. than those stated by lord Castlereagh, in his speech of the 19th of July, 1804.

To this must be added the additional Civil Charges to be incurred in consequence of the late acquisitions, of which I shall also read an estimate :

*ESTIMATE of the Annual Increased Civil and Military Charges incurred in India since the Year 1802-3.*

**PENSIONS AND JAGHEERS.**

|  | Rups. of Sorts. | Sonant Rups. |
|--|-----------------|--------------|
| Scindeah and his Family . . . .                                      | 7,00,000        |              |
| Royal Family at Delhi, including<br>the expence of irregular corps } | 17,00,000       |              |
| Begum Sunroo . . . . .   | 10,00,000       |              |
| Total in Rupees of Sorts . .   | 34,00,000       | or 32,64,000 |

**CIVIL ESTABLISHMENTS.**

|  |          |            |
|--|----------|------------|
| Salary and establishments of seven<br>Judges and Magistrates . . . } | 3,92,000 |            |
| Ditto of six Collectors . . . .                                      | 2,23,200 |            |
| Residency at Delhi . . . . .   | 1,44,000 |            |
| Civil charges at Bombay . . . .                                      | 40,800   |            |
|  |          | 8,00,000   |
| Total of Civil Charges, &c. in St. Rs. . . . .                       |          | 40,64,000  |
| Ditto in Sicca Rupees . . . . .                                      |          | 38,20,160  |
| Total of Ditto in Pounds Sterling . . . . .                          |          | £. 477,520 |

**MILITARY CHARGES.**

**IN BENGAL.**

|  |          |           |
|--|----------|-----------|
| Two regiments of Native Cavalry,<br>at 20,000 Rupees per month. }                        | 40,000   |           |
| Seven Ditto of Native Infantry,<br>at 30,000 each per month . . }                        | 2,10,000 |           |
| Horse artillery . . . . .  | 2,000    |           |
| Extra cattle to the Increase . . .   | 10,000   |           |
| Off-reckonings . . . . .   | 17,000   |           |
| Wear and tear of two regiments<br>of cavalry . . . . . }                                 | 5,000    |           |
| Military stores, contingencies,<br>buildings, &c. not fixed in the<br>amoyat . . . . . } | 25,000   |           |
| Per month . . . . .  | 3,09,000 |           |
| Per ann. . . . .   |          | 37,08,000 |

Rups. of Sorts.    Sont. Rups.

**FORT ST. GEORGE.**

|   |                            |           |
|---|----------------------------|-----------|
| One regiment of Native cavalry, }<br>including off-reckonings . . . . } | 22,100                     |           |
| Four regiments of Native infantry, }<br>at 29,000 each . . . . . }      | 1,16,000                   |           |
| Off-reckonings . . . . .  | 6,400                      |           |
| Military stores, and other charges .                                    | 15,000                     |           |
| Wear and tear of horses for one regt.                                   | 2,500                      |           |
|   | <u>Per month . . . . .</u> |           |
|   | Per ann. . . . .           | 19,44,000 |

**BOMBAY.**

|   |                            |                   |
|---|----------------------------|-------------------|
| One regiment of infantry . . . . .                                  | 29,000                     |                   |
| Off-reckonings, &c. . . . .   | 1,600                      |                   |
|   | <u>Per month . . . . .</u> |                   |
|   | Per ann. . . . .           | 3,67,200          |
| Total increase of the Military }<br>Charges, in Sonant Rupees . . } |                            | 60,19,200         |
| Ditto, in Sicca Rupees . . . . .                                    |                            | 56,40,000         |
| Ditto, in Pounds sterling . . . . .                                 |                            | <u>£. 705,000</u> |

**A B S T R A C T.**

|                                     | Sonant<br>Rupees. | Sicca<br>Rupees. | Pounds<br>Sterling. | Total<br>Sterling. |
|-------------------------------------|-------------------|------------------|---------------------|--------------------|
| Civil Charges, }<br>Pensions, &c. } | 40,64,000         | 38,20,160        | 477,520             | } £.<br>1,182,520  |
| Military Ditto.                     | 60,19,200         | 56,40,000        | 705,000             |                    |

The increase of the Military Establishments required in India, and which I have now estimated beyond those of 1802-3, are two regiments of native cavalry, and seven regiments of native infantry, in Bengal; one regiment of native cavalry, and four regiments of native infantry on the establishment of Fort St. George; and one regiment of native infantry on the establishment of Bombay.—In the general distribution of the armies in India, which was made subsequently to the treaties of peace concluded at the end of the year 1803, it was settled, that the army of Bengal should supply the troops required for the subsidiary force to serve with Scindeah, (being six battalions) and the subsidiary force to serve with the Ranah of Gohud, (being three battalions) as well as troops for the Company's territories under the Presidency of Bengal, including the acquisitions in Bundelcund, those made from Scindeah in the Doab and in Hindustan, and the province of Cuttack.—By the same distribution, the government of Fort St. George was to supply, as it had formerly done, the troops to serve with the Nizam; and all those required for the southern parts of the Peninsula, including the garrisons and provinces on the coast of Malabar, (with the exception of Goa) and one regiment of cavalry for the Peishwah;—and the government of Bombay ~~was to~~ supply six battalions for the subsidiary force to serve with the Peishwah, three battalions to serve with the Quickwar, a garrison for Bombay, a garrison for Goa, and troops to occupy the territories ceded by the Peishwah and the Quickwar in Guzerat, and in the neighbourhood of Surat.

The establishments in the year 1802-3 having been formed on the lowest scale, compatible with tranquillity and security, and with a view to external peace, it stands to reason, that they could not supply the additional troops required from them, without some additions. The establishment of Bengal required an addition of six battalions to serve with Scindeah, and three to serve with the Ranah of Gohud. The smallest number that could be required for the protection to be given to the cities of Delhi and Agra, to the person of the king, and to the territories in the Doab, in Hindustan, and in Cuttack, is two regiments of native cavalry, and five battalions of native infantry; which numbers complete the augmentation (viz. fourteen battalions) made to the Bengal army since 1802-3.

By the late arrangements made in India with Scindeah, it appears that the subsidiary troops for that chieftain, and for the Ranah of Gohud, will not be required for those services; and if it had been intended to make a more favourable statement of the finances in India, than their situation warrants, it would have been possible to strike off from the estimate of in-

creased military charges, (amounting, as I have already shewn, to upwards of 60 lacks of Rupees,) the expence of four regiments of native infantry, at least: but it is apprehended, that the service of a portion of these troops will be required in Bundelcund for some time; and, at all events, that the number of two regiments of native cavalry, and five battalions of native infantry, is scarcely sufficient to perform the additional services which will be required from the Bengal army, in consequence of the additions made to the territories under the Bengal government, by the treaties of peace concluded at the end of the year 1803.

In consequence of the distribution made in the year 1804, the duties of the provinces on the coast of Malabar, which, in 1802-3, had been performed by the army of Bombay, fell to the lot of the army of Fort St. George. These duties had always required eight battalions; and when, in consequence of the distribution which I have already noticed, it had become necessary to remove the Bombay troops from those provinces to the Northward, an augmentation of the army of Fort St. George, to the amount of four regiments, became necessary. The regiment of cavalry to be supplied to the Peishwah, also required that a regiment should be added to the establishment of Fort St. George.—The duties which fell upon the Bombay army by the distribution of 1804, required for the subsidiary force with the Peishwah six battalions, for the subsidiary force with the Guickwar three battalions, and garrisons for Bombay, Goa, Broach, Surat, and troops to occupy the territories of Guzerat and in the neighbourhood of Surat, ceded by the Peishwah, and the Guickwar, and conquered from Scindeah; the detailed number for each of which services, it is not necessary to mention.

It will be observed from this statement, that the additional services required from the armies of Fort St. George and Bombay, in the year 1804, and at the present moment, beyond those required in the year 1802-3, exclusive of the garrison for Goa, are one regiment of cavalry, and six battalions for the Peishwah, three battalions for the Guickwar, and troops for the conquered and ceded territories in Guzerat. Accordingly, the addition made to the military establishments, the expenses of which are included in the estimate of 60 lacks, are one regiment of cavalry and four regiments of native infantry for Fort St. George, and one regiment for Bombay; making, in the whole, ten battalions.—No reductions of these establishments can, in my judgment, be made with safety. The total of charges, therefore, for a future peace establishment, including the charges of 1802-3, and adding the civil and military

charges occasioned by treaties of subsidy, and by the consequences of the Mahratta war, will stand thus :

|   |   |   |   |   |              |
|---|---|---|---|---|--------------|
| Charges of 1802-3   | - | - | - | - | 10,656,834   |
| Additional civil charges, rendered necessary by treaties of subsidy, peace, &c. | - | - | - | - | 477,520      |
| Additional military charges   | - | - | - | - | 705,000      |
|   |   |   |   |   | <hr/>        |
| Total future charges  | - | - | - | - | 11,839,354   |
| The revenues, as before stated, will be   | - | - | - | - | 14,668,119   |
|   |   |   |   |   | <hr/>        |
| Leaving a surplus revenue of  | - | - | - | - | £. 2,828,765 |
|   |   |   |   |   | <hr/>        |

From this sum must be deducted the interest of the debt, as stated in the account No. 2, page 93, 1,823,010*l.* to which sum must be added the interest on the sum to be borrowed to supply the deficiency in the year 1805-6, viz. 2,655,957*l.* being at 10 per cent, 265,595*l.* making the total interest of the debt, in 1806, 2,088,605*l.* and the actual surplus, after providing for every demand, will be 740,130*l.* In calculating this surplus, no credit is taken for any augmentation of revenue beyond 1802-3; although it is certain, that some branches, such as salt and opium, must be, and have been already augmented; ~~the~~ revenues of the provinces gained by the peace, will also produce more than they have been estimated at.

The actual Debt in India, in April, 1805, was, according to account No. 1, page 99, 28,197,198*l.* including arrears of establishments, Debts not bearing interest, and demands upon the Company of every description. —To this Debt must be added the deficiency of resource, as stated in page 93, for the year 1805-6, being 2,655,957*l.* and the total gross debt, on the 30th of April 1806, will be 30,873,155*l.* From this sum ought to be subtracted 3,151,614*l.* (being the amount in possession of the commissioners for the redemption of the Debt, on the 30th of April 1805,) and the balance will give 27,722,591*l.* for the net Debt of India on the 30th April 1806; of which sum, the amount bearing interest, appears to be 24,250,821*l.*

When this Debt, however large, is compared with the Assets in India, and with the value of the forts, houses, warehouses, &c. in India, (valued in No. 23, page 78, at 9,994,208*l.* all necessary for carrying on government, which have cost money, and would cost money to the Company's successors, whoever they might be, supposing the transfer of the territory ever to take place,) and when to these sums are added the amount of the Company's claims upon government for money expended in India, on account of the public, it may fairly be stated, that the actual value of the property of the East India Company in India, exceeds the amount of their debts.

I am aware of an error in this statement, as in this view of the Debts and Assets, the amount in the possession of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund ought to be subtracted from the amount of the Quick Stock, on the 30th of April 1804. But there is an error also in the Assets. The Quick Stock is estimated only to April 1804, and is stated in page 72, to amount to 17,252,399*l*. But in the calculation of these Assets, there is an omission of 12,48,600 pagodas in the cash at Fort St. George. It appears by the paper No. 19, page 63, that the balance remaining in the different departments at Fort St. George, on the 30th of April 1804, was 57,19,605 pagodas; whereas credit is given in the account of the Assets to the same period, for only 44,71,005 pagodas. The difference between these sums ought to be credited to the Assets in April 1804, viz. 12,48,600, or 500,000*l*.\*

The additional sum in the hands of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, on the 30th April 1805, ought likewise to be added to the Assets calculated to that period. The sum stated in page 48 to be in the hands of the Commissioners for the reduction of the Debt on the 30th April

|   |   |   |   |   |   |                     |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---------------------|
| 1804, is  | - | - | - | - | - | Ct. Rs. 2,80,00,563 |
| On the 30th April 1805, it is                   | - | - | - | - | - | Ct. Rs. 3,15,10,648 |
| Difference to be added to the Assets calculated |   |   |   |   |   |                     |
| up to April 1805                                | - | - | - | - | - | 35,10,085           |

In estimating the Assets to April 1806, it is proper to add to them the sum which will be in the hands of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund in April 1806, viz.

|  |   |   |   |   |   |           |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| Interest upon the sum of 3,15,10,648 Current Rupees, for one year, from April 1805, to April 1806, at eight per cent. is about | - | - | - | - | - | 25,00,000 |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|

To the Assets then, as they stood in April 1804, *£*.

viz. - - - - - 17,252,399

Must be added the sum at Madras omitted - - - 500,000

The additional sum stated to be in the hands of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund in April 1805 - - - - - 351,008

The interest upon 3,15,10,648 Rs. or 3,151,064*l*. for one year to April 1806, - - - - - 250,000

And the total of the Assets in April 1806, will be *£*.18,353,407

This view of the Debt and Assets of different descriptions, however, is taken only as a general one, and not by any means

\* There is also a small sum of money omitted in the cash at Bombay, but this is not taken into the account.

to be relied upon. Measures undoubtedly ought to be taken to reduce the amount of the debt; but if, from circumstances, those means should be impracticable, this general statement will serve to shew, that in case of the transfer of the territory, upon the conclusion of the charter, there is value in India to the amount of the debt.—But it may be contended, that this statement is no justification of the amount of the Debt, which, from 1793, when it was 7,362,190*l.* has increased to be, in April 1806, 27,722,391*l.* of which sum 16,669,745*l.* have been incurred since 1798, under the administration of the late Governor-General, Marquis Wellesley.

In order to understand the mode in which this Debt has been incurred, it is necessary to advert to the state of the Company's affairs, in the year 1798.

|   |   |   |   |              |
|---|---|---|---|--------------|
| The Revenues at that time were                    | - | - | - | £. 8,059,880 |
| The Charges, including supplies to Bencoolen, &c. |   |   |   | 765,654      |
| The Interest of the Debt was                      | - | - | - | 603,926      |
| Leaving a Deficiency of resource or a Surplus net |   |   |   |              |
| Charge, of  | - | - | - | 194,700      |
| The Debt in 1798 was                              | - | - | - | 11,032,645   |
| The Assets in India were                          | - | - | - | 9,922,903    |

This state of the resources in India had been occasioned by a laudable desire to increase the investment as much as was possible, which will be seen by a review of what had passed between the years 1793 and 1798.

|  |   |   |              |
|--|---|---|--------------|
| In April 1793 the Revenues of India were   | - | - | £. 8,294,399 |
| The Charges, including Bencoolen, &c. were |   |   | 6,155,968    |
| The Interest of the Debt was               | - | - | 526,205      |
| The Debt was                               | - | - | 7,362,190    |
| The Assets were                            | - | - | 8,834,538    |

|   |   |   |   |           |
|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| The Surplus Revenue, after providing for all  |   |   |   |           |
| Charges, exclusive of receipts for sales, &c. |   |   |   |           |
| was   | - | - | - | 1,612,226 |

In the course of the five years between 1793 and 1798, the following events occurred to increase the Charges in India: there was war in Europe; an expedition was fitted out against Mauritius; and another against Manilla; Pondicherry and Cochin were taken; and maritime expeditions were sent against Ceylon, Malacca, and the eastern islands.—It was necessary to keep up large establishments in the conquests made; and salaries were paid to the civil and military servants of our enemies who became our prisoners.—During the same period of time, the Company's military establishments in India were new-modelled, and this occasioned an increase of expense. The civil and judicial establishments in Bengal were



fixed on the just scale on which they exist at this day; which at that time occasioned an increase of annual expense to a very considerable amount. Accordingly it appears, that the actual charges of the civil and military establishments in 1798, exceeded the actual charges of the civil and military establishment in the year 1793, in the amount of 1,372,209*l.* and the supplies to Bencoolen &c. of 1798, exceeded those of 1793 in the amount of 102,477*l.* But the efficient cause of the state in which the finances were found, in the year 1798, was the continuance to send home investment at the high rate at which it had been fixed in the year 1793, notwithstanding that the charges of India had necessarily increased, and the revenues had decreased to the amount of 234,349*l.*

|  |   |   |              |
|--|---|---|--------------|
| By reference to the accounts, it will be found, that in the five years between 1793 and 1798, the cost and charges of investments sent home to Europe, was | - | - | £. 9,892,794 |
| Supplies to China  | - | - | 339,444      |
| Amount advanced in India to the king's and company's ships during the same period, was   | - |   | 551,952      |
| Making a total disbursed on account of London, of  | - | - | 10,784,190   |
| The amount of Supplies received from Europe, in the same period, for bills drawn, stores, merchandize, export sales, and bullion, was                      | - |   | 8,744,425    |
| Leaving a balance of   | - | - | 7,039,765    |
| against London.  |   |   |              |

It appears by what is above stated, that the Charges in India, between 1793 and 1798, had increased considerably; but there was upon the five years a surplus of Receipt of revenue beyond the Charges, amounting to 4,181,559*l.* which being deducted from the balance before stated, against London, leaves the sum of 2,858,206*l.* which must have been borrowed in India at high interest, for the purchase of investment.

|  |   |   |   |              |
|--|---|---|---|--------------|
| It will be found, that the Debt incurred in the five years, from 1793 to 1798, was | - | - | - | £. 3,665,455 |
| The increase of the Assets in those five years was                                 |   |   |   | 1,088,365    |
| Those in 1793 being  | - | - | - | 8,834,538    |
| Those in 1798 being  | - | - | - | 9,922,903    |
| And the actual increase of the Debt in comparison with the Assets, was             | - | - | - | 2,557,090    |

In a minute which Lord Wellesley recorded in June 1798, he reviewed the state of the Finances in India, and pointed out the real cause of the increase of Debt in the following words :

" From that paper it appears, that, allowing for a supply in the course of the year 1798-9 to Fort St. George, of 75,00,000 sicca rupees, or 937,500*l.*, and to Bombay of 25,00,000, or 312,500*l.*, the deficiency for which provision must be made, in order to meet the expected demands at the three Presidencies respectively, will be

|              |                   |             |
|--------------|-------------------|-------------|
| in . . . . . | Bengal, . . . . . | 1,28,68,360 |
| "            | Madras, . . . . . | 43,45,351   |
| "            | Bombay, . . . . . | 41,67,611   |

" The total deficiency therefore at the three Presidencies together, will amount to sicca rupees 2,13,81,521, or 2,672,655*l.*

" The immediate causes of the estimated deficiency, will appear obvious from the annexed accounts.

" By account (No. 2) the sums appropriated in India to the purposes of investments and commercial charges, in the years 1796-7 and 1797-8 amounted to . . . . . 4,96,45,165

" current rupees; having been, in 1796-7 . . . . . 2,30,70,125

" . . . . . and in 1797-8 . . . . . 2,65,45,040

" and exceeding the amount of Bills drawn upon the Court of Directors from India, within the same period, by the sum of 3,83,39,263

" current rupees; the bills drawn on the Court of Directors having been, in 1796-7 . . . . . 79,88,699

" and in 1797-8 . . . . . 32,87,203

" And by account (No. 3) it appears, that the proposed investment, for 1798, from all our India possessions, including the supply promised to Canton, amounts to 2,40,88,000 current rupees.

" But the accounts Nos. 4, 5, and 6, shew, that the total sum applicable to the purchase of investment from the revenues in India, and produce of sales of imports from Europe was, in 1796-7 . . . . . 81,43,858

" In 1797-8 . . . . . 96,44,550

" and is estimated to be in 1798-9 . . . . . 78,20,133

" This annual demand for the purpose of investment, upon a scale so far exceeding the annual means of the three Presidencies, is the principal cause of the present deficiency.

" The comparative view which I have taken of our expenses and receipts, in examining the causes of our actual distress, sufficiently

" proves, that many of those causes are of an absolute permanent nature, and that most of them must be expected to continue for

" a considerable time; that the investment, at once the most powerful cause of our temporary distress, the main spring of the industry and opulence of the people committed to our charge, and

" the active principle of the commercial interests of the Company, is more likely to be increased than to be diminished in any future

" year; and, consequently, that the embarrassments of our finances must be progressive, if some means be not devised for aiding the

" resources of this Presidency, which must now be considered as the general treasury and bank of our Indian empire, furnishing

" supplies for the services of all our other possessions in India, as well as a large and increasing proportion of the capital employed

" in trade to Europe and to China.

"The mode of supplying this assistance which I would recommend, has already been suggested by the accountant-general, and seems to unite several advantages with relation to the interests both of India and Great Britain: it is comprised in the following propositions.

"That it be respectfully recommended to the honourable the Court of Directors, to take the earliest occasion of sending out supplies to India to the amount of eighty-five lacs of rupees, or 1,062,500*l.* in addition to their usual consignments, by an increase of their annual export of British manufactures and produce, to Bengal and Bombay, to the full extent of the indents from Bengal and Bombay respectively; and by an annual supply of silver bullion to Bengal, to the amount of fifty lacs, or 625,000*l.* The supply of bullion to be provided in part, by a proportionate reduction in their usual consignment to China.

"The increase of the export of British manufacture and produce to Bengal and Bombay, will, probably, afford considerably relief to the finances of this government; as, by reference to the account of sales of Imports from England, it appears, that the average profit upon the Imports from England, sold in Bengal in 1796-7, has been above twenty per cent. and at Bombay thirty-five per cent. and that the demand is increasing. This measure would, at the same time, obviously become highly beneficial to the interests of Great Britain.

"The export of silver to Bengal would be more advantageous to the Company than the payment of bills, at the present high rate of exchange; a rate which will probably continue for a considerable period of time. Such a stock of silver would be a relief both to public and private credit, and would invigorate all the financial operations of this Government. From this resource supplies might easily be furnished to Canton, through the medium of the trade in Opium.

"If the sale of British manufactures in Bengal and at Bombay should equal the general expectation, an additional supply of near a crore of rupees (1,250,000*l.*) would accrue to this presidency from the combined result of the two proposed measures. This supply would be nearly equal to the probable amount of the permanent deficiency of our resources.

"Nothing would be more just than to appropriate a proportion of the profits arising from the Sale Amount of the Investment in Europe to the augmentation of the Funds necessary for the purchase of investment in India. Unless some such plan be adopted, or some other means devised of furnishing aid to the resources of Bengal from England, it is evident, that a reduction in the amount of the Indian investment will soon become inevitable; for it cannot be denied, that a very large proportion of the Capital which has passed into Europe through the medium of Indian Commerce, for these last two years, and is about to pass in the present year, has been, and must be created by loans of money raised in India, under every circumstance of disadvantage. The increase of the Investment, therefore, during the period described, must be viewed as representing, not the surplus revenue, but the increased debt of India. The circulating Capital of India, which is known to be very inconsiderable,

“ in proportion to the productive and commercial power of  
 “ country, cannot supply so large a drain for any long period of  
 “ time, even in the event of peace; but if the war in Europe  
 “ should continue, the difficulty of raising money for the public ser-  
 “ vice, by loans to be negociated in India, must become nearly  
 “ insurmountable.”

At that early period of time, the Governor-general earnestly urged the Company to provide for the provision of investment, by increasing the amount of the supplies sent from Europe. They were still continued, however, upon a scale much too low for the amount of the investment, notwithstanding the efforts which were undoubtedly made by the noble lord who, at that time, presided at the Board of Controul, and by my noble friend, (lord Castlereagh) and by the Court of Directors, to send out larger sums.

By a reference to the papers before the house of commons, it will be found, that the total amount of the sums laid out in Investment, from April 1798 to April 1804,

|  |   |   |   |   |   |   |             |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|-------------|
| was  | - | - | - | - | - | - | £.9,619,348 |
| Supplies to China  | - | - | - | - | - | - | 1,761,263   |
| Of advances to the King's and to the Company's<br>chartered ships in the same period | - | - | - | - | - | - | 448,931     |

Making a total advanced in India, up to 1804 - 11,829,542

In making up the account of the sums advanced  
 in India, on account of the home concern, the  
 following must be added:

|                     |   |   |   |   |   |           |
|---------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| Advances for Ceylon | - | - | - | - | - | 1,182,472 |
|---------------------|---|---|---|---|---|-----------|

Making a total advanced for the home concern,  
 up to April 1804 - - - - £.13,012,014

The total actual amount of the supplies received in India by the sale of goods, in bullion and stores, and for bills drawn on the Directors, in the same period, appears to be, £.9,864,086  
 The balance is - - - - - 3,147,725  
 for which London is indebted to India. \

It may be said, that the Company had a right to expect aid from the territorial resources of India; that the revenues have increased since April 1798; and that the financial distresses which existed at that period were very soon removed.

The events which have occurred since April 1798, must be recollected. The first of these, in point of time, was the war against Tippoo Sultaun; at the same time that a large army was put into the field on the frontiers of Oude, to oppose Zemaun Shah. The army of Fort St. George did not return to its quarters till the month of December 1799; and in the

month of May 1800, the army of Fort St. George was assembled again, and put down the rebellion of Doondeah Waug. Before this service was completed, an expedition was fitted out against Egypt; and, in a very few months after the troops had returned from Egypt, the armies of Fort St. George and Bombay were assembled and increased, in consequence of the disturbances in the Mahratta empire.—Besides all this, the pay of the King's and Company's troops, serving under Fort St. George, was increased; and the civil and judicial establishments, under that government, were placed on a more just scale than they had been before.

During these great and extensive military operations, a variety of others were necessarily carried on in different parts of the Peninsula, each of which had a tendency to increase the military charges.

According to this statement, it appears, that a very considerable proportion of the debt in India had been incurred at different times by the purchase of investment. If the account between the revenues of India and the Company had been kept in the form of a merchant's account, or in the manner in which the East India Company keep their account against the public, the interest upon each sum borrowed for the commerce of the Company would have been carried to account against them from the moment at which such sum was borrowed.

|   |                    |
|---|--------------------|
| In this view of the case, the interest at 10 per cent. upon             |                    |
| 2,858,206 <i>l</i> . being the amount laid out in India beyond supplies |                    |
| from England, and surplus revenue previous to 1798, would               |                    |
| be annually   | <i>£</i> . 285,820 |
| And for eight years to 1806   | 2,126,560          |
| The Interest upon the sums borrowed since                               |                    |
| 1798, each from their respective number of                              |                    |
| years to 1806   | 633,005            |

|                   |                      |
|-------------------|----------------------|
| Making a total of | <i>£</i> . 2,759,565 |
|-------------------|----------------------|

It is evident that all these sums have been charges upon the revenues, and of course have contributed to swell the amount of the existing debt.

There is also in the amount of the debts incurred during lord Wellesley's government, as before stated, a sum of 1,200,000*l*. on the revenue of the Carnatic, with interest; which debt was incurred in a former period, previously to lord Wellesley's arrival. The mode in which this debt was incurred is as follows:—The registered Creditors, under the act of 1784, had a right to certain portions of the annual payments made to the Company by the Nabob, under the treaty concluded with that prince by sir Archibald Campbell.

In the year 1791, lord Cornwallis assumed the Nabob's countries, and applied all the revenues to defray the civil and military charges of the Company. The Creditors applied for payment to the Company, and the decision was not passed upon the subject till after the year 1798, when the principal which had been due in 1791, with interest calculated to that period, was added to the Company's bonded debt of Fort St. George.

But there is another view which may be taken of the Debt of 27,722,391*l.* which is supposed to be due in India, on the 30th April 1806; 16,669,745*l.* of which have been incurred since the 30th of April 1798.

The Assets in India, in April 1798, were - - - £.9,922,903  
In April 1806, supposing them the same as in

April 1804, they were - - - 17,252,399  
Increase of Assets in that period is - - - 7,229,493  
Subtract the Increase of Assets from the amount of  
the Increased Debt since 1798, and the remainder  
will be - - - 9,440,252  
which is the net Increase of Debt.

Set off against the net Increase of Debt the sum of 3,147,725 being the sum applied to investment, to supplies to China, and to his Majesty's and to the Company's chartered ships, beyond the amount of the exports and supplies from Europe, and the result will be, that the debt incurred in India, on account of civil and military establishments and services of all descriptions, including the Egyptian expedition, is 6,292,517*l.*\* in eight years, from April 1798, to April 1806.

This view is liable to the same exception as the former, on account of the errors in the accounts of the Assets: but the error is not of very great magnitude. In this account of debt, supposed to have been incurred on account of political expenses, is included the amount of supplies to Bencoolen and St. Helena, which, in the six years from 1798 to 1804 only, amount to 1,096,736*l.*

Upon a review of the accounts which have been laid before parliament at different times, it appears, that large sums have been expended in India, for services chargeable to his Majesty's Government; the Egyptian expedition was carried on

|  |                  |
|--|------------------|
| * Increase of debt as above, for services in India                           | £. 6,292,527     |
| Deduct Egyptian Expedition   | £. 902,861       |
| Carnatic debt, with interest, as stated in Lord Castlereagh's printed Budget | 1,800,000        |
|  | <u>2,702,861</u> |

Residue for the net debt incurred on account of Indian Ex-  
penses, during eight years . . . . . £.3,589,666

at the expense of the Company; and expenses have been incurred in India, on account of expeditions against the Danish settlements, and of their capture; for all of which expenses, the Company have a claim upon the public.—But as these expenses have been incurred in India, and have been a charge upon its revenues, the amount allowed for them, and paid, or to be paid to the Company, ought fairly to be set off against the amount of the debt, as well as the sums advanced to his Majesty's ships, and for the Government of Ceylon already noticed.

There are other sums also which now constitute a part of the debt in India, the value of which the Company have received in England.—The total charge of the Molucca Islands, during the time they were in the possession of the British Government, ought to be carried against the home concern in the analysis of the debt in India; as nearly the whole of the produce of the Moluccas was sent home, and sold for the benefit of the East India Company.

After this view of the Debt, it is to be hoped that its amount, considering all the circumstances which have contributed to raise it, will not prove, that the Company's affairs have been managed in an improvident manner; and that the public will see, in the general situation of the Company's finances, ample means of reducing this debt to any amount that may be deemed advisable.—If the mode proposed of drawing a proportion of the debt to England be adopted, and the saving of interest, which will be the result of this operation, be added to the annual interest calculated to amount to 250,000*l.* upon the principal now in the hands of the commissioners for the redemption of the debt, this revenue alone will make an impression upon the debt, which must soon reduce it to the level to which every body wishes to see it reduced.

Notwithstanding the large amount of the debt, and the embarrassments occasioned in India, at different times, by the great demands for the various services which were in progress, the Company's credit was improving from the moment of lord Wellesley's arrival in India, to the moment of his departure.—On the first of June 1798, the 12 per cent. paper in Bengal bore a discount of  $\frac{3}{4}$  to  $\frac{1}{4}$  per cent; on the 29th of July 1805, the 12 per cents. were all paid off, and the 10 per cent. paper bore a premium of 4 per cent. In June 1798, the 8 per cent. paper was at a discount of from  $12\frac{1}{2}$  to  $13\frac{1}{2}$  per cent.; in the beginning of 1805, the 8 per cent. were at par, and would have continued so, if it had been possible to send out specie from England at an early period in the season. In July 1805, they were at a discount of from  $3\frac{1}{4}$  to  $3\frac{3}{4}$  per cent.; in June 1798, the 6 per cent. paper was at 21 per cent. discount, in 1805, the 6 per cents. bore a discount of only  $8\frac{1}{4}$  per cent.

This improving state of the credit is to be attributed to the public confidence gained by the regularity and publicity of all the financial operations of the Government, by the measure of establishing funds at Fort St. George and in Bengal for the redemption of Debt; and by the judicious measures adopted for the improvement of the revenue.—The amount in possession of the commissioners for the redemption of the debt, on the 30th of April 1805, as appears in page 90 of the printed accounts, is 3,151,064*l.* which sum at eight per cent. interest, will give nearly 250,000*l.* per annum for the reduction of the debt:

The improvements effected in the revenue during lord Wellesley's government also deserve notice. Exclusive of the increase of revenue, by territorial acquisitions, and by subsidies, it appears, that every branch of the revenue of 1798, under the Bengal government, which, in the five preceding years had decreased to the amount of 234,519*l.* was improved, under lord Wellesley's government, as follows:

|  | 1798.             | 1803-4            | Increase.         |
|--|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
|  | <i>S. Rupees.</i> | <i>S. Rupees.</i> | <i>S. Rupees.</i> |
| Mint Duties - - -                                | 64,510            | 68,042            | 3,502             |
| Post Office - - -                                | 1,10,398          | 2,18,127          | 1,47,729          |
| Stamp Duties - - -                               | 92,416            | 5,47,137          | 4,54,721          |
| Licenses for the sale of<br>spirited liquors - - | 47,531            | 1,38,209          | 90,678            |
| Fees and fines - - -                             | 6,606             | 96,049            | 89,443            |
| Provincial Police - -                            | 4,37,938          | 4,56,217          | 29,239            |
| Land revenue - - -                               | 2,98,25,933       | 3,18,05,421       | 19,79,438         |
| Salt - - - - -                                   | 1,08,02,783       | 1,53,74,223       | 50,71,440         |
| Opium - - - - -                                  | 20,34,184         | 39,39,200         | 19,05,016         |
| Customs - - - - -                                | 12,51,469         | 32,23,865         | 20,23,396         |

|   |               |              |
|---|---------------|--------------|
| Increase of the old Revenues of<br>Bengal during lord Wellesley's<br>government | Sicca Rupees. | 1,07,94,652  |
|   | Sterl.        | £. 1,349,331 |

The total increase of revenues during lord Wellesley's administration, in different parts of India, is - - - £.6,608,239  
 The revenues having been, in 1798, - - - 8,059,880  
 And those estimated by me for the future - - - 14,668,119

The general commerce of the country is improved equally with the revenue. It appears, by the public documents before the House of Commons, that the commerce of India is now able to supply the China market so effectually, as nearly to preclude the necessity of sending bullion to China; and large sums in specie are now imported into India from that country.

After the view which I have taken of the general situation of the affairs of the East India Company in India, I have to it



will be found, that their Debt, although large, and certainly pressing in a very great degree upon their prosperity, and upon the attention of those who have the management of their affairs, is not of a magnitude to create any danger; that it appears, that there are means of reducing it, at no very great distance of time, to a moderate amount, and that, under the auspices of the noble lord, (Morpeth) by a just attention to the system of economy which he has recommended, and by reverting to the system and scale of establishments fixed in 1802-3, with such augmentations as the change of affairs has rendered necessary, and as I have already described, the revenues of that great empire will be found to afford ample means of restoring the finances.

Mr. WHITSIED KEENE said, he greatly preferred the situation of India at present, to what it was in 1798, and had such confidence in the benefit that would result from the territorial acquisitions made by marquis Wellesley, inasmuch as they had left no footing for Buonaparte, that he would invest all his property, had he ten times what he possessed, in India stock.

Mr. GRANT said, he had a statement in his hand which he had reason to believe to be correct; the only mode of ascertaining where the error lay, was by comparison; it was impossible then to enter into the detail; it might be done upon the report.

Mr. PRINSEP declared, that he could not allow the committee to rise without first delivering his opinion, at great length, on the alarming aspect of the Company's affairs, which he declared to be in a state of absolute insolvency. Rather than again forego his privilege, of which he had been more than once deprived in the way now attempted, he would count the house. He was ready at that late hour to enter into this investigation, or to adjourn the debate.

Mr. G. SMITH denied that the Company was in a state of insolvency, and said, that such an assertion as that which the honourable member had made, required some further explanation.

Mr. PRINSEP was proceeding to account for the opinion which he had expressed, when

Lord CASTLEREAGH observed, that, from the honourable member's course of reasoning, it was evident that his ex-

man reported progress and obtained leave to sit again on Tuesday next.

## DEBATE ON THE 15th OF JULY.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

*Tuesday, July 15.*

Lord MORPETH moved the order of the day, for resuming the adjourned debate on the East-India Budget. The house having resolved itself into a committee,

Mr. GRANT said, that after the clear and satisfactory exposition given by the noble lord (Morpeth) of the present state of the Company's affairs, it was not his intention to have entered into much observation upon them; but, as the hon. general (Sir A. Wellesley) had, on the first night of the debate, brought forward a variety of statements, which, in fact, amounted to another Exposé of those affairs, having, for its object, a justification, or, rather, commendation, of the financial management of lord Wellesley, it became his duty to submit to the house the views he entertained of the principal subjects treated of in the hon. General's speech. But, first, it would be necessary for him to advert to some remarks which had fallen, on the preceding night, from another hon. gent. (Mr. Francis). That hon. gent. had said, that the Company's Sales were now acknowledged to be productive of loss. Mr. Grant denied, that any such acknowledgment was made by those connected with the Company, or that the statements on the table would support the hon. gentleman's allegations in respect to loss on the Sales. The amount of Profit on Sales ending 1st March 1805, Mr. Grant observed, was, by the printed account on the table, No. 25 - - - £.1,172,779 And the Charges of all kinds were per said account - 1,591,212

Leaving an apparent deficiency of. - - - - 418,540

But among these Charges, were several articles which did not belong to the commerce, and were entirely of a territorial nature, such as Political Charges on account of the territory; in all - - - - 0

Military ditto - - - - -

St. Helena Charges are stated at - 76,0

But the average of 3 years is only 63.

The total of these is - - - - - 392,496

Leaving a deficit of only - - - - - £.25,924

His right fairly be placed, also, to the Political Charges, because the settlement of St. Helena answered; and pur-

poses, as well as commercial, and a part of its charge ought justly to go to the former head. It would be unfair, however, to judge of the result of the Company's commerce by the last year; because the Imports from India, in that year, were most uncommonly small, the advances for them in India having been less than the estimate in the Indian accounts of 1804-5, in the sum of rupees 41,78,282; and the Sales also were, from the unsettled state of Europe, much more unfavourable than usual, as would appear from reverting to the accounts of former years.

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| In 9 years, from 1795 to 1803; the average of | £.        |
| profits was                                   | 1,397,971 |

|                                       |   |   |           |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|-----------|
| In 5 years, from 1799 to 1803, in was | - | - | 1,677,517 |
|---------------------------------------|---|---|-----------|

|                              |   |   |   |           |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|-----------|
| In 2 years, in 1804 and 1805 | - | - | - | 1,185,307 |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|-----------|

|   |         |
|---|---------|
| Difference short, in the average of the 2 last years, |         |
| per annum   | 492,210 |

Mr. Grant said, he should have occasion, in the sequel, to notice some other things, advanced by the honourable gentleman (Mr. Francis); but, in the mean time, would address himself to the Statement of accounts between India and Europe, which the honourable General had delivered in his speech on the former night. By that Statement, the honourable General made the Commerce with Europe to be indebted to the Territorial Revenue, from April 1798 to April 1804, in the sum of - - - - - £. 3,578,590

|  |   |           |
|--|---|-----------|
| And, from April 1793 to April 1798, in | - | 2,216,032 |
|--|---|-----------|

|      |           |
|------|-----------|
| Both | 5,794,622 |
|------|-----------|

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| To which if the Interest on these sums be added, |           |
| it would be                                      | 2,407,839 |

|                   |              |
|-------------------|--------------|
| Making a total of | £. 8,202,461 |
|-------------------|--------------|

He did not question, that the honourable General was satisfied as to the accuracy of the Statement he thus brought forward; but it would be found to be extremely erroneous. In an Account drawn up with great care at the India House, which he (Mr. Grant) had occasion, in a former session, to produce to the house, and which he now held in his hand, the Debits and Credits between Britain, on the one

India and China, on the other, from the year 1788-9 to 1802-3, forming a period of 15 years, stood thus :

|  |               |
|--|---------------|
| Total amount of supplies of Goods, Stores, and Bullion, to India and China - - - - - | £. 43,353,837 |
| Ditto, of payments in England, on account of India and China - - - - -               | 5,085,690     |
|  | <hr/>         |
|  | 48,439,527    |
| Ditto, of receipts from India and China in goods and bills - - - - -                 | £. 46,973,220 |
| Ditto, of receipts in England, on account of India - - - - -                         | 1,599,586     |
|  | <hr/>         |
|  | 48,573,406    |
| Balance in favour of India - - - - -   | £. 133,879    |

In this account, every thing received from India and China in any way, was credited; every thing supplied to them was debited. Goods lost outward bound were not charged to India and China; but, goods lost homeward bound, were placed to the credit of India and China. India had also credit for the Commercial Charges paid there, which were not included in its invoices; and for loss on the sales of exports thither. The exchange was, as usual, at 2s. per current rupee, 2s. 3d. the Bombay rupee, and 6s. 8d. the pagoda. The bills drawn by India and China were debited; the sums received from government in England, for the expences of military expeditions from India, were credited.

Again, by a new account, which he had caused to be made up between India and China, on the one hand, and England, on the other, for 10 years, from 1793-4 to 1802-3,

|  |               |
|--|---------------|
| The Total amount of Supplies to India and China were . . . . .   | £. 29,531,583 |
| The total amount of Political Payments in England, on account of the territory in India, was . . . . . | 3,743,028     |

Both 33,274,611

|   |            |
|---|------------|
| Total amount of receipts from those Countries . . . . . | £. 32,572  |
| Ditto in England, on the account of India . . . . .     | 1,2        |
|   | <hr/>      |
| Both . . . . .  | 35,503,160 |

Excess of Receipts from India and China, in the . . . . . 3,549

The causes of this difference of result, in the last period of 10 years, appeared to be these:

|   |           |                 |
|---|-----------|-----------------|
| In the first period, from 1788-9 to 1792-3, the Imports from India and China were proportionably less | £.        | 752,008         |
| Payment to government at home, more   |           | 500,552         |
| Difference of Political Charges, more   |           | 842,661         |
|   |           | <hr/> 2,094,669 |
| Difference apparent per first account of 15 years   |           | 133,879         |
|   | Total     | <hr/> 2,228,548 |
|   | as above. |                 |

Mr. Grant said, he had also caused a third Document to be made out, shewing the state of Accounts between the same countries for 7 years, from 1798-9 to 1804-5, inclusive; which comprehended nearly the whole time of lord Wellesley's government; and this account stood thus:

|  |    |                  |
|--|----|------------------|
| Total supplies to India and China  | £. | 25,782,632       |
| Political Charges paid in England  |    | 2,833,227        |
|  |    | <hr/> 28,615,859 |
| Total Imports  | £. | 23,286,591       |
| Payments received in England   |    | 4,762,767        |
|  |    | <hr/> 28,079,274 |
| Balance against India  | £. | 536,585          |
| To which may be added the Balance that appears against India in 1805-6, when the Exports to it were very large, and the receipts from it unusually small |    | 1,690,100        |
| Total against India and China, in 8 years, up to 1st September 1805  |    | <hr/> 2,226,685  |

There was still another way of viewing this account:

|  |    |               |
|--|----|---------------|
| The balance as above, in a period of 15 years, from 1788-9 to 1802-3, was in favour of India | £. | 133,879       |
| In the two following years, 1803-4 and 1804-5 the balance was against India                  |    | 642,840       |
| Apparent Balance against India and China in 17 years   | £. | <hr/> 508,961 |

Although these accounts, comprehending a great variety of transaction for a considerable length of time, were not to be contended for as absolutely perfect; yet the honourable gentleman said, they were, as far as he knew, just; he must conclude them to be, in fact, substantially so; and far more than those with which the honourable General had been

nished; though he did not doubt they, also, had been made up without any intentional mis-statement.

|   |           |
|---|-----------|
| These statements, produced by the honourable General, | £.        |
| made the Balance against the Commerce, from April     |           |
| 1793, to April 1804 . . . . .                         | 5,794,622 |
| To which add the Balance by Mr. Grant's Statements    |           |
| in favour of it, as above . . . . .                   | 508,961   |
| And the whole Difference would be . . . . .           | 6,303,583 |

It must, therefore, be highly presumable, that there were some great omissions, in the honourable General's accounts, to the credit of England; probably, the bills drawn on England. [General Wellesley dissented from this observation; and it appeared in the debate, on a following night, that the Political Charges paid in England, on account of the territory, were not credited in the General's statements, and made the principal cause of difference.], On the whole, therefore, there was no evidence, that the commerce owed any thing to the territory in the period of Lord Wellesley's administration, or that any part of the increase of the India debt during that administration was to be charged to the Commerce.

Mr. Grant next adverted to the Account entitled "Stock per Computation;"\* on which Mr. Francis had made some animadversions. This Account shews the whole state and result of the Company's affairs, at home and abroad. In it the capital stock, subscribed by the members of the Company, and owing to them, was not included, because an order of the house had directed it to be omitted; but this in the judgment of any intelligent person could make no difference, and there was a fair reason for the omission, because, when a partnership laid an account of its Debits and Credits before those to whom it was indebted, it never included the debts owing to the partners, or, in other words, their capital; the question being only, what the partnership owed to others, and what it had to satisfy them. By this Account of Stock, the Company appear, contrary to all unfavourable insinuations, to be solvent; 1st, as to all the demands upon them from creditors, exclusive of their own body, and, 2dly, as to the demands upon stockholders, thus:

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| The balance of the Stock per Computation, is     | £.        |
| the Company, over and above all claims upon      |           |
| except by the Stockholders for stock, is .       | 6,181,267 |
| The value of the Stock, at the rates at which it |           |
| is . . . . .                                     | 7,780,000 |

\* See Appendix, No. 2.

|  |              |
|--|--------------|
| And this account exhibits, that to pay up the stockholders, a sum would be wanting of . . . . .  | 1,598,733    |
| But, to answer this apparent Balance, there are Fortifications, Buildings, and a variety of articles, comprised under the head of Dead Stock, which stands in the Company's books (deducting 400,000 <i>l.</i> awarded for that head in the time of queen Anne) at . . . . . | 9,550,400    |
| Balance in favour  | 7,960,667    |
| From which admitting deductions made by government at home, from the Company's claims on it . . . . .  | 2,460,000    |
| There will still remain  | £. 5,500,667 |

The various subjects comprehended under the head of Dead Stock are undoubtedly to be regarded as a great and valuable mass of property; for which it must be allowed that the Company would, in all reason, have to receive a very large sum, if (let the supposition for the sake of argument be made) every thing except the Commerce were to be transferred from them to the Crown. But, besides all this, the Company possess an immense territory; which, by retrenchments, will immediately produce an available surplus, that must, progressively, improve the state of the Company's affairs, by reducing the debt, and the interest on it.

The honourable gentleman next proceeded to take a view of the Company's Indian Debt. The honourable General had computed this Debt to be, at the end of April 1806, something more than 27 millions sterling; and, of this sum, he estimated about 16 millions to have been incurred during the administration of lord Wellesley. Mr. Grant observed that, according to the Budget Accounts, the Debt had been,

|   |               |
|---|---------------|
| On the 30th of April 1804 . . . . .                     | £. 22,536,207 |
| On the 30th of April 1805 . . . . .                     | 25,415,760    |
| And on the 30th of April 1806, by computation . . . . . | 28,500,000    |

after deducting the amount of the Sinking fund. But, as it had been found, subsequent to the close of all our former wars in India, that there were large arrears due for Military Expenses, over and above the sums previously reckoned upon in estimates, so he could not help apprehending, that, in the complicated military operations lately carried on upon a scale large beyond all former example, the same thing would be experienced in a considerable degree; and he therefore, thought it fair to allow, at least, a million and a half for arrears of Military charges not yet brought to account. This sum would make the debt, on the 30th April 1806, after deduct-

ing the amount of the sinking fund, 30 millions sterling. On the accumulation of this debt, he observed, that, in 1793, it had stood at - - - - - £ 8,074,865

In 1798, when lord Wellesley's government commenced, at - - - - - 11,032,645

And in 1806, including the arrears above-mentioned for expences in 1805 at - - - - - 30,000,000

So that the accumulation of the Debt, during lord Wellesley's government, would be about - - - - - 18,967,356

Instead of 16 millions, besides a sum paid off from 1799 to 1805, by bills on England of - - - - - 2,532,195

Both 21,499,550

or making, altogether, the increase of the Debt, in the 8 years of his lordship's administration, about  $21\frac{1}{2}$  millions sterling. How this vast sum had been expended, was a question that required particular investigation, before it could be accurately answered. It was a question of very serious import. Clear it was, that the honourable General's method of accounting for it was not satisfactory, because he had supposed a considerable part to have been incurred by borrowing money in India to supply investments to Europe; which supposition was shewn to be groundless by the statements Mr. Grant had exhibited. Doubtless, a very great proportion of the Debt had been occasioned by the expenses of the military expeditions undertaken in India, at the desire of the king's government, by the wars we had carried on there since the year 1798, and by the larger balances which the extended scale of our affairs had placed in the various offices and departments of the different presidencies. The increasing Interest on the Debt would, alone, account for the absorption of a large sum of the resources of government.

In 7 years, from 1791-2 to 1797-8, there had been paid, for interest, on the Indian Debt - - - - - 3,688,000

In 7 years, from 1789 to 1804-5, the amount of payments for interest is - - - - - 9,000,000

Making an increase for the payment of Interest in the last 7 years, of - - - - - 5,440,000

With regard to the debts termed op - - - - - y were understood to be a class of debts contracted by the year 1800, and amounted, - - - - -

For Bengal, to - - - - - 5,022,000

For Madras - - - - - 600,000

Both - - - - - 22,000



The characteristic of these Debts was, that the interest as well as the principal was payable in England at the option of the lenders, and both principal and interest at rates of exchange which rendered it probable, that payment of them might be demanded in England. All the other Debts were in a certain sense optional, the principal being also transferable to England, but only very gradually, and at a rate of exchange which made it improbable that the holders would avail themselves of that option. Undoubtedly, the contingency of being liable to be called on in England for the payment of even six millions, (though any such demand could only come in the course of some years, and so not without affording time for preparation,) was a very serious contingency, which ought to be looked at with the other considerations belonging to this subject, certainly most alarming, of the Indian Debt.

The great question which now called for attention, was the liquidation of this enormous Debt. It was of a magnitude which left all former precedent far behind, and unless means were taken to reduce it, the interest alone must overwhelm the affairs of the Company. A plan for this purpose was necessary, and immediately necessary. It should be the prime object of consideration, and of any such plan the first principle must be a retrenchment of our expenditure. We had heard much from the honourable General and others, of the increase of our Indian revenues; but in vain are our revenues increased, if the increase of our expences keeps pace with them. The most important question is not, what is the amount of our revenues, but what is the amount of our surplus; and unhappily it will be found that as our revenues have increased of late years, our surplus has diminished, as will appear from the following particulars:

In the years 1793-4.

| Revenue.     | Interest.  | Charges.     | Net Rev.     |
|--------------|------------|--------------|--------------|
| £. 8,294,309 | £. 526,205 | £. 6,115,146 | £. 1,612,226 |

In the years 1802-3.

|            |           |            |         |
|------------|-----------|------------|---------|
| 13,464,537 | 1,457,377 | 10,960,324 | 369,988 |
|------------|-----------|------------|---------|

In the years 1803-4.

|            |           |            | [Deficit. |
|------------|-----------|------------|-----------|
| 13,273,044 | 1,534,758 | 13,518,170 | 1,779,884 |

And the last of these years in which, instead of a surplus, there was so large a deficit, included only a part of the expence of the first war with the Mahratta chiefs Dowlut Row Scindia and the Berar rajah. It was obvious, therefore, that there was a

necessity for an available surplus, and in a degree commensurate to the effect required. Without this, all plans for the reduction of our Debt must be chimerical. No ingenuity of plan could relieve that man whose expences should continue greater than his income. This was not the time to enter into a discussion of the means of reducing the Debt, but it was clear that an economical spirit was essential to that end, and this being presupposed, of which indeed the recent proceedings of the Bengal government give fair promise, he thought that the reduction was practicable, perhaps even without resorting to an increase of the Company's capital; though he did not conceive the objection of an honourable gentleman (Mr. Francis) to this measure to be sufficient, because, if money could be employed to advantage, as it was clear it could in the present case, it was immaterial whether the advantage was to be in the way of commerce, or of gain by interest. There were, however, other objections to increasing the capital at present; for, during war, new Stock would necessarily be sold on terms comparatively unfavourable, and the public might object to the increase of the capital on such terms, for the purpose of paying off Indian Debt.

As the honourable General had enlarged on the improved state of the Company's credit in India during the administration of lord Wellesley, the honourable gentleman said, he felt it necessary to make some remarks on that subject: and, first, with respect to the Sinking Fund established in Bengal. That fund, although it had indeed bought up a considerable sum of the Debt, had in fact given no extraordinary aid to the reduction of it; for it differed essentially in its principle from the Sinking Fund established in England, which with every new provision for the payment of interest on loans, laid an additional tax on the subject to form a fund for the reduction of the principal; here was an addition to the income of the state. But the Bengal Sinking Fund was formed by no such addition of income. It had only a part of an income existing before, appropriated to this particular object of buying up Company's paper, and an equal reduction might have been effected by the same sum in directly paying off debt, without any establishment of a sinking Fund, the establishment of which, as all the available surplus of the Bengal revenue was pledged to the public to be primarily applied to pay off debt, seemed to trench on the faith of Government in respect to that pledge, and if it were true, as he had heard, that the advances to the Sinking Fund were even anticipated by loans from the treasury, this was certainly a direct violation of the pledge that had been given. On the other hand, it was to be admitted, that the pur-

chases of Company's paper, by the Sinking Fund, served to keep up the credit of that paper. But it was true also, that the new optional loans, being taken on far better terms for the lenders, than the earlier loans, did contribute to give an increased value to one description, at least, of Company's paper; but it was because the paper was really better; there were however several weighty objections to these loans; they frustrated the old remittance plan, for liquidating the Company's debt; they might be productive of very serious embarrassments to the Company's finances at home; and, above all, they were a dangerous instrument in the hands of any government, by enabling it to undertake schemes of conquest and ambition unsuitable to the intrinsic powers of our Indian government, and our true line of policy.

As to the merit that had been ascribed to lord Wellesley, for the reduction which had taken place in his time in the rates of discount on the Company's paper, it would be found, on investigation, to result from causes distinct from increased confidence in the government, or increased prosperity in the public affairs. The sinking fund, as already observed, otherwise a measure liable to objection, had raised the value of the paper. The new paper issued, being of a better description than the old, was not only at a lower discount itself, but served to diminish the discount on the rest.

The property of the community in India was much increased; for, as government became poor, the subjects became rich; and, therefore, more money was brought into the market to buy paper, which enhanced its value. Great part of the nine millions sterling paid for interest on the Debt, in the last 7 years, had, doubtless, gone for the purchase of new paper;—and, as the old loans, on which the discount had been highest, drew, in the course of time, nearer to the term of payment, they, of course, became more valuable; whilst paper, bearing the same disadvantageous conditions, was not again issued; all which will account for an improvement in the rates of discount, without ascribing it to the merit of government, or the confidence reposed in it; though it may be also true, that the eclat of victories and conquests might have raised sanguine expectations of future prosperity, among those who looked no farther.—As to the general influence of the late wars in India, on the affairs of the Company, he would not take this occasion to go into a digression on a subject deserving of distinct and serious discussion; but he thought it right just to observe, that those wars had enormously increased the expenses and the Debt of the Company, without adding any security necessary to us; without even adding, permanently, much to

our revenues; and at the expense of our reputation, for justice and moderation, in the eyes of India.

Before concluding he wished to say a few words on the Treaties lately concluded by sir George Barlow, which had been censured by an honourable gentleman (Mr. Francis), as precipitate. Mr. Grant said, they were conducted according to the general principles established by the legislature, and the orders of the Company; according to the positive instructions lord Cornwallis had carried out, and the opinions and commenced measures of that ever-to-be-lamented nobleman; that they were also to be justified by financial propriety; for if, as an honourable General had said, there was no financial necessity for them, which he (Mr. Grant) did not admit, there was at least, great financial expediency; there was no just object for carrying on the war; every thing was against it; and, therefore, the sooner it was terminated, consistently with our credit, which these treaties have preserved, the better.

As to the severe censures which the same honourable gentleman (Mr. Francis) states the Court of Directors to have passed on sir G. Barlow, they were confined to an expression of the Court's great surprise, that the members of the Council should have submitted to their own virtual exclusion from their official functions, by the assumptions of the governor-general; but as to any change in the conduct of sir G. Barlow, with regard to the line of policy he had acquiesced in under lord Wellesley's government, it was not to be ascribed to mean compliance, but to his sense of duty, on learning what he had not distinctly understood before, the positive determination of the authorities at home to change the system of foreign policy which lord Wellesley had followed. Sir G. Barlow had conducted himself, in the late negotiations consequent of the views entertained at home, with great vigour and ability; his general merits were acknowledged, even by administration; and he was in high esteem with the Company, although they had not, on account of his acquiescence in the measures of lord Wellesley, at first nominated him provisional successor to lord Cornwallis; and, indeed, although they had been strangely censured for sending out that nobleman in a dying state, Mr. Grant solemnly declared, that he had no idea of his being in ill health when he embarked for India, otherwise, neither he, nor any one who loved that most amiable man, would have contributed to his going out. But, in fact, sir G. Barlow, by standing next to lord Cornwallis, had all the benefit and the authority of a provisional appointment, saving only the exercise of the extraordinary powers of governor-general at the presidency, which was not likely to be of any importance.

As to the question, that had lately been very warmly agitated, concerning the removal of sir G. Barlow, and the appointment of a successor to him, Mr. G. said, he should, for different reasons, then abstain from entering into it. It had already taken a determinate shape. The body with which he was connected, had followed a line concerning it, in forbearing to bring it before that house, which he should acquiesce in; and he himself, who had in the earlier proceedings, been, as chairman, a party concerned, had he understood, been misrepresented in some things, though he did not know by whom, nor, exactly, in what terms; but, he had endeavoured to bring what had been whispered into light; to bring it into a tangible shape, in order to its refutation; of which he was most confident; for, he solemnly declared that, in the whole of the transaction alluded to, as far as he was concerned, he had acted uprightly and conscientiously, as his friend (Mr. Smith) the deputy-chairman, than whom a more honourable man did not exist, had also done; and they were most anxious for an opportunity of vindicating themselves; and should be obliged to any gentleman in that house, or out of it, to aid them, in bringing any thing alleged against their conduct into light.

Mr. Alderman PRINSEP rose in reply to Mr. Grant, and observed, that he knew not how far the speeches and statement of the honourable ex-chairman had tended to dispel the gloomy apprehensions which must have arisen from the result of the candid and perspicuous detail of the noble lord (Morpeth) on a former night. He knew not how far he might venture to calculate upon the impression he should endeavour to make on the committee, by the totally different view he should take of the magnitude and the causes of the Company's present distress. But he felt it his duty, first to apprise the committee of the nature and extent of the responsibility imposed upon the house and the country, by the act of the 33d of his present majesty. No man, after reading that act, could entertain any other idea than that of direct partnership. By the 11th clause of that act, disposing of the profits of the Company, it appeared that "during the continuance of the exclusive trade, the net proceeds of the Company's sales of goods at home, with the duties and allowances arising from the private trade, and all other profits of the said Company, shall be applied and disposed of (after other preferences) in the payment of a sum not exceeding 500,000*l.* per annum into the receipt of his majesty's exchequer, to be applied as parliament shall direct." Here, after quoting these words of the act, the honourable member proceeded to observe, that, however equal

this partnership might be in responsibility, the profits had been by no means equally divided; for whilst the proprietors had been receiving 10 and a half per cent. on their nominal capital, the country had been disappointed of every half-yearly payment but two of its stipulated proportion; and, at the same time, an enormous debt had been accumulating by the Company, and an enormous expence incurred by the state, in the protection of their commerce and dominions.

It had been admitted by the honourable gentleman who spoke last, that a responsibility of 17 millions hung over England at a time the most critical in her own financial affairs. A demand, infinitely beyond the Company's faculty of answering. The house and the country would, therefore, soon be called upon to make it good. A fresh minute investigation was, therefore now become absolutely necessary, and this at a time when the government ought to be wholly occupied in its own more immediate defence and support. The noble lord, it was true, had declared it to be the duty and intention of the commissioners for India affairs to call the attention of parliament to this subject at an early period of the next session. In the mean time the honourable member conceived he was doing his duty to his country, however irksome and ungracious the task might prove, to dissect this anomalous mixture of imperial commerce and commercial dominion; to separate the Capital actually absorbed by this commerce, from the mass of Debts, Payments, and Assets, comprehended in the Budget Statement annually laid before the house. For if it should appear, that any thing like his estimate of its amount was drawn from a capital wholly borrowed at interest, it would be utterly impossible to reject the conclusion he had so frequently pressed upon the house, that the trade had been a losing one to an immense amount; and this fact would do away all the arguments of the honourable ex-chairman, which he had again adduced from an irrelevant statement of the interchange of property between Asia and Europe, blending together the India and the China trade, and forgetting, that since the year 1780 the date of the first subscription investment, these operations had originated abroad, on funds principally borrowed at interest. Would a return of the bare principal, four years afterwards, be an equivalent, especially when the greater part of these returns were made in stores, and bullion? The honourable gentleman had endeavoured to prove, by this statement, taking three different views of the subject, that the Company's trade was not indebted to the territories, or to the India Debt. He should, however, now beg leave to distinguish what it had always been studiously endeavouring to confound; and to se-

parate the trading Capital from the resources of dominion, and, as far as the documents before the house would allow him, the capital required by the India Trade, from that of China.

The honourable Alderman then proceeded to read extracts from the Budgets of 1804 and 1805, reciting, as he proceeded, the points of reference in each. The advances for trade in the three presidencies, and Fort Marlborough, in 1802-3, were he observed, upwards of two millions. While these cargoes were coming home, others were collecting at the presidencies which employed 2,300,000*l.* more. The Cash Balances abroad on the 30th of April 1804, were nearly 600,000*l.*

|   |                |
|---|----------------|
| So that taking these sums, as they stood of | £. 2,100,000   |
|   | 2,300,000      |
|   | <u>600,000</u> |

The India Imports employed an active capital of 5,000,000

|   |           |           |
|---|-----------|-----------|
| At this period there were at home, of goods sold and not paid for | - - - - - | 1,150,000 |
|---|-----------|-----------|

|   |       |                  |
|---|-------|------------------|
| Goods in England, unsold, partly China, and partly India produce, 6,440,00 <i>l.</i> which he should charge the India trade with one half | - - - | <u>3,220,000</u> |
|---|-------|------------------|

|   |           |           |
|---|-----------|-----------|
| This made India commerce amount to upwards of | - - - - - | 9,000,000 |
|---|-----------|-----------|

With regard to the exports, the amount of the Cargoes from England, not arrived at their destination, at the date of the quick stock account was

|   |                |
|---|----------------|
| - - - - -                               | 3,580,000      |
| Exports paid for, exclusive of bullion  | 1,200,000      |
| Silver exported and remaining           | - - - 820,000  |
| Impress and war allowances on ships out | <u>450,000</u> |

|  |       |           |
|--|-------|-----------|
| Which gave, according to Stock, by Computation, in the whole | - - - | 6,050,000 |
|--|-------|-----------|

|                                 |       |           |
|---------------------------------|-------|-----------|
| Half of which belonged to India | - - - | 3,025,000 |
|---------------------------------|-------|-----------|

The whole India concern, therefore, absorbed twelve millions.

The China Cargoes, homeward bound, he should estimate at three millions; those providing abroad were no where stated, but on an estimate of 1803 and 1804, he should assume 3 millions, making together, 6 millions; if, to this, he added 3 millions, being the moiety deducted from the India account before-mentioned of 6,050,000*l.* it made the sum of 9 millions, which, added to the 12 millions, already mentioned, formed a mass of 21 millions sterling, of active capital, absolutely employed in the joint commerce of India and China.

The honourable member next stated, as part of the dormant capital, the value of East-India house, warehouses, &c. - - - - - £.992,200  
 Dead stock purchased 100 years since, and still  
 \*remaining in the Company's accounts - - - 400,000

The total of these items, which however were not by any means all that might be charged to the trade, the committee would perceive, was upwards of twenty two millions. He was aware that probably some of them might be subjects of dispute: altho' India goods were paid for before manufactured, on the other hand he believed several of the English commodities exported were bought upon credit: and the bills drawn from India and China, the latter particularly, supplied this Capital to a considerable extent. He would nevertheless take, what had been repeatedly acknowledged, and he rather thought by the noble lord near him (lord Castlereagh) that the commerce of the East India Company required four Capitals, or about four and twenty millions sterling: the allowances he had just made, nothing invalidated his assertion that the trade was carried on with a borrowed Capital; for where could it be shewn, that 24, 22, or even 10 millions of real funds of the Company were or had been existing for many years back? The trade was carried on with borrowed money, and the interest upon the loan made it a ruinous trade and had occasioned most of the existing embarrassment.

The honourable member then proceeded to complain of the very small portion of the manufactures of this country, which this immense capital enabled the Company to export to India, and the inconsiderable British Tonnage employed altogether in this trade. The number of tons, he stated to be, not more than 20,000 out, and the same home; and the Company's merchandise for the last 11 years by referring to the papers on the table, 5 millions; or on an average, below 500,000*l.* per annum:—Was this small and contemptible proportion of the national exports our natural share of the trade to British India, to acquire and defend which the mother country had made such sacrifices; and was now in danger of being soon called on to make a sacrifice of 17 millions more? Was this a consideration sufficient to justify the exclusion of the rest of his majesty's subjects from a free intercourse with the immense and populous regions within the limits of the Company's charter, extending from the Cape of Good Hope to Cape Horn; while neutral flags could range at large throughout the Pacific and Indian oceans, and derive encouragement and support to their rising and rival commerce and navigation, from a free and unlimited access to every one



of the Company's establishments, whither they carried and sold, unmolested, not only the produce of their own, but the manufactures of this country, and brought away, in return, the productions of India, to meet us in every market of Europe and America? Not that he disapproved of their admission into the ports of India; the silver they carried there, had afforded considerable relief to the circulation. All he had ever claimed, was, a right in British subjects, to a fair competition with foreigners in that part of the trade, which the company had neither faculty, nor inclination to carry on.

It next became necessary to enquire into the fact he had asserted on a former evening, with regard to the means which the Company possessed, of carrying on this limited commerce, from funds of their own; a commerce which must, from its very nature, prove ruinous, from the expensive manner in which the goods were conveyed,—in ships larger than necessary, expensively fitted up, and constructed on principles which diminished their capacity for stowage of merchandize, on the plea of enabling them the better to act as ships of war.—Four-and-twenty millions he had assumed as the capital required to carry on this commerce. This capital he looked for, in vain, in the account of Stock by Computation, where, instead of finding any Capital, he repeated, and with regret, the balance, if fairly taken, was considerably against the Company. In this Account, exclusive of the Company's Capital, a balance was assumed of - - - - - 6,181,267  
The Company's Capital actually cost - - - - - 7,780,000

So that the balance - - - - - £. 1,598,733  
was the amount which, upon their own statement, the company were minus.

The hon. ex-chairman had argued at considerable length against this mode of stating the account, and wished to compare the Joint Stock of a great public and chartered company with the Capital of a private partnership or individual trader: but was there any analogy between them? The one was a public and joint stock, in which the subjects at large held transferable shares, always at market, and fluctuating in value, according to the price of money, and the estimation or credit of the Company. In the instance before the committee, this Company enjoyed privileges, guaranteed by parliament, and possessed territories, producing a princely revenue; their stock, therefore, partook of the nature of the public securities of this country, pledged for the national debt, and was as much a public claim, as the India Debt of 30 millions, or the Bond Debt of upwards of 2 millions at home. It came, by no means, under the description of the capital of tradesmen, which must always be

applied to the payment of debts, before they can be deemed insolvent; and is, therefore, properly excluded, when a statement of their affairs is laid before their creditors. In this view of the subject, he would, therefore, ask, where he was to find the 24 millions, required for trade? where else but in the general assets of the stock account, in which a debt of 30 millions, mostly at India interest, made so prominent a figure. The interest of that debt was a charge upon the whole concern of revenue and commerce; and to exclude a proportion of that interest from the charges of the trade, was, he contended, contrary to the common sense and reason of mankind, whilst the admission of it totally abolished all the profit so vauntingly assumed upon the commerce at large.

Here he would ask the hon. ex-deputy chairman to behold him (Mr. G. Smith), who was besides, a banker of the first eminence, his candid opinion of the Stock by Computation, taken without the capital, according to the hon. ex-chairman's statement; and which, therefore, might be considered as the exposition of the affairs of one of his customers in embarrassed circumstances, and calling on his banker for assistance: it was only considering millions as thousands, and the analogy would be complete. Before the honourable banker advanced any considerable sum, such as 17 millions, he meant 17 thousands. He was perfectly sure the honourable banker would sit down, and minutely scrutinize the items on the credit side of this account. All the debts, he would know, must be answered, and probably to an amount beyond the statement; but he would naturally enquire what was the nature of the assets to answer them?

Here the honourable member discussed several of the items of the Stock account up to March 1805. The first was a sum of 1,207,560*l.* alleged to be due from government to the company: this, he contended, was not the case; it was a part of the national debt, consisting of consols, and standing in the name of the company, for which they had taken credit at par: valuing them at 60, this item was overcharged in the sum of 483,024*l.* Another debt of government for stores and supplies, which stood at 4,400,192*l.* had been, by a special commission, curtailed in the sum of 2,089,392*l.* Another item, which must come against the general assets, was a charge upon the Carnatic estate, of 5,630,838*l.*; under liquidation, it was true, but substantiated abroad under the register of the late nabob's creditors: and, as he believed, still running at interest: to avoid much cavil on this item, he would strike off whatever should appear reasonable to any member of the committee; he would, therefore, call it only 4 millions. Here he must thank the

noble lord (Morpeth) for his candour in producing a prospective Estimate\* of the Revenues and Charges in India, for 1805 and 1806, by which it appeared that the Debts abroad on the 1st of March last would be increased in the sum of 2,655,957*l.* (and this without any provision for investment).

The next article was, it was true, a matter of estimate and opinion: it regarded the actual value of an item, which appeared, in the Guick Stock abroad, under the title of Debts Outstanding, and included advances for Investment, Arrears of Revenue, Loans to Rajahs and Zemindars, (the Guickwah Rajah among the rest), to no less an amount than 9,168,000*l.*: but, would any man of business in the house, either financial or commercial deny the honourable banker's claim to a considerable allowance for bad debts under this article? Would 2 millions be too much to deduct from this item? The sums, therefore, to be deducted on the whole account were --

|   |             |
|---|-------------|
|   | £.2,000,000 |
|   | 483,024     |
|   | 2,089,392   |
|   | 4,000,000   |
|   | 2,655,557   |
| Forming a total of                              | 11,228,373  |
| Which, when set against the balance, in favour, |             |
| in the Stock account before him, of             | 6,181,267   |

Left a balance against the Company of - - £. 5,047,106

There was indeed, as the last speaker had stated, a memorandum at the foot of the stock account, by which a sum of no less than 9,994,208*l.* was stated as the cost of Buildings and Fortifications, of Plate, Furniture, Vessels, and Plantations, since the year 1702, which sum the hon. ex-chairman had considered as an available asset, against the alledged deficiency. He was very much surprised, indeed, to find this item adduced in the manner it had been: were it even valid, this sum, though nearly ten millions, would not square the account, when the Company's capital, and the deficiency he had just proved, should be set against it. But, really, a single glance at the title of this account would remove every idea of considering it as a claim upon government, when the lease should expire. One column, amounting to nearly two millions, consisted of Household Furniture, Farming Stock, Pleasure Boats, Plate, and Table Linen, of which articles, the wear of an hundred years had not much increased the value. Of what nature were the Buildings? Some of them forts upon the great rivers, dis-

\* See Appendix, No. 2.

mantled by time, or swept away by the changes of currents. Others, either absolutely levelled with the ground, and rebuilt, or, if standing, repaired at an enormous expence. Others of the buildings had given place to the new (and, if they pleased, splendid) palace lately erected for the accommodation of the Governor-general, which, however it had been reprobated, the hon. member thought highly necessary and becoming. Would such items as these be admitted in a final adjustment between the Company and the State which had expended so many millions in effecting the acquisition, and protecting, by its marine, these commercial dominions? Was it nothing that the country was now actually deprived of the services of 25 of its own regiments; that two squadrons were maintained in the Indian seas; that Ceylon once, and the Cape of Good Hope had been twice conquered and retained, at an enormous expence; that a sum of 3 millions and a half had been paid to the Company on this account since 1804, and a further sum of 2 millions was now under liquidation? If there must exist an *imperium in imperio*, while it did exist, the subordinate empire ought, at least, to bear its own expences, of which these ought to form a part. The hon. member, therefore, totally rejected this item of ten millions.

Would an exposition, he asked, such as this now appeared, if made by an individual, induce any banker to enable him to continue the concern? The hon. member, for his part, declared, that he could not see how it was possible to continue this system, cumbrous and unprofitable as it was: time, would, perhaps, shew what was to be done; or he might learn, from the noble lord who had lately presided at the India board, how the Company were to go on, without having recourse, as on a former occasion, to the aid of parliament, its partuer in this concern. For himself, he could see no other justifiable mode of affording that relief, than a previous examination into their affairs, and a resolution to separate the Revenue from the Trade. As to the hope expressed by the hon. ex-chairman, that their affairs would recover, during a long period of peace in India, it was with regret, he stated, that the best-informed men on the spot were by no means sanguine in this particular, neither could the peace continue nor could the savings be made. By an honourable general's calculation of the immediate savings on a peace establishment, 740,000*l.* were expected to be saved in the first year: but would that keep down even the interest of their enormous debts? Would it afford any resource for investment? Might nor that balance be absorbed by unforeseen contingencies; or arrested to pay off unstated claims, in the winding up of the last war accounts?

The noble lord, and the committee, must see, by this statement of facts, deduced from documents on the table, and authenticated by the Company themselves, how utterly impossible it was, any longer to support this anomalous mixture of trade and dominion, unprecedented, except in a solitary and calamitous instance, that of the Dutch East-India company, whose fate he need not recall to their recollection. Nothing was more just than the remark that the ruin of that man or that public body was inevitable whose expenses for a series of years exceeded its income, the committee would apply it to the following facts:—

|  |              |
|--|--------------|
| The resources from Revenue and Sales of Imports in 1803-4 had been stated by the noble lord on a former night as insufficient to the amount of . . . | £. 1,121,403 |
| Nevertheless investments had been purchased to the extent of . . .   | 2,320,484    |
| Encrease of the debt abroad . . .  | 3,414,867    |
| The estimated for the next Year, his Lordship had taken at . . .   | 1,131,191    |
| If the Investment had been kept up to last Year . . .  | 2,320,484    |
| A farther encrease would result . . .  | 3,151,675    |
| The sums estimated by the noble Lord for 1805-6 without Commercial Charges . . .   | 2,651,939    |
| The Cash balance on the 1st March 1806, by estimate (he knew not why the actual was not presented) had been stated as deficient . . .                | 62,336       |

with these facts before him, and the prospects of still greater disappointment in the sales at home, the honourable Alderman declared he was utterly at a loss to suggest any remedy to the distress already existing, much less to point out the means of continuing the Company's trade, even on its present contracted scale; for, he would state to the noble lord an important fact; and he hoped it would convince him it was high time to check the present system. The faculty of borrowing abroad was an end, and the ships of the Company were actually loading home with private goods at 29*l.* per ton, for want of the regular investment: while the Company, for this very tonnage were paying 60*l.* for the sake of prosecuting their favorite plan of excluding the ships of individuals, who could gain by navigating on still lower terms. In this way, neutrals were suffered to encroach upon our natural intercourse with India, and to nourish, at our expence, their maritime power and commercial importance. How long was the merchandize of the private traders to be reluctantly brought home at this immense loss; and a fair

competition between imperial commerce, and the exertions of the British merchant withheld? So confined was the trade of the Company, that it visited no shores but their own, while the neutral flag, as he had already remarked, ranged, unmolested and even encouraged, from the Pacific to the Indian ocean and from these to every other part of the Globe.

But what pressed immediately on the committee, was the present distress of the Company, and the inevitable call on parliament for relief. How far the country was bound to answer that call, would appear from Mr. Dundas's Letter to the Directors, at the discussion respecting the renewal of their charter; wherein he expressed his opinion, that the debts of the company must accompany the territory into whosoever hands it might fall. Whether the debt had accrued, from losses in trade, or from territorial expences, the committee would now judge; for his part, he agreed perfectly with the honourable General (sir Arthur Wellesley) in his statement of the subject; and that investment, and not war, had swelled the debt to its present magnitude. His own chief object, in this long detail, was, to warn the noble lord of the responsibility of the country. At present, he would make no motion, but would content himself with the promise of the noble lord, that an investigation would soon take place. Certainly, such was the situation of things, that strong and decisive measures were become necessary. When the disorder was violent, strong remedies must be administered. With regard to the right and extent of interference on the part of government, he should merely quote the authority of a great statesman (the earl of Liverpool, just leaving the world, distinguished for having asserted the rights of the British flag; and who, now, after a long and illustrious career, and already sinking into the grave, had yet vigour enough to compose, by his expiring lamp, an address to his Sovereign on the intricate subject of Comage, which work would add to his already acquired fame, as a political economist. The words were to be found in a pamphlet on the Conduct of Great Britain towards neutral Nations.--“The rights of mankind admit of various degrees; and whenever two of these come into competition, the lowest in the scale must give place to the higher.”—“Each man hath a right to perform certain actions; but if the destruction of another should follow from them, would not this be a just cause of restraint?” How far this high authority applied, in the present case, he must leave to the noble lord to determine; certain he was, that it would have its due weight, in the consideration of this important subject. The honourable Alderman concluded, by observing, that he felt grateful to the committee for their indulgent hearing; and would no longer trespass on their attention.

Lord CASTLEREAGH was fully aware of the difficulties under which the East India Company at present laboured. He nevertheless was very far from entertaining in his mind that gloomy view of the Company's affairs which had been drawn by the worthy alderman who had just sat down. On the contrary, he was well convinced that if the Company's affairs were vigorously conducted, it would not be long before they would reach as great a state of prosperity as the most sanguine wishes of any friend to the interests of the Company could reasonably entitle them to expect. For the accomplishment of this great object he would recommend that the general state of the Company's affairs should undergo the most ample investigation before a committee. The result, he was confident, would be highly favourable to the Company. But, at the same time that he was convinced, from his knowledge of the affairs of the Company, that a committee which had it in view to obtain a correct statement of the debts, assets, and revenue of the Company, must necessarily draw inferences favourable to the Company, as he had before stated; still he most clearly saw that something was wanting for the present to be done for the assistance of the Company. To attain this great and most desirable object, he would recommend that a loan should be raised under the sanction of parliament; not that he could by any means suppose that there could be any hesitation or doubt of the solvency of the Company, but that he saw how much more advantageously a loan would be raised under such circumstances, than if the Company itself was to go into the market for that purpose. Before Ireland was united to this country, it was the uniform practice with the English parliament to include the loan for Ireland in one general vote along with that which was given for this country. By the adoption of such a system, the Company would gain what they most particularly wanted, an extension of their capital; and the public would have considerably better security than they could now possibly have, as, from the profits to accrue from such an extension of capital, there would be a sinking fund for the total and speedy extinction of the whole debt.

Dr. LAURENCE caught the Speaker's eye, and was entering into a consideration of the subject, when

Mr. ROBSON rose to order. He observed, that on so important an occasion, an occasion that required the fullest attendance, not one of his majesty's ministers was present, to guard the purse of the public: and as he observed by the order-book, that little business stood for to-morrow, he should move an adjournment. The gallery was then cleared, and there being only 31 members present, the house adjourned.

## DEBATE ON THE 18th OF JULY.

## HOUSE OF COMMONS.

*Friday, July 18.*

On the motion of lord Morpeth, the house, in a committee, resumed the debate on the East India Budget.

Mr. TYRWHIT JONES asked, if there had been an adjustment of the sum of 2,672,440*l.* thus described, and in a paper moved for by him in 1801: "By what due from government for stores and supplies for his majesty's troops, &c. &c."

Lord MORPETH replied, that this account, blended with another, amounting to nearly 4 millions, was in a way of settlement, and some part of it had been allowed.

Mr. T. JONES then asked, how much of the 500,000*l.* per annum, as settled by the charter bill of 1793, had been paid by the Company to the public?

Dr. LAURENCE spoke to order. He thought it contrary to the rules of the house, that, when the question for their determination was only respecting a single year, any member should think himself at liberty to ask all manner of questions. When the debate was disposed of, he certainly might find opportunities enough of asking the noble lord any questions he might think proper.

Mr. HOBHOUSE (the chairman of the committee) considered that it was the custom upon India budgets, for the member who brought them forward, to take a very wide range into the general situation of the affairs of India, preparatory to moving his first resolution; and that, therefore, it was allowed to other members, to take a considerable latitude in speaking upon that question. As to the right of asking questions, he believed, the rule was this: every member had a right to put questions; but the person to whom they were put, might answer them, or not, as he thought proper.

Mr. T. JONES said, that if the learned doctor wished to make a speech upon the subject himself, he should sit down with pleasure. He was prepared to meet him on every point which he had stated; and, as the learned doctor was so famous for brevity, the house would, no doubt, be very much delighted



with hearing him. If this was not the proper time to put his questions, he should take another opportunity.

Mr. PAULL said, that having, last February, found himself under the necessity, from a paramount sense of duty, of calling the attention of the house and the public, to the state of the Finances of India; and, as his sentiments, on that important topic, were now before the house, in the form of a specific charge, he would forbear, on the present occasion, from entering fully into the subject; though the honourable general (sir Arthur Wellesley), and the noble lord (Castlereagh), had given ample room for discussion, by statements the most fallacious ever produced to any reasoning assembly; but, said the honourable gentleman, to refute such statements is the less necessary, as the noble lord, who brought forward the business, had done ample justice to his (Mr. Paull's) sentiments. and had confirmed every assertion he had ever made on the melancholy state of India, rendered still more melancholy and desperate, by the immense sums shortly to be provided for in that unhappy country.

The honourable gentleman paid the noble lord (Morpeth) some well-merited compliments, for the honest, honourable, and fair manner, in which he had brought forward the Budget: he had scorned deception; and his candour was as conspicuous as his talents were acknowledged. The noble lord had given the only fair statement that had been exhibited of the Finances of India for upwards of 20 years; and, for the whole of his conduct, he merited the thanks of every man in the kingdom. The noble lord had looked the prospect, dark and gloomy as it was, boldly and fairly in the face; and had scorned to delude the house with promises that were never to be fulfilled, and prospects of prosperity that never were to be realized. But, said Mr. Paull, the noble lord has still, most unintentionally, omitted some most important items. On his own shewing, including the defalcations in the ceded provinces, the actual deficit, even on sanguine estimates, exceeds 3 millions sterl.; the deficit, in the course of the next year, 1807, cannot be less; and, added to these two sums, making 6 millions, the decennial loan, amounting to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  millions; and two other loans, contracted for two years, at 10 and 12 per cent., and amounting to nearly a million, all become payable in 1808; so that, in that year, even taking the most favourable circumstances into account, the debt will be increased nearly 9 millions, and that in the 16th year of the Company's charter; and where is the man sanguine enough to say, that we shall then be on the peace establishment? But the fact is, we can have no peace establishment; from Cape

Comorin, to beyond the walls of Delhi, our troops must be kept up, and scattered, to keep our subjects in awe, even if we have no enemy to contend with. An honourable gentleman (Mr. Johnstone) has indulged himself, lately, in making frequent attacks on his majesty's ministers, for the removal of sir G. Barlow. Would that, instead, he had turned his attention to the state of the Finances of India, which no man knew better than he did; and had fairly and candidly admitted, that to measures acquiesced in by sir G. Barlow, for 8 years criminally acquiesced in, was to be attributed the present deplorable state of the East-India Company! As to the removal of sir G. Barlow, the honourable gentleman can hardly be serious in his loud complaints on that subject; no man, either in India, or in Europe, ever looked to sir G. Barlow's being permanent governor-general. The honourable gentleman himself never could have imagined it even probable that sir George would be allowed to continue; for he must know, that sir George, though an excellent revenue officer, had none of the qualities to fit him for governor-general; and that, to insure the respect of the foreign courts a nobleman from England was indispensable for the good government of India. The honourable gentleman had indulged in these attacks, from his hostility to ministers; and had neglected ever looking into the accounts, which, perhaps wisely, he had not even touched upon, although the only subject regularly before the house.

This, Mr. Paull said, he the more deplored, as no man in England understood the real situation of the Company better than the honourable gentleman. Mr. Paull concluded with again sincerely thanking the noble lord (Morpeth) for his clear, able, honest, and candid statement; and was sure, his lordship would feel that, by the line he had adopted, he had justly raised himself in the opinion of every honest man in the kingdom.

Mr. T. JONES said, that his object in interrogating the noble lord (Morpeth) was, to save his trouble, and that of the house; but more particularly that of the noble lord, who had given a fair and accurate, however to be lamented, Budget, and was now sitting to hear the third discussion on it, left quite alone, both by his majesty's ministers, and such directors of the East-India Company as were members of parliament: that, by getting answers to his questions, he should see what alteration, for the better or worse, had taken place since his speech and statement, delivered in that house, June 25, 1802, thereon. But, however, as he did not wish to be pertinacious, as to putting questions, he should state facts: Now, in 1800, up to the 30th of April, the India Debt was 20 millions. Out

of the 6,000,000*l.* due on the charter, only 500,000*l.* had been paid; so that 5,500,000*l.* remained due to the public. In 1801, the honourable gentleman said, he had stated the East-India Company to be on the eve of bankruptcy. In 1806, he was borne out by the uncontradicted assertion of a worthy alderman (Priusep), that it was in a state of insolvency. The difference between insolvency and bankruptcy was a distinction without a difference and not to be argued; and, therefore, he said, instead of the eve of bankruptcy, he considered the Company in a positive state of bankruptcy; and soon, very soon, the noble lord and his colleagues, instead of being "comptrollers," would be "assignees," under a commission of bankruptcy.

Mr. JOHNSTONE said, that there was no danger of a bankruptcy. He would not enter upon the particulars of the accounts, however, as it was painful to him to look at the situation of the Company. But that situation was still not so gloomy as had been represented by the honourable gentleman. As to the loans, he hoped the persons who held them would renew their engagements. But he deprecated the transferring them to this country; and warned the directors, not to ask such a thing of Parliament, for the minister of the day would be strongly tempted to grasp at a share of the patronage, which would be dangerous to the liberties of this country. He begged the house to consider, what would be the consequence of a patronage over 3,000,000*l.* sterling, in addition to what was already possessed by the government. Any inconvenience of trade was better than that the minister should acquire such an extraordinary power. He meant this as no particular reflection, but mentioned it as applying to any minister. As to the case of sir G. Barlow, his opinion was unaltered. Even though what the honourable gentleman (Mr. Paull) had said should be correct, still his observations were proper. Ministers had gratuitously appointed him, on the 26th of February, and removed him 14 days after. Now, why was he appointed at all, if it was in contemplation to remove him so soon? All the powers of governor-general would have remained with him, by devolution, till the appointment of a successor, except the power of exercising the highest functions of the office without the consent of the council—a power so extraordinary, that it had never been exercised. The charge, therefore, remained in full force.

Sir ARTHUR WELLESLEY considered the honourable member (Mr. Paull) was completely wrong, in supposing that so large a sum as 10 millions was to be due in 1807. He

shewed, from a variety of calculations, that the greater part of this sum would not be due until the years 1809 and 1810. If there was a large floating debt at the end of the war, there were also floating securities in the hands of the Company, which balanced it. He denied, that the loans in India had been contracted for on such unfavourable terms as the honourable gentleman had represented.

Mr. PAULL said, that the reason that the loan appeared to be contracted on better terms in India than it really was, was, because above two-thirds of it was contracted at Lucknow and Benares; where the value of the rupee was considerably less than the Calcutta rupee. The interest of the debt being paid in Calcutta rupees, and the principal contracted in the rupees of Lucknow and Benares, it made the real interest from 12 to 14 per cent. instead of 8. He contended, that the Company actually owed 6 millions to the country, on account of the 12 years arrears of the half million annually; for which consideration their charter was renewed. India had, ever since, been a drain to this country, both in men and money; and not a single advantage had been derived from the possession. He was sure that, at the time the charter was last renewed, no one had the most distant idea that it would ever be renewed again, except on terms much more advantageous; but, if they could not pay half a million, they could not pay more, and Great Britain would be the only country prohibited from trading to India, and thus without any sort of consideration.

Mr. GRANT, in general, vindicated the accounts which he had brought forward on the second night, see p. 41. With respect to the amount of the Indian Debt, he continued of opinion, that considerable arrears of the expences of the two wars, in which we had recently been engaged, remained still to be brought to account. The experience of former wars, carried on upon a less extensive scale, justified this opinion; and he was, upon the whole, persuaded, that it was reasonable to estimate the Debt, on 30th April 1806, at 80 millions sterling, after allowing for the purchases made by the Sinking Fund. As to the Sinking Fund, he had admitted it to have aided in improving the credit of the Company's paper; but maintained, still, that the establishment of that scheme, constituted as the fund was, circumstanced as were the affairs of the Company, and pledged as the Company were, to apply every valuable surplus of their revenues to the discharge of Debt, was liable to objections which outweighed any incidental benefit resulting from it. That no considerable part of the Indian Debt was to be

charged to the commerce of the Company, he contended to be satisfactorily proved by the documents he had adduced on a former night; documents framed with great care, by the able officers of the India-house, and founded on fuller and more accurate materials, than those statements could well be, with which the honourable general had been furnished, and which had, by him, been quoted to the house. How to account for the great difference between the honourable general's statements and his, he was at a loss, unless the honourable general had omitted to give credit for bills drawn on England on account of Debt, on a supposition, that the payment of debt not contracted by lord Wellesley, ought not to be charged in the accounts of his administration: but the omission would not be warranted on this ground, because, in the question of accounts between India and England, the only fair way was, to charge all that was paid, and credit all that was received. The honourable general said, the bills drawn for the payment of Debt had been credited for; but admitted, that his statements did not give credit for the political charges defrayed by the Company in England; which, with the other payments made there on account of the territorial possessions, would, in a great degree, account for the balance which the honourable general thought chargeable to the commerce. At the same time, Mr. Grant expressed his willingness, that a very strict scrutiny should be made into the state of account between the revenue and the commerce, as far as it was possible to separate them, in order that this question might be determined and set at rest.—As to the prospect of future revenue and savings, which the honourable general had stated, and which another honourable gentleman (Mr. Keene) carried much higher, Mr. Grant observed, that taking credit for future expectations was not the most satisfactory way of compensating for the past. Hitherto, the recently-conquered provinces were not even estimated to produce beyond a trifle more than the disbursements incurred on account of them;—provinces which had cost so much blood and treasure in the acquisition. Calculations founded on future receipts of revenue must be liable to uncertainty; and the surest dependence was, that of retrenching expense.

Mr. H. MARTIN commented on the construction of the act by which the Company held their charter; and said, that it clearly appeared from it, that when the Company were in straitened circumstances, the payment was only suspended, and they now were debtors to the public for 6 millions. The only excuse must be, their inability to pay; and he hardly thought that this excuse would be resorted to, as it would amount to a

confession, that they had been insolvent ever since the year 1793.

Lord CASTLEREAGH said, that the share he had borne, and the interest he must always continue to feel in the administration of India, made him desirous of troubling the committee with such observations as the course of the present debate, and the general state of the Company's affairs at this period, suggested. It was not necessary that he should detain them upon the detail of the accounts, which were the immediate subject of the committee's consideration. The different results had been very fairly and clearly opened by the noble lord, and so far as the statement related to the actual accounts for the year 1803-4 almost, and those in estimate for 1804-5, he had the satisfaction of entirely concurring in the view his lordship had given of those accounts.

Owing certainly to no omission for which the noble lord could be responsible, but from the documents not having been received in due course from India, the committee had only now before them what ought more properly to have constituted the Budget of the preceding year, and had to regret that the information was still so much in arrear, as to deprive them of the means of forming any very precise judgment of the present state of the Company's finances.

Notwithstanding the defective nature of the materials, he was glad that the present discussion had taken place. It was not likely that gentlemen reasoning upon points that can only now be given on estimate, and drawing their inferences from combinations of accounts intricate in themselves, and such as cannot be easily reconciled in a single discussion of this nature, should frequently find it impossible to agree in any very precise conclusion. At the same time, the debate served to bring into view, and into discussion, many leading points connected with the management of this important concern, with sufficient accuracy, to be productive of practical advantage to the administration of Indian affairs. He had always considered the public service much indebted to those gentlemen who provoked enquiry and discussion upon Indian subjects, from an intimate persuasion that it was attended with beneficial consequences both abroad and at home. Under this impression of duty, he should state to the committee his sentiments upon the leading points which had been adverted to in the course of the present debate, and more particularly on the probable state of the Company's affairs at the winding up of the Indian war, and the measures which he deemed it requisite should be taken thereupon, with a view of enabling the Company effectually to avail

themselves of their general resources, in meeting the pressure of the heavy debt which had grown up abroad.

He could not but regret that in discussing the situation of the Company's affairs, gentlemen so frequently neglected to take the obvious distinction (which they never failed to do as a matter of course, when speaking of our affairs at home) between a period of war and peace. When they ventured to speak of the insolvency of the Company, and attempted to prove it by a comparison of their annual means, independent of loans, with their late expenditure, it would be well they would consider, whether the insolvency of the government at home, or of any government in the world might not, in time of war, be established by the same mode of reasoning. It would be as untrue with respect to an individual to bring forward a year of extraordinary outgoings as the measure of his expenditure, and to conclude him ruined, because he could not meet such an extent of charge, without having recourse to loans.—Another mode in which it is attempted to establish this theory of insolvency, is, to suppose the Company dissolved, and called upon like any common banker, at a moment's warning, to pay, not only all just demands upon them, but also to repay themselves, their capital stock subscribed. It is then said, Where are your means? can you turn your wealth into money? must not the Company acknowledge itself bankrupt?

It is hardly necessary to observe on the absurdity of resembling a great body of this description, created for the double purpose of trade and government (in which capacity it was to be hoped, for the sake of the constitutional liberties of the country, they would in all times, under proper regulations, continue to endure) with an ordinary trader; but if this very inappropriate comparison is to be made, would not a manufacturer, who had sunk much of his capital in machinery, not in itself of a description to be easily turned into money, though productive to him of considerable annual profit, be as open to a sentence of bankruptcy, upon these principles as the Company? It is hardly fair of gentlemen who wish to throw open the Company's trade, or to carry forward any other speculative project with respect to India, to endeavour thus indirectly to attain their ends, by holding out to the public exaggerated and gloomy representations of the affairs of a commercial body, whose credit, and consequently whose interests must, if these statements are believed, be thereby materially injured.

But, even upon the grounds of their own reasoning, their conclusion may be disproved. They set out by very unfairly considering the entire Indian debt as a sole and absolute charge

upon the Company's funds, distinct from the territories. Now, assuming the day arrived when parliament should think fit to vest the government of India in other hands, can it be supposed that, upon an equitable settlement between the Public and the Company, the latter upon the expiration of their charter, which may be considered in the nature of a lease for 21 years under the state, would be ultimately saddled with these loans, so far as they have been contracted, not for any temporary or commercial interest of the Company, but for the permanent defence and security of those valuable possessions? It is obvious that an adjustment must be made on this head, the extent and nature of which must depend on a variety of considerations.

It is enough at present to point out the fallacy, in any general balance of the Company's affairs, of considering the Indian Debt as wholly chargeable upon them, as a trading Company. —But even on this supposition, the result is not so discouraging, when the Assets, Dead Stock, and absolute rights of the Company, are set off against the Gross debts.

|                             |                    |                      |
|-----------------------------|--------------------|----------------------|
| India, Debt, April 1804     | . . .              | £.22,536,207         |
| Debt in Europe, March 1805  | . . .              | 6,012,196            |
|                             | <b>Total</b>       | <b>£. 28,548,403</b> |
| Capital Stock               | . . .              | 7,780,000            |
|                             | <b>Total Debts</b> | <b>£.36,328,403</b>  |
| Assets in India, April 1804 | . .                | 14,452,343           |
| Assets at Home, March 1805  | . .                | 20,442,659           |
|                             |                    | <b>£. 34,895,002</b> |
| Debts, including Capital    | . . .              | 36,328,403           |
| Assets                      | . . .              | 34,895,002           |
| Balance against             | . . .              | <b>£. 1,433,401</b>  |

This balance will certainly stand less favourably, when the accounts are received, bringing down the expences abroad to April 1806, before which time the peace reductions could not begin materially to operate, and a considerable reduction must be made, though by no means to the extent gentlemen are disposed to push it, from the Assets for bad Debts and Demands on government not allowed; but, on the other hand the Company have a considerable claim on any final settlement



for their Dead stock amounting to 9,994,208*l*. They would also still stand possessed, if the charter was terminated, of considerable revenues, arising from territories to which they long since became entitled, by grants and not by conquest. Of this description are Bombay, Fort St. George, Fort William, with their dependant territories, St. Helena, the northern Circars, subject to a question, and other possessions, the annual revenues of which in 1793 were estimated at 526,000*l*.

Upon a mere balance then of their capitalwealth, compared with the claims upon them, after making all due deductions from the Assets for such claims as may be insolvent, and striking off the proportion of debt that must in equity follow the territories, and remain secured upon them till finally liquidated, the balance of such an account would, he had no doubt, leave the Company in possession of ample means to discharge all demands upon them, including their Capital Stock.

But the productive wealth of the Company ought to be measured, not merely by their capital, but by the ordinary produce of the concern in years of peace. In 1802, their net proceeds arising from Surplus Revenue and Profits of Trade were estimated at 1,500,000*l*. after defraying all charges, an estimate which, from subsequent experience, it appears would have been fully realized, had we remained at peace.

If we were, then, to look at this question as a mere matter of account, without reference to the more enlarged functions the Company were intended to perform, it would be impossible to contend, upon any fair view of their wealth in point of capital, or upon their presumeable clear income in time of peace, even after their own immediate profits have been secured in the shape of dividends, that the Company can be considered in a state any thing approaching to insolvency, however their affairs may at the present moment severely experience the pressure of war, and the extent and nature of their debt require, in sound policy, the most vigorous measures for its reduction.

There were a few other points that had been touched upon in the course of the debate, which he should wish to notice, before he proceeded to state what, in his conception, would be the state of the finances abroad at the winding up of the war, and the course which ought to be pursued, for the effectual relief of the Company's affairs. They might be classed under the following heads: 1st. The extent and nature of the Company's trade, whether profitable or not? 2ndly. Whether the commercial capital of the Company had become insufficient for carrying on their trade, and if so, from what sources the extra funds had been supplied? 3rdly. Whether in the

general management of the Company's affairs for a period of years, India stood indebted to Europe, or Europe to India? and 4thly as connected with, and arising out of the preceding points, to what purposes, whether of commerce or government, the produce of the various loans made abroad since the renewal of the charter, had been applied?

And first, as to their Commerce, he conceived an honourable alderman (Prinsep) in endeavouring to lead the attention of the committee to a collateral question; viz. that of the Private Trade, one certainly of great moment in itself, but much too extensive in its bearings to be mixed with propriety or advantage in the present debate, had given not a very true or candid picture of the Company's commerce, either as it related to their own immediate profits, or to its effects upon the manufacturing prosperity of the empire at home. Their trade, but more particularly that with the continent of India, he had described as a losing commerce, in order to found upon this assumption the inference, that their monopoly ought to be put an end to, and their trade, at least with the continent of India, thrown open. That the trade either with India or China was carried on to a loss, he must be permitted to doubt. He held in his hand an account, prepared at the India house, of the clear profit on the prime cost of both the Indian and China investments for 15 years from 1787 to 1801, both years inclusive. By this it appeared, that the average of profit on the Indian investments for the period in question, was 22l. 8s. 6d. per cent. for the whole period, and proportionably much higher in the later years since the shipping system of the Company was opened to a free and unrestrained competition.

The average Profit on the China Investment calculated upon the same principles and for the like period, is stated to be 37l. 14s. 4d. per cent. The committee would observe that this was the profit upon the entire commercial transaction, from the dispatch of the goods or funds from hence till the return and sale of the investment, and that in order to determine how far the operation is commercially profitable, the above per centage must be compared with the amount of capital employed and the extent of time which is required in the ordinary course of business to complete this revolution, which may be taken at about two years and a half upon an average, the return from India being somewhat quicker than from China.

Another mode of looking at this question might be had recourse to, by reference to an account then on the table, which he had himself moved for in 1803, viz. of the actual annual

Proceeds at home of the 4 years ending in March 1802, which were on an average 366,000*l.* per annum, after paying all charges, in this account, previous to the balance being struck, the dividends were included, which must be considered as in the nature of commercial profit, being in truth the return to the proprietors upon their capital stock employed in trade. This account, subject however to some adjustments, would go to prove the Company's commerce eminently productive; but before we can consider this large annual surplus a clear commercial gain, in addition to the ten and a half per cent. the proprietors receive in dividends, we must first be satisfied, (and he would subsequently state his reasons for holding a different opinion), that no more capital was really employed in carrying on this trade, than that which was visibly assigned to this purpose; namely, the Capital Stock, the Company's Bonds, and the other floating Securities for which an interest was paid. Whatever additional funds had actually found their way into the commercial concern, must be considered as part of the capital employed, and the return must provide for the interest of such funds, before the clear profit can be precisely ascertained.

It seemed, however, unjust to describe the Company's commerce as carried on at a loss. To what precise extent it might be profitable, after providing a liberal dividend to the proprietors, might be a matter of more difficult calculation, and must, like all commercial results, be in its nature fluctuating; but, in reasoning upon this branch of the Company's affairs, the worthy alderman must establish several preliminary facts, before he can expect to persuade parliament that the commercial existence of the Company is to be considered merely on grounds of mercantile profit. He must be prepared to shew that individuals would be as likely to carry on steadily the commerce of India, under all the fluctuations to which such a trade is liable, where the outgoings are great, and the returns distant, as a great trading corporation. He must be prepared to dispel the apprehensions which must be entertained with respect to the injurious influence on the prosperity of India, which may be the consequence of an unsteady and unequal demand for their produce, before he can expect to satisfy parliament that an intercourse, perfectly unrestrained, is preferable to that qualified intercourse, partly free and partly restricted, which now prevails. If he assumes, that individuals by using an inferior description of tonnage, could carry on the trade at less expence, and consequently at greater profit, he must be prepared to shew, that this is not merely by throwing

the difference of the expence on the publick, by rendering numerous and expensive convoys requisite to protect their feeble vessels in time of war, whilst the Company's ships, with a comparatively slight aid from our navy, are competent to protect each other, and to set the enemy's ships of war, even when in considerable force, at defiance. He must be prepared to shew, that such an establishment as that of the Company, could be kept up without the protection of a qualified monopoly; or that such a system is in itself unnecessary to the political existence of the Company, and the management of large territorial revenues, when both in peace and in war funds must be transferred through the medium of commerce from India to Europe and from Europe to India. He must also shew, before he can establish that the interest of the manufacturer at home is interested in such a change, that individual speculators would be disposed to send out British manufactures, even at some loss, as the Company have frequently done, or that there is any other limit to the amount of this description of Export, on the part of the Company, than the utmost quantity the Indian market can take off, which they have not hitherto been able, with their most strenuous efforts and some sacrifices to carry beyond 2,000,000 a year. These, and many other important doubts must be solved, before any satisfactory or sound conclusion can be come to, on the great practical question, to which the worthy alderman, somewhat out of time, had been solicitous to point the attention of the committee.

With respect to his position, that the commercial capital of the Company, properly so called, has in progress of time become inadequate to its purpose, that an accession of funds has been found necessary, and that the requisite encrease has been supplied by loans raised abroad, he had the satisfaction to agree with the worthy alderman, though by no means to the extent of his statement. Where the worthy alderman found his principle, that it required four capitals, or 24,000,000*l.* to carry on the Company's trade, he knew not; certainly not from any thing he had ever said. He never had himself heard it before stated higher than two capitals and a half, or at the utmost three capitals; but without being able to trace the precise extent of the actual increase, he was persuaded that some considerable increase had taken place, partly from tracing the funds borrowed abroad to their probable destination, partly from a general but intimate persuasion that the Capital itself, even with the increased amount of the Company's floating securities, has gradually become unequal to the extent of their commerce; under the progressive increase of charge at which

The Charges abroad for the same period, including Interest of Debt, and deducting Expence of Bencoolen, St. Helena, and the other settlements extra the continent of India as being rather connected with the commercial than the territorial charges, were as follows :

|  |   |   |   |   |                |
|--|---|---|---|---|----------------|
| Ten Years to 1803                              | - | - | - | - | £. 91,416,635  |
| Actual, 1803-4                                 | - | - | - | - | - 14,748,872   |
| Estimate, 1804-5                               | - | - | - | - | - 15,005,013   |
| Estimate, 1805-6                               | - | - | - | - | - 16,664,672   |
|  |   |   |   |   | £. 137,835,192 |
| Interest paid to Commissioners of Sinking Fund |   |   |   |   | 730,000        |
| Net Expenditure abroad                         | - | - | - | - | 137,105,192    |
| Revenues, 13 years                             | - | - | - | - | - 135,867,367  |
| Charges, 13 years                              | - | - | - | - | - 137,105,192  |
| Deficiency                                     | - | - | - | - | £. 1,237,825   |

During the above period certain expences immediately appertaining to the territories were paid in Europe, which ought to be added to the charges. They amounted, on an average of years, to about 300,000*l.* per annum, or for the entire period 3,900,000*l.* On the other hand, the Revenues are entitled to have credit for whatever sums included in the Charges abroad were disbursed on account of government, and for which the Company either have or will receive payment with Indian interest thereupon perhaps to the amount of 3,500,000*l.*

Upon the whole, it appeared, that during the period in question, which was one of nearly uninterrupted war, the territories had nearly maintained themselves, and consequently but a very small proportion of the sums raised by loans had been sunk in their defence.

Where, then, did the great mass of the 19,467,038*l.* Extraordinary Funds raised by loans since 1793, go? By referring to the Account of Assets abroad to April 1804, and March 1805 at home, it would appear that a very large increase had taken place in both since 1793.

|                               |   |   |   |               |
|-------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------|
| Assets in India, April 1804   | - | - | - | 14,452,343    |
| Assets, in Europe, March 1805 | - | - | - | 20,442,659    |
|                               |   |   |   | £. 34,895,002 |

|                              |   |   |   |               |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|---------------|
| Assets in India, April 1793  | - | - | - | 8,339,362     |
| Assets in Europe, March 1794 | - | - | - | 9,888,386     |
|                              |   |   |   | <hr/>         |
|                              |   |   |   | £. 18,228,198 |

|                |   |   |   |   |   |            |
|----------------|---|---|---|---|---|------------|
| Assets 1804-5  | - | - | - | - | - | 34,895,002 |
| Assets, 1793-4 | - | - | - | - | - | 18,228,198 |
|                |   |   |   |   |   | <hr/>      |
| Total Increase | - | - | - | - | - | 16,666,804 |

This sum was liable to be increased by whatever proportion of the funds expended in the two subsequent years, viz. previous to April 1806, to which the Debts have been stated on estimate, had been realized in the Assets. The amount would probably be considerable, though inferior to the Increase of Debt within the period.

It then appeared, that an increase had taken place in the Assets since 1793, to an amount nearly corresponding to that which had been made to the debt. It was plain such an immense increase could not have grown up from the Commercial Profits. It was as clear, that during the period in question it could not have arisen from the Surplus Produce of the Revenues, absorbed as they had been by war: The only other possible source from which it could have arisen, was from the loans contracted within the period; with which in amount (without then inquiring how far it had been invested in a description of value which could be realized or not) it in some degree corresponded.

If, then, the greater proportion of the 19,467,038*l.* added to the debt since 1793, was to be looked for in the Assets of the Company, it remained generally to be ascertained how far those funds had been appropriated to purposes connected with the commercial or territorial interests of the Company. That could only be done in a very general way, but he conceived with sufficient precision for any practical purpose. He apprehended, that to neither of these sources could its application be exclusively traced, but to both in their respective proportions. The Increase on the Home Assets was greatest. It amounted to 10,553,823*l.* that on the Assets abroad to 6,112,981*l.*

If the committee would inspect the items of which the Account of Assets consisted, they would perceive that of 20,442,659*l.* at home, with the exception of what was stated to be due from government to the Company, the whole was strictly of a commercial description. The Charge against

government within this period was stated at 4,460,192*l.* which deducted from the increase of 10,553,823*l.* seemed to leave the increase strictly commercial to be 6,093,631*l.*—If the Assets abroad, amounting to 14,432,343*l.* after deducting the securities in the hands of the commissioners were similarly analyzed, the greater proportion would certainly be found to be connected with the management of the territories; but still a considerable share must be referred to the commerce, viz.

|                               |              |
|-------------------------------|--------------|
| Export Goods . . . . .        | £. 1,022,007 |
| Import Goods . . . . .        | 1,156,228    |
| Commercial Advances . . . . . | 2,131,172    |
| Stores, in part . . . . .     | 2,061,593    |

To which might be added some allowance for the share the trade might have in rendering large Balances of cash necessary, in the various principal and subordinate treasuries abroad for the convenient conduct thereof. Supposing the same proportion to prevail between the commercial and political branches with respect to the 6,112,981*l.* increase in the foreign Assets since 1793, which is observable in the general account; there would then be assignable within the period of increase,

|                                 |              |
|---------------------------------|--------------|
| To Territories, about . . . . . | 4,112,981    |
| To Commerce, about . . . . .    | 2,000,000    |
|                                 | <hr/>        |
|                                 | £. 6,112,981 |
|                                 | =            |

If, then, to the increased Commercial Assets at home, viz. 6,093,631*l.* were added the proportion of the increased Assets abroad, which might be deemed commercial, viz. 2,000,000*l.* the whole commercial increase would be 8,093,631*l.* since 1793, which might be taken to be about the proportion of the Debt which had been contracted for purposes directly or indirectly connected with the commerce, and to have been gradually invested in a larger and more valuable stock of goods and stores on hand both abroad and at home; in a commerce more enlarged, as well as necessarily conducted at a considerably increased advance of Capital; and also in an extension of the buildings and other establishments connected with this branch of the Company's service.

Deducting the amount which appeared to have been thus realized in the Commercial Assets from the gross Increase of Debt, here was some reason to presume that the residue had been

raised and applied to services either connected with the territorial government or the service of the state at home,

|   |                     |
|---|---------------------|
| Gross Increase of Debt since 1793 . . . . . | £. 19,467,038       |
| Assignable to Trade . . . . .               | 8,093,631           |
| Remains . . . . .                           | 11,373,407          |
| Deduct Claims on Government . . . . .       | 4,460,192           |
| Remains . . . . .                           | <u>£. 6,913,215</u> |

The latter sum, liable to be increased by whatever proportion of the Claim on government is disallowed, may be deemed, upon grounds of general reasoning, the proportion of the Debt incurred since 1793 assignable to the territories, about 4,000,000*l.* of which may be found in the territorial Assets abroad, having been invested partly in increased Cash Balances, partly in larger sums floating between the presidencies, as well as between the sub-treasuries within each presidency, partly to advances to native powers, or their creditors, as for instance, the advance on account of the Carnatic Debt, the Loan to the Quikwar, &c. The advances on account of the public, he did not consider as a debt belonging to the territories, as the sum, when repaid, whatever it was, ought to discharge an equal amount of debt.

If this statement were sufficient correct for the purposes of reasoning upon, of which he thought no doubt could well be entertained, however the detail might, on a closer inspection, be varied, two observations naturally suggested themselves which it was important to remark, not only with regard to the past but the future management of the Company's affairs: First, the extent of Debt which had been contracted, and Secondly, that the entire increase had taken place abroad. The obvious disadvantage of providing those extraordinary funds abroad, which either the political or commercial service of the Company might require, at an interest nearly double that paid for money in Europe, at first sight might seem to call in question the prudence with which the Company's affairs during that period had been conducted; but, it was due to the Court of Directors, and to those who then presided over the Indian administration, to state, that the most serious obstacles stood in the way of their raising any considerable sum in the market at home, nearly throughout the entire of that period. He dwelt the rather on this point, as it, in principle, connected itself immediately with the remedial measures hereafter to be recommended. With respect to the past, there



was every reason to presume (to such a degree was the market at home preoccupied by the public loans,) that the Company had then no other option but to borrow abroad. The serious evil however of raising money at 10 and 12 per cent. exclusive of a bonus to the subscribers, ought to suggest, for future consideration, if the requisite loans cannot, either in the whole or in part, be raised in time of war in Europe, and remitted to India; whether the amount of the money borrowed abroad ought not to be kept down as much as possible, even at the inconvenience of some reduction of the usual extent of the investment. He was fully aware of the importance of giving at all times the utmost support to the industry and prosperity of India, by the purchase of its manufactured produce; and of the objections to any check being given to the full employment of the company's Shipping; but, if the funds for both the commercial and political services cannot be found at such a period, on terms less ruinous, it was of the last importance that the amount raised by loans abroad, should be kept within the narrowest limits possible.

He was aware that the extent of Extra Funds which he was led to suppose had found their way into the commerce, more particularly in Europe since 1798, did not quite accord with the account of value transmitted to, and received from India during that period from which his honourable friend (Mr. Grant) had made his statement. He was not able to follow the items of the account so far as to judge whether it gave India credit not only for its ordinary advances on account of Europe, viz. to Ceylon, to the navy, to the Company's ships, &c. but also for the very large advances an account of government, with interest due thereon, which had been a subject of enquiry and settlement in the course of last session, or whether it gave credit for the commercial charges abroad not added to the invoices, and also for the Funds remitted to Bencoolen, St. Helena, &c. which must be considered chiefly as commercial advances. It would require much pains and attention to reconcile these several accounts, and from the whole to deduce a consistent and satisfactory result. With this view, he was of opinion, that it would be desirable to charge a special committee sitting above stairs, with the task of investigating and reporting upon the present state of the Company's finances in all its details. If such an enquiry was instituted, not with any hostile or indirect view of shaking the Company's rights, or of innovating on their existing constitution, but with a sincere and candid desire to remove doubt, and to throw light on such points as were disputable in their financial system, he was persuaded the result would be highly advantageous to their ge-

eral credit, and that a report coming from such authority would go far to prevent the public mind from being hereafter misled with respect to the true state of the Company's affairs.

He was the more desirous that such an enquiry should be instituted, as he did not conceive, upon any grounds less grave and satisfactory than an investigation before a committee of their own members, that parliament would feel itself authorized to lend its aid to the Company in carrying into effect those vigorous measures which could alone, in his judgment, afford an early, adequate, and effectual relief to their finances, the nature of which relief he should now lay before the committee; first, however, shortly explaining the actual state of their affairs, as calling for and recommending such a measure.

The Company's Debt in April 1802, to which debt the plan of liquidation which he had the honour of opening to parliament in March 1803 was applied, amounted to 18,654,381*l.* of which about 16,000,000*l.* bore interest. The Debt up to April 1806 was estimated at 28,500,000*l.* of which about 25,000,000*l.* might be considered as bearing interest. The annual Interest in the former period was 1,394,170*l.* In the latter, it would somewhat exceed 2,000,000*l.* The Surplus Revenue was estimated in March 1803 at 1,053,000, exclusive of 80,000*l.* interest payable on debt redeemed. By the actual accounts of 1802-3 the surplus, notwithstanding 500,000*l.* additional charge occasioned by assembling towards the close of the year the armies on the Mahratta frontier, amounted to 797,000*l.* which would have given a surplus of 1,297,000*l.* in that year had this armament not taken place.

Calculating upon some further military reductions then in contemplation, and about 120,000*l.* a year which had since accrued to the revenue of Fort George from the fund antecedently appropriated to the Carnatic Creditors, had we remained on a peace establishment, the Surplus at this day, independent of savings from reduction of interest, would probably not have fallen short of 1,500,000*l.* Out of this Surplus, the Charge of Interest on Debt since incurred, must be defrayed. Taking this at 700,000*l.* the surplus likely to be forth-coming upon our return to a peace establishment, might then be estimated at about 800,000*l.*

This corresponded pretty nearly with the view which his honourable friend (sir A. Wellesley) had taken of this part of the subject; in which, after estimating the revenues from the late conquests and cessions at 1,200,000*l.* and the additional Charges of the same at nearly a like sum, he reckoned upon an annual surplus of 700,000*l.* when all the reductions were

completed, exclusive of the interest payable on debt redeemed amounting to about 250,000*l*.

It would certainly be too sanguine to estimate the Surplus, upon the most favourable hypothesis, at more than 1,000,000*l*. It would not be necessary to waste many arguments in order to satisfy the committee, that to contend successfully against a debt of 28,000,000*l*. a more effective surplus is indispensable, and they must at once perceive that the Plan of Reduction which was framed in 1803 to meet a debt of 18,000,000*l*. must be comparatively feeble and inadequate as applied to the debt augmented as it now is by ten millions additional.

It was obvious, that the system of liquidation now to be pursued should be of a description to be rapidly operative in peace, else the Company, in case of an early recurrence of war, might be exposed to have its Surplus Revenue absorbed in defraying the charge of new loans, and thus find itself deprived upon a peace even of the existing means of liquidation.

The past intervals of peace since our connection with India, have not been found such as to justify us in being satisfied with paying off debt only at the rate intended in 1803, when the gross amount of debt did not exceed 18,000,000*l*. Under these circumstances, the natural remedy and resource for the Company to look to, was, on the return of peace, to repair, with the least possible delay, the misfortune of having been obliged to raise since 1793 all their loans abroad. For this purpose, he would recommend that not less than 20,000,000*l*. of the debt owing in India should be transferred to Europe, with as much rapidity as its transfer could be arranged, or funds remitted from hence for its liquidation. The immediate saving of interest on this transaction alone, would be nearly 4 per cent. at once adding about 800,000*l*. a year to the Company's surplus.

Some gentlemen had spoken with alarm of the proportion of the Indian debt, of which payment was demandable in Europe: the amount was stated to be 17,000,000*l*. He believed the securities which gave an option to the holders to transfer their debts to Europe, might not fall short in the aggregate of this sum, but from the terms of remittance to which they were entitled, the amount which would really come home, he believed, was not likely to exceed 7,000,000*l*. He was not however, disposed to draw any consolation from this circumstance. He should deem it rather desirable, that the whole 17,000,000*l*. should come home, as it would additionally impel the Company to make arrangements for converting so much of the Indian into a European debt. He was satisfied that they had the means of doing so with great advantage to their affairs and if

he was desirous of seeing this measure thus in some degree forced upon them, it was from an apprehension that, where the inconvenience was operating at a distance, men were always less disposed to make an effort out of the ordinary course of management, than when it was directly pressed upon their attention.—The means of giving complete effect to this plan, he admitted to depend in a great measure on the return of peace. During war, the Company could not, with the same advantage, add to their capital, nor could they, without some inconvenience to the state, add materially to the amount of the loan which the market was called on to supply for the public service. To a certain extent he was however of opinion, even in war it should be attempted; reserving till the peace the execution of the measure in its full extent.

The amount of funds required for this conversion of debt was much beyond what the Company, without great inconvenience, could obtain merely by an extension of their capital Stock, as money thus raised was procured by creating a debt in its nature not redeemable. He was of opinion that the sum to be raised in this manner, ought not very materially to exceed what the Company were at present entitled by law to borrow, namely, 2,000,000*l.* which being subscribed for at 200*l.* per cent. and upwards, that not being too high an estimate of its peace value, would produce above 1,000,000*l.* sterling.

The remaining 16,000,000*l.* he should propose to borrow upon the security of the territorial revenues guaranteed by parliament, in such proportion as it might be required for re-emption to India. The money to be raised in the first instance like any other public loan, and paid over to parliamentary commissioners, charged with its application to the reduction of the Indian debt, who should be authorized to receive the annual interest, together with the one per cent. sinking fund payable on account of the same, out of the Indian revenues, to be strictly set apart and paid over to them, or their order, in the precise order of payment, (that is, immediately after the Military Charges are provided for, and in preference to all other civil or commercial demands whatever) which is now by law provided in favour of the creditors of the Company.

This proposition might at first sight appear open to many objections, and seem to realize at once the prophecies of some gentlemen, that the distresses of the Company were become such as had at length compelled them to come to parliament for relief; but he denied that it was at all open to such a comment any more than the system which had been acted upon uninterruptedly for the last ten years with respect to the loans raised for the service of Ireland, even before the union. The

amount annually required being invariably comprehended in the British loan for the year, was in the first instance secured upon the British consolidated fund. It was then paid over by the British to the Irish treasury; the Irish treasury being bound to remit to the British treasury in each year, the Interest and Sinking Fund, till the whole capital thus created on account of Ireland was paid off.

In proposing a similar arrangement with respect to the Company, the committee would hold in mind, that the proposition in no degree originated with the Company; that it was merely the suggestion of an individual, not founded upon any existing failure of means in that body to meet, without the aid of parliament, every claim upon them, but offered for consideration as a measure calculated without loss to the public to add 800,000*l.* a year to the Company's income, and thereby obtain with more certainty for the public their annual participation of 500,000*l.* to which in the event of an adequate surplus existing abroad, they are entitled.

It really appeared to him that the public were even more interested than the Company in this measure, as their prospect of participation would be thereby at once improved so much, as to be placed nearly beyond the reach of failure; whereas the dividends to the proprietors were already secured, but both the public and the Company would largely feel the benefit of it, in the effect it would have in ameliorating the finances of an Empire in which they have a common interest, which is the only British possession that has never yet in war been a charge on the mother country, except so far as its naval protection is concerned, and which has ample means of sustaining itself, in all future wars, from its own resources, if wisely administered, and upon principles not less enlarged and liberal than those which have been already acted upon with respect to other leading branches of the empire.

That the general inducements in the present case were not less strong, and the risks not greater than in the precedent of Ireland, he thought might be successfully contended. As to the extreme case of either Ireland or India being lost to the British crown, he thought it one not to be contemplated in regulating one's decision upon a financial question of this nature. Parliament had not formerly suffered such a consideration with respect to Ireland, nor would they now suffer it with respect to India, to divert them from an important and beneficial measure of general policy. Short of the case of our absolute expulsion from India, it was impossible to call in question the nature of the security which the public would have for the regular discharge of these loans. They would have revenues in the first

instance mortgaged to them, the produce of which was not less than 14,279,000*l.* a year, out of which this payment would be set apart, next in order after the military charges of the government, which in the most expensive year of war did not exceed 8,970,000*l.* The charge for Interest and Sinking Fund, suppose on a loan of 16,000,000*l.* amounting annually to less than 1,000,000*l.* would be received out of a residue of above five millions sterling. They would have not only the same security as the creditors of the Company have lent their money on, but the same security in fact much improved by there being 800,000*l.* less to be paid out of the same means. They would also have, if possible, better security than the public had in the case of Ireland, as the large sums applicable in time of peace to the reduction of the Indian debt would in this case over and above the ordinary sinking fund of one per cent. be payable to the commissioners, to be by them applied to the more rapid extinction of the capital created for the service of the Company.

It might be said, if the security of the Company was really as good as had been described, why was it necessary to come to parliament to negotiate a loan for them? why did not they at once raise it for themselves? The answer to this was, that the Company were not in the habit of borrowing in Europe to such an extent. Their security might be unexceptionable, yet individuals being unable, amidst so much controversy as to the nature of it, to form a decisive opinion of their own, might be disinclined to lend to them on the same advantageous terms as they would to the public. In short, the same reasons for adopting the measure applied in this case, as did in the case of Ireland, and the public had even a more direct interest than they had in that case to facilitate the execution of the measure.

But the obtaining the money on more advantageous terms in the first instance was not the only benefit that would accrue from its being raised as a public loan. Being included in the general mass of the Funded Debt, the capital would be redeemable at the precise value of the funds at the time, whereas, were this sum funded in a three per cent. separate stock, although no corresponding advantage in the original terms would probably be allowed to the company by the subscribers, the magnitude of the sinking fund applicable to its reduction in peace, would force up the value of this particular stock to par much sooner than the other funds, and thus the Company would have to redeem it on much less favourable terms.

Whilst the advantages, then, were clearly in favour, not only of the transfer of a large proportion of the debt to Europe,

but also of its transfer in this mode, he did not see any solid grounds of objection which could be urged on the part of the public to the proposition. Ireland was not the only instance in which the credit of the public had been interposed for the purpose of promoting and protecting the general prosperity. When the commercial credit of the country was embarrassed by temporary causes, parliament voted five millions of exchequer bills to be advanced by commissioners to individuals upon security, to be approved by them. This measure relieved the prevailing distress, and cost the public nothing. Loans of the same description had been extended to sufferers by the calamity of seasons in the West Indies. These seemed but two considerations in such a case to be weighed: first, whether the security was adequate, and secondly, whether the exigency, and the advantage likely to result, were such as justified an extraordinary interference? If the interest of the India Company was alone concerned, he thought parliament would have a very strong inducement to lend its aid to an arrangement by which the prosperity of so great a commercial body must be materially promoted, but in the present instance the public were in truth themselves direct parties, not merely in the more limited pecuniary sense, as entitled to share in the surplus profits, but in the larger though more remote view of the Company being the instrument by which India was to be governed and preserved to the British crown, in failure of whose resources the charge of defending those possessions must in fact fall on the state.

The great object to look to in the management of the Company's finances, was, to have such a surplus in peace, as should make an effective progress in reducing the debt. If the suggestion which had been made added at once 800,000*l.* a year, to whatever the surplus might otherwise be, it was an augmentation of resource which, even in the more extended scale of the public finances, could not but be attended with the most important and beneficial consequences. Those who had looked at the Company's finances with hope and confidence, as he had done, must feel disposed to promote a measure which was obviously calculated to accelerate and secure all the advantages which the public had been taught to expect from them, and in which expectation they would not have been disappointed under any other circumstances, than those of a continued War Expenditure; but those who had been led to form more gloomy conclusions, and to persuade themselves that India would yet prove a burthen to the public, ought to be the more eager, by these means, to postpone at least the evil day; the saving to be effected by this transfer of debt being in itself sufficient, without

adding to the existing charges, to enable the Company to borrow not less than from eight to ten millions, if the exigency of their affairs should require it, and consequently operate proportionably to defer any possible demand for direct aid from the public.

The noble lord concluded by saying, that he thought it natural and proper that his majesty's ministers should not be prepared till the actual accounts were received from India down to the close of the Mahatta war, to submit any conclusive plan to parliament upon this subject. He trusted however it would not be long delayed. It was to be presumed that the accounts which ought to have been before this time on the table, would arrive so as to admit of their being opened to parliament at the commencement of the next session. He should then hope that those immediately entrusted with the administration of India would be prepared to state the system upon which it was proposed to act. He trusted it would be one of energy proportioned to the necessity of rapidly reducing the debt abroad. He thought it ought to be preceded by a parliamentary enquiry. Whatever course his majesty's ministers might, upon full communication with the court of directors, think fit to pursue, provided it was founded upon enlarged and operative principles, it should have his cordial support. He only deprecated postponing the necessary effort too long; if made in due time, the debt might be kept within bounds; if not, it might hereafter, under the accumulating expenditure of war, prove fatal to the prosperity of the Company, and highly injurious to the general interests of the empire.

Dr. LAURENCE said, he should not attempt to follow the noble lord through the long statement which the house had just heard, but there were some points on which he wished to make a few short observations. If the Company could pay the 500,000*l.* annually, they should come and state to the house that they were capable of so doing. The noble lord (Castlereagh) had annually told the house, that the Company were in an absolute state of prosperity, and now he ventured to come forward with a proposition for this country to relieve them by guaranteeing their loans! Mr. Dundas too, said, that it was more likely that India would come in aid of this country, than that she should become a burthen to her. All these fine predictions were however reversed, and there was now as decided a change as ever was known in this world. This was the jet and issue of all the fallacies that had been stated to the house from year to year! Such, said the learned gentleman were the statements made in this little snug party! [only 27



members were present]. The noble lord called upon ministers to institute an enquiry; but why did he not make such an enquiry while he was in office? With respect to the question of exclusive trade; when that came before the house, the learned gentleman said, he should look at it as a whole, and not as the honourable alderman (Prinsep) had done. The house had lately been told, that the government of the country had been guilty of a breach of faith towards the army, but yet we were not permitted to say that the Company were in a state of insolvency. What was insolvency but an inability to pay debts? And that he insisted, was the present state of the India Company. The Dead Stock, every stick and stone had been put together, and set off against a debt that might come upon them at a day's notice. In the name of common sense, how could this be the case, unless there was a deficiency of the means of the Company? Something must be done, he ventured to say, and that speedily. Whether what the noble lord (Castlereagh) proposed, or whether what had been suggested by the honourable alderman, he did not say, but he could not put his trust in the noble lord, after the many years fine prospects that had been held out by him.

Mr. T. JONES said, that he concurred (notwithstanding his interrupting him as to putting questions) with the learned doctor in the opinion, that the Company ought to give some account of the payment of the six million charter-money due, which at best (as stated by him and another member Mr. Martin) was a sum suspended, and as such could not be done away with, and it amounted to a sum, which, if paid, would relieve the public from that grievous and grinding tax, the Property Tax, which had been increased in bitterness and oppression by the ungracious mode, *per saltum*, of laying it on. He had often heard the late president of the board of controul (now lord Melville), state amidst his lavish praises of the Company's affairs, (while the figures told a different story) the immense sums which the mother country might soon expect from India. Has it ever come? Will it ever come? Must not (for that is the dread) the mother country bleed to support her offspring? The learned doctor observes, this is a "snug party" to discuss topics in, a snug party of pleasure with all his heart, said the honourable member, but this was a disgraceful party, twenty-seven members (alias creditors) met to adjust a debt of nearer 40 than 30 millions! and this he should prove on summing up. Where are his majesty's ministers, said the honourable member? Where are the directors [one only present, Mr. Hudlestone]? Why do they not attend and assist the noble lord (Morpeth) in settling their

own accounts? The Company is in a state of insolvency, and the noble ex-president (lord Castlereagh) says, he considers them in the view of wanting "prompt and vigorous amelioration;" so that he, whatever he may think of his majesty's ministers, certainly does not imagine the directors lay on a "bed of roses." The noble lord says, he compares them to manufacturers in embarrassment, who give in a list of their assets, &c. So do I, said the honourable gentleman; but honest manufacturers labouring under misfortunes call their creditors together: for instance, a coach-maker, who says "Here, I am in a bad way, take an inventory of all I have, barouches, landaus, gigs, tandems, telegraphs, &c. and come to some understanding." But have the directors of the East India Company done any such thing? The honourable member then proceeded to state, that lord Castlereagh had not succeeded, during his presidency, in getting a loan for some expedition (Egypt) and on that had recommended an enquiry into their affairs.

It was a matter of indifference, whether the debt was a commercial one or not. The noble lord had insisted much on that advantage; but the honourable gentleman observed, that it was partly commercial and partly military, consisting of expensive staffs, and various expeditions as stated by him on the 25th of June 1801, and since considerably increased; and here he observed, that ever since the taking of Seringapatam, and the subsequent wars and acquirements, India had gained in aggrandisement of territory, but had improved only in poverty. Moreover, said the honourable member, to whom do these conquests belong? to the government or to the country? The honourable gentleman then quoted, in proof of his assertions, Mr. Alderman Priusep's speech, who had given an historical account of the Company, and in his asserting that they had always dealt in credit, Mr. Jones observed, that hitherto he had supposed them only as dealers in tea, nankeen, &c. He appealed strongly to the house on the comparison which had been made between the India and South Sea House. He agreed with the honourable alderman, that the East India Company were in a state of insolvency, as they could not go on? They must borrow; they must die—"die all, die nobly," as in the Dramatist, "die like demi Directors."—Then to the honourable gentleman (Mr. Grant) who would not proceed until he had asked a question as to the amount of the debt, Mr. Jones made this statement, 31,000,000*l.*; the granted debt 6,000,000*l.* Sub-judice, at best, 2,672,440*l.* comprised in an account of above four millions with government, of which only part had been allowed to the Company, and consequently this

sum might (as it was so in fact) be added, making the debt of the Company nearer forty millions than thirty. The honourable member then emphatically said, "All that the grand defender of the Company (Mr. Grant) can say is, that he thinks theirs "an extricable case." These are two very remarkable words, and all I shall say further is, I think (and I believe the world thinks with me) theirs—an inextricable case.

Mr. W. KEENE thought, that the excessive military charge of nearly 9 millions had caused the embarrassment of the Company's finances, and that prosperity might now fairly be anticipated.

Mr. JOHNSTONE thought the prosperity of India was calculated on estimates never to be realized, and he thought it too much for human patience to hear the arguments urged in their support.

Mr. HUDLESTON rose and said:—Sir, the strictures which an honourable member opposite (Mr T. Jones) has been pleased to address to me on the conduct of some of my colleagues for their absence from the house on this occasion, it is not difficult to answer. My colleagues, sir, have been occupied to day for 7 or 8 hours by very important public duties in another place. They know also that the statements before the house contain full and accurate information relative to the finances of the East India Company; and they were aware that whatever further explanation might be required, no one is more able to give than my honourable friend, the late chairman, who would, in all probability, be present in his place at this discussion. For my own part, sir, I confess I came down to the house for the purpose of offering some observations on the speech of an honourable alderman (Prinsep) who the other evening entered so largely into the subject of the Company's commerce, and with views so obvious respecting it; and on part of the speech of the noble lord who so ably followed him, and I shall now endeavour to submit those observations to the house.

With respect to the facts assumed by the worthy alderman, it is not necessary to dispute them. Without stopping to enquire into their validity, it may be sufficient to examine the structure he would build upon them in a fair comparison with that which he would overthrow. Such an examination, I am confident the honourable alderman can never have made, for, if he had, it would have enabled him to take a more enlarged

view of the subject, and convinced him that the view he had before taken of it was narrow and fallacious.

Hitherto the honourable alderman seems to have looked at the commerce of the East India Company through a peculiar sort of glass, which has possessed the property of hiding all its great and leading features, and all the benefits which it diffuses. The loss which he supposes the Company to sustain by their trade forms the grand foundation of his argument, to that point therefore I shall immediately direct my attention, by claiming of him what I am sure his candour will readily admit, namely, that the loss is principally, if not entirely, confined to the exports. I shall then remind the worthy alderman, and solicit the attention of the committee, to the momentous fact, that from the provision of those exports many thousands of the community derive their subsistence, and are enabled by it to contribute their proportion of the public burthens, instead of being themselves burthens on the state. To illustrate this, I will take that article of the Company's exports on which the ascertained loss comprises a very great part of the guilt which the alderman charges to the whole of their commerce—I mean the article of woollens; and to what is it owing that the Company sustain that loss? Why, literally, sir, to their consulting the public interests in preference to their own—to their exporting annually woollens to the enormous amount of 1,300,000*l.* by which the Company sustain very great loss, but the public gain in a still greater proportion; for the provision of those woollens gives employment to more than 40,000 persons: and until lately this was not all, for the Company virtually paid a penalty for rendering this benefit to the state, in the shape of a duty of 4*l.* per cent. which was afterwards increased to 5*l.* per cent. and amounted annually to upwards of 50,000*l.* Even before that duty was imposed, it was a losing trade. We know, that in the last 4 years, the loss on the woollens sent to China alone exceeded 100,000*l.* in each year; and from the progressive advance in the price of labour, and of the raw material, both native and foreign, this loss is increasing; for the China trade differs from all others in this essential respect, that the China merchants themselves fix the prices, and the same that were fixed many years ago still continue, notwithstanding the advance in the cost of the woollens here. Two points, then are clear; 1st, that nothing but a disposition to promote the manufacturing interests of this country in preference to their own, could induce the East India Company to export woollens to such an extent; for in respect to China they could obtain a more favourable remittance in silver; and 2dly, that were the Company to seek other

modes of remittance, the consequences would be dreadful to the manufacturing and the labouring poor in the counties of Gloucester, Devon, Somerset, and Cornwall, and in the city of Norwich; it would also operate the ruin of several extensive establishments in this metropolis, and deprive more than 700 persons of a respectable subsistence which they now derive from the East India Company. Now, sir, I think I have a right to ask the honourable alderman whether his trade, or that to which he is partial, could bear this loss, or afford to the public this benefit. Perhaps he will have the goodness to inform the committee of the quantity of woollens annually exported to India by any private trader, or the aggregate of the quantity exported by all of them.

I have stated only the benefit which the public derive from one article in one branch, of the Company's commerce; but, if the worthy alderman would take due view of the commerce of the East India Company which I have been accustomed to take of it, it would appear to him as a vast edifice, erected on a solid foundation, which has for ages withstood the fury of the elements, and given shelter to millions of people, which through every vicissitude has been the firm and constant friend, as well as child, of the state, and made an ample return for the uniform protection it has received. In the provision of a single article, as I have just stated, it gives employment to 40,000 persons. The exchequer derives from it annually three millions sterling in duties and customs. It employs about 10,000 British seamen, and thus nourishes for the state a great portion of that force on which its safety essentially depends. It assisted in acquiring, and has assisted in preserving, our dominion in India. At a memorable and critical era, the enemy's squadron was totally defeated in the Ganges by the ships of the East India Company—an event that materially contributed to lay the foundation of all our subsequent greatness. On various occasions since, they have assisted in fighting the battles of the state, and particularly off Pondicherry, in October 1778, two of our Indiamen shared in the glory of forcing the French squadron to leave that fortress to its fate. I am sure the committee must anticipate my alluding to a more recent event in the China seas, in which the ships of the East India Company under the brave and able conduct of their commanders, furnished an argument in favour of the Company's commerce that will not soon be forgotten, and at this moment it will not be denied that the commerce of the East India Company supplies no inconsiderable portion of the force destined for the defence of this Capital in case of invasion.—Sir, the list of his majesty's

navy bears testimony in favour of the commerce of the East India Company. And need I ask if the utility of this commerce is to be judged of by the balance of the head of profit and loss in the ledger? or if it be any reproach to this commerce that all which I have stated has not been accomplished without the aid of the Indian revenue? certainly I am not prepared to say that the Company's commerce could go on without that aid, on the contrary I believe the commerce and the revenue to be necessary to each other, and their continued union to be essential to the vital interests of the state.

Some years ago the worthy alderman and his friends brought forward another, and very captivating argument against the Company's commerce, and in favour of their own, but I know not if he has recurred to it on this occasion, not having been able to get down to the house the other evening until he had made considerable progress in his speech, viz. the idea of bringing all the trade of India to the river Thames, and making London the grand emporium of Asiatic commerce. This was certainly a magnificent project, and only two objections weigh with me against it. First, that it is impracticable; and secondly, that if practicable, it would be unwise to effect it. Most of the maritime powers of Europe possess, or on the return of peace will probably again possess, ports and commercial factories in India. On the coast of Malabar, and from Cape Comorin to the Ganges, are those of the French, Dutch, Danes, and Portuguese, who are all as sensible of the value of a trade with India as we are, and their merchants as eager in the pursuit of gain, and only less enterprising than ours. Is there then any rational hope that we can exclude foreigners from this trade, or prevail on them to relinquish it, and consent to receive the produce of India only through the port of London? But I have said that, if practicable, it would not be wise to effect it, and here I would entreat of the worthy alderman to forget for a moment his commercial character, and to consider this point only as a member of the state, and when in that capacity he shall have weighed it maturely combining with it our present situation, and acquisitions in India, I would ask him, if no considerations occur to his mind as adverse to our obtaining for ourselves so invidious a preference? I would beg of him to state how much he thinks we can afford to lose of the reputation we possess with foreign powers for moderation and liberality in what relates to our commercial, and naval interests, and pre-eminence.

Sir, there is one other consideration which I shall merely glance at: some persons I know are not sufficiently aware of its importance, but no reflecting mind not warped by views of pri-

vate or pecuniary interest will overlook it, or deem it visionary : it applies equally to the system of Indian commerce favoured by the worthy alderman, and to the late system of conquest and extension of territory in India. At present I shall confine myself to the former. The system desired by the worthy alderman, would substitute in the Indian trade, ships built in India for ships built in England ; Teak ships for Oak ; the Lascar, or Indian sailor, for the British tar ; and the Ganges for the Thames. The home of his trade is India, and it would soon make India the home of thousands of artificers, agents, and adventurers of all descriptions. At every outport and subordinate factory, there would be a European public, and in the space of 60 or 70 years the number of Europeans in India, would exceed the number of British Americans in north America when that country declared its independence. Can there be any doubt then of the direct tendency of such a system, if established in regions so much more distant from the mother country ? The opinion entertained on this subject by a late truly illustrious person—illustrious for his virtues even more than for his services, may be collected from the following short passage in one of his letters dated in November 1794 ; “ I am strongly impressed with a conviction that it “ will be of essential importance to the interests of Britain “ that Europeans should be discouraged, and prevented as “ much as possible, from colonizing, and settling in our pos- “ sessions in India.”

Whether the utmost human wisdom can do more than delay the event against which the noble marquis meant to guard, is a question beyond our reach ; but it requires no gift of prophecy to be able to pronounce with conscious certainty, that the laying open the trade to the public would accelerate it by at least half a century, and under that conviction, I should have felt it my duty to submit to the committee these observations on the speech of the honourable alderman, even if there had been no other objection to the system which it is his object to recommend, and without alluding to an argument that I am sure would of itself be sufficient to secure its rejection, viz. the injustice it would operate on the East India Company, but if I differ from the worthy alderman in almost all his deductions, and inferences, from the facts he laid down, I am as little able to concur with the noble lord who followed him in the debate, I mean in his limited view of the existing evils, and his mode of accounting for the vast increase of our Indian debt, and the sole remedy which he has suggested for the consideration of the committee.

The noble lord seems to consider our present financial difficulties as the only evil we have to overcome, and war as the only cause, and the remedies he proposes are of course equally confined; whereas, in my view of our present situation in India, were our debt to be this moment extinguished, very serious evils would still remain; but, even adopting the noble lord's view of the subject, and supposing it only necessary at present to advert to the immediate cause, or causes of the deranged state of our finances in India, it would still be impossible for me to acquiesce in the noble lord's statement of 13 years of war as the cause of that derangement. Two years ago I heard a similar argument from the right honourable gentleman whose loss is so justly deplored, and I heard it then with equal surprize; because I well knew that during five or six of the 10 years which he spoke of, the continent of India had not been in a state of war, and that correctly speaking the war in India commenced in 1798. The noble lord I am sure has too much candour to contend, that the march of a detachment to take possession of Pondicherry, where there was not a shot fired, nor an enemy capable of making the least resistance, constituted war in the only sense in which the argument could apply. Several other expeditions were projected, in which the East India Company had no more interest than any other corporate body: such expeditions indeed, by withdrawing their troops from the continent of India, and carrying them to unhealthy climes, are worse than useless to the Company: they occasioned however a large expenditure, for the whole amount of which the Company have a just claim on government, as I shall at all times be prepared to prove, but the amount, large as it is, forms but a small part of the enormous increase in our Indian expenditure and debt.—The peace of Seringapatam concluded with Tippoo Sultaun by lord Cornwallis, was signed the beginning of March 1792, and from that period till the year 1798, the peninsula of India was undisturbed by war; but when the noble lord spoke of 13 years of war, as if the Indian debt had been progressively encreasing each of those years, he must have forgotten the decisive fact, that, in two of the first six years, the Indian debt, instead of encreasing, diminished; viz. that in 1794, it was less by upwards 700,000*l.* than in 1793; and in 1795 upwards of 500,000*l.* less than in 1794, and that in 1796, tho' a little more than in 1795, the debt was still nearly 900,000*l.* less than in 1793, when, as is well known to the noble lord, its amount was 8 millions; from that year (1793) to 1798, the increase was only 3 millions; if then we suppose with the noble lord, that the 5 intervening years were years of war,



what does that fact express with regard to the expenditure of the succeeding seven years; viz. from 1798 to 1805; during which, according to the estimate on the table, the Indian debt has accumulated from 11 millions to  $26\frac{1}{2}$  millions? for although the noble lord spoke of 13 years, which must include the present year, I imagine his meaning went to no later period than to April 1805, which is the latest to which the usual estimate of the Indian debt is brought up, but if the noble lord wishes to bring it up to the present time, I fear several millions must be added to that estimate.

The committee will judge therefore whether the present embarrassed state of the Company's finances can with accuracy be ascribed to 13 years of war, and it is at least highly important and just that the committee should be aware, that of the  $18\frac{1}{2}$  millions added to the Indian debt since the year 1793, three millions only, were contracted before the year 1798.

That this enormous increase in the Indian debt has been principally occasioned by the late war in India, there can be no doubt, but if war alone could produce so great a change in the state of our finances, what would have been our situation after the war which began in 1779, and ended in 1784, in which we had to contend in India with the French and the Dutch, the Mahrattas and Hyder Ally? between which too and the late war there was this striking difference, viz. that our own districts were the seat of war, and by far the greater part of the Carnatic for a considerable time in the possession of the enemy; yet, at the conclusion of that war, the Company's debt in India, I believe, amounted only to 6 or 7 millions. Whereas the late war in India was carried on in the territories of the enemy, and our own felt none of its calamities, except that during a few weeks an adventurer, named Dundeah, committed depredations in some of the Mysore districts. This is well known to the honourable general opposite (sir Arthur Wellesley) who himself so ably conducted the war in the Deckan, and to whose military prowess is most essentially to be attributed its successful issue, and its not having been carried into our own districts. Doubtless there are expences incident to a state of war, although the troops may not be actually in the field; and the war in Europe by giving birth to the maritime expeditions I have alluded to, contributed essentially to the reduction of the surplus revenue; but it made no other very considerable addition to our Indian expenditure, for, owing to the vigilance of government, and the vast superiority of our navy, not a French soldier I believe landed in India.

If then, I were to be asked, to what causes the present state of our finances in India were to be attributed, I should answer, that they might be traced to a system of policy which sought the aggrandisement and extension of the British empire and influence in India, through the medium of what is called the system of subsidiary alliances, or the bringing all the native states into subjection to, or dependence on the British power, by means of large bodies of troops stationed in their respective capitals, with agents or ministers, on the part of the Company, to watch and direct their political conduct. This system became the fruitful parent of an extended war, on an extended scale of expence, and a corresponding system of finance and general expenditure; in both of which economy was overlooked, or perhaps did not seem necessary; for one of the effects of this system was a vast nominal increase of revenue by the necessity of exacting from each native prince a subsidy for defraying the expence of the troops stationed in his capital. These subsidies, whether in money, or commuted for an equivalent in territory, occasioned a great apparent increase of revenue, and every extension of our territory or revenue being supposed to bring with it a proportionate extension of our means of paying, produced a real alteration in the scale of ideas and expectations, and unfortunately the increased expenditure not being made conditional, or dependent on the continuance of a surplus revenue, remained after the surplus had ceased to exist.

Such I believe to have been, in abstract, the combined causes of the present embarrassed state of our finances in India; but, do I therefore concur in the position which the honourable alderman has so industriously laboured to impress upon the committee, namely, that the East India Company is insolvent? No, sir, I deny that the Company is insolvent, or that our present pecuniary difficulties will make us so, unless we continue in the course which has brought them upon us.

How then are our finances to be retrieved, and what is to be done? Why, sir, if there is a determined disposition to retrieve them on both sides the Atlantic, they may and will be retrieved by measuring back our steps to those systems, both political and financial, from which we ought never to have departed; in a word, the system and principles of Cornwallis; by disavowing all views of extending our dominion and influence in India, and in proof of the sincerity of the disavowal, relinquishing the acquisitions both in territory and alliances, which have been made under them; and lastly, by contracting the number of our vast and expensive establishments, and the scale of those which it may be necessary to continue. The work, both in re-

spect to policy and finance, we have reason to believe is already begun, and if persevered in with firmness and decision, will effect the re-establishment of a surplus revenue, and the gradual reduction of the Indian debt; but it will be in vain to hope for such effects from any other means than those which I have stated; other measures may be resorted to in aid of those means, but if attempted without them, will only aggravate the existing evils, and perhaps render them insurmountable; but least of all can those effects be produced by the adoption of the advise of the honourable alderman, for which, however, I do not presume to censure him, as it is the result of opinions which he has long habitually cherished; with the view which he takes of the subject I am not surprized that the annihilation of the Company's commerce, and the substitution of the private trade in the place of it, which to my mind present the most ruinous consequences to the East India Company, the public, and even the traders themselves, should to him seem fraught with benefits to all of them; but, differing so widely as I do from the worthy alderman, I have felt anxious to submit to the committee my impressions on the whole subject, and I have now to assure them that nothing but my sense of its extreme importance could make me venture on so long an intrusion on their time.

Mr. Alderman PRINSEP rose to reply. He began with observing, that after the long indulgence with which he had been honoured in a former part of the debate, he felt in his duty to abridge as much as possible, what he had to say further on the subject; and here he must acknowledge his obligation to two honourable members (Mr. Paull and Mr. Robson), and also to another honourable member (Mr. Francis) who had volunteered in his support. For himself, he had long fought this battle single handed, and had thrown himself alone into "the imminent and deadly breach," with truth for his standard, facts for his buckler, and the powerful and never failing auxiliaries of cause and effect: What but a reliance on such auxiliaries, could have sustained him against the influence and resentment of the most powerful public body upon earth, or induced him to sacrifice personal ease, and perhaps the interests of a large family, to the prosecution of a great public object, the assertion of national right to a natural share of the British trade with its Indian dependencies. The causes of the Company's situation, which he had so long and so often exposed, had now produced the fatal consequences he had predicted, and dire distress and necessity were irresistibly forcing a change of system and a call for relief.

It had given him much satisfaction to hear the honourable director, who had just sat down, admitting without reserve, all the facts he had stated on a former night, although the honourable gentleman had differed as much with regard to the conclusions drawn from them, as he had misunderstood the views and objects of their exposure. The honourable director had represented him to have contrasted the present system, with the probable consequences of separating trade and revenue: with no other view than that of obtaining the abolition of the Company's charter from selfish and personal motives; when in fact he had merely stated the four active capitals requisite for conducting, even on its present scale, the Company's trade, and the total want of any such commercial resource; in order first to prove that India interest attached to every operation, and if it did attach, the honourable director well knew, that all alledged profit on the trade was done away.

His next object was to shew the necessity of allowing British subjects to carry on that trade, which the Company had no faculty of embracing; not to confine it to a few old commercial houses on each side the water, but to enable all the merchants, manufacturers and ship owners at home and in India, to compete with foreigners in carrying it on: not in the wild and extravagant idea of rendering Great Britain the emporium of all the products even of British Asia; but in the sober contemplation, of securing to the mother country that natural proportion of the traffic, of which she was deprived by the impolitic restrictions under which the private trader to and from India had laboured and continued to labour.

The honourable alderman next observed, that he had been charged with expatiating widely on the little value of an item of 10 millions, stated by the Company themselves, as composed of bad debts, old buildings, old furniture, and other articles, which sum their own accountant had struck out of the balance sheet, and estimated at only 400,000*l.*; \* was it unjust, as he had observed on a former night, to scrutinize such an asset, when adduced as a probable future claim upon government, and as part of those resources, on the security of which a noble lord had proposed that the house should advance 17 millions of money? Was it invidious to suppose a case possible, in which government might be obliged to resume its lease of the territories, and dissolve a partnership ruinously unprofitable to both parties of the firm? Would his majesty's ministers, or would they not, be justified in opposing to such claims, the 5

\* Vide note to Appendix No. 2. [No. 23, Budget Accounts.]

millions and a half they had and were to pay for defending India since 1804:—the expences of the Cape and Ceylon, the charge of two squadrons in the eastern seas, and the pay of 25 regiments employed in acquiring and protecting the dominions in question?

But the Company, it was asserted, has estates abroad of great value, of which they could not be deprived: how far it would be politic to retrain them, would appear by looking at the expence of these estates; at that of the island of Bombay, for instance, where 764,994*l.* had been expended in one year beyond the product of farms, licences, and quit rents; at that of St. Helena, which exceeded in the sum of 47,628*l.* as appeared by the accounts of 1802-3; at the value of the villages round Madras and Masulipatam; at their factory charges of Bencoolen; and above all, at their more recently purchased island Penang, where half a million was likely to be squandered on the wild project of making an arsenal, that could never be defended; of keeping a garrison where there were no provisions, and erecting docks where there was neither tide to float the vessels, nor workmen or materials for their construction or repair. As well might the Company resume their possessions at Balem, Bangain, and the Andamans, and call them profitable estates, as retain any thing of landed property, after they should lose the revenues at large.

The Dutch and French had retained indeed their factories in our territories, one for the sake of patronage, for a few favoured families of the Aristocracy, the other from a political motive of disturbing our influence: neither were profitable, on the contrary, the Dutch Company had become bankrupts, from the expences they had thus incurred, and the French would never resume theirs, but from a determined enmity to our prosperity in India. These estates therefore, were no addition to the amount of their assets, in the stock by computation.

But this Imperial Company, it was said, exported from patriotic motives, vast quantities of woollens, at an enormous loss.

The honourable director, who as well as the honourable ex-chairman, always carefully blended the India and China trade together, had vauntingly boasted of this immense export of woollens, and stated the heavy loss thereon as a sacrifice to the manufacturers of this country; the former had asked, what would become of the 40,000 British hands now employed, were the Company to throw up that trade? In the first place, the Alderman observed, that no idea had ever been entertained by him, of invading the exclusive trade to China; it was, if any national trade could be, the properest of all subjects for monopoly, though not perhaps the

most beneficial trade in a national point of view. Tea was the principal import from thence, and the excise it afforded, like the gabelle upon Salt in another Country, and the excise on Tobacco, was a most convenient instrument for taxing the subject: the duties on this article were ninety-five per cent. on the selling price, and formed the greater part of the revenues which the honourable director had stated were furnished by the Company's exclusive trade. It was certainly a most important and convenient instrument of luxury for the Exchequer; but who paid the Tax? "the East India Company to be sure" in the first instance, and so would any other importer. No not even so: the buyer pays the tax separately before he receives the Tea: and the Country, not the East India Company, pays in the labour of 40,000 men, and in the wool employed in manufacturing cloths to the value of the director's estimate of 1,300,000*l.* per annum, for the privilege of drinking Tea legally imported: It might be necessary to impose the duty, and for securing it, to leave the Company a monopoly of the China Trade, but they had no other merit to claim on that account, than would any other importer were it convenient to throw the trade open. In fact, no great quantity of woollens were, or ever would be, consumed in British India, none were exported thither, except for Sepoy's cloathing, and the limited wear of Europeans. The argument therefore in this point of view fell to the ground.

The fact was, that China was super-saturated with the Company's woollens, and that this circumstance had kept down the price. A reference to the director's own \* report on this branch of the trade, would set right the noble lord and his colleagues respecting the cause and extent of loss on this item.

But, granting that British subjects did interfere, would that interference lessen the exportation if there were any demand? would it not rather occasion a greater employ of the manufacturers of Devon, Yorkshire, and Gloucestershire? This threadbare topic had long ceased to convince men of the policy of shutting out British subjects from India, and allowing neutrals to rival us in our own natural colonial trade; to load their ships under our noses at ever port of the united kingdom; to range unmolested from pole to pole; and even to buy and sell at our Indian factories, on the same terms as the Company's privileged captains and officers of the regular ships.

Here the Alderman desired the committee to look at the total export of the Company to India, in other manufactures for the 11 years past. He had moved for this important

\* 2d Report, 29th December 1791, p. 24 and 36.

paper, separate from the China exports; it was presented on the 5th June, and would be seen in page 94 of the Budget accounts. During the 11 last years the total export of merchandize in the first column, instead of the immense sum the last speaker had asserted it to be, the committee would be surprised to find amounted, as he had correctly stated on a former night, to no more than 5,044,960*l*.\* little above 450,000*l*. per annum. (In 1794-5 it was only 133,000*l*.) The Company's tonnage for their India trade was only 9,822 tons† on 12 ships; and, including that for private trade last year, was only 25 ships, or 17,082 tons.

He compared this with the tonnage of Barbadoes, and that of a single Dutch colony, Surinam, which loaded home last year 16,493 tons. Was this, he repeated, the natural share of India trade, which the mother country was entitled to? observe, he said, the striking contrast between imperial and individual energy; by the document‡ on the table it appeared, that in 1799-1800 the whole of the Company's export to India was only 463,578*l*. and this exceeded the average of the 11 years to which he had before alluded.

In the same year, by an authenticated paper, laid before Mr. Dundas, and to be found in an able publication of a gentleman deceased (Mr. Henchman) it appeared, that 20 India built ships, wisely licenced by the noble lord (Wellesley), an act fully justified by him in a dispatch to the directors, these ships had actually carried back merchandize from London to the amount of 615,247*l*. 12*s*. 6*d*. and expended here in repairs and disbursements 202,877*l*. although two of the number were laden back by government, and this besides wine taken in at Madeira from British merchants there.

Who then, he emphatically exclaimed, are the enemies to the manufacturers, ship-builders, and ship-owners; to the traders and merchants of these kingdoms? himself and those who thought with him, or the directors of the India Company? Were the people of Sheffield and Birmingham more likely to starve, if a freer intercourse subsisted with the millions of people in our own Indian territories, and a trade were opened with the myriads who inhabited regions within the Company's limits; regions which they never had it in contemplation to visit, much less to supply with their instant demands, and with the growing wants, which a knowledge of our manufactures would create.

\* From 1781 to 1791, inclusive, eleven years, 1,179,342*l*. 2 Rep. of 1791, p. 30.

† India House List, 26 June 1806.

‡ Budget Account, page 94.

The Company's imports from their Indian territories were principally of manufactured goods, in which manufactures, Manchester and Glasgow were now their successful rivals and competitors in the markets of Europe and America. Four fifths of these Indian goods were exported from hence, and drew back the greater part of those duties, which the honourable director boasted of as a contribution of the Company to the State ; whereas the trade of individuals from India, in their own shipping, would consist chiefly of raw materials, and dyeing drugs for the use of these home rivals of Asian manufacturers ; and the agriculture and revenue of India would feel the benefits of extending the cultivation it would create, of drawing the tribute without exhausting the country. Was it policy to suffer these raw materials to find their way into other countries of Europe, without supporting our carrying trade, or to be brought circuitously into England, as had been the case, in neutral vessels ?

Mr. Dundas, when the charter was renewed, had long hesitated respecting the continuance of the exclusive trade. That great statesman had decided with hesitation ; and with an intended but ineffectual guard against the too rigorous interpretation of the Company's powers. The use since made of them, said the alderman, had, he believed, long ago occasioned severe regret in that minister, at their having been granted.

Another of the honourable director's arguments had been the danger of colonization, were a freer sea-intercourse permitted. But whilst the present rigorous and unconstitutional power existed, of seizing British subjects, and sending them home without trial, or reason assigned ; while such was the power vested in a governor-general by act of Parliament ; —this was only a bugbear to frighten the ignorant, the thing itself, if it were dangerous, was utterly impossible.

The honourable director had re-echoed against him, the charges of personal motives and attachment to a favourite project of introducing India shipping to the injury of the British artisan ; but, would opening the India trade, that trade which the Company could not carry on, would giving facility to that trade be likely to confine it to half a dozen established English houses abroad, and himself and four or five India agency houses in London ? certainly not, on the contrary it would open India to the British merchant, trader, and ship-owner, without distinction or preference, whether at Liverpool, Bristol, Leith or Glasgow, Dublin or Cork ; it would injure, not the Company, as was dreaded, but only the privileged neutral rivals, whose operations he had already in part deve-



loped, and should farther expose in the next session.—So much with regard to any selfish object on his part.

He should next proceed to notice the danger of removing our artizans, (ship builders he presumed were meant,) out of this kingdom to our dominions in Asia. But did there, he would ask, exist any want of ship-builders abroad? At Penang (Prince of Wales' Island) it was true, there were neither workmen, nor materials, neither revenues, nor provisions, but was that the case at Bombay, on the Malabar coast, or at Calcutta? were no ships built there by British subjects? were none built at Pegue or Demaun by Burmahs and Parsees; was it not a notorious fact, that ship-building materials of every kind superabounded in our own territories? that they no less abounded in artisans, and master-builders of the first eminence to put them together? was it not then sound policy for this government to encourage the extraction of these materials, and indeed of every other resource, which dependencies dearly acquired, and of such precarious tenure, would furnish to the mother country? would it not be sound policy to build ships there for government, which might partly pay for their construction by a freight home, and to compel the Company to build there for their own commerce, and leave the oaklings of our home forests to acquire their natural growth? If, said the Alderman, the peninsula was worth the winning, would it not be folly if we did not enjoy the benefits which the possession of it afforded? Would the ship-builders of Blackwall, or of any other yard, complain of such a necessary expedient? did they not candidly acknowledge, and every ship-owner feel, that the expences, and of course the profits, of refitting and repair, exceeded those of original construction; that materials were grown so scarce and dear at home, that no merchant vessel could be built to sail against neutrals, nor any Indiaman be allowed to arrest the inefficient and scanty supply of our own timber for the royal navy? was not the contract price of building for the king's service more than doubled within these few years? Could the commissioners obtain contracts at all to the extent required?—These facts made most completely against the Director's assertions.

The honourable Director had next brought forward, the Company's trade, as a nursery for British seamen, and deprecated the employ of India shipping, as injurious to that object. In the first place, he would ask, by whom are the Company's ships now manned, and likely to be both in peace and war, while our enemy was attempting to rival us on the seas: By foreigners mostly when outward bound, and back principally by Lascars, natives or subjects of British India. Which of

these classes deserved most to be encouraged he need not ask; our commerce was now become too much the nursery for seamen of other countries, and unless care was taken hereafter, most of our British sailors would become Americans.—It was not interest, but necessity that ever induced the employ of black sailors on board the merchant ships; the greater number of them required, in proportion to the tonnage, made it always cheaper to navigate with European, and most of all with British seamen. But, if any preference was due, the British Lascars ought in policy to be preferred to Danish or American sailors.

The honourable Director had paid a just tribute to the skill and gallantry of the men who navigated the Company's ships, and of those who commanded them. No man, said the Alderman, had an higher opinion of them, than himself, they were the best seamen and the first navigators in the world; they had distinguished themselves against Suffrein under Sir Edw. Hughes in 1778, and the last glorious instance of gallantry in the China seas, under captain Dance, would for ever endear them to their country. But how that establishment was supported or merit and seniority regarded, he would not stop to enquire. In nothing, he said, was there any design to deprive the Company of their shipping, nor of that trade they were able to carry on, which trade ought to maintain its own maritime establishment.

The noble lord had fairly stated the expansion of the double system of trade and dominion, to have called for a greater amount of fixed and floating assets, than had formerly been requisite, but where among them was to be found any capital applicable to trade? In all the Budget speeches, the surplus revenue and the product of exports were expressly mentioned as the amount applicable to investment, the rest at any rate was borrowed for the purpose, as the noble lord himself had confessed in his last Budget statement (page 35) "The question" says he "that will naturally be suggested on this occasion, is, as to the prudence or propriety of investing so large an amount in goods, when the surplus from the revenue is estimated so low; as the system of providing funds for this purpose by new loans has been often objected to."—Mr. Dundas in 1801 had made use of these words: "The question must naturally arise, from whence funds could be derived to meet demands to so considerable an amount, to which I shall merely now reply, that, in whatever amount the supplies from Europe in bullion and the cash received for bills on the Court of Directors were found deficient, money was raised on loans, as will appear in the increase of the Indian debt."

The Alderman here affirmed, that notwithstanding all assertions to the contrary, much the greater part, if not all that debt, had been created by the trade.

The exclusive system, according to the honourable Director, embraced great political objects, it ought not therefore to be judged of on the narrow principles of a profit and loss trade; this the Alderman observed might possibly be rational doctrine, if the revenues were able to make good the deficiencies in trade; but, had that been the case? on the contrary, the Indian debt had increased as the commerce extended, nor had the honourable ex-chairman, the noble lord, the honourable general (Wellesley) nor the Director himself been able to show any solid capital, on which the trade had been supported; the fact was, a trade on money borrowed at Indian interest had ruined the Company; the Company, as he had repeatedly asserted, never had an active capital applicable to the purpose of commerce. He would state their capital *ab ovo*.

The united Company were incorporated in the year 1702, by an indenture between her majesty queen Anne and the two East India Companies, which had previously existed, on separate establishments. In 1698 the 10th of king William, there had been raised for this purpose by subscription, in virtue of his letter patent, on a capital of 3,200,000*l.* at 87½ per cent.

|  |           |
|--|-----------|
| £. 2,800,000   |           |
| Of which there had been lent to government               |           |
| at 8 per cent. interest                                  | 2,000,000 |
| They had also paid for dead stock under lord             |           |
| Godolphin's award  | 400,000   |
| which made from the first capital a deduction of         | 2,400,000 |
| So that the active capital amounted only to              | 400,000   |
| To which a fresh subscription was made in 1701 upon      |           |
| 800,000 <i>l.</i> Stock at 155 per cent, of              | 1,240,000 |
| So that the capital was then                             | 1,640,000 |
| But of this sum, there was lent to government the same   |           |
| year   | 1,200,000 |
| So that the capital then remaining for trade was but     | 440,000   |
| (At this time interest was reduced to 5 per cent.)       |           |
| In 1729, a <i>douceur</i> was paid to government of      | 200,000   |
| Unless therefore the trade had increased their stock     |           |
| beyond their dividends, the capital was reduced to       | 240,000   |
| In 1741, they lent however to government, at 3 per cent. |           |
| without any call on the proprietors                      | 1,000,000 |
| which exceeded the funded subscription afloat            | 760,000   |

At this time their loan to government amounted to . 4,200,000

In 1750, the interest on this loan was reduced to 3 per cent.

In 1789, a new subscription of one million stock at 174 per cent. added to the Company's resources the sum of 1,740,000

In 1793 the capital becoming more inefficient, 1,000,000*l.* of stock was added, though not all subscribed till the year after, and this produced . . . . . 2,027,295

Upon this capital and the surplus revenues, had the Company conducted their complicated system of conquests and commerce, with what success, the committee were now the judges.

One source of loss, however, he ought to state, and that was on the sale of three of the four millions which their necessities had compelled the Company to dispose of, at the market price, after the whole loan to government had been converted into Consols at 3 per cent. and the remainder, which was of no greater value than the Consols of the day, was still a resource, though at the decreased value he had before stated, in examining the stock by computation. Upon such slender means had the machine been conducted; how far they were adequate he would not detain the committee to enquire, but a reference to the annual balances of their stock account would in a moment, shew the progress of their affairs.

The ex-chairman (Mr. Grant) had broadly admitted the Company's present distress, and indeed to have denied the fact, would have been strangely inconsistent with his declarations in another place. The noble lord (Castlereagh) had also made a similar confession, but the prospect of a long peace in our provinces, afforded, in their opinion, ample confidence in the resources of the Company to surmount its present difficulties. The noble lord admitted that the India debt had afforded the capital for its commerce; he had also corroborated the elaborate statement of the honourable general (Wellesley) for a peace establishment, in which he was able only to exhibit the hope of a saving of 740,000*l.* per ann. and this without any allowance for the unliquidated arrears of the war, the increasing interest on the bond debt, or the funds constantly required for investment on present footing; both however had denied the insolvency of the Company, or that India was now more likely to become a burthen, than a relief to the mother country. The noble lord's illustration of the grounds of this confidence, was in unison with the declarations, so often officially made by him and his predecessors in the board of controul. It was only a

strong dose of that sweet *nepenthe*, annually distributed in their budget speeches,

“ Hope travels on, nor quits us till we die.”

The fate, however, of a certain other great monopoly, framed upon extravagant speculation, ought to be a warning to this country as well as the India Company. In a large building, between Leadenhall-street and the Royal Exchange, was there now at this day an evidence of the country's being compelled to pay a composition upon the capital, as well as the debts of a privileged corporation; The Mississippi bubble had ruined French credit, and so would the South Sea project have ruined that of England, had not government stepped forward with the public purse, to pay a part of the corporate deficiency.

But the Company, as was asserted by the noble lord and the ex-chairman, and after them the director who had just sat down, possessed ample resources to prevent ultimate loss to the state. They had their claim of ten millions for buildings and fortifications;—this, the alderman said, he had completely disposed of. The noble lord had indeed stated, that they were, it was true, 1,598,000*l.* deficient of their capital, assuming all the items in the stock by computation to be valid; but admitting this fallacious statement, were they not still without the capital for trade, or the means of raising one? If, however, the committee adopted his (the Alderman's) deductions, this deficit would be found nearer 14,600,000*l.*

But the relief which the noble lord himself had suggested, sufficiently proved what his own real opinion was of the Company's situation—“ We are in no danger of becoming burthensome to the state, or of calling for any fresh trading capital;” only, says the noble lord, “ allow us to raise four or five millions by the sale of fresh created stock, and lend us seventeen millions more, to be raised on parliamentary security, for our corporate use and benefit!” Sweet, indeed, and large must be the dose of *nepenthe*; copious the opiate draught that would any longer lull the house and the country into such dangerous security. Better far would it be, the alderman observed, to go first into the committee, which the noble lord now recommended; for himself, he was persuaded, that the extent of the disease was not yet discovered, and therefore no adequate remedy could be applied till a fresh report was made to the house, upon a full investigation of all the branches of the India system—a firm conviction in his mind of the magnitude of those embarrassments, and of the extreme difficulty of finding a remedy; and not any of the personal or party motives, which had been again ascribed to himself; not any resentment for disappointed ambition, nor envy at the Company's power and in-

fluence, but a just sense of his duty, as a representative of the commons of England, and as one of the magistrates of the first commercial city in the universe, the greatest that modern or ancient times beheld; these were the stimuli which had urged him to enter thus largely into the wide detail of the Company's affairs, and which would continue to support him, in the further prosecution of the subject, next session, of which he had given notice in the house.

Mr. HUDLESTONE in explanation said, it was impossible for him to imagine where the worthy alderman had gotten the statement which he had made to the committee of the amount or value of the Company's exports to India, or who had furnished it, but that fortunately he (Mr. Hudlestone), happened to have brought with him to the house a document on that head, for the accuracy of which he would pledge himself to the committee. Mr. Hudlestone accordingly read from the document, that the Company's exports to India from the season of 1797, to that of 1804, amounted to 12,368,402*l.* giving an average of 1,546,050*l.* in each year.

Mr. Alderman PRINSEP, in explanation, said, he did not include the China trade, which he considered to be distinct from the India trade.

Mr. GRANT in answer to Mr. Alderman Prinsep said, that after having already engaged for some time the attention of the house, he would decline following the honourable gentleman through all the details of his extraordinary speech, which contained the most extravagant and most unfounded views of the Company's affairs. It had little or no reference to the ultimate object of the discussion now carried on by the house which was the improvement of the Company's state; its aim was evidently not the amendment but the abolition of the whole of the present system of the Company, and indeed the Company itself. For this he had pressed into his service facts altogether irrelevant, and had employed them in a very exceptionable manner. He was the professed advocate of another system, that of enlarging or rather entirely opening the Private Trade, a question not simply commercial, but involving one of the greatest state concerns which could engage the attention of parliament, namely, on what principles India should continue to be held and governed by Great Britain. All that he had said respecting the loss with which he alleged the Company carried on their trade, amounted to mere assertion, and was disproved by the statements he (Mr.

Grant) had submitted to the house. The Company's Profits had, indeed, been diminished, but it was owing in part to the competition of the private traders, who had thereby injured both themselves and the Company. He had equally failed in his attempt to shew that the Company traded on a Revenue Capital. Nothing could be more loose and fallacious, than the data on which he endeavoured to support this idea. But the most surprizing of his assertions was, that the Company required 24 millions sterling to carry on their trade, that is to say, according to him, 21 millions for active capital, and 3 millions for dead capital. Whence did this enormous capital come? It was impossible for the honourable gentleman himself to maintain that it was derived from the revenue; the honourable gentleman affirmed that the Company possessed no property of their own—"that they had not a single shilling of their stock;"—it was evident that their debts in England never amounted to any thing like this sum; how, then, was the existence of such a capital to be accounted for? The fact was, such a capital did not exist. The investment of one year out and home, amounted on an average of 10 years ending with 1802-3, to little more than 5 millions, and the trade did not require an investment of four successive years before the returns of the first year were ready to be employed again. Nor would the allowance of 3 millions which the honourable gentleman was pleased to make for Dead Stock or dead capital, added to all the circulating capital, bring the aggregate amount to nearly the sum of 24 millions. But, according to the honourable gentleman's mode of stating things, the Dead Stock, which he had been pleased to reduce in value from 9,900,000*l.* to 3,000,000*l.* must be taken at its full amount, because whatever it may be worth, it actually cost the Company the sum at which it stands, and therefore he ought to compute the capital invested in their trade at 30,990,000*l.* instead of 24 millions. Mr. Grant supposed that the capital actually employed by the Company, in their commerce, independent of their floating credits by India Bonds, Bills of Exchange, and goods bought on time, might on an average of the 10 years before mentioned, be from 10 to 12 millions. Of capital to this extent, the honourable gentleman's own statement allowed the Company to be actually possessed, although he was pleased to affirm that they had no resource for investment; they likewise still enjoyed the credits just noticed, although he had further affirmed, that their faculty of borrowing seemed completely extinguished. It was the honourable gentleman's object to disparage the Company as an organ for carrying on the national commerce

with India, and to extol the channel of the private trade in which he was personally interested ; to supersede a tried and steady channel which had answered its purpose for two centuries, and had contributed to raise the prosperity of the country, in order to favour another channel very uncertain in its extent or permanence. This was not the time to enter into a question which could not be justly treated without taking a comprehensive view of many topics connected with it, but such vague and unwarranted assertions as the honourable gentleman dealt in, could have no weight in settling this question. He had boasted of the great exports sent from this country to India when an experiment was allowed to be made by the private merchants. The fact was, the experiment did not increase the exports of the country, but only shifted them for that time from Company's to private ships, which by sailing sooner, anticipated the export the Company would otherwise have carried out.

The honourable gentleman professed to give the history of the capital of the India Company *ab ovo*, and began with the year 1698, in which, according to him, the first capital was founded. But, unfortunately for him, he had begun a century too late, the Company, as every body knew, having been first incorporated in 1600. The Company formed in 1698, was a second Company, the first still continuing, and an instance very unhappily chosen by the honourable gentleman : because that second Company was composed of merchants who envied the first, and the consequence was, that by the effect of rivalry and competition, raising the prices upon each other in their purchases, and lowering them upon each other in their sales, they were both brought to the brink of ruin, and at length, for self preservation obliged in the course of a few years to coalesce, which produced the United East India Company, subsisting at this day. The honourable gentleman affected to consider the active capital of the Company as at all times contemptible. The detached circumstances he mentioned to prove this strange assertion, did not at all establish it, and still less the annual amount of the Company's trade which was the true question ; but without entering minutely into this point, was it not universally known that the Company had carried on their trade for a century and a half without any aid of capital from revenue or government ; that they had become great by their trade, and had at length acquired territory and dominion chiefly by their own commercial resources ! What more could be necessary to show that their means had been equal to the production of great prosperity and power to themselves and the state ? It was with much injustice therefore, that the ho-



nourable gentleman attempted to degrade their means, their profits, their solvency, or their stability, by such rash and unwarranted assertions as he had ventured to utter. They could have no weight with those who knew or would examine the subject, but they were nevertheless highly reprehensible as used in that house, because it might be supposed no member would use them without some degree of authority, and they were most of all reprehensible from such persons as the honourable gentleman who was fostered under the Company's wing, and now turns against that body the influence which his beneficial connection with it has given him.

Lord MORPETH conceived the worthy Alderman to be perfectly justified by parliamentary usage in the latitude of discussion he had indulged in that night, however irrelevant some of the subjects he had mentioned might appear in a debate on the finances of the India Company. The worthy magistrate had stated many objects of great importance, which would obtain the early attention of the Board of Commissioners: and it was certainly in his discretion to press forward the system respecting private trade, which appeared to be the principal point in the Alderman's contemplation; who, however, seemed to stand alone in the Committee, in the opinion it had just heard from him on that subject.

Mr. Alderman PRINSEP concluded the debate, in reply to the director's (Mr. Hudlestons) question, where it was he found the small amount of British Exports to India, he again referred to the paper on the table, page 94,\* certified by the Company's accountant-general, Mr. Cartwright; on the 3rd of June last, 5,044,960*l.* was the total of British merchandize exported in eleven years by the Company to India. The honourable director had no such public document in proof of his declaration; the director must have blended the India merchandize with China merchandize, bullion and stores, to make any thing like the amount he had quoted.

With respect to the observation of the noble lord opposite (lord Morpeth) that his, the alderman's sentiments were those of a single member of the Committee, he should merely restate, that the impression on his mind respecting the India system which he had that night again ventured to enforce, was no new idea, it had been corroborated by the documents on the table; for he had reasoned on no fact which had not been certified by the Company's officers—discussion was professedly

\* See Appendix, No. 4. (1)

courted on these occasions. His opinion would now be public—*valeat quantum valere potuit*, its value would be estimated by the house at large and by the country, and he was perfectly resigned to their decision. If, he added, the expressions he had used, of which such heavy complaints had just been made by the honourable ex-chairman (Mr. Grant) were felt to be either disrespectful to the great body whose affairs were now again under their annual investigation, or stronger than the occasion called for, (and even in this case they could not justify the use of invective as a reply where confutation was felt to be impossible,) he trusted, that in the one case, allowance would be made for some degree of provocation he had met with at the beginning of the debate, in a fresh attempt to preclude him from expressing his sentiments at all in the committee, and in the other case, that the committee would think with him, that, feeling as he did, the importance of the facts, and of his deductions from them, it became both his right and his duty, to enforce conviction, by the strongest language that the subject suggested to his mind.—The Resolutions was then agreed to, and the house having resumed, the Report was ordered to be received on Monday.



## APPENDIX.

(APPENDIX No. 1)

AN ACCOUNT of the BALANCE of QUICK STOCK  
and ASSETS, as they stood at the several Presidencies of Fort  
of Fort Marlborough, at the

|   | FORT WILLIAM. | FORT ST. GEORGE. |             |
|---|---------------|------------------|-------------|
|   | C.Rs          | Pagodas.         | C.Rs.       |
| CASH - - - -  | 98,68,354     | 44,71,005        | 1,90,01,777 |
| BILLS, Receivable - -   | 7,14,119      | - - -            | - - -       |
| STORES - - - -  | 72,56,703     | 22,30,891        | 94,81,287   |
| DEBTS outstanding (including Advances for investment, (a) - - - | 4,32,37,330   | 93,22,224        | 3,96,19,452 |
| EXPORT GOODS - -  | 43,55,366     | 9,65,572         | 41,03,681   |
| IMPORT GOODS - -  | 34,33,099     | 7,74,621         | 32,92,139   |
| SALT, OPIUM, GRAIN, and CATTLE - - -                            | 27,11,447     | 7,92,171         | 33,66,727   |
| Total Assets - -  | 7,15,76,418   | 1,85,56,484      | 7,88,65,057 |
| BOND or Registered DEBTS (a) - - - -                            | 14,00,81,600  | 1,12,16,044      | 4,76,68,187 |
| ARREARS and DEBTS not bearing Interest - -                      | 2,68,87,248   | 6,47,463         | 27,51,718   |
| Total Debts - - -   | 16,69,68,848  | 1,18,63,507      | 5,04,19,905 |
| Excess of Debts - -   | 9,53,92,430   | - - -            | - - -       |
| Excess of Assets - -  | - - -         | 66,92,977        | 2,84,45,152 |
| Net Excess of Debts C.Rs  | - - -         | - - -            | - - -       |

(a) In these are included the Amount of Government Securities purchased by the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, &c.—See Notes to No 16.

N. B. Pagodas converted into C.Rs. a. 425 C.Rs. per 0/0 Pagodas.

Bombay Rupees - - Do. - 116 - per 0/0 Rupees,

Dollars - - - - Do. - 243 - per 0/0 Dollars.

*Budget Account, No. 21. p. 72. 73.]*

Announcing a State of the Company's Affairs, in respect to their DEBTS  
William, Fort St. George, and Bombay, and at the Residency  
Conclusion of the Year 1803-4.

| BOMBAY.     |             | FORT MARLBRO. |           | TOTAL.       |
|-------------|-------------|---------------|-----------|--------------|
| Rs.         | C.Rs.       | Dollars.      | C.Rs.     | C.Rs.        |
| 16,39,234   | 19,01,511   | 36,958        | 89,808    | 3,08,61,444  |
| - - -       | - - -       | - - -         | - - -     | 7,14,119     |
| 29,69,765   | 34,44,927   | 1,78,197      | 4,33,018  | 2,06,15,935  |
| 47,11,104   | 54,64,880   | 13,82,256     | 33,58,882 | 9,16,80,544  |
| 12,32,111   | 14,29,248   | 1,36,534      | 3,31,777  | 1,02,20,072  |
| 41,69,869   | 48,37,048   | - - -         | - - -     | 1,15,62,286  |
| 6,82,257    | 7,91,418    | - - -         | - - -     | 68,69,592    |
| 1,54,04,340 | 1,78,69,032 | 17,33,945     | 42,13,485 | 17,25,23,992 |
| 2,86,35,645 | 3,32,17,348 | 46,502        | 1,13,000  | 22,10,80,135 |
| 14,29,032   | 16,57,677   | 4,05,701      | 9,85,853  | 3,22,82,496  |
| 5,00,64,677 | 3,48,75,025 | 4,52,203      | 10,98,853 | 25,33,62,631 |
| 4,46,60,337 | 1,70,05,993 | - - -         | - - -     | 11,25,98,423 |
| - - -       | - - -       | 12,81,742     | 31,14,632 | 3,15,59,784  |
| - - -       | - - -       | - - -         | - - -     | 8,08,38,639  |

East India House, }  
13th May 1806. }

(Errors excepted.)

WM. WRIGHT.

Auditor of India Accounts.

## (APPENDIX, No. 2.)

AN ACCOUNT of STOCK per COMPUTATION "of the  
DR. STOCK) on the 1st

|   | £.                |
|---|-------------------|
| TO Bonds bearing Interest .....   | 1,396,575         |
| To Bonds not bearing Interest .....   | 15,517            |
| To Bills of Exchange unpaid from China .....  | 393,500           |
| To Bills of Exchange unpaid from India .....  | 299,728           |
| To Bills of Exchange unpaid from India, on Account of the<br>Indian Debt .....  | 11,100            |
| To Customs on Goods sold and unsold .....   | 87,620            |
| To the Bank, for a Loan on Mortgage of the Annuities that<br>may be sold per Act of 1788 .....                        | 700,000           |
| To ... Ditto, for a Loan on Bond .....  | 100,000           |
| To ... Ditto, for Interest on the above Loans to 8th March ..   | 10,933            |
| To Government, borrowed out of Tea Duties .....   | 500,000           |
| To Freight and Demorage .....   | 387,600           |
| To Supra Cargoes Commission on all Goods sold and unsold ..   | 103,930           |
| To Proprietors of Private Trade on all Goods sold .....   | 585,000           |
| To Almshouses at Poplar .....   | 66,563            |
| To Interest on Military Fund, more than applied .....   | 6,650             |
| To ... Do. ... Contingent ... Do. ....  | 994               |
| To what owing in the Department of the Committee of Ship-<br>ping, exclusive of Exports .....                         | 135,050           |
| To .... Ditto .. for Exports of former Seasons .....  | 16,780            |
| To .... Ditto .. to the Warehouse Contingent Fund ....  | 14,167            |
| To Warrants passed the Court unpaid .....   | 63,000            |
| To what owing for Teas returned by the Buyers and resold ..   | 971               |
| To Interest on Bonds .....  | 56,336            |
| To Dividends on Stock .....   | 60,182            |
| To BALANCE of Quick Stock against the Company at Bengal,<br>made up to 31 January 1804 .....                          | C Rs. 8,93,57,260 |
| Add the Sum given for constituting a Military<br>and Contingent Fund .... C.Rs. 11,50,720                             |                   |
| ... Cargoes dispatched to England,<br>the Invoices of which are dated<br>since the Close of the Quick Stock 35,38,347 |                   |
|   | 46,89,067         |
| Current Rupees ....   | 9,40,46,327       |
|   | 2/3 £. 10,580,212 |
| ... Indigo Contractors, payable in Bengal .....   | 11,427            |
|   | £. 10,591,639     |
| Deduct Bills of Exchange drawn on England<br>since the Close of the Quick Stock .....                                 | 56,400            |
|   | 10,535,239        |

(Continued, p. 122.)

[*Budget Account, No. 23. p. 78, 79.*]

**EAST INDIA COMPANY** (exclusive of their CAPITAL  
Day of March 1805. **CR.**

|   | £.                   |           |
|---|----------------------|-----------|
| BY what due from Government to the Company .....  | 1,207,560            |           |
| By Cash, its Balance, on 1st March 1805 .....   | 12,020               |           |
| By the Amount of Goods sold not paid for .....  | 1,148,170            |           |
| By the Honourable Board of Ordnance, for Saltpetre delivered .....  | 35,400               |           |
| By the Value of Goods in England unsold .....   | 6,446,585            |           |
| By BALANCE of Quick Stock in favour of the<br>Company at Port St. George, made up to the<br>31st July 1804 .....        | Pagodas 81,65,111    |           |
| DiDuct Cargoes dispatched to England, the<br>Invoices of which are dated since the Close<br>of the Quick Stock .....    | 4,006                |           |
|   | Pagodas 81,61,105    |           |
| ADD Military Stores, not included in Quick<br>Stock, per Memorandum of Floating Stock .....                             | 697                  |           |
|   | Pagodas 81,61,802    |           |
|   | s/ £. 3,264,721      |           |
| .... Bills of Exchange drawn on England since<br>the Close of the Quick Stock .....                                     | 18,000               | 3,282,721 |
| By BALANCE of Quick Stock in favour of the<br>Company at Bencoolen, made up to 31st<br>January 1802 .....               | S. D. 1,017,566      |           |
| DiDuct Cargoes dispatched to England, the<br>Invoices of which are dated since the Close<br>of the Quick Stock .....    | 442,901              |           |
|   | Sp. Dollars 575,662  |           |
|   | 5/ £. 142,665        |           |
| ADD Bills of Exchange drawn on England since<br>the Close of the Quick Stock .....                                      | 18,400               | 192,065   |
| By BALANCE of Quick Stock in favour of the Com-<br>pany at China, made up to 29th Jan. 1804 .....                       | 61,104               |           |
| ADD the Outward Cargo per Woodford, arrived<br>in China, since the Close of the Quick Stock .....                       | 552,500              |           |
|   | 613,604              |           |
| DiDuct the Homeward Cargo received in Eng-<br>land per Woodford, dispatched since the Close<br>of the Quick Stock ..... | 915,165              |           |
|   | Tales 368,339        |           |
|   | a. 77 17/ £. 140,690 |           |
| ADD Bills of Exchange drawn on England since<br>the Close of the Quick Stock .....                                      | 41,700               |           |

182,390



## ACCOUNT STOCK

D

|  |          |            |
|--|----------|------------|
| To BALANCE of Quick Stock against the Com- |          |            |
| pany at Bombay, made up to 30th April 1804 |          | 1,46,60,31 |
| Add Cargoes dispatched to England, the In- |          |            |
| voices of which are dated since the Close  |          |            |
| of the Quick Stock .....                   | 13,95,71 |            |
| Bombay Rupces ....                         |          | 1,60,56,1  |
| 2/6 £.                                     |          | 2,007,0    |
| Deduct Bills of Exchange drawn on England  |          |            |
| since the Close of the Quick Stock .....   |          | 130,51     |
|  |          | 1,876,5    |
|  |          | 15,423,91  |
| BALANCE in Favour .....                    |          |            |

East India House, }  
the 20th March 1806. }

(Errors excepted.)

CHARLES CARTWRIGHT,

Accountant General

The Account with Government has been under Discussion, and the Principle upon which it is framed has been disputed, it being contended that the Company should bear the Whole of some of the Charges, and Part of others—the Company, on the other hand, claim to be allowed Indian Interest for the Expence they have incurred, upon whatever grounds the Account may finally be admitted.

## COMPUTATION, CONTINUED.

Ca.

|  |    |            |           |
|--|----|------------|-----------|
| By BALANCE of last Books at St. Helena, ending<br>30th September 1803 .....  | £. | 92,882     |           |
| Add Bills of Exchange drawn on England since<br>the Close of the Books .....   |    | 12,500     |           |
|  |    |            | 105,382   |
| By Cargoes from England, not arrived in India and China at<br>the dates of the several Quick Stocks .....                              |    |            | 3,581,504 |
| By Exports paid for, exclusive of Bullion .....  |    |            | 1,171,509 |
| By Silver exported this Season, and remaining in the Treas-<br>ury, paid for .....   |    |            | 822,750   |
| By Impress and War Allowances paid Owners of Ships not<br>arrived in England .....   |    |            | 450,663   |
| By the Value of Ships, Sloops, and Vessels, exclusive of those<br>stationed Abroad .....   |    |            | 76,460    |
| By the Value of the East India House, Warehouses, &c. ..   |    |            | 992,169   |
| By what the Company paid for their Dead Stock in India ..  |    |            | 400,000   |
| By what due from Government for Stores and Supplies to His<br>Majesty's Troops, &c. as per Account drawn up to 1st<br>March 1805 ..... |    |            | 4,460,192 |
| By what owing from sundry Persons returned from India, and<br>in India, to be repaid in England .....                                  |    |            | 37,677    |
|  | £. | 24,605,217 |           |

*Memorandum:*

IN the above Account, the Article of Dead Stock is valued at £. 400,000; which includes Buildings and Fortifications, Plate, Household Furniture, Plantations, Farms, Sloops, Vessels, Stores, and other Articles of Dead Stock, according to Lord Godolphin's Award in the Year 1702: Whereas the whole of the Sums of Money expended in Buildings and Fortifications, by the latest Advices from the Company's several Settlements, for the Acquisition and Maintenance of their Possessions, and the nearest estimated Value of other Articles of Dead Stock, are as follows:

|  | Buildings<br>and<br>Fortifications. | Plate, Household<br>Furniture, Plan-<br>tations, Farms,<br>Sloops, Vessels,<br>Stores, &c. | TOTALS.   |
|--|-------------------------------------|--|-----------|
|  | £.                                  | £.   | £.        |
| At Bengal .....                        | 4,938,857                           | 985,292  | 5,924,149 |
| Fort St. George and Subordinates ..... | 1,767,070                           | 446,488  | 2,213,558 |
| Bombay and ..... Do. ....              | 1,105,874                           | 437,049  | 1,542,923 |
| Fort Marlbro' .....                    | 183,343                             | 22,503   | 205,846   |
| St. Helena .....                       | 41,272                              | 66,460   | 107,732   |
| £.                                     | 8,036,416                           | 1,577,792  | 9,994,208 |

There are Bonds given to sundry Persons, by the Chief and Council of Balambangan, to the Amount of £.10,167, and Interest thereon, which are not included in the Debt of this Account; it not being yet determined whether the Company are able to the Payment of the whole of these Bonds.

## (APPENDIX No. 3.)

**An ESTIMATE of the probable Amount of the Revenues and  
Amount of the Commercial Charges not added to the Invoi-  
COOLEN, PRINCE OF WALES**

| REVENUES:  |                 |                   |
|--|-----------------|-------------------|
| <hr/>  |                 |                   |
| <b>BENGAL:</b> at 2s. the Current Rupee:               | £.              |                   |
| Mint, Post Office, Stamps, and Judicial Fees ..        | 197,200         |                   |
| Ceded Provinces in Oude .....                          | 1,786,400       |                   |
| Conquered Provinces .....                              | 614,800         |                   |
| Land, &c Revenues of Bengal, Bahar, &c. ..             | 3,630,800       |                   |
| Customs .....  | 352,060         |                   |
| Salt Sales .....                                       | 1,474,360       |                   |
| Opium Do. ....   | 707,600         |                   |
|  | <hr/>           | 8,763,220         |
| <b>MADRAS:</b> at 8s. the Pagoda:                      |                 |                   |
| Post Office, Farms, and Licences, Judicial Fees .....  | 92,382          |                   |
| Revenues and Customs of the Carnatic .....             | 1,233,628       |                   |
| Do. .. and Do. .... Tanjore .....                      | 452,398         |                   |
| Do. .. and Do. o Cessions by the Nizam .....           | 670,460         |                   |
| Do. .. and Do. of Possessions before 1790 .....        | 1,086,255       |                   |
| Do. .. and Do. of Mysore, Malabar, Canara, &c. ....    | 1,239,173       |                   |
|  | <hr/>           | 4,774,296         |
| <b>BOMBAY:</b> at 2s. 3d. the Rupee:                   |                 |                   |
| Revenues and Customs of former Possessions ..          | 330,188         |                   |
| Do. .... Do. of late Acquisitions ....                 | 411,829         |                   |
|  | <hr/>           | 742,017           |
| <b>Total estimated Revenues ....</b>                   | <b>..... £.</b> | <b>14,279,533</b> |
| <hr/>  |                 |                   |
| CHARGES:   |                 |                   |
| <hr/>  |                 |                   |
| <b>BENGAL.</b> Civil, Revenue, Judicial, &c. 3,402,814 | £.              |                   |
| Military, including Fortifications 4,012,556           |                 |                   |
|  | <hr/>           | 7,415,370         |
| <b>MADRAS.</b> Civil, Revenue, Judicial, &c. 1,751,433 |                 |                   |
| Military, including Fortifications 3,898,749           |                 |                   |
|  | <hr/>           | 5,650,182         |
| <b>BOMBAY.</b> Civil, Revenue, Judicial, &c. 519,473   |                 |                   |
| Military, including Fortifications 1,060,819           |                 |                   |
|  | <hr/>           | 1,580,292         |
| <b>Total estimated Charges ....</b>                    | <b>..... £.</b> | <b>14,645,844</b> |

*Budget Account, No. [2.] p. 92, 93.]*

Charges in INDIA, for the Year 1805-6; together with the  
ces, the Interest on the DEBTS, and the Supplies to BEN-  
ISLAND, and SAINT HELENA.

|  |              |            |
|--|--------------|------------|
| Brought up .... Estimated Charges  | ..... £.     | 14,645,844 |
| <hr/>  |              |            |
| COMMERCIAL CHARGES not added<br>to INVOICES:   |              |            |
| BENGAL .....   | £. 104,388   | .          |
| MADRAS .....   | 77,924       |            |
| BOMBAY .....   | 17,494       |            |
|  |              | 199,806    |
| <hr/>  |              |            |
| INTEREST ON DEBTS:   |              |            |
| BENGAL .....   | £. 1,155,040 |            |
| MADRAS .....   | 400,000      |            |
| BOMBAY .....   | 270,000      |            |
|  |              | 1,823,040  |
| Total estimated Charges and Interest ....  | ..... £.     | 16,668,690 |
| SUPPLIES from Bengal to Prince of Wales Island,<br>Fort Marlbro', and Saint Helena ..... |              | 266,800    |
|  |              | 16,935,490 |
| Deduct estimated Revenues .....  | ..... £.     | 14,279,533 |
| Estimated Deficiency .....   | ..... £.     | 2,655,957  |

East India House, }  
3d June 1806. }

(Errors excepted.)

Wm. WRIGHT,

Auditor of India Accounts.

(APPENDIX 4.) [*Budget Account, p. 94, 95.*]

- (1)—AN ACCOUNT, shewing the Annual Amount of BULLION, STORES, and MERCHANDIZE, respectively Exported by and for the Service of *The East India Company*, to INDIA, from the Year ending the 1st March 1793 to the 1st March 1804; together with the Expenditure and Sales thereof at each Presidency, and the respective Balances in Store and Afloat, on the 30th April 1793 and the 30th April 1803; as far as the same can be made out.

EXPORTED from 1st March 1793 to 1st March 1804.

|  |  | Merchandise. | Stores. | Bullion. | TOTAL. |
|--|--|--------------|---------|----------|--------|
| From 1st 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|  |              |         |          |        |

AMOUNT Expenditure and Sales of EUROPE GOODS and STORES.

|              | BENGAL. | MADRAS. | BOMBAY. | TOTAL.  |
|--------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|              | £.      | £.      | £.      | £.      |
| 1793/4 ..... | 132,406 | 55,115  | 128,984 | 316,505 |
| 4/5 .....    | 182,948 | 131,415 | 115,586 | 429,949 |
| 5/6 .....    | 205,136 | 99,780  | 93,936  | 398,852 |
| 6/7 .....    | 178,940 | 88,773  | 97,383  | 365,096 |
| 7/8 .....    | 164,184 | 168,161 | 250,487 | 582,832 |
| 8/9 .....    | 217,501 | 133,143 | 192,296 | 542,940 |
| 9/1800 ..... | 203,232 | 238,840 | 264,422 | 706,404 |
| 1800/1 ..... | 209,336 | 91,109  | 193,221 | 493,666 |
| 1/2 .....    | 254,757 | 60,535  | 103,424 | 418,716 |
| 2/3 .....    | 245,756 | 63,384  | 229,299 | 537,939 |
| 3/4 .....    | 260,547 | 161,084 | 233,848 | 655,479 |

BALANCE of IMPORT GOODS Remaining.

|                              | BENGAL. | MADRAS. | BOMBAY. | TOTAL.  |
|------------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|                              | £.      | £.      | £.      | £.      |
| On the 30th April 1793 ..... | 34,699  | 75,830  | 38,774  | 149,303 |
| On the 30th April 1803 ..... | 342,731 | 238,281 | 7,092   | 588,104 |

The Balances of Europe Stores are not distinguished in the accounts received from India.

The Current Rupee is valued at 2s; the Star Pagoda at 8s; and the Bombay Rupee at 2s. 3d.

(2.)—AN ACCOUNT, shewing the Annual Amount of BULLION, STORES, and MERCHANDIZE, respectively Exported by and for the Service of *The East India Company*, to CHINA, from the Year ending the 1st March 1793 to the 1st March 1804; together with the Sales thereof at CANTON, and the respective Balance in Store and Afloat, on the 30th April 1793 and the 30th April 1805; as far as the same can be made out.

AN ACCOUNT, shewing the Annual Amount of BULLION, STORES, and MERCHANDIZE, respectively Exported by and for the Service of *The East India Company*, to CHINA; from the Year ending the 1st March 1793 to the 1st March 1804.

|                                     |           | Bullion. | Stores.   | Merchandize. | TOTAL.    |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|----------|-----------|--------------|-----------|
| From 1st March<br><br>to 1st Mar. h | 1793      | - - -    | 586       | 639,574      | 640,160   |
|                                     | 1794      | - - -    | 949       | 795,914      | 796,863   |
|                                     | 1795      | - - -    | 513       | 819,965      | 820,478   |
|                                     | 1796      | 38,302   | 506       | 823,931      | 862,739   |
|                                     | 1797      | 303,859  | 1,741     | 460,495      | 766,095   |
|                                     | 1798      | 309,206  | 1,349     | 506,560      | 817,055   |
|                                     | 1799      | 502,967  | 1,441     | 880,496      | 1,384,904 |
|                                     | 1800      | 140,734  | 11,258    | 912,237      | 1,064,229 |
|                                     | 1801      | - - -    | 12,281    | 1,364,005    | 1,376,286 |
|                                     | 1802      | - - -    | 3,078     | 838,633      | 846,711   |
|                                     | 1803      | 570,963  | 4,376     | 1,494,155    | 2,069,494 |
|                                     | 1804      |          |           |              |           |
| £.                                  | 1,866,031 | 43,078   | 9,523,905 | 11,443,014   |           |

#### AN ACCOUNT of the Sales of EUROPE GOODS at CANTON.

|                 |           |
|-----------------|-----------|
| 1793/4 .....    | £.736,875 |
| 1794/5 .....    | 728,339   |
| 1795/6 .....    | 638,622   |
| 1796/7 .....    | 676,328   |
| 1797/8 .....    | 511,080   |
| 1798/9 .....    | 507,925   |
| 1799/1800 ..... | 775,009   |
| 1800/1801 ..... | 807,286   |
| 1801/2 .....    | 915,029   |
| 1802/3 .....    | 1,014,114 |
| 1803/4 .....    | 903,947   |
| 1804/5 .....    | 1,208,151 |

The Tale is valued at 6/8.

No Balances remaining.

The Stores are used for the Factory.

East India House, }  
3d June 1806. }

Errors excepted.

Wm. WRIGHT,

Auditor of India Accounts.



A  
**Corrected Report**  
OF  
**THE DEBATE**  
ON THE  
**CARNATIC QUESTION**





# CORRECTED REPORT

OF

## The Debate

ON THE

# CARNATIC QUESTION,

IN THE

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

*On the 17th of May,*

AND CONTINUED

*On the 1st and 17th of June, 1808.*

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR BLACK, PARRY, AND KINGSBURY,

BOOKSELLERS TO THE HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY,

LEADENHALL-STREET.



*Messrs. BLACK, PARRY, and KINGSBURY beg most respectfully to return their thanks to those HONOURABLE MEMBERS who favoured them with corrected Copies of their Speeches: and to make their acknowledgments to Mr. COBBETT for, permitting them to use his Report of this important Debate.*



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THE

# CARNATIC QUESTION.

HOUSE OF COMMONS,

*Tuesday, May 17.*

CONDUCT OF MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

**SIR THOMAS TURTON** rose to move his promised Resolutions respecting the deposition of the nabob of the Carnatic. He began by saying—

Mr. Speaker— Before I immediately call the attention of the house to the important subject of this night's discussion, important, not only as it affects our interests in India, but as it involves the character and justice of Great Britain, I must claim the liberal indulgence of the house whilst I state the motives which have induced me, and the steps by which I have been led, to undertake a task, which I must own myself so unequal to, without any personal weight in this house, unconnected with party, and disdaining to seek any other aid than the justice of my cause. Unable to supply these defects by talents or eloquence, I can only bring to this momentous case, the aid of laborious investigation, of disinterested zeal, and of an ardent desire to rescue the character of my country from the reproach which its Indian government has brought upon it. But however weak an advocate— however unequal to do justice to the question I may be, still, this great cause, decisive (as I firmly believe it to be) of our future interests in India, must wholly fall to the ground, if it is not preserved by my exertions, feeble and impotent as they are. Long before I had a seat in this house, the partial discussions which took place within it on this subject, and the private documents which accidentally fell into my hands, fully satisfied me of the necessity of an enquiry into the conduct of those who appeared to be deeply implicated in transactions so injurious to the character and justice of the country. Sir, when I learnt that this task had devolved on a gentleman (Mr. Sheridan) whose genius and talents are no less splendid than his political connections are powerful, I felt satisfied, that



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whatever might be the decision of the house, yet the subject would receive all the aid of talent and eloquence, of perspicuous and luminous arrangement, in addition to its own intrinsic merit. But when I entered this house, I found that these hopes could no longer be indulged; that the right hon. gentleman to whom I have alluded, felt himself compelled by circumstances to renounce that prominent station to which his character and abilities so peculiarly fitted him. Whilst, in common with those who considered the investigation as due to the honour of the country, I lamented this change of intention in the right hon. gentleman, I certainly did not impute it to any interested or unworthy motive; I have seen too much of the public conduct, and know too well the disinterested character of that right hon. gentleman, to believe that he would sacrifice public justice to party motives; and whilst I admit the probability, that his political connection with the friends of a noble lord implicated in this transaction, might have some influence on his conduct, I cannot impute to this cause only, his desertion of his post. We all know, that great genius is often allied to great indolence; or perhaps the demands which society makes on splendid talents, leave to the possessors leisure very inadequate to the deep and laborious application which this subject required. To whatever cause, however, this loss is to be attributed, all must deeply lament it. The public, as it feels interested for the honour of the country; this house, as it participates in the public feeling; but above all, myself personally, when I consider the comparison which all who hear me *must* make, between the advocate as he is, and the advocate as he might have been; yet, under our disappointment, this consolation still remains, that the right hon. gentleman, if he gives not the weight of his abilities to conduct the cause, has avowed his firm and unequivocal support of it — has openly and recently declared, with the manliness which forms so prominent a part of his character, “that he firmly adhered to his former opinion, and continued to look on the deposition of the nabob of the Carnatic as the most atrocious and inhuman proceeding that ever disgraced the worst government, in any age, or in any country.” — I assure the house that this declaration has been one inducement to my undertaking this cause.

This, Sir, was the state of the question when I first had a seat in this house. The cause abandoned by its leader; deserted by those who had moved for the several papers on your table; a mass of documents proving to conviction every charge as yet brought forward, and forming a body of criminating evidence scarcely paralleled in parliamentary history; with no chance of investigation, but what we might derive from intentions yet floating and unsettled in the mind of a noble lord (Folkstone), to whose patriotism and public spirit the country is indebted for the investigation of the Oude Question, and from whom it would have been unreasonable to expect a pledge of undertaking this. In this state, impressed with the importance of the subject, feeling for the deeply wounded character of my country, yet aware how unequal I was to the task, I gave early notice of my intention to bring the subject forward, if no one else could be found to conduct it; but within and without these doors, I have uniformly and sincerely invited those whose talents might assist, and whose influence might give weight to their efforts, to advocate this cause in my stead. I was satisfied how much

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it would suffer by being placed in my hands. With sincerity may I say, in the language of the Roman patriot, "*Semper fuit in hac re mea sententia et voluntas, quævis ut hoc mallem de iis qui essent idonei suscipere quam me, me ut mallem quam neminem.*" Whilst I occupied a seat on the other side of the house, no one could I find; since I have sat on this, I have no longer sought a successor. My situation was changed, and no choice was left me, but either to undertake the cause, unfit as I might be for it, or to admit a supposition most injurious to the character of an honest man in this house—that my principles and feelings changed with my seat, and that I was willing to shift from my shoulders a charge, the defenders of which were in my own ranks, and no unimportant supporters of that administration with which I commonly voted. So circumstanced, I could have no hesitation what to do; no alternative in honour was left me but to redeem the pledge I had made, and to give up the thoughts of a substitute. I have done so, and on the indulgence and candour of the house I throw myself; to their assistance I appeal to supply every deficiency of the advocate, should the cause be endangered by it. My motives I know they will do justice to. I *can* have no object of party to gratify, no personal antipathy to indulge. The noble marquis, to whom these transactions are imputed, I do not even know, but I have ever admired his early public character and conduct; educated in the school of Pitt, I cannot but feel a bias towards his political principles. But, Sir, I must freely confess, that, highly as I have thought of the political character of the noble marquis before he assumed the government of India, yet, after reading the documents on the table, I shall much regret if public report speaks true, that the discussion of this question only stands between him and an high official situation in this country. If I have taken a proper view of these papers, God forbid that he should have the means of bringing into our councils that tyranny and oppression which has so disgraced his Indian government. No man, in my opinion, could be a more unfit minister of this country than the noble marquis. Sir, I thank the house for this long and patient indulgence to my personal feelings and explanations. I shall no longer detain them from the subject.

I much fear, Sir, that in opening this subject, I shall not quite satisfy the taste of one hon. member (Mr. Whitshed Keene) opposite to me, who considers it essential to a knowledge of this case, as well as that of Oude, to go into a long detail of the various dynasties, and forms of government, which have existed from the breaking up of the Mogul empire in India, to the assumption of the Carnatic by our government. I have been certainly obliged to wade through them; but in this progress I have seen nothing which can induce me to believe that the house will obtain any useful information on the subject of this night's discussion, much less any amusement, by a detail of the Ghisnian, the Afghan, or Patan dynasties, enlivened as they occasionally may be by the exploits of a Tamerlane, or the conquests of a Nadir Shah. Every one knows what the character of a Mussulman government is:—general imbecility, but occasional energy. Sir, I shall content myself with commencing the epoch of Indian transactions in the Carnatic at the death of Nizam ul Mulck, soubah of the Deccan, in 1748, who had, about six years before his death, invested Anwar u Deen, father of Wallah

Jah, or Mahomed Ali, with the nabobship of the Carnatic. At the death of the nizam, Chunda Saheb set up his claim to the nabobship. The French espoused the cause of Chunda Saheb, and we that of Anwar u Deen. The war was carried on for six years with various success, till, in 1754, the two East Indian Companies in Europe put an end to it: and Wallah Jah, son of Anwar u Deen, (who was killed in the war) was left on the musnud of the Carnatic, and invested by the mogul. No one can doubt the motive which induced our alliance — it was no favour to the family of Anwar u Deen; for, as the French had espoused the cause of his opponent, we had no alternative — it was not even a matter of choice, but of necessity. If Anwar u Deen had not succeeded, we must have left our settlement on the coast to our rivals, and lost all the advantages of the famous commercial charter granted to us by Ferocksere in 1716. Interest was our sole motive, though perhaps not supported by the same rapacity and violence as at subsequent periods. But if the nabob was our debtor, how long did he remain so? In 1763, he granted the East India Company a jaghire of four districts, surrounding our settlement at Madras, forty miles in extent. — This surely was ample recompense for the support of our own interests in India.

The alliance between us and the nabob continued uninterrupted for many years — indeed it never ceased. In the war with Hyder Ali, in 1769, when that prince dictated a peace at the gates of Madras, the nabob's forces joined ours; and it is well known in India, that Hyder was in a great measure induced to invade the Carnatic from resentment at the unnatural friendship subsisting between a Mussulman government and the British. In subsequent wars, the same alliance, the same cordiality, subsisted between us. In the year 1786, we persuaded the nabob to disband his army, and to commute his military services for a subsidy. This was the foundation of the treaty of 1787, which was a subsidiary treaty. In the year 1792, Lord Cornwallis, finding that the payment stipulated for by the treaty of 1787, was beyond the means of the nabob to pay, without a grievous oppression of his subjects, reduced the amount, but obtained security for the regular payment of the sum stipulated by this last treaty. The policy, as well as justice of this measure, was soon evident — from that time to our assumption of the government, the kists were paid regularly; indeed the payments were almost all made within a few days of the time in which they were due, and quite up to the period of the assumption of the country by us. In 1796, the nabob Wallah Jah, or as he has been otherwise called, Mahomed Ali, died at an advanced age, and the declared and recognized friend and ally of the British government; — He is so described in all the treaties executed with him — he is so recognized in the treaty of Paris in 1763; — he was so treated by the great Lord Chatham, in his letter to him; and even by a still greater authority, by the sovereign of these realms. At his death, his son, Omdut ul Omrah, succeeded him; and from the moment of his ascending the musnud to his death, the same alliance, the same friendship, the same treaties subsisted. True it is, that at different periods attempts had been made to modify the treaty of 1792, but firmly resisted by the then nabob. Lord Macartney had attempted it; so had Lord Hobart; the East India Company wished it; but their servants were expressly forbidden to use any vio-

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lence to obtain it, or any other arguments than those of persuasion and entreaty. In this they were seconded by the opinion of that virtuous man, the late Lord Cornwallis, who, impressed with the advantages which some partial modification of the treaty would give to the Company's general affairs, yet thought it dishonourable to the British character to use the shadow of violence to obtain them, much more to violate a solemn treaty for the purpose. The papers on your table will fully prove this statement. This treaty, therefore, unaltered, unmodified, in the state in which it was executed by Lord Cornwallis, in its basis guaranteeing the rights of sovereignty of the then nabob, Mahomed Ali, his son, Omdut ul Omrah, and "*his heirs and successors*," remained obligatory on the East India Company at the death of Omdut ul Omrah in 1801. Let us then see how the Company (or more properly the government) got rid of this solemn act of their own — this treaty, so mutually advantageous as it appeared, so strictly adhered to on all sides; by what means, or under what pretence, the seal was violently torn from it by us, its sovereign deposed, and his territories seized! Perhaps, Sir, the best mode of enabling us to form an opinion on this case, will be by a plain detail of the transaction as taken from the papers so long before the house; and to which gentlemen, if they doubt my correctness, may refer. If the house will honour me with its attention, I am confident that the mere statement of the facts, as taken from the documents on your table, will convince all who hear me, that a more foul and wicked deed never stained the annals of mankind.

Sir, I have before stated to the house that on the accession of Omdut ul Omrah, he succeeded naturally to all the rights of his ancestor, and to all the advantages and obligations of the treaty of 1792; and that to the moment of his death he faithfully discharged the payment of the kists due by that treaty. When this prince was on his death-bed — surrounded by his relatives and nobles — afflicted with a malady that threatened speedy dissolution, and consequently occupied in preparing for another world, and in his arrangements to quit this — environed by the affectionate sorrow of his family and friends, to whom he was giving his last mournful directions: — at such a moment, and under such circumstances, was it thought not unbecoming British honour and feeling to violate the repose of the dying, and, under the base pretext of protecting the palace from tumult, to commence the first scene of this foul tragedy, by the introduction of a military force into the interior of the dying monarch's palace! On the 5th of July, 1801, Colonel M'Neil received orders to proceed with a body of troops to take possession of the palace of Chepauk. On the troops arriving at the outer gate, Major Grant communicated to the nabob their arrival, with the pretext of their being sent. On this information, the unhappy monarch sprang from his bed of sickness, and prostrating himself on the ground, clung round the knees of Major Grant, imploring him, by the ancient friendship which had so uninterruptedly subsisted between the English government and himself, not to suffer his dying moments to be interrupted by this unfeeling outrage, or his subjects to witness this sad and low insult to their monarch, and degradation of his consequence in their eyes. Colonel M'Neil not seeing that any advantage was to be gained by the occupation of the interior, ventured to disobey the orders of their

government, and stationed the troops so as only to surround the palace. In this state things remained till the 15th, when Omdut ul Onrah died, and to all appearance (for the approach of the troops was accounted for by a concern of the Company for the peace and security of the nabob's government), in friendship with the Company. At no period of our connection with Hindustan, were the interests of Great Britain less endangered, her influence more powerful, her apprehensions less alive to danger, than at this moment. There was nothing to excite fear, or even to justify precaution, much less violence; yet scarcely was the nabob dead, before two cold-blooded commissioners entered the apartment of grief, and tore—from the performance of filial duties, from the sacred indulgence of heart-felt sorrow for a deceased parent—the heir to his virtues and his throne, to answer countless interrogatories, and to bear the memory of his revered father and grandfather polluted with the name of *traitors* to the East India Company—traitors, Sir, to a power their friend and ally, and who occupied scarcely a foot of land which they owed not to the bounty and gratitude of these sovereigns.

Sir, to conceive the extent of this outrage, of this unhallowed profanation of that decency, which even the rude, uncivilized savage deems sacred towards the remains of the dead, in a country where prejudices and customs, as in India, form part of the business of life, one must have lived in that country; but I have been informed by those best acquainted with the customs and habits of its natives, that the human mind can scarcely conceive the extent of sacred veneration and hallowed grief which presides at the funeral couch of the princes and nobles of the East. One instance will suffice: that for forty days after the death of a near relative, no business whatever is done. If there ever was an occasion when this custom might be allowed, even by European fastidiousness, to have its full operation, it must be on this, where an amiable youth was mourning the loss of an indulgent and beloved parent. But the errand of violence and rapine, on which these agents were sent, disdained the weakness of filial duties; their message brooked no delay. The prince (then sovereign of the Carnatic) was *ordered to attend the British commissioners*. To save himself (as he afterwards describes it) and his deceased parent from pollutions he could not bear to think of, he obeyed the unfeeling mandate. The will of the deceased was first required by the commissioners, and delivered to them: in it the prince was appointed successor to the musnud. When the commissioners were satisfied of this, they began to open the purport of their embassy: with an affected concern for the situation of the prince, they informed him and the regents appointed by his father's will, that his dominions were forfeited to the Company by the treason of his father and grandfather, in having maintained a correspondence with the late Tippoo Suldaun, hostile to the British interests. In vain did the prince and regents remonstrate against this foul imputation on the character and good faith of their parent and sovereign; in vain did the dejected prince state the uniform tenor of his father's conduct, the long and well-tryed friendship that uniformly subsisted between the English and the nabobs, and the principles and feelings of friendly attachment to the British nation in which his father had educated him from his earliest infancy.

All these and other arguments were advanced to shew the impossibility of such a charge having any real foundation : but the errand of the commissioners was not to investigate, but to convict ; not to hear the defence of the accused, but to pass sentence on their innocent successors. The prince was soon informed, that the proofs of guilt were decisive, the punishment settled ; that he must either descend from his elevated rank, and mix with the bulk of his own subjects, or subscribe to conditions the most humiliating and base, and which would stamp with ignominy the memory and revered names of his ancestors—no other, Sir, than the complete surrender of the whole Carnatic to the East India Company, retaining the nominal sovereignty, and consenting to be a pensioner on the bounty of the Company. This first conference was protracted to a late hour, and the prince was at last suffered to retire. At a subsequent meeting of the commissioners, the regent proposed, in his name, a modification of the treaty of 1792 ; to place as security for the payment of the kists, the mortgaged territories in the hands of the Company ; in fine, to do every thing consistently with his honour and dignity to manifest his regard and friendship for the British nation. This and every other expedient was rejected, and absolute, unconditional submission to the will and mandate of the Company insisted upon. Other meetings took place, two of them in the tent of Colonel McNeil, Lord Clive being present, and here every engine of intimidation and persuasion were alternately practised on the young man. Troopers, with their drawn swords, paraded in front of the tent. He was informed by Mr. Fitzgerald that resistance was vain ; that the governor-general, the court of directors, and the British government, were determined to carry this measure into effect. These arguments, coupled with promises of exterior advantages from the friendship of the Company, on the mind of a young prince scarcely seventeen years of age, were very likely to shake his first and natural impressions ; and, if we are to believe the statement of the commissioners, they for a moment staggered his first virtuous and honourable resolutions ; but reflection soon restored his fortitude and honour, and at the next meeting with Lord Clive, Ali Hussein informed him, that his mind was fixed and determined rather to endure any calamity, than consent to affix this deadly stain on the memory of his ancestors. He was again asked if he was aware of the consequences of his resolution ; that, from the pinnacle of human greatness, he would be precipitated into the abyss of worldly misery ; and, on replying in the affirmative, he was told, that his lot, in future, would be that of a subject only.

He then took leave of his oppressors (as the commissioners themselves represent it) “ with a smile of internal complacency : ” and perhaps another was added of just contempt for this specimen of British justice and humanity in India. Sir, one should have imagined that this dignified and firm conduct in an Eastern prince, would have ensured to him the friendship, and would have excited the interest, even of those employed in this cruel mission ; that at least they would have paused before they completed the work of injustice, and learnt from the great fountain head, from the contriver and mover of this wretched policy, whether there was no retreat, no compromise which British tyranny could admit. But no, Sir. The noble lord, (Earl Powis) whose character

for humanity amongst his English circle of friends has always stood fair, acknowledged no emotion of sympathy, no feeling of compassion for this injured prince; he came as the agent of an inhuman government, and one symptom of feeling displayed by him would have been a libel on his instructors. After having, therefore, observed, that he had done enough for the national faith, and the duties of humanity, (Oh! prostituted names!) he dismissed this miserable, but high-minded, prince, with the unworthy threat, "that he would repent his conduct." The threat, Sir, was not long in executing; injustice and tyranny found too quick and ready agents. Determined to strip him of his dominions, the task was not difficult. Appearances, however, were to be preserved. A nominal sovereign was to be raised to the musnud in the room of the rightful heir. The two next in succession by the Muhammedan law, Syf ul Mulck, and Hussain ul Mulck, were passed over; perhaps their dispositions were not favourable to the intended usurpation. The situation of Azcem ul Dowlah (the late Amcer's son), immersed in prison (as is the sad custom of the East towards those princes not in succession), presented the Commissioners with the means of carrying this nefarious project into execution; from him it was impossible to suppose any opposition to their plan; he had no pretensions to the musnud, and therefore could not be supposed to dispute the terms on which he was to receive his elevation. On their first application to him he was too much frightened to permit them to develope their plan; he was apprehensive they were coming to assassinate him, and it was with difficulty he could be assured of his safety. Subsequent interviews, however, soon informed him of the honours that were prepared for him, and the terms on which he was to receive them; of course the conditions were not objected to, and the very acceptance of the terms raised this uneducated young man (a prisoner almost from his earliest infancy), in the eyes of his disinterested patrons, to the height of mental capacity, and to the credit of displaying "*considerable talents*" for government. This discovery was natural, as the criterion for talent was the greater or less subserviency to their demands; and it is not surprising, therefore, that in a few interviews they found him the perfect model of a sovereign and a statesman. On the 26th he was presented in form to Lord Clive; on the 28th he was installed on the musnud. But this day, in all countries, but particularly in the East, a day of festivity and splendid joy, was ushered in with the form, indeed, of gratulation and pomp, but with the heart of sorrow and misery. Instead of nobles vying with each other in the heartfelt obeisance of duty and love to their new monarchy whilst none but the hired and venal slaves of the British government, or the most despicable of the natives could be found to attend the ceremony, only one of the nobles could be prevailed on by menaces or entreaties, to do homage to the usurper, by attending the installation; and that noble (a just reward for his apostacy) has been since an outcast from all parties. But the feelings of the nobles or people of the Carnatic formed no part of the consideration of the British government. The country was to be obtained—no matter how. But this was not yet enough; the treaty of 1792 still remained, if not in force, yet in existence; by that the real heir and successor of Omdut ul Omrah was guaranteed in his succession. A new treaty, therefore,

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was to be made; but what could be the preamble? It could not state "that the young prince Ali Hussein, who succeeded, by the will of his father, to the musnud, had refused to convey all his territories to the East India Company, and that therefore they had set him aside, and raised Azem ul Dowlah to the throne." No, Sir, this was too bold and daring a flight of tyranny and injustice, to suit the littleness of the rest of the plan; they were resolved to be, at least, consistent. On the 31st of July, therefore, they executed a treaty with their puppet, in which they state "the hereditary right of Azem ul Dowlah to the throne of his ancestors!" They had forgotten that to Ali Hussein they had alleged the forfeiture of all hereditary right by the treason of his ancestors, and that from the bounty of the Company alone could the usurper or adopted heir of Omud ul Omrah hold any part of the dominions of his ancestors. In the joy of their success in the attainment of their object, they did not observe that this very preamble tore off, at an instant, the flimsy veil which, to save appearances, they interposed to throw over this diabolical transaction; that the whole world must see through the paltry pretexts they had advanced for their treatment of Ali Hussein. Indeed, it must have puzzled Azem ul Dowlah himself, if he was capable of forming a judgment on the treaty, how he came to an hereditary right to the musnud, in preference to the three princes he had mentioned. The treaty, however, was executed, and sent to the governor-general. This glaring mistake did not escape his acute and discerning eye, and whilst he gave his general approbation, and bestowed his warm encomiums, on the "ability and moderation" with which the governor of Madras had conducted himself, he delicately observed on the inconsistency in which this acknowledgment of hereditary right would involve the British government, and suggested an application to Azem ul Dowlah to substitute "the liberality and bounty of the Company" for those two dangerous words. The application was made, and of course consented to; and thus stands the treaty at present. Before I take leave of it, I cannot help observing, that a more cruel piece of state mechanism never graced the archives of the British Museum; a treaty which with one hand gives every thing to a sovereign, and with the other takes it again from him; an happy specimen of Eastern composition! of British negotiation in India!

After this statement, one should have hoped, for the honour of humanity, thus daringly outraged; for the honour of the British character thus deeply wounded through its servants, that the last and finishing stroke was given to British tyranny and oppression; that when the end and only object was obtained, some little pains would have been taken to soothe the irritated and astonished minds of the unhappy sufferers in this scheme of state villainy; that, above all, the gallant and heroic-minded prince, the dreadful sacrifice to their lawless ambition, would have found a peaceful refuge from his misfortunes in the protection of that power which had deprived him of his dominions, under the pretence of his ancestral misconduct, and that he would not have formed a cruel exception to obtaining that sympathy which the virtuous character in misfortune is sure to excite. Whoever, Sir, thus hopes, thus reasons, knows little of the character and conduct of the then British government in India. No, Sir; Ali Hussein had signed before



forgiveness; he had dared to disobey the mandate of that government; in offence never to be forgiven. For him, therefore, tyranny was to exhaust its shafts, and oppression all its deadly weapons. Will it, Sir, be credited, will it not, to those who have not read the papers, rather appear as the effusion of an heated and disordered imagination, when I state to the house, that this amiable prince, the most accomplished and most literate of his age and country, whose patriotism and filial affection, had induced him rather to sacrifice a throne, than basely transfer his subjects, or even suffer an unmerited stain on the memory of his ancestors, was deliberately placed by the British government, together with his wife and family, with every thing dear and valuable to him in this life, *in the power and custody of the usurper of his throne*; that his very subsistence, the actual means of life, were made by them to depend on the nod and will of his natural enemy? Can the human mind conceive a refinement of cruelty exceeding this? Yet, even in the place of confinement, in the mode of executing this tyrannous act, vindictiveness found a powerful auxiliary. The very palace in which he had been educated, where, in the life time of his parent, he had resided with his wife and family, which had been bequeathed to him as his private legacy, and which had been decided in the case of Mr. Laton, a mortgagee of the late nabob's, to be the exclusive private property of his ancestors, and, as such, subject to the right of the mortgagee — this palace, Sir, was chosen for the place of his imprisonment, and the usurper of his throne put in possession of his property and person at the same time, and not one friend, one acquaintance, permitted to enter his apartment, without the permission of Azem ul Dowlah. It requires no great foresight to predict the issue of this measure; he must be ill read in the history of royal captivity, not to perceive how short, in these cases, is the distance between the prison and the grave. The unhappy prince was fully aware of the fate which awaited him; and in that feeling protest, on the table, to the sovereign and to the heir apparent of these kingdoms, against the manifold injuries he had sustained from the British government in India, he pathetically dwells, in the spirit of prophecy, on this last aggravated act of oppression and injustice. "I need not (says he) endeavour to impress you with the horrors of the situation to which I feel myself reduced. You have but to picture to yourselves the height of human grandeur, and the sad and miserable reverse of it, the highest and lowest of which humanity is capable; but even the meanest subject of the very worst government possesses a blessing which my fortune and fate forbid. He owns the gratifying sensation of knowing himself safe amidst the society of his fellows; whilst I, an unit, as it were, in the sum of the people of the Carnatic, am delivered into the hands of an enemy, who has but one act to execute to finish his career." Alas! Sir, too fatally prophetic were these fears. Before the government at home could send out their orders to take this unhappy prince under the protection of the government (for this justice must be done to the administration of Mr. Addington), and out of the hands of Azem ul Dowlah, this unhappy prince was no longer the object of earthly commiseration. The bitter cup of misery, filled to the brim, at last overflowed, and "ran over into eternity." His great and dignified mind, unfitted to encounter the tyranny and violence of

British Indian justice, sunk under the accumulated injuries which pressed on him, and his pure spirit, weary of its earthly abode, fled from its persecutors, to those regions of eternal bliss, where, at the feet of his Creator, he is seeking retribution for his wrongs. God grant they may not be visited on Britain, for the delinquency of her sons in India!

And now, Sir, let me for a moment pause, and ask the house, the country, and even the friends and supporters of the then government in India, whether the annals of a Nero or Caligula, ay, Sir, even of the modern Nero, furnish one instance of a transaction more tyrannous, more diabolical, more keenly outraging every feeling of a British mind, than this which I have so faintly stated to the house; in which I have not only exaggerated nothing, but, if I am permitted to have a committee to investigate the particulars of the treatment this heroic prince received, I pledge myself to the house to prove a case, far, very far, more atrocious than I have represented it. I have, Sir, a motion to submit for this purpose. And is it really, Sir, the conduct of a British government in any quarter of the world, that I am compelled to designate with terms so opprobrious? with a character so opposite to the mild spirit and practice, not only of our government and constitution, but of every Englishman? How, Sir, are we to account for this wonderful and sad change of the British character? I well remember, that great statesman, Mr. B.roke, with that energy of expression, and that sublime eloquence which so peculiarly distinguished him, describing the change of British character in India, could no otherwise account for it, than by supposing "that those who visited India were unbaptized in crossing the line, and left all their Christian virtues behind them." At least, it appears that some of our governors, if they took their virtues with them, so forgot them after their landing in India. Sir, I have read, in a book published by a Swedish traveller, an account of a tree called the *Bobon-l'pas*, the vapour of which destroyed the faculties of all who came within its reach. I am very apprehensive that there is some such tree near the seat of our government in the East, which destroys the noble faculties of the mind, those virtuous and honourable feelings, that spirit of philanthropy and justice, which characterizes Englishmen in Europe. To whatever cause it may be attributed, certain it is, not one trait of the English character is to be found in this nefarious transaction.

I remember, Sir, when I moved for the re-printing these papers, I was asked whether I meant to charge either Lord Wellesley or Lord Clive with the specific crime of *the murder of Ali Hussein*. To that question I answer now as I did then—That of the specific crime which the law calls murder, and which implies intention, I never did; but I hesitate not to charge them with being in a great measure *the cause of his death*—first, by their oppressive conduct towards him in despoiling him of his dominions; and secondly, by placing him in the power of the usurper of his throne. That he died not a natural death, I firmly believe, by the evidence of Dr. Anderson—The disorder had been attended with bloody stools, which lasted twenty-five days, as I understood, no uncommon symptom of poison. But I do not charge even Azem ul Dowlah with the murder of his prisoner, not because I doubt

it, but because I have no proofs of it. But is there one individual who has read these papers, the most partial and allowing friend of those who are implicated, that can hesitate to condemn this ill-judged and inconsiderate conduct (to say the least of it) in the government of India? Did it require any great knowledge of human nature, to perceive the imminent danger to which the prince must be exposed, if placed under the power and controul of Azeem ul Dowlah? and the strong, very strong interest which the usurper must feel in the death of his captive? It is impossible but he must have wished and sought it. If they had even consulted that great master of the human passions, the immortal Shakespeare, he would have told them —

‘ It could not be  
That while warm life plays in that prince’s vein,  
The musick’d *Azeem* should entertain an hour,  
One minute, nay, one quiet breath of rest.  
A sceptre snatch’d with an unsluggish hand,  
Must be as hotly snatched as got,  
And he that stands upon a slippery place  
Makes nice of no vile hold to keep him up.”

Every man in India saw the danger. Mr. Addington and the government here saw it: and if the two noble lords saw it not, they either shut their eyes, or lost for the moment their common intellects. No, Sir, they did see and feel it; they occasioned it, and they refused to remedy it. Application after application was made to them on the subject by the prince, the regent, and all the captives of the family, male and female. No redress followed; but the increased insult of placing them to the usurper, by whom they had been inflicted. At last, however, they were told, “that they might leave the palace if they chose.” In the excess of benevolence they were permitted to be wanderers from that home, which was their own and sole property, and strangers in a land subject to the sway of their ancestors; yet not even the protection of the Company from want and insult was proffered them! This boon of liberty, steeped as it was in poverty and want, was clogged with a condition which rendered the acceptance of it impossible — *then women were to remain in the palace, subject to the lust and will of the usurper!* On such conditions they refused the noble boon; they spurned the insult offered them, and preferred to drag on a miserable captivity. But, Sir, I have been before told in this house, “that the prince Ali Hussein was not a captive; that imprisonment is, by no means a term suitable to his situation; that however he might suffer a temporary restraint, he had liberty to go where he chose; and that at one time he was absent for several weeks from the palace, and only returned there a short time before his death.” Sir, I shall be glad to hear from these hon. members what their Eastern definition of imprisonment is; and whether I am not justified in applying the term in this case, when I state to the house, that from the usurpation of Azeem ul Dowlah to the death of Ali Hussein, this latter prince was never permitted (except on the terms just mentioned, and that a very short time before his death) to go without the precincts of the palace of Chepauk; that centinels were placed around the walls to prevent his getting out; and that he was by these means wholly deprived of the exercise and amusements to which he had

been accustomed. It is very true that he was absent some weeks, not from the palace, but from his own apartments; and I will state to the house the nature and cause of it:—After experiencing various mortifications and insults from the usurper and his minions, and sustaining daily robberies and extortions, he learned that Azeem ul Dowlah projected the taking by force from him, the scal, and some other haubics of his late father, Omdut ul Omrah, on which he set a value, which a feeling mind will give him credit for: to avoid the pollution of violence, he escaped over the wall which separated the apartments of the women from his own, where he knew Eastern customs would prevent them from following him, and there he remained till within a short time of his death. I think this is an answer to that part of the defence.

I will now, Sir, take leave of this most painful part of my subject; and would to God the scenes I shall now turn to, were such as to console us for those we have just witnessed; that dark and melancholy as has been the picture of woe I have exhibited, it could have been rendered less disgusting to the eye, by a review of those reasons which have been assigned to justify the act. If, however, the act itself presents all the horrid features of tyranny and oppression, of cruelty and injustice, the pretexts by which it is defended are still more disgraceful to the British character,—they strip the act itself of those bold and daring qualities, which dazzle and confound the mind, and in some measure diminish the atrocity of the act; but here every thing is low, mean, and pitiful; all is subterfuge and chicquery. A sovereign is despoiled of his dominions, on charges and pretexts—not against himself, but against his deceased ancestors, which, if fully substantiated, would not have convicted them of the indefinite crime of an intention towards unfriendly conduct against the British interests: the most abandoned and notorious criminal could not have suffered the slightest punishment on such evidence, for what is the evidence? A correspondence which took place many years since—between whom? not between Wallah Jah and Tippoo Sultan; nor between Omdut ul Omrah and Tippoo; but between the ambassadors of Tippoo and their master, stating conversations which passed between them, Wallah Jah, and Omdut ul Omrah! How is such evidence made to affect the nabob? By what forced construction does it apply to them? Will the right honourable and learned baronet opposite (Sir John Anstruther) say, he would have convicted any criminal on such evidence in his court at Bengal? Would he even have suffered it to be read? The right hon. gentleman may smile, but will he answer in the affirmative? I challenge him to do so.

If, however, I can summon patience to go through the disgusting scene, I will state to the house the whole of these contemptible substitutes for evidence. I will examine in order this mass of impotent proof; and let us see whether, if cleared of their legal objections, they prove any thing criminal, or approaching to it, against any body, save against the British government in India; that, indeed, for the use it has made of them, will be consigned to eternal disgrace and infamy.

The first of these criminal letters is from Gholaun Ali Khan and Ali Reza Khan, Tippoo's ambassadors (attending on the young princes who were hostages with Lord Cornwallis) to their master. It states a con-

versation between them and old Wallah Jah, in the presence of the princes, in which the old nabob is made to say, on the ambassadors' presenting him with a gold mohur, in their master's name, "May God long preserve Tippoo Sultaun, who is the pillar of the religion of Mahomed"! Was this criminal? I observe the gentlemen on the other side, by their gestures, seem to say — yes. What! were wishes, dressed in the hyperbole of Eastern language, to be considered as criminal? Who was Tippoo, to whom he wished prosperity? An enemy of the British government in India? No such thing: he was at the time a friend, and in alliance with the Company; and such a friend as had been recommended by the British government, by Lord Cornwallis himself, to the attention of the nabob; and we actually find, that at another interview, about three days afterwards, the particulars of which are detailed by the same ambassadors, they write to Tippoo thus: "On the 24th Tuckee, Wallah Jah, Omdut ul Omrah, and Hussein Nawauz Khan, the younger son of Wallah Jah, Lord Cornwallis, and General Meadows came to visit the princes. His highness took occasion to observe, that we considered him to have been an enemy; whereas, he declared in the presence of God, that he was not, and is not; that, on the contrary, he was a friend and well-wisher; that he had opposed the breach between your majesty and the three allied states to such a degree, that every one decided in his own mind, that inwardly your majesty and his highness were one; and he desired us to ask Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows (who were present) whether he said true or not." \* Now, Sir, let me ask the most credulous, if it was possible that a conversation so open, and to which reference is made to the British government, then present by its representatives, could have any thing criminal in it? And yet this explicit declaration, made thus openly, is not less liable to treasonable inference than any part of these curious documents, on which the charge of treason is founded. The truth is this, that government had long since recommended to the nabob to cultivate the friendship of the Mysore king. It was a point made by the Madras government, many years before this; and the nabob, after much unavailing resistance, conceded to their wishes. Lord Cornwallis, after his treaty with Tippoo, believing, perhaps, that it would be the means of more firmly establishing the good understanding between the English and Tippoo, in that spirit of peace which always directed the conduct of this amiable nobleman, recommended Wallah Jah to cultivate his friendship, and to treat the young princes of Mysore with attention. It was in compliance with these wishes that the old nabob paid them these visits and these compliments, which have so alarmed the British government. But to proceed, Sir, to the second paper, which is also an extract. This is an acknowledgement, by the same ambassadors, of "a gracious letter, giving cover to a slip of paper, on which were written two couplets of the 28th Tuckee;" and after this, the writers inform his Mysorean majesty, "that they understand his instructions, and will act up to them when occasion requires." Well, Sir, what has poor Wallah Jah to do with this? Why has it been introduced as a charge against him, that ambassadors receive instructions from their court, and pro-

\* See No. 1, and further Extract.

nise to obey them? But it may be said, these were not common instructions, for they produce a second letter from the ambassadors, promising secrecy; for No. 3 is an arzee from the same ambassadors to Tippoo, in which are the important words, "*Your majesty desires we will not divulge the secret to any one. Refuge of the world! we consider the concealment of the commands and secrets of our superiors in the light of a religious duty.*" I have no doubt the instructions were deemed important by Tippoo; perhaps they were so; but is there the slightest proof that they were ever communicated to the nabob, or even that he was concerned in them? Not one tittle. As well may you say, that if the right hon. secretary sends instructions to an ambassador at a friendly court, enjoining secrecy, that this very injunction is an hostile measure to the court where he resides, and must mean treachery towards it. But then I shall perhaps be told, that, if it proves nothing by itself, it confirms other more strong proofs of the nabob's treason, and that the next document is evidence of it. Let us then examine it. This is also an extract of a letter from the same ambassadors to their master, recounting what passed at another interview, six days after the former, in which the old nabob, then turned of eighty years of age, with those amiable feelings, his characteristic, took the young prince on his knees for two hours, and, in all the simplicity and goodness of an ancient patriarch, invoked blessings on them and their parent; assured the ambassadors that he considered Tippoo as a pillar of the Mussulman faith, and that he daily offered up prayers for him, and made his subjects do the same." The next day it appears the visit was returned, and it being the feast of the Eedoo Zohra (the feast of the camel), the nabob, his sons, and sirdars, all came out to meet the ambassadors, and the prince was again taken on his knees, and the same blessings and compliments passed; and he is represented as the prince "through whom these rituals and observances of the faith (alluding probably to the Eed) yet remain." The ambassadors then go on to state, that the nabob observed to them (and this is, I understand, the threatened proof of treachery), "that in his first conversation with them, as detailed in No. 1, he spoke to them on the subject of establishing a friendship and harmony between him and Tippoo," asking them, "if they had intimated it to him, and received a favourable answer?" The ambassadors reply that they have; and that Tippoo had answered most favourably, not admitting a doubt of cordiality and friendship subsisting between the followers of Islamism; and they then relate an expression of Tippoo's, "God preserve the nabob Wallah Jah! who is a prince, and one of the leaders of the faithful, and a pillar of the faith." The politeness and modesty of the old monarch here break out, and he refuses this title, which he had before appropriated to Tippoo, exclaiming — "I am what I know myself to be; tell the sultana that he is the pillar of the faith." After this struggle of compliment, the old nabob, resolving not to be outdone in courtesy, exclaims to the princes, "Oh! my sons, if my life and property can be of any service to you, God is witness that I will not refuse them to you." He then gave orders to his gardener to send the children, daily, fruits and flowers; and afterwards, turning to the ambassadors, assured them of his regard, telling them how anxious he had been to preserve peace between their master and the English, and how much he had incur-

the reproofs of the latter for his interference. He enters also into the particulars of his own affairs at great length, and concludes the visit with presenting *khellants* of embroidery and jewels, to the princes and ambassadors, as is the custom on feast days, and then, after sending dancing girls with the princes, took leave of them. — The ambassadors then comment on the general disposition of the people of the Carnatic, and inform Tippoo, that whenever the princes went out, the natives stood by thousands in the streets, and offered up prayers for Tippoo's prosperity; and that, on festivals and Fridays, all the Mussulmans first prayed for his (Tippoo's) preservation. — Thus ends this very important *extract*, which is to shew the hostility of the nabob to the English. Will it, Sir, be credited, that all this avowal of friendship, so dangerous to British interests; all this regard for the happiness and prosperity of Tippoo, so inconsistent with his alliance, and on which the solemn charge of *treason* is founded, passed in the presence and hearing of a loyal and gallant English officer, Major Doyeton, who had the custody of the princes? and for the truth of these assertions, wherein the nabob is made to avow the sincerity and extent of regard for the interests of Tippoo, he appeals to this officer, as he had before done to Lord Cornwallis? Is there, then, a possibility that the nabob, at such a time, and in such company, was meditating hostility to the English government? The semblance of deceit, or concealment of purpose, is not to be found in any of these details; on the contrary, all was Eastern compliment, openly and undisguisedly avowed. The religious compliments were similar to those we usually meet with between Mussulman princes, who (as well as their subjects) we know, hold in abhorrence the votaries of another faith. Indeed, we may venture to admit, that it was probable the preservation of the Mahometan faith in Hindustan, and the support which Tippoo could give it, were points of importance to the nabob at that time of life, when bigotry takes no slight hold of the human mind, and in a country where Islamism had few supporters, and many enemies. But was this a crime in a sovereign prince? Even if the definition of treason could be applied to such a character, how, by the most forced construction, does a particle of it appear in this conduct of the nabob? Were his prayers for Tippoo treasonable? Tippoo, the friend and ally of Great Britain! If they were so, how came it they were not noticed, and put a stop to? for it plainly appears that these prayers were put up in the mosques regularly, and even in the very streets. Sir, there is not a man in the house who will seriously affix to any part of this letter one guilty thought or expression. — We are next favoured with another extract of a letter from Tippoo himself to his ambassadors. What does he direct his ambassadors to do? Nothing more than to return his compliments and thanks to the old nabob for the kindness he had shewn to his (Tippoo's) sons. Nor the word appears in it hostile to the British interests, or leading to the remotest suspicion that the nabob was carrying on a clandestine, much less a treasonable correspondence. There is certainly a great deal of *comely style* and Eastern hyperbole. The sultana had been called the pillar of the faith, and in return he tells his ambassadors that "it is evident the nabob is a pillar of the Mahomedan religion, the elect of the Almighty, a man of dignity and workly experience." — Really,

Sir, one can hardly summon patience to read through these unmeaning documents.

The next in order is the cypher, which I shall reserve for the last, as considered by them the most important, and by myself the most ridiculous, of all the pretences they have advanced for proof of guilt. — Number 7 we will therefore next examine. This is a translation of a letter (the first whole letter we have yet had) from Gholaum Ali Khan to Tippoo, *without any date*. It appears that, at this time, Ali Rheza left the Carnatic on a special mission to his master: we are not left in doubt what and from whence the proposition was, for the letter informs us that it was “for the purpose of bringing to a favourable issue the propositions of Lord Cornwallis, and the well-wisher of Marbud (Wallah Jah).” I think, after reading this sentence, it would be a waste of time to give one moment more to this document. No. 8 is full of nothing but unmeaning compliment. No. 9 is a translation of *the copy of a letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Omdut ul Omrah, the nabob of the Carnatic*, dated November, 1792. Now, Sir, it is impossible but part of this copy must be a forgery. It is addressed to Omdut ul Omrah as *nabob of the Carnatic*. Now, he was not nabob till 1795; and is it possible to believe that, in a country where forms and ceremonies almost constitute the business of life, such a prince as Tippoo should address Omdut ul Omrah, who might never be the nabob of the Carnatic (if Wallah Jah so chose), as the then nabob? The thing is impossible; it discredits the whole mass of these flimsy documents, and excites the suspicion that they might all have been forged. But if this letter has not been fabricated; if it is a true copy of a letter really written; it is as unmeaning and as trifling as the others. No. 10 deserves more attention, because in this Gholaum Ali Khan writes to Tippoo, that he (Gholaum) had received a message by Khadir Nawaz Khan from the nabob, giving Tippoo some information and friendly advice. Without waiting to examine the validity of such evidence, I will suppose the message was actually sent by Wallah Jah to Tippoo. It was certainly most kind and friendly advice. “Take care (says the nabob) what you are about; you may not mean wrong, but your frequent communications with the Poonah government have excited suspicions here; and this, added to the withholding your kists, and your refusal to release the European prisoners, has alarmed even Lord Cornwallis. For God’s sake, if you will rush headlong on destruction, do not break your word of honour with him; at any rate, perform your engagements with him; and if, after he is gone, you choose to act imprudently, the blame will not fall upon him.” I should be glad to know what there is in this advice incompatible with the nabob’s friendship towards us? I will put the worst possible construction on it, namely, that it was an advice to Tippoo to temporize with us. Why, Sir, with such a mind as Tippoo’s, perhaps this was a great object gained; if not to us, yet to himself. Do we not know what the invariable consequence of a war between us and the sovereign of the Mysore was? the probable desolation and plunder of his kingdom; — in any event, the taking of his dominions from him for the time. Was it, therefore, either unnatural or unreasonable, that he should use every possible means, even of delaying such a calamity? This is the most unfavourable view of the



subject for the nabob. But I do not believe, if he did send the message, that he had any other intention than to act as mediator between both countries, from personal regard to Lord Cornwallis; and I think there is every reason to think that the advice was given at the suggestion of the noble lord himself. No. 11 needs no other notice than that it is an account of an exhibition of fire-works, given to the princes on occasion of a festival, and for which the governor of Madras lent his garden. Here Omdut ul Omrah is made to commence his career of compliment to Tippoo, as adulatory and absurd (to us) as his father's. No. 12 contains some more advice from the nabob, said to be sent by the same Khadir Nawaz Khan. If this is a fabrication, it is carried on; if a real transaction, it is consistent with the former advice. The nabob here informs Tippoo, that, if he looks for support from the French, he will be deceived; that the English troops are going against Pondicherry, and that the place will be taken. He then expresses his hopes that the sultan "keeps in view all the ups and downs of the time," and states his motive for this advice to be friendship. What is here in this hostile to Great Britain? Not one syllable that can bear such an interpretation. No. 13 is an extract of a letter from the ambassadors to Tippoo, detailing a conversation between Omdut ul Omrah and themselves, in the garden of the ambassadors, wherein, like his father, he is made to repeat the old story of his regard for Tippoo as the defender or protector of the faith. The ambassadors then inform Tippoo, that they have, under suitable pleas, and a proper introduction, prevailed on Omdut ul Omrah to lay the foundation of it, and that, please God, they would inform him (Tippoo) of the result. Now, Sir, I am very ready to allow, that something here is intimated, which wickedness and design might construe into mysterious, and therefore, guilty intention; but how will malice be disappointed, when it learns that this communication related solely to a projected marriage between the courts, which never took place, and the failure of which, Tippoo, imputing to the want of address or skill in his ambassadors, put them into prison on their return to Seringapatam. In truth, the nabob, Nizam Jah, wished not to offend Tippoo; and though, from the first, he declined not to consent to the alliance (never having forgotten nor forgiven the insult offered to his family by Hyder Ali, who, having captured a sister of the nabob's, placed her in his harem), he gave the ambassadors no reason to suppose he would ultimately decline it. But it will be said — Why this secrecy? why is not the marriage mentioned? why, at least, not hinted at? I will tell the hon. gentlemen, who look with such meaning and enquiring looks, — Marriage is never mentioned in Hindustan, nor forms part of a correspondence. The institution, and all that relates to it, is held so sacred and hallowed, that every thing regarding it is mentioned and designated under figurative expressions; *the affair — the business — the transaction* — are the terms used frequently to express it, as we find here. Can any explanation be more satisfactory? I challenge its contradiction. In No. 15 Tippoo seems to acknowledge the receipt of the last letter, as in this he desires further information, when *they* receive any. No. 16 is the translation of a letter from the ambassadors to Tippoo, in which they give him an account of their having administered an obligation sent by Tippoo, to

the servants of the sultaun in the Jaumeh mosque. This is a very curious ceremony, and Wallah Jah's young sons went to see the grand spectacle; near a thousand persons were assembled, and all the servants, "high and low," belonging to the sircar, were ordered to attend, to put on their best clothes, and to bathe themselves. Then Ali Rheza, with the Canzy of the city, the Khuttub (or preacher), Syed Mahomed, *a man of great learning*, joined the gaping throng. After prayers, Ali Rheza asks the Cauzy, and other persons of learning who were present, to explain to the people present the contents of the Kotba, and the punishment for breaking any of the laws contained in it. The Cauzy replies, that the contents were, the command of God to wage holy wars; not to take flight in the face of an enemy; to form an union among the professors of Islamism, and other obligations of the faith; then, after a learned exposition of the duty of servants, the engagement was made by each of the servants, that they never would be guilty of flight from an enemy, of theft, of lying, of injuring, nor of any thing that belonged to treachery and ingratitude. Thus ended the ceremony; and a more innocent and laudable one can scarcely be conceived, nor the duties of religion or morality more properly enforced; and yet this, I know, is stated as one of the great charges against the nabob, and that it is evidence of a religious union between the monarchs, to wage religious war against the English. Never was so absurd a supposition. And here it is remarkable, that neither Wallah Jah nor Omdut ul Omrah was present, which, if the meeting had been held for such a purpose, they would have been. Indeed, it has no more to do with them than with any of us. No. 17 is a fine specimen of Indian poetry; Omdut ul Omrah is said to be the poet; it is supposed to be addressed to Gholaum Ali Khan. This is a most curious document, written "*with a pencil, upon half a sheet of post paper, with an envelope of English paper.*" The translator has chosen to say it is Omdut ul Omrah's writing. This could have been easily proved; but it has not been attempted. But it is impossible it should have been sent to any one. What! a note written with "a pencil," enclosing a message to the sultaun, and a couplet to be repeated to him — the thing is wholly impossible. I will venture to say, no such departure from the ceremony of Eastern manners ever took place. But it is quite unnatural; for the poetry, if excellent, is very innocent. I shall therefore waste no more time on it. No. 18 and 19 introduce two new characters: Mahomed Ghyans, and Mahomed Ghor Khan, new ambassadors, who, on the disgrace of the old ones (as it is generally believed, from their failure in accomplishing the projected marriage) are sent by Tippoo to condole with Omdut ul Omrah on the loss of his father, Wallah Jah. When I observe, that Major Grant, the town-major, and the governor of Madras, introduced these ambassadors to the nabob, it is unnecessary to add much more: they had two interviews; the nabob sent them clothes and provisions, and a generous struggle took place on the occasion; nothing more passed, and away went the ambassadors, with the usual presents and compliments. I cannot discover what occasioned these two letters to be introduced; as little can one imagine what importance is attached to the two which remain; one written by the nabob, Omdut ul Omrah (as it is said), under the name of Gholaum Hussain to Gholaum Ali Khan, and the

other by Khader Nawaz Khan, to the same. The latter, of course, can have nothing to do with the nabob, but it is a mere letter of friendly wishes to the old ambassador. The same answer, however, as to any inference of improper understanding between the nabob and Tippoo, will apply to both; and I think it will not be an unsatisfactory one, when I inform the house, that at this very period, January, 1797, after a correspondence and too good understanding charged to exist between these two monarchs, neither the nabob, nor Kadir Nawaz Khan, knew that Gholaum Ali Khan, to whom they were addressing these letters, was in disgrace and confinement at Seringapatam; and that Tippoo, suspecting that Gholaum Ali Khan had, in his embassy, betrayed his interests, intercepted these letters written to Gholaum, having previously instructed his new ambassadors to conceal the circumstance; and this will account for their being found in the palace at Seringapatam. I think it is impossible to give a more complete refutation to the whole of this pretended conspiracy, than this statement of the conduct of Tippoo towards the nabobs; a conduct so wholly unlike the confidence necessary for co-operation, that it is undoubted evidence of the direct contrary. And now, Sir, let me ask the house, whether they can discern, in any of those letters, one symptom of treasonable correspondence, one feature of criminal intercourse? Professions, indeed, there are, of civility; offers, indeed, of friendship; compliments on the attachment of Tippoo to the Mahomedan faith; but is there treason in this? We are told by those very persons who wrote the account (for let the house always bear in mind that these are narrations by Tippoo's ambassadors, who, of course, would model their language and information as would best please their master), "that it was all unmeaning compliment, and there was no sincerity in it." What then becomes, even of this new species of treason, which consists in *wishes*?

But I shall be told, that I have forgotten the cypher—that I have purposely passed over this dreadful engine of treason, this unanswerable proof of hostility to British interests. I can assure those who think so, that they are much mistaken. I would not rob the house of the amusement which the examination of this curious document will afford them. And first, I will ask the right hon. secretary for foreign affairs, whether he remembers an instance of a cypher, for the purpose of concerting hostile measures, resembling this? and if not for this purpose, there is nothing criminal attached to it. Where are the symbols or characters of treason in it? One man is designated by the name of The Friend of Mankind; another by The Distinguished in Friendship; a third by The Protector of the Faith; and a fourth by that of nothing, or non-enemy! Well, Sir, these have no hostile meaning in them. But then, there are two fatal words that can mean nothing else than war and destruction: there are the words, "*a scymitar and a saddle.*" I must acknowledge, Sir, that both may be very hostilely employed, but by whom? by poor Wallah Jah? or his successor, Omdut ul Omrah? Alas! Sir, British art and perfidy had not left them a single trooper to mount the saddle, or to gird on the scymitar: with the exception of these terrific characters, there was not a symbol or character which could, by the most forced construction, designate any thing hostile; but it is an extraordinary circumstance, that the translator of this curious piece of

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mechanism, which was to deluge the Carnatic with blood, and to strain the English government to its centre, candidly confesses, that it is frequently very difficult to make out which is the cypher and which the key! But it will be said, perhaps, that the cypher has been actually in use; that many of the words have been used in correspondence. True, Sir, they have, or at least similar ones; but what words? any of hostility to Great Britain? any of military or political concert or co-operation? No such thing; not the semblance of it. The words have been mere formal ceremonies of appellation — “*Well-wisher of Mankind*,” “*Pillar of the Faith*,” — these are the only ones I can collect; but even these exact words it may be observed are not to be found in the cypher: but if they were, they mean nothing but compliment. And this actually presents a much better key to the cypher, than any other which interest or guilt has annexed to it. I understand it is not at all uncommon for princes and nobles to assume titles of benevolence and philanthropy, and to think themselves honoured by such appellations; which are again changed when the fancy or ingenuity of the writer can suggest a more honourable one. I have had the numerous titles assumed by Wallah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah (and which we find at the head of all the treaties and state papers), translated to me, and most of them designate some moral quality. The nobles in the confidence of their masters affect the same consequence, though in a more limited degree; and when they are written to, or spoken of, it is often under their assumed titles. This will therefore account for the use of this cypher, if it was ever used. But will the gentlemen who pin their faith of the guilt of these princes on this precious document, give us one single proof of its having been used for hostile, or even suspicious purposes? In vain will they say, “this is not likely, for the parties would take care to destroy such documents.” Why then have they not destroyed the cypher? Why then did they not destroy these treasonable letters? It is pretty plain why they did not — they knew and felt that they meant nothing; that the excess of political craft and villainy alone could torture them into any proofs of guilt, or even suspicion of unworthy motives. But, Sir, I might even, for the sake of argument, allow that this cypher afforded presumption of guilt; that it justified the suspicions which, after *two years investigation*, they have fixed on it; yet, how is it made to affect the nabob? Why, it is said, it was written by Omdut ul Omrah, and said to be given by him to Khader Nawaz Khan, who gives it to Ali Rheeza Khan, on his departure for Seringapatam. — Who proves this? No one. In fact, he who receives it knows not from whom he got it; and does not even pretend that it was from Omdut ul Omrah, but from some one of Wallah Jah’s ministers. But I have been told, that it is in Omdut ul Omrah’s hand writing, and at the bottom of the key or cypher is a symbol designating “the hand-writing of Omdut ul Omrah;” but how does this prove that he either wrote the cypher or the key? But that which damns all possible inference of its being the work of Omdut ul Omrah, or of any person by his or Wallah Jah’s directions, is, that the British government, having in their possession, or under their controul, the minister of the nabob, at the time, and the ambassadors of Tippon, have not dared to examine those who could give the most positive proof, if such

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was the case; and in any event could have proved the hand-writing of Omdut ul Omrah. But this, Sir, was not the wish of the British government; the development of the truth they feared; they *knew* there was no guilt; the more obscure the case, the better it would answer their purpose of substituting suspicion for proof; this was what they wanted, and in it they succeeded. Will any man doubt that such was their object, when I am enabled to refer my hearers to the information of the commissioners, that the translator commenced writing the evidence in the Persian language, but that he soon changed it for the English, "the evidence not taking the turn which they (the commissioners) expected"! But, Sir, I will not consume another moment on this grand key-stone of their case, this curious and unique state paper, which I think deserves, equally with the treaty, a place in the archives of the British Museum!

Having gone through the whole of the written evidence in support of the charge against the nabob; and let it be remembered that the greater part are only *extracts* of letters; I will ask every man in the house, whether they can lay their hands on their hearts, and say they believe the alleged treachery of the nabobs. But, Sir, when I refer gentlemen to the oral evidence in support of it, there cannot be two opinions, not only as to the guilt of the nabobs, in the house, but as to the belief of it in those who fabricated the charge. What will the house think of the prostituted character of British justice in India, when I inform them, (and refer to the papers on the table for the proofs), of the manner in which this examination was conducted. — The two witnesses were Ali Rheza Khan and Gholaum Ali Khan, the writers of the letters we have been examining. They were at that time pensioners on the bounty of the English government, and that government thought it not dishonourable to remind them of their dependent state, or to threaten them with the loss of its favor and protection if their answers to the questions put to them were not correspondent with the views and expectations of the British government. In the course of the evidence, particularly in that of Gholaum Ali Khan, we find this was not an idle threat: when his replies suited the purpose of conviction, all was right, no objection was made; but when they had the remotest tendency to exculpation, or even to explain doubtful circumstances, the witness was stopped, was seriously admonished of the perilous situation in which he stood, and of the probability that he would lose the protection of the British government. More than once he was dismissed, and ordered to weigh well, *not* his evidence, not the truth of his depositions, but the situation he was placing himself in, if he spoke unwelcome truths! Yet all these menaces, from a power to whom these witnesses owed, not only protection, but the very means of subsistence, could not extort one contradiction to their testimony. They again and again declared, that the whole correspondence was mere unmeaning compliment; that the "business or affair" mentioned, was a proposition of marriage, which, not succeeding, they had fallen under the displeasure of their master; that there was no conspiracy against the British government; on the contrary, there was not even a good understanding between the monarchs; all was hollow, insincere profession. This, Sir, would not answer the purpose of the British govern-

ment. In vain did they alternately menace and soothe their witnesses; nothing more could be obtained. What then was to be done? how were they to supply this defect of proof? One should have thought, that as the cypher was the most material evidence on which they relied, as affecting Omdut ul Omrah, they would have examined Khadar Nawaz Khan, who was said to have received it from Omdut ul Omrah, and given it to Gholaun Ali Khan; he would have proved or disproved this material fact; would have explained the use for which this cypher was meant, and that to which it was applied. No, Sir, him they dared not examine; they knew he would have told them the truth, and proved the innocence of the transaction; he would have disproved that it was the hand-writing of Omdut ul Omrah; nay, there were an hundred persons who could have disproved this. Why, Sir, did they not examine this moonshee of Tippoo's, who is said to have endorsed the receipt of the other document, supposed to have come from Omdut ul Omrah? He would have explained how it came to him, from whom, and for what purpose. No, Sir, this was not consistent with their plan; if they could not prove positive guilt in the accused, they were to infer perjury in their witnesses. What! discredit their own witnesses? and witnesses so tutored, so prepared for their purpose? Yes, Sir, this was the course they deemed it prudent to follow. To Ali Rheza Khan, who had somewhat better answered their purpose, they imputed merely inconsistency, but gave him the credit of good intentions; but Gholaun Ali Khan they accused of absolute, direct perjury, of wilful, obstinate perseverance in falsehood. For the honour of British justice, let me ask the right hon. baronet opposite to me (Sir John Anstruther) if he would have permitted a proceeding so disgraceful to have passed in his court, whilst he presided over the judicial proceedings in India? I will not dishonour him by the question as applied to the court in which he presided, but does he really believe that there is to be found any inferior court, professing to administer British justice in India, where such a conduct towards witnesses would have been for an instant endured? (Here Sir John Anstruther rose, and called to order: he said it was very irregular in the hon. baronet to make such repeated allusions to him; and he did not know what right he had to ask his opinion on the subject. Sir Thomas Turton maintained he was strictly in order; and the speaker decided there was nothing irregular in putting such questions in the course of argument.) Well, Sir, if the right hon. gentleman feels hurt at the reference, I will appeal to any lawyer in the house, if a judge in the lowest court of this country would have witnessed such treatment of evidence, without the severest rebuke? Indeed, I may ask whether, on documents like these, supported by free, unbiassed evidence, any judge would have convicted the most abandoned culprit of the most trivial offence? Yet, Sir, upon no other than this, is a charge of treason made out, by which a sovereign is to be despoiled of his dominions, and his accusers and judges put in possession of them. If, however, these contemptible charges could for an instant be supposed to affect the character and interests of Omdut ul Omrah, how came they not to have been brought forward in his lifetime? Will the house believe that these pretended proofs have been upwards of two years in possession of the British government in India

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If brought forward during the life of Omdut ul Omrah, they might have been explained or disproved; but on what principle, but that of the most wicked and tyrannous intent, were they reserved to greet his amiable and innocent successor? Let me ask these great legal casuists, who can extract even the semblance of guilt from such despicable papers? (and of a guilt too which is to carry with it the extremity of punishment) by what distortion of argument they affix any part of it on his successor? How is he implicated in transactions of which he formed no part? they surely will not pretend it. How then do they justify the base act they have committed, in stripping him of his dominions, in humbling him to the dust, and of having ultimately precipitated him to an untimely grave! Sir, I should indeed have in vain sought for the reasoning on which this attempt is founded, if I had not felt it my duty to peruse the numerous publications with which the press has lately teemed on this subject, publications as disgraceful to the authors as they are injurious to the fame of their patron, in which the respectable authorities of Puffendorf, Grotius, Domat, and even of the immortal Locke, (Ah! little, Sir, did he dream that his authority could have been so prostituted!) are adduced in support of their monstrous propositions. There is one which stands pre-eminent in abuse of the accusers of the noble marquis, honouring me with a notice, which, if the author writes from necessity, excites my pity, if not, my contempt. In this noted publication the authority of Domat is quoted, to prove "that the damage done by the parent, the heir is bound to repair;" and this is the justification deemed sufficient by the author for this act of violence and bloodshed—"damage done by the parent." What damage has been done? what injury has been sustained? Is there any attempt to prove more than a conspiracy, an intent to do something, which *might have led* to injury or damage to the British interests. Prove your loss, and we will then, on these principles, set about repairing the injury. And is this the defence which the indiscreet partisans of the noble marquis think it prudent to advance? Is it "*tah auxilio, defensoribus istis*," that his cause is to be supported? As well might they have rested their defence on the fable of the Wolf and the Lamb. The principles of justice are not more glaringly violated in that memorable story; indeed, one must be struck with the exact resemblance of the cases. The wolf accuses the lamb of troubling the water of the rivulet at which they both drank; "how can that be," says the lamb, "seeing that the water runs from you to me." "Well then," says the wolf, "if it was not you, your father did it at such a time." "That could not be," says the other, "for my father was dead before the time you mention." "Oh! but," says the ravenous monster, "if it was not your father, it was your grandfather, and I must take my revenge on you;" and so saying, he ate him up. Such, Sir, was the dispute and result in the case I now submit to the house. Gracious heaven! and are crimes so atrocious, so abhorrent from the common feelings of humanity, to remain unpunished by a British legislature! We talk much, and with reason, of the atrocities of Bonaparte; but let us suppose, that, after the peace of Presburgh, the emperor of Austria had suddenly died, and that Bonaparte had found in the palace at Vienna, letters, or scraps of paper, in the hand-writing of Count Stahrenberg, the minister at

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the court of London, detailing the intentions of Great Britain with respect to France, and advising a pacific and cautious conduct towards Bonaparte, and this at a time when the cabinets of the Thuilleries and Vienna were at peace, would he, with his latitude of thinking and acting where his interest is concerned, have deemed this, if completely proved, sufficient to have taken Austria from his innocent successor? In what terms would the noble marquis, and his present defenders, have designated such atrocity? They would have described it as the crime of injustice, of cruelty, and oppression. And yet the case before us, with all its accompanying circumstances, is still more flagrant and atrocious. Let us put a case, coming still nearer to ourselves:—Suppose a minister of this country, having in his possession what he conceived proofs of treason against the parent of any one who hears me, should wait to bring those proofs till the death of the parent, and then inform his heir, that, if he will not give the king, his master, four-fifths of his father's patrimony, he shall be despoiled of the whole; and, on the son's refusal either to brand his father's name with infamy, or to surrender his patrimony, proceed to put his threats into execution, what would be the general feeling of the country against such a monster? Can it be thought that such a minister would be permitted even the formalities of a trial, for an act so villainous? Would not the just indignation of the people sacrifice him to their resentment, before he could obtain a trial? He would be torn piece-meal on his way to that tribunal, whose principles he had so glaringly violated. Are, then, the feelings of Britons lost or deadened by the distance at which the act is perpetrated? Do injustice or cruelty lose their horrors, or cease to excite our resentment, because the Atlantic intervenes? We have lately given a splendid and honourable proof to the contrary. Let us not re-trace our footsteps of blood and iniquity. Let the British parliament declare aloud, that it will be consistently just and humane; that in the utmost extremity of the globe, where the British name is heard, never shall it be coupled with oppression and injustice; that it will bring to condign punishment all those, however high their rank or consequence, who shall exercise that power, which is never meant to be entrusted to them but for the happiness of those over whom they rule, either to purposes of ambition, or of personal interest.

Long, Sir, as I am sensible I have detained the house, yet there are two points more which I must notice before I sit down. The first relates to the charge against the nabob, of the tuncaws, or assignments of the territories mortgaged to the Company by the treaty of 1799. Sir, I have heard this stated as a forfeiture of the benefits of that treaty. Suppose it was—then the treaty was at an end, and the parties might either have contracted a new engagement, or remained without any. But did we so consider it? Did we announce such to be our intention? Did we not, to the very day of the death of Omdut ul Omrah, receive the payment of the instalments under this treaty? Is it not then clear what was our view of this pretext, which we now advanced as a ground of forfeiture, not of the benefits of the treaty, or of our protection, but of the territories of our ally to us? Is there any thing in that treaty which says that such was to be the consequence of the tuncaws being granted by the nabob? It was impossible there could be such an article.



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But there was a provision in the treaty which rendered it quite immaterial whether tuncaws were granted or not; for, if the kists were not regularly paid, the districts were to be taken by us as mortgagees, and we were then to pay ourselves. Nay, in order to apprise the people of the Carnatic of the danger of their purchasing these tuncaws, we took care to publish this article of it. Is it, then, possible to suppose any one would deal in them? If they did, we could receive no injury thereby. But it is said, that the governors of Madras informed their masters that such was the case; and the Company sent out orders to seize the districts. This is true; but it is no less so, that, inclined as they were, particularly so as Lord Hobart was, they never *did* seize them; this of itself was a proof of the falsehood of the allegation. The nabob positively denies it "*on the faith and honour of a sovereign.*" The regular payment of the kists for nine years, proves it still stronger; and the explanation of that, which they termed granting assignments of tuncaws, by the nabob himself, sets the matter wholly at rest. He informs us, that the rigid payment of the kists, insisted on by the British government, would occasionally be disappointed, from the neglect or inability of the collectors; in such case, in order to make good his payments, he was obliged to borrow part of the kists, and give the lenders an order on the collector for payment. This, I doubt not, is the real truth, and yet this was argued into an admission that he granted tuncaws. Even if he had, I pronounce that we ourselves deemed it a forfeiture of the treaty. — The other point relates to the assertion, or more properly the insinuation, that the nabobs of the Carnatic were not independent sovereigns. What do you mean by independent sovereigns? Do you mean that those only are independent princes, who can treat on terms of perfect equality with other sovereigns? If so, what were Austria, what Prussia, Naples, and other powers, when they treated with France, at whose feet they were? Yet who considered them in the light of sovereigns, with whom treaties imposed no reciprocal obligations? But, in this case, if the dependency was on either side, it was on *ours*. From the nabob did we receive the jaghir I have before-mentioned; it was a *fiel* which enjoined military services and inferred subjection in the party receiving it; for, however the transaction was attended with something like demand, it was accepted by us as a grant. True, indeed, Sir, we had made him dependent on us, and by influence and artifice had persuaded him to disband his armies, and to confide in us for defence against our mutual enemies. Little did he imagine, that the only real enemies he should have to encounter would be the perfidy and ambition of the British government; that under the ungenerous pretext of dependency (a plea which should have insured him the kindness and protection of the British government), they should despoil him of his territories, and defraud him of rights, guaranteed by treaties the most solemn and obligatory. But I need not, to a British House of Commons, waste one word more on this part of the subject — they will, they must disdain an argument so little consistent with the feelings of Britons.

Sir, I am too well aware that I have been compelled, from the importance and extent of the subject, to trespass very long on the attention of the house; but if I had not anticipated many of the objection

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Which I know will be made, and replied to many of the arguments which, I presume, will be advanced in justification of this act, gentlemen, who only heard them from my opponents, would consider them a satisfactory answer to my charge.

Sir, in the Resolutions which I shall feel it my duty to submit to the house, I shall merely observe, that the greater part contain a statement of historical facts, and (as I presume) incontrovertible inferences, necessary to enable us to form an impartial judgment on the charge I have adduced; others contain a direct charge against the persons at the head of the government in India; and the last proposes, that this house should forthwith go into a committee, not only for the purpose of examining into the proof of the allegations, but what I conceive in a national view to be of much more importance, to consider what reparation British justice requires for its outraged character, and what British interests demand for their future preservation in India. I pledge myself, Sir, to the house, to prove every statement I have made. Give me the committee, and the most partial of the noble lord's friends will not have to accuse me that this charge is brought on slender or untenable grounds. If they refuse me the committee, what will the public think? Will they not naturally conclude, that they dread the investigation?—that they fear the result? It is impossible that they should think otherwise.

Before I sit down, let me conjure the house, as they regard the national honour and faith; let me conjure ministers, as peculiarly the guardians of the national character; let me intreat every man who hears me, in the name of those sacred principles of justice, eternal, immutable, universal, the great and valued gift of God to man—the foundation of his happiness here and hereafter, to pause before he gives his vote from personal attachment, or political connection, not rashly to decide on a question which involves not only the honour and character, but the future interests of our government in India. It is plain that the native princes can have no attachment to us; they have experienced from us nothing but tyranny, injustice, and oppression. If 10,000 Europeans were to enter India, I am persuaded our empire there would be shaken to its centre. The maharattas, the peishwah, the nizam, the nabob of Oude, every prince, who in his turn has been robbed by us of part of his territories, or whose independence has been outraged by our interference, would, in such a case, unite against us. Ours is the government of the sword only, that may be destroyed by the sword. Look at our situation in the Doab, where Doondeah, a petty zemindar, is actually setting at defiance our efforts to subdue him. Sir, there is only one way to establish our power in India on those bases which will give us real security. Let us substitute for injustice and oppression honour and moderation; let us strive to win the hearts, not to subjugate the persons, of the native princes; let us return to the system pursued and inculcated by Lord Cornwallis, even up to the moment when death robbed us of his valuable services; a system comprised in a very narrow compass—*justice and good faith*. With such a system we may preserve India; without it, I am satisfied we shall lose it. In the one case, the British government will be a blessing to the natives; in the other, a curse.

## CARNATIC QUESTION.

Sir, I shall trespass no longer, but move the following Resolutions:

Resolved, 1. "That it appears to this house, that Mahomed Ali, otherwise called Wallah Juh, nabob of the Carnatic, was an ally of the East India Company, and under a vicissitude of fortunes, attendant on the introduction of the British power in India, adliered to the British cause, when it was endangered by the contending interests and arms of France; that under a just sense of the services so rendered by Mahomed Ali, and with the especial view to prevent all future controversy with respect to the succession to that kingdom, an acknowledgment of the right in the person of the nabob, Mahomed Ali, and in his heirs and successors for ever, was procured in the treaty concluded at Paris in the year 1763, and formally recognized therein by the powers of England and France. — That at various times since, the East India Company have entered into divers agreements and treaties, through their governments in India, with Mahomed Ali, under the character and title of nabob of Arcot, or of the Carnatic, for the express purpose, and with the avowed intent of defending, jointly with their own, the title and rights of the said nabob; and especially in two treaties concluded in the years 1787 and 1792, the latter of which purports to be a treaty executed on behalf of the East India Company, their heirs and successors, and to be mutually binding as well on them as on his highness the nabob Mahomed Ali, and his successor, his eldest son Omdut ul Omrah, and his heirs and successors; that such treaty of 1792 remained in force, and as such, obligatory on the contracting parties, at the death of the said Mahomed Ali, which happened in the year 1796, who at his death was succeeded by his said son Omdut ul Omrah. — That the said Omdut ul Omrah died in the month of July, 1801, without any alteration or modification of the said treaty having been made in his life time.

"That it appears to this house, that the said nabob Omdut ul Omrah made a will, or testamentary writing, by which he appointed his son, the prince Ali Hussein Juh ul Omrah, &c. his heir and successor in the dominions of the Carnatic. An instrument which is admitted by the British government in India to have been competently executed, and in form, disposition, and principle, consonant to the Mahomedan law. That by such will the said prince Ali Hussein became, on succeeding to the rights of his father, a party to the treaty of 1792, which expressly included the heirs and successors of the said Omdut ul Omrah, and in virtue thereof entitled to the benefits, and bound to the observance of all the terms and conditions of such treaty. That the said prince Ali Hussein, on his succession, professed his readiness and determination strictly to fulfil all the obligations of the said treaty, and required the fulfilment of the correspondent obligations by the government of India.

"That it appears to this house, that the government of Madras, acting under the authority of instructions from the Marquis Wellesley, the governor-general of India, refused to admit the said prince Ali Hussein, as successor to the nabob of the Carnatic, in virtue of the

## CARNATIC QUESTION.

will of his father, the late nabob, and of the said treaty of 1792, unless he would previously consent to an ignominious and disgraceful surrender of all his rights in the territorial possessions of the Carnatic, and accept in lieu thereof an indefinite sum as a bounty or gratuity from the Company; and on the steady and dignified refusal of the said prince to accede to this unworthy and humiliating proposition, his succession was set aside, and another and more distant branch of the family of Mahomed Ali, namely, Azem ul Dowlah, was placed on the throne of the Carnatic, on his acceptance of the above disgraceful and servile conditions.

"That it appears to this house, that the said Azem ul Dowlah was raised to the musnud of the Carnatic in the room of, and through the disinheritance of, the lawful successor, prince Ali Hussein; — that the injustice and tyranny of the act was not more disgraceful to the British name and character, than the unfounded pretences by which it is attempted to be justified, inasmuch as the pretended treason of the said nabobs, Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omrah, on which the assumption of the Carnatic was founded, although alleged to have been discovered two years preceding the death of the latter prince, was never brought forward during his life, and could by no possible construction affect the right of the said Ali Hussein, the innocent and unoffending successor of the said nabob. This house, therefore, is of opinion, that the British power in India, intrusted to the Marquis Wellesley, has, in this instance, been employed by him wantonly and unjustly, to deprive the lawful heir to the Carnatic of his undoubted rights, contrary to every principle of justice and equity, in violation of the sacred faith of treaties, and to the degradation of the British name and character in India.

"That it appears to this house, that the person of the prince Ali Hussein, the rightful nabob of Arcot, was committed to the custody of the said Azem ul Dowlah, who had, through the undue exercise of the power of the Company, usurped his dominions; that the said prince Ali Hussein, notwithstanding the frequent remonstrances and representations made to the British government by himself and others, of the humiliating and degrading state to which he and his family were reduced by such confinement — notwithstanding his representations of the imminent danger to his life, which he anticipated from being placed in the power of his enemy, and the usurper of his throne, was suffered to continue in such custody until the 6th of April, 1802, when he died.

Resolved, "That policy as well as justice loudly demands the vindication of the character of Great Britain in India, from the reproach of the above transactions; and that the interests, if not the preservation of our empire there, calls for some public act, which will convince the native princes, that a religious adherence to its engagements, will, in future, characterize the British government. Consistently with these sentiments, and at a time when our implacable enemy attempts to justify his atrocities and despotism in Europe by the example of our conduct in India, it is peculiarly incumbent on the house, in the name of the people of England, to declare openly to the world, that the British parliament never did, nor will counte-

nance any act of oppression and injustice in its Indian government. And as evidence of its sincerity, this house resolves forthwith to appoint a committee to inquire into the before-mentioned act of the assumption of the Carnatic — the alleged motives thereof — and into the particulars of the treatment of the family of our late ally, the nabob Mahomed Ali, and of the prince Ali Hussain, the lawful successor to the musnud of the Carnatic; and that it be an instruction to the said committee, to inquire into, and to report whether any and what reparation can, or ought to be made to the said family, for the injuries they have sustained by the usurpation of the said Azcem ul Dowlah; and that they may further report their opinion by what means the British character can be most effectually rescued from the obloquy and odium incurred from the above conduct of its servants; and how the British interests in India may be best secured from injury thereby."

The question upon the first Resolution being put from the Chair,

Mr. WALLACE rose, and began by saying — In offering myself to your attention, Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of objecting to the Resolutions proposed, and taking a view of the event to which they relate, essentially differing from that stated by the hon. baronet who has just sat down, I may be permitted to express some degree of surprise, arising from the period at which this subject is now submitted to the consideration of the house. If the transaction in question be of the nature described in the speech we have just heard: if the epithets of foul and atrocious, which have been repeatedly applied to it, have been justly applied; if it does indeed, as vitally as it is said to do, involve the faith, the justice, and the character of the country; if it is not brought forward rather for the distinction of an individual, than as a necessary vindication of the national honour; if it is surely matter of just astonishment, that it should not be till after the sixth year from the time it was first brought under the notice of this house, — that it should not be till after every document elucidating it has been printed and re-printed for the consideration of three successive parliaments, that we are at length arrived at this long-looked-for discussion. I do not mean to accuse the hon. baronet: it is only for a comparatively short part of that period he has had a seat in this house; and I must do him the justice to say, that since he has undertaken the business, I am not aware of its having been delayed a single hour on the ground of his personal convenience. But, if there are those who concur in his impressions, who are prepared to manifest that concurrence by their votes this night, and who have enjoyed opportunities which he has not possessed, of appealing to the judgment of parliament — it will become them, nay, Sir, they owe it to themselves, to this house, and to their country, to repel, if they can, the charge of such a dereliction of their public duty, as irresistibly results from their having endured, for so long a period, a stain so foul to disgrace the British name; from having left the national faith and justice, six long years, wounded, impeached, dishonoured, and, as far as depended on *their* efforts, wholly unredressed.

Late as it is, it must still be a matter of satisfaction, as well to the noble lord against whom the Resolutions are principally directed, as to

all who, either from personal or public motives, feel an interest in the subject of them, that the accusation is finally before the house; and I trust that the decision of this night (not such as anticipated by the hon. baronet, but one more consistent with substantial justice), will set this question at rest for ever; that it will not be suffered to continue suspended over our heads, or furnish, any longer, against the noble lord and our counsels in India, a vehicle for every species of libel and calumny, that ingenuity, disappointment, and revenge, can devise or propagate.

That a measure of the description of this now under our consideration should not excite clamour and hostility in some quarters, would have been contrary to every rational probability and expectation. No man who knows what has been passing in that part of India for the last thirty or forty years — the corruptions, the abuses, the iniquities, that have prevailed there, but must have foreseen that a measure calculated to eradicate those corruptions, to frustrate the hopes of avarice, to blight for ever the harvest of plunder and extortion, would have to encounter a host of foes, and be assailed by detraction in every form. But to me, Sir, and I trust equally to the house, such animosity is, in fact, its best recommendation — it is a proof that it has effectually accomplished one of its most important objects; an object dear to the interests of humanity, and the happiness of millions, by destroying a system the most baneful that ever existed; to which not your resources only, but the country itself, and its inhabitants in all their gradations, were the victims; which degraded the prince; which impoverished the landholder; which oppressed the peasant; which drove labour from the field, and industry from the loom; which depopulated the provinces, and spread desolation and misery over the whole face of the land.

But, much, Sir, as humanity, much as policy might be interested in the extinction of such a system, had they been the *only* grounds of the great measure adopted, however convinced I might have been of the soundness and the validity of each of them, I will readily own I should have thought the justification they furnished incomplete and unsatisfactory. I am too well aware of the danger of such alleged principles of action, and the abuse to which they directly tend: it is not on these grounds that a pretence of right is founded; it is on the violation of every tie of public faith, gratitude, and friendship; on the contempt of the most solemn engagements and binding duties of alliance, connected with a sympathetic conduct of unequivocal hostility on the part of the nabobs of the Carnatic, supported by facts no man can deny, established by inferences no man can dispute, that the rights we asserted rest; and that this measure was embraced by those to whom the care of the British interests in the East was delegated, and whose first duty it was to maintain and protect them.

The speech of the hon. baronet, and the Resolutions, convey but a very imperfect outline of the transaction before us: from the documents on your table alone can the real nature and character of it be collected. From them it will appear, that, owing to the perfidious and hostile conduct of the successive nabobs, Wallah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah, it became the right, and was consequently the duty, of the British government to provide for the security of its interests, as connected with

the Carnatic; the intended exercise of this right having been evaded by the death of the latter, and not acceded to on the part of his natural heir, Ali Hussein, the usual course of succession was changed, and another prince of the same family raised, by our power, to the throne.

The considerations arising out of his statement obviously divide themselves into—the rights we possessed; the duty of exercising those rights, in the manner and to the extent in which they were exercised; and, lastly, the circumstances with which the exercise of them was attended.

Before, however, I proceed to discuss the points I have adverted to, I feel myself under the necessity of detaining you for a few moments, to refer to the state and origin of our political connection with the nabobs of the Carnatic, because I am desirous of correcting some impressions on that subject, which the hon. baronet's speech seemed calculated to convey.

Those who are acquainted with the history of India, know that the family of Wallah Jah had no hereditary claim to the situation of nabob of the Carnatic; that the way to the musnud was opened to Anwar u Dien, his father, by the means of two assassinations, of which he was not supposed to be wholly innocent. This prince afterwards sunk under the united arms of the French, and the soubah of the Deccan, and fell at the battle of Amboor, where his eldest son was at the same time made a prisoner; while his second son, Mahomed Ali (known subsequently by the name of Wallah Jah) fled, stripped of every thing, to the fortress of Trichinopoly; a new nabob was immediately appointed by the victorious party, and the fortunes of the house of Anwar u Dien seemed to be for ever extinguished. In vain did Mahomed Ali proclaim his pretended title to the succession; in vain implore the friendship of the French, by whom his rival was avowedly supported. His last resource was to solicit the protection of the British government. Fortunately for him, our situation at the moment, and the necessity of preserving our own existence in the peninsula, forced upon us that of resisting the increasing power and ambitious projects of France. We extended to him, therefore, the protection he solicited; and how we performed *our* part need not now be told. After an arduous and glorious contest, success crowned the British arms, and the consequence of that success placed Mahomed Ali on the musnud. Having thus raised him from the dust, and, in an evil hour, given him the possession of a great and flourishing kingdom; having procured the recognition of his title both in India and in Europe; it is not easy to conceive what services he could render that were more than adequate to those he had received.—Less than fidelity and attachment to the power which had retrieved the fortunes, and revived the splendor and power of his house;—less than a fair participation in the resources of the country, gained by our arms, to the extent which might be necessary to maintain the common interest of its defence, we could not, in justice to ourselves, demand, and more we did not claim.

This, Sir, is the language of all the treaties concluded with this prince; and these the conditions of all his claims to the support which he invariably experienced from the British power.

It is not my intention to enter into any details relative to what has

passed during the connexion which has so long subsisted; or to give you a history of the intrigues, the corruptions, the impatience of our power, the struggles for independence, and the unprincipled ambition, which have been exhibited on the part of the nabob; neither do I mean to detail the instances of his faithlessness to all his engagements, which have, in every war in which we have been engaged, embarrassed the progress of our aims, and more than once brought our affairs to the very verge of ruin; but I shall come at once to what bears more directly upon the subject of our discussion; I mean the treaty concluded by Sir Archibald Campbell in the year 1767.—That treaty was in part pecuniary, and in part political: it provided an annual sum for the discharge of the nabob's debts, and for a large military subsidy, for which it appointed a landed security; and it precluded him from entering into any political negotiations or controversies with any state or power, without the consent or approbation of the president in council of Fort St. George.

The alleged distresses of the nabob, and the difficulties he professed to feel in fulfilling his pecuniary engagements, induced Lord Cornwallis to consent to a revision of this treaty; and, in consequence of that revision, a new treaty was concluded in 1792, between the British government in India and Mahomed Ali, known by the name of Lord Cornwallis's treaty. By this engagement the nabob was relieved from a large proportion of the burden of his payments, and his son, Omdut ul Omrah, was acknowledged as his successor. For this modification of our rights,—for this relief of the nabob,—what was our compensation? A recognized power of assuming the civil and military administration in time of war, which we had before really possessed, and actually exercised; a security supposed more efficient, for the regular and permanent discharge of the military subsidy; and a renewal, in more precise terms, of the article precluding all political correspondence between the nabobs of the Carnatic and foreign powers, without the knowledge of the British government.\* This treaty, exhibiting on our part nothing but consideration for the situation and feelings of the nabob, and giving us additional claims to his attachment and gratitude, was scarcely concluded, before it was badly violated, not in its letter merely, but in its vital spirit and fundamental principle. While it was yet actually negotiating, the nabob will be found to have commenced a correspondence, not with an allied or friendly power, but with Tippoo Sulthan, the sworn enemy of the British nation, with whom peace was only a preparation for war, and the undisguised purpose of whose hostility was the total extirpation of our name from the peninsula of India.—A prince, whose every act and thought bore testimony of irreconcilable hate; whose daily meditations and nightly dreams presented to him but one object, and that object the destruction of our empire.

\* Tenth article of the treaty of 1792.—The said nawab shall receive regular information of all negotiations which shall relate to declaring war or making peace, wherein the said Company may engage, and the interests of the Carnatic and its dependencies may be concerned; and the said nawab shall be considered as an ally of the said Company, in all treaties which shall in any respect affect the Carnatic, and countries adjoining thereto, or belonging to either of the contracting parties, contiguous thereto; and the said nawab agrees that he will not enter into any negotiation or political correspondence with any European or native power, without the consent of the said Company.



With this man did the nabobs, Wallah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah (both parties to the treaty of 1793), while the ink was yet wet with which they signed their engagements to be faithful to us; in contempt of that solemn tie—in defiance of every condition by which their power was enjoyed; with this man did they solicit communion and correspondence to his projects did they become accessaries, and for his successes did the aged Wallah Jah (as he tells us) weary heaven with petitions! Successes which could only be obtained by our loss, and triumphs which could arise only from our humiliations and defeats!

What rights such perfidy, when detected, confers, I shall discuss presently.—The first question is, Whether there is sufficient proof in the documents before the house to establish the charge?

I remember, Sir, a right hon. gentleman, (Mr. Sheridan) who formerly called our attention to the subject of the present discussion, and on whose powerful aid the hon. baronet has told us he places his chief reliance in this day's conflict, when addressing you on one of the preliminary discussions relative to the production of papers, implored the house to weigh well the delicacy of the situation in which it stood, in coming to the consideration of this transaction: Who, he asked, was the accuser?—The British government. Who the judge?—The British government. To whom accrued the benefit of the conviction?—The British government. This, Sir, is true; and I hope that, with these impressions, and with an honest wish to decide without prejudice, I entered upon the consideration of it. I know not what credit I may have with the hon. gentleman, when I declare the result of that consideration to have been, a conscientious conviction that the charge against the nabobs was substantiated. I do not mean that the evidence is such as the strict accuracy of a British court of justice might require; but that there arises from it that degree of presumption on which nations have universally acted, and on which nations must act, if they have any regard for their safety. There is reason for caution undoubtedly, but caution ought not to degenerate into timidity; and I own I should have little respect for that man, and think him little fitted for his situation, who, entrusted with the affairs of a great people, from apprehension of the clamour of misrepresentation and injustice he might eventually experience, could consent to sacrifice one atom of the interests he was delegated to preserve.

The evidence is of two kinds—partly to be found in the correspondence, and partly in the conduct, of the nabob. The first part I shall consider is the correspondence.

After the fall of Seringapatam, it is known that all the papers of the sultan fell into the hands of the British government. In these papers were discovered the various negotiations in which he had been engaged with different powers, and amongst them, a correspondence implicating the nabobs Wallah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah, carried on through the vakeels who attended the sons of Tippoo when hostages at Madras, for the performance of the conditions of peace in 1792.

\* Of the authenticity of these papers the hon. baronet has not ventured to express much doubt. In fact, Sir, they are so recognized by the evidence of the vakeels themselves, through whom the communications passed, that it is not necessary to rest on the circumstance of their transmission by the governor-general, whose authority, independent of

that circumstance, I would not condescend to balance against the supposition of the khans, that, it was possible, they might have been introduced among Tippoo's papers by enemies of the nabob Omdut ul Omrah.

Assuming, then, their authenticity, they prove, in the first instance, that a correspondence was carried on between Tippoo Sultaun and the nabob of the Carnatic, through a secret and unavowed channel.

Fully am I aware of the spirit of intrigue prevailing among the princes of India; and I admit that a correspondence, which, in Europe, would infer a violation of every tie of honour and good faith, may not, in the native courts, be always liable to such an imputation; but, to that I must answer, that the British government was known to act on other principles; that it was known to apprehend danger from such correspondence; that it had anxiously precluded them in two successive treaties; and that the nabobs had every reason to be sufficiently conscious of the interpretation we should put upon, and the indignation we should feel, at the discovery of such clandestine intercourse.

The first observation, then, that presents itself, is, that any correspondence between the parties in question was at least a ground of grave suspicion. Next, that a correspondence carried on in defiance of the warnings among out of the treaties, and with a certainty of the feelings that would be excited by the detection of it, could not be one of idle form or empty compliment; that it must have had distinct objects, and objects of an interest commensurate to the risk incurred; objects which demanded secrecy, and rendered the precautions resorted to not superfluous; that this correspondence must therefore have been of a nature not less important in itself than inconsistent with the relations of good faith, common interest, and friendly connection, in which the nabobs stood towards the British government. Such, I say, would be the inference, from the very existence of a secret correspondence between parties so circumstanced as the nabobs and Tippoo Sultaun. — The one, on the one hand, united to us by every tie that can be supposed binding on man; the other, instigated by the most inveterate hate, and in the very act of meditating, if not preparing, hostilities against us.

If this inference be a just one, the object of enquiry is, next, Whether there is any thing in the contents of the papers themselves to invalidate or destroy it; or whether they are not (as I think they will be found to be, when fairly examined) calculated to confirm and support it, — and when combined with subsequent events, to establish it beyond the possibility of refutation?

The hon. baronet has objected to these papers as being extracts. It is true, Sir, they are so; but that they are fairly taken — That they convey the real sense and purport of the letters from which they are drawn, is proved, by their having been exhibited to the very parties who wrote them, who, disposed, as they appear in the course of their examinations, to make the interpretations they give most favourable to the innocence of the nabobs, would undoubtedly have urged the objection, had they recollected or perceived the omission of any passages in the letters, likely to contradict the obvious tenor of the extracts produced.

To the general truth of what is related (though the expressions of personal regard may be, as indeed they are said to be, occasionally

heightened), the very situations in which the vakeels stood, bear, as well as their subsequent examinations, ample testimony. It is scarcely possible to imagine a statement, generally speaking, more to be relied on, than one made by ministers without any visible interest to deceive, intended for the guidance of their sovereign's conduct, and of a sovereign too of the character of the sultaun, whose vigilance would probably have detected, and whose arbitrary and cruel disposition would have led him to punish, any material deviation from the truth, with the last and most exemplary severity.

The general style of these papers is that of extravagant adulation towards the sultaun; and had they contained no more, I should have, in a great measure, agreed with the hon. baronet, that they would have been little entitled to our attention, as we all know, that in the inflated terms of Eastern correspondence, assurances of attachment and devotion mean frequently nothing beyond common compliment, or at most, general friendship and good will.

But to come to the papers themselves --- It is with regret I feel that the hon. baronet's speech has imposed upon me the necessity of entering into a detail that may be fatiguing to the house; but I can assure gentlemen that I shall detain them no longer than may be absolutely requisite to do justice to the cause I am supporting, and will call their attention to those points only which appear to me most important in directing our judgment, and which are generally confirmed by the concurring testimony of the witnesses examined at Vellore.

The first paper\* with which this singular correspondence commences, relates two separate conversations which appear to have taken place between the nabob Walah Jah and the vakeels of Tippoo, on the 1st and 12th of June, 1792. It should seem, that from the events that had taken place in the course of the last years, the nabob entertained some doubts of the manner in which his proposition might be received, and that some management was requisite in the introduction of it, he therefore begins by an address to the ruling passion of Tippoo's mind --- his bigotry and ambition to be universally considered as the chief pillar and champion of the Mahomedan faith. In this character the nabob directs his address to him, and follows up his expressions of attachment to the faith, and to him the protector of it, by representing as a confederacy formed for the subversion of religion, the war recently concluded; a war (if ever there was one), strictly just and defensive on our part, and deriving its origin from the unwarrantable aggressions of the enemy. Then, after adverting to the events of former hostility as past recals, the nabob declares his desire to establish a cordial harmony with the sultaun, and earnestly solicits the vakeels to forward his purpose, as pregnant with great and numberless benefits to both parties. Thus, sir, is laid the foundation of this extraordinary correspondence, an intercourse between the nabobs and the sultaun.

The subsequent conversation is said to have passed in the presence of Lord Cornwallis. His expressions of attachment to Tippoo --- his dislike of the war --- are both expressed indeed, but expressed in more guarded terms. The circumstance, however, to which I particularly wish to

\* Appendix, No. 1.

call your attention in the conversation, is this, that not one syllable is breathed which indicates the connection he had proposed in the former one. If, as it has been pretended, this was perfectly innocent — if he was acting only in conformity to the wishes of Lord Cornwallis, and this connection was held out merely to conciliate the sultana, without any serious intention attached to it, why this difference? why the suppression of all mention of *that* which, if known, could, on these suppositions, be known only to his advantage?

The next letter on which I wish to fix your attention appears marked No. 4. The contents of the intervening ones\* are confined to the sultana and his ministers: they relate to a writing and a couplet connected with a secret commission he had entrusted to them, and which is satisfactorily explained in the evidence: on them, therefore, I shall offer no comments, but shall come to No. 4. In this also a conversation is related between the nabob Wallah Juh and the vakeels, in which the former, after again connecting the sultana with the cause and maintenance of religion, and praying to God to preserve him victorious and triumphant, is represented as adverting to his former conversation, and the proposition he had offered, and enquiring if the vakeels had communicated it to the sultana, and had received a *favourable* answer. They replied, they had communicated it; and then proceeded to convey the answer with which they were charged, and which amounts to a ready acceptance of the proposition, on the ground of their friendship which ought to subsist amongst the professors of the Mahomedan faith.

It is at least manifest from this letter, that the nabob attached an interpretation not quite consistent with barren compliment, to the proposition which he had hazarded. Had he felt that it was in the common course of complimentary intercourse between princes; had he felt that in that light the sultana would have received and interpreted it, why this solicitude for an answer, which, in its nature, could be nothing but an echo of his own idle and empty compliment? The following letter still more confirms my inference, and shews that in the mind of Tippoo, no more than in that of the nabob, was the proposition in question considered as a mere unsubstantial illusion.

This is a letter† from Tippoo Sultana to his ministers, expressive of his sense of the friendship of the nabob, and the kindness shewn to his sons, with the strong intimation of his hope that the nabob would do whatever may tend to the support of the religion of Mahomed.

What precise expectation this is intended to convey is beyond my power to ascertain with distinctness; but the nature of the services looked for may be in some slight degree conjectured, as well from what is deemed generally necessary to the support of the cause of the Mahomedan faith, namely, the co-operation of all Mussulmans for the destruction of infidels, as from the known views and sentiments of the sultana, and the services we shall find hereafter to have been actually rendered to him by the *unquestionable fidelity* of this our ancient and trusty ally.

Notwithstanding the contempt with which the worthy baronet has affected to treat the correspondence generally, he has vouchsafed, not without reason, to honour the next paper with a considerable portion of

\* Appendix, No. 2 and 3.

† Ditto. No. 5.

his attention, and laboured, if not successfully, certainly zealously, to destroy the effect which such a paper cannot fail to produce.\* It professes to be the key to a cypher — it bears the strongest internal evidence of having been contrived for a correspondence embracing political subjects, and is authenticated by the signature of Omdut ul Omrah himself.

Ali Rheza Khan, one of the vakeels, gives you the history and intention of it. — He is asked if he ever saw the paper: he says, “I have — it was instituted by Wallah Jah for the purposes of secret communication, and the original, I believe, is written in pencil by Khader Nawaz, or some person about the nabob Wallah Jah.” He says afterwards, “To my knowledge it was never brought into use, it having been intended for use after the departure of the hostages, in case of necessity.” Again, “It was delivered to Gholaum Ali Khan by Khader Nawaz Khan, and to me at my departure (to Seringapatam) by Gholaum Ali Khan, who told me it had been composed for communication between Tippoo Sultan and the nabobs Wallah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah. That a copy should be given to Tippoo, and the original brought back to Madras. Tippoo Sultan, however, kept the original.”

No one will feel surprise that some pains should be taken to discredit and invalidate this fatal document; but till the ingenuity or eloquence of the hon. gentleman can erase the contents of it, till he can rail away the signature that authenticates it, or completely pervert the course of human understanding, here it remains, and will ever remain, an irrefragable testimony of the faithlessness and duplicity of which it was devised to be the instrument. We are told cyphers are common in India — it may be so; but to be used, I apprehend, as cyphers are habitually used in Europe, in confidential communications between a minister and his court; but this, I believe, is the first instance in the history of cyphers, in which one was ever devised to be the means of communication between two courts; if there ever was such an instance, I shall be most thankful to learn where it is to be discovered.

In his endeavours to throw discredit on this document, the hon. baronet has resorted to the observation of the key and the cypher being upon the same paper. The very mode, Sir, of its transmission, in the course of which it was to pass only through the most confidential hands, may sufficiently account for this circumstance. It is said, too, to be so awkward and ill-contrived, that it never could answer the purposes of secrecy. Be it so — be it as wanting in ingenuity as you will. What is its ingenuity to the purpose? Ingenious, or otherwise, it is still a cypher; and no cypher is instituted except with the intention of concealing what is supposed to require concealment. If we make this admission, (and how is it to be refused?) if we believe the account given by Ali Rheza Khan, which there is no reason to dispute, can we doubt that the correspondence, of which this cypher was the intended instrument, in case of necessity at a future time, was felt to be of a nature to involve matters to which concealment was essential; and to what correspondence such a concealment could be essential, except to one, repugnant to the existing engagements between the nabobs of the Carnatic

\* Appendix, No. 6.

and the British government, I own myself incapable of imagining, and must rely on those who support the Resolutions to explain.

Were the evidence drawn from written papers confined to this document, coupled with the details already adverted to, and combined with subsequent circumstances, I should think it far from inconsiderable. — We have the proposition on the part of the nabob — the acceptance on the part of Tippoo; and in consequence of the harmony, as it is called, so established, a cypher manifestly calculated for correspondence on political subjects, and avowedly devised to carry on the purposes of such correspondence, whenever the present channel of communication between the parties should cease to be open. To have thus conveyed to Tippoo, under every precaution of secrecy, the means of communication, means which anticipated all the chances of interruption with a providence and anxiety nothing but objects the most important could call forth, would, in itself, prove the eager solicitude of the nabob to maintain a connection with a prince, who, inexorably hostile towards the British power, not only habitually cherished, but at the very instant was meditating hostile projects against it. Had we no more than this, I say, it would warrant, not simply a suspicion of the most faithless designs, but would amount, if not to a literal infraction of the subsisting treaty, at least to a virtual violation of the vital spirit of it, and justify the adoption of measures for the protection of our rights and interests in the Carnatic, from the injury to which they might be exposed by the infidelity or treachery of our ally.

About this period it appears that Ali Rheza Khan made a journey to Seringapatam; it is mentioned in the next letter: \* the principal object of it is explained by the evidence as having been to impress with greater force upon the mind of the sultana, the representations of Lord Cornwallis, relative to the prisoners still detained, and the cruelty with which they were treated; the allusions in it are said to apply to Lord Cornwallis and Wallah Jah. On this letter I shall not detain you with any remark, beyond calling the attention of the house to the journey adverted to, and the period at which it took place. I proceed, then, to the two which follow.† They are from Tippoo to the nabobs Wallah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah: they contain little more than professions of regard, and merit observation only on account of the application of some of the designations in the cypher, as the *well-wisher of mankind* to the nabob Wallah Jah, the *distinguished in friendship* to Ali Rheza Khan. The second of these, however, from a supposed trivial mistake in the title of it, has been selected by the hon. baronet, and treated as a convicted fabrication. If, Sir, there is one letter more than another that bears internal evidence of its own authenticity, it is this: for in the whole collection there is scarcely one of so little importance. Had those who conducted the transaction in question been capable of condescending to any forgery as the means of warranting it; had they really introduced a fictitious letter into the correspondence, it is not, surely, presuming much to suppose, that they would have introduced one that might have borne strongly upon the point it was their natural object to establish, and from which powerful inferences might be deduced. But

\* Appendix, No. 7.

† Ditto, No. 8 and 9.

from this it would require more than human ingenuity to extract any thing of real importance. And if it be a fabrication, it is not only improbable in respect to the character, and unworthy of the ability of those to whom it must be attributed, but certainly the most gratuitous and unprofitable one that ever was committed.

The harmony and union being thus, Sir, established, the letter\* we now are to consider begins to display the fruits of it; to this I shall join No. 12, because the observations applicable to that immediately before me, are, in a great degree, applicable to both. They alike convey intelligence of considerable moment to the sultaun's interests, and advice for the regulation of his conduct as arising out of it. They alike expressly refer to the good understanding recently established, and may be not unfairly admitted as a proof of the nature of those services which the sultaun appears to have expected from the nabob, as tending to the support of the Mahomedan faith.

Before I proceed to the contents of these two letters, I beg to be allowed to put it to every man who hears me, with what impressions he would learn, that a person who had received the most substantial benefits from this country, who, maintained by its bounty, and existing but by its protection, after soliciting and establishing a secret intercourse with a foreign power, had been detected in conveying to it intelligence, and suggesting counsels for the government of its measures, at a period too, when, though nominally at peace, it was known not only to entertain the most inveterate enmity towards us, but was suspected of actually preparing to give effect to that enmity? Suppose, for instance, that one under these circumstances had been detected, at any time, in writing to the French, or any foreign government actuated by feelings similar to those of France, in terms of this kind:—"The conduct you are pursuing excites suspicion—be more cautious—this is not the moment to commence hostilities with any prospect of advantage. There is now a minister who enjoys the confidence of the country—who is capable of calling out all its resources, and directing them against you with energy and success—wait a little—symptoms of a change in our counsels manifest themselves, and there appears the chance of a successor the very reverse of the minister I have described: when this change takes place, you may prosecute your hostile purposes without apprehension!"—Or, imagine, Sir, the design of the hostile power to be the invasion of this kingdom, and the person I am supposing had written:—"Do not attempt to invade Great Britain. Here every man is devoted to the government of his country, and every arm will be raised to drive you from its shores;—here your attempt can only expose you to inevitable destruction: but there are other parts of the British empire more vulnerable, where you may possibly find less of union, or less preparation to resist your attacks; there direct your efforts; but, as you tender your hopes of success, or your escape from destruction, avoid an invasion of England!"—If, Sir, such counsels were detected, accompanied with every expression of attachment and devotion to that power and to its cause, I ask, what would be the impression on every unprejudiced mind? Could it be, that this was done in a spirit of loyalty and zeal for

the service of this country? — that, in one instance, it was to obviate the calamities of war — in the other, to avert the perils of invasion from the shores of England? Or, is there a man who would not feel that such counsel must be intended for the benefit of the adverse power, and that it spoke the language, as it betrayed the heart, of an enemy and a traitor?

Having made this observation, I beg the attention of the house to the letters in question. They relate two messages conveyed through Khader Navaz Khan, a person enjoying a great share of the confidence of the nabob of the Carnatic. Tippoo, as it seems, was endeavouring to excite and combine all the Indian powers against us; while in the prosecution of this object, the activity of his negotiations at Poonah alarmed the vigilance of the British resident, who immediately apprised the supreme government of his suspicions. — This comes to the knowledge of the nabob; and what is the conduct of our *faithful friend* on the occasion? He proceeds directly to communicate the intelligence he had received to the sultana, advising him, at the same time, in the spirit of that cordiality by which they were united — to do what? to lay aside, no doubt, his hostile designs, to cultivate friendship, and preserve peace with the British power? — No, no, quite the reverse: the advice of this our incomparable ally, is of a very different complexion (in conformity, no doubt, to the British interests, and the views of its government), it prudently suggests to the sultana the policy of *suspending his measures* till the approaching departure of Lord Cornwallis should leave the field open to him, to act with safety and effect; and then, whatever might be his *highest pleasure would be right and proper!* Such is the purport of the first message. The second † contains also similar information and counsel, relative to the situation of the French at Pondicherry. Nothing is now, says the nabob, to be expected; and, following the impulse of his friendship towards the sultana, he advises him, not as one should expect, to detach himself from his dangerous connection with the French, but to communicate with them less directly — to refrain, for the present, from open correspondence, and to confine his intercourse to verbal communication.\* To the nature of that intercourse we must, therefore, conclude the nabob to have been no stranger, and his suggestion the result only of his interest for its safe continuance, without interruption or observation from us; an intercourse doubtless most friendly to the British power! between parties such as Tippoo Sultana and the French, how could it be otherwise? — I shall conclude my remarks on these important documents, by observing, that the intelligence contained in them is, in both instances, referred to the amity and friendship established between the nabob and the sultana. Both instances prove the hostile designs then meditated by the latter; and that the nabob, neither ignorant of them, nor unsolicitous for their success, was prepared to avail himself of whatever means might be in his power, to promote and assist their accomplishment.

Though the obvious connection of the two letters † have just commented upon, led me for a moment to pass the one ‡ that intervenes, I cannot consent to leave it entirely unnoticed; containing, as it does, a

\* Appendix. No. 10.

† Ditto, No. 11.

‡ Ditto. No. 11.



message from Omdut ul Omrah, in his own name, expressive of the most fervent attachment to the sultann, followed by a promise, that, please God, at a proper time, *his fidelity should be manifest*. I notice it, first, because it shews how cordially Omdut ul Omrah acted, not merely as the minister of his father, but as a substantial party in this negotiation; and still more, because, in this promise so given, will be found the key to his subsequent conduct: it will hereafter be seen, when the occasion did occur, how he remembered the pledge he had given, and redeemed it with but too faithful punctuality.

The secrecy that is one of the striking characters of the whole transaction, now increases in an extraordinary degree. New precautions are devised; and the interviews with the vakeels (which had never been hitherto subject to any restriction) are covered by fictitious pretences, totally foreign to their real object.

The letter I next refer\* to, relates a meeting to which the vakeels were invited, under pretence of seeing a mosque, but for the real purpose of learning something of a secret nature, which the nabob Wallah Jah had long felt a wish to convey to them; the interview takes place in a tomb near the mosque, and a question is put to them by Omdut ul Omrah, whether they had full powers? Being satisfied on that head, he proceeds to deliver to them a message in the name of Wallah Jah: "That for a long time there had been, without a cause, a veil (or want of cordiality) between his highness and your majesty, which had been productive of injuries to both; but now that, by the favour of God, a system of harmony, such as is becoming among the professors of Islamism, had taken place, his highness confidently hoped from God, the prime cause of all, that the time past might be amply redeemed; that for his highness' own part, considering from his heart, himself, his country, and his property, to belong to your majesty, he had made it a testamentary injunction to his children and family, taking God and his Holy Prophet to witness, to pray night and day for the pillar of faith (that is to say), your majesty, and to consider their prosperity and welfare as inseparably connected with your majesty; that we must ascertain your majesty's wishes on this head, in a manner satisfactory to both; and if your majesty should be, from your heart, solicitous of this proposed cordial harmony, his highness would, under the testimony of God and his prophet, detail to us his sentiments fully at the time of our departure, which, please God, would soon take place."

Without adverting to the marriage, which is said to have made at this meeting the subject of a separate conversation with Gholaum Ali, I must remark that, either there is a strange confusion in this message, or the words friendship, harmony, &c. must be understood in more than one meaning. The nabob first talks of harmony being established, and then desires them to ascertain if Tippoo is really desirous of the proposed cordial harmony: they either mean different things, and more is contained in the latter words than at first appears, or the passage is nonsense. Why, we are tempted to ask, is there any anxiety about full power? All that was proposed, in its simple and obvious sense, had been, I imagine, both proposed and cordially accepted. To desire the

\* Appendix, No. 13.

vakeels, then, to ascertain the sultaun's disposition on this point, appears absolutely absurd, and we have no other way of extricating ourselves from the difficulty, but by concluding, that under the words "cordial harmony," was veiled some new and distinct proposition, comprehended by the vakeels and the nabob, and involving in it what was far beyond any common meaning, conveyed by the expressions in which it was couched; as well as beyond that union said to have been already established between the nabob and the sultaun. It could not be the marriage, because Omdut ul Omrah appears to be a party in it; and it is only in the succeeding letter we find he had been induced to take any share, or interest himself in the negociation relating to the marriage.

The following letter\* describes also a similar meeting in a garden, under an equally fictitious pretext, with this difference, that it was solicited on the part of the vakeels. Omdut ul Omrah is there stated to have conjured them not to commit to writing some expressions he used, saying, that he so expressed himself *out of regard to the faith, and his friendship towards the protector of it*. In the last paragraph of this letter it is mentioned, that they had induced Omdut ul Omrah to lay the foundation of the connection by marriage. To those who refer to this letter it will be clear, from the manner in which the marriage is mentioned, that whatever was conveyed under the mysterious expressions that were not to be committed to writing, it had no reference or connection with the marriage. The marriage, if at all a subject of negotiation, was entrusted exclusively to Gholam Ali Khan. It is stated that a negociation for marriage is a matter of much delicacy among the Mahomedans, the nabob, therefore, would, certainly not propose to treat on it with both the vakeels jointly. It appears, besides, that separate conversations took place between Omdut ul Omrah and Gholam Ali Khan, at each of these meetings, said to be in relation to that subject; but we learn from the evidence of Gholam Ali Khan, that what they were conjured not to commit to writing, was communicated to both. The short extract from a letter† of the sultaun, too, is a confirmation of this argument, and seems to leave no question of the marriage and the subject of these confidential expressions to be totally distinct. He directs them to inform him of the expressions of Omdut ul Omrah, and the *thing you know of*, which is explained by the evidence always to mean the marriage. What then was the purport of these expressions? Ali Rheza says, it was confined to professions of attachment, and to information relative to the French. Now, Sir, it cannot be forgotten, that both these had been long before communicated and written, and could not, therefore, require that solemn injunction of secrecy that was imposed. We are thus reduced, I say, to the necessity of doing one of two things — either totally withdrawing our belief from Ali Rheza Khan's account of what passed; or, in admitting the truth of it, to admit, that under the words, friendship, attachment, and regard, was veiled a sense little corresponding, in point of comprehension and effect, to that in which they are usually accepted.

The ceremony which is related in the ensuing letter,‡ as having taken place under the immediate directions of the sultaun, in the Jauman

\* Appendix, No. 14.

† Ditto, No. 15.

‡ Ditto, No. 16.

mosque, does not immediately involve either Wallah Jah or Omdut ul Omrah, as the younger branches of the family appear to have been alone present. The remark, therefore, that I wish to offer on this document, relates rather to the sultaun — The probability of his anxiety to connect himself with the nabob, and the prevailing purpose in his mind, of the connection he desired. It has been held out that the sultaun was indifferent to the pretended advances of the nabobs; and it has been asked, what benefit could he possibly hope from such a connection? Why should he be solicitous to contract ties with persons so little likely to assist him as the princes of the Carnatic?—The question is not so easily answered by the evidence of Ali Rheza Khan. He has shown that it was the sultaun's object to unite all Mussulmans for the purpose of extirpating the English. It appears, too, that though a sermon of civility on this occasion was administered to the subjects of Tippoos, yet that an exhortation was addressed to all who were present, the intention of it was to attach the Mussulmans to the sultaun, and to exhort them for adhering to those of a different persuasion. Let us suppose, if the sultaun did entertain the object thus ascribed to him, that he which is beyond dispute; if he condescended, as stated in this letter, to appeal to the lowest of our subjects, with the view of subverting their allegiance, and of attaching them to his cause, must it not be evident that he would be most anxious to win over, by every means in his power, not only a most considerable member of Islamism, but a prince whose influence extended over those very people, whom he had thus shown his desire to enlist under his standard, and who possessed such means for aiding him in the prosecution of the object nearest to his heart? Is it credible, then, that he would have slighted such a prince, and neglected the proffered advantages of his friendship and assistance?

The delivery of the hostages, and the return of the vakeels to their master, took place in the interim between the date of this letter and that of the one \* which follows; a letter, in some points of view, of considerable importance. It is addressed to Gholaum Ali, under the fictitious signature of Gholaum Hussein, but written in the hand of Omdut ul Omrah. The difficulty and danger of communication sufficiently accounts for the purport of it being so little detailed; but those who have attended to the preceding letters, will easily trace in it a continuation of the former expressions of attachment, founded on the same basis, the maintenance of the Mahomedan faith, so well adapted, and so conciliating to the spirit to which they were addressed. — Repeat this complet, he says, on my part, to the sultaun:

*In the preservation of thy person is the perpetual permanence of the faith.  
Let him not remain who wisheth not thy preservation.*

How unlike is this to the coldness of the avowed letter of form, written on the same occasion, namely, the marriages of two of the sons of Tippoos, and transmitted through the British government. "I have received," says the nabob, "your letter, informing me of the celebration of the weddings of Abdul Khaleh and Mohammed Moiz ud Deen, together with a dress and jewels, and I am made happy beyond measure by this agreeable intelligence — may the Almighty render this event

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"happy." How impossible is it not to be struck with the marked difference of the sentiment of the couplet from the style of the letter I have just read—and why this difference?—Why? but that one is intended to convey what the other is intended to conceal.

In the year 1795, the nabob Wallah Jah died, and Omdut ul Omrah succeeded to the musnud. An embassy, charged with the compliments usual on such occasions, was sent by the sultan; the letters, \* No. 18 and 19, are from the ambassadors; but there is nothing related, except one long conversation about union and friendship, on which his highness is said to have expatiated with great warmth. It is, indeed, stated, that the vakeels employed on this occasion were not persons to whom a negotiation of much delicacy was likely to be entrusted:—at the same time, we must observe, that the following letter from Omdut ul Omrah makes a reference to his communications with them, as if something had passed connected with the former intercourse. This letter is, † like the other, marked with the fictitious name of Gholaum Hussein, and addressed to Gholaum Ali. The introduction of it is material only on account of the reference I have stated, and as it carries on the existence of the correspondence to so late a period preceding the Mysore war.

The impression of the nature of that reference is forcibly confirmed by the subsequent letter from Khader Nawaz Khan, the confidential minister before alluded to, whose name appears more than once as the channel of communication between the nabobs and the vakeels. Advancing in this to his previous services, he congratulates himself, and thanks the Almighty, that the system of harmony and union between *the two chosen of the Lord* (meaning Tippoo Sultan and Omdut ul Omrah), calculated to promote the happiness of God's people, and which his labours had been employed in establishing, had acquired the requisite degree of stability and firmness. The authenticity of this letter is fully supported by the oral testimony; nor is there any thing that has a tendency to invalidate the obvious inference resulting from it. It stands, then, as a convincing testimony, that whatever that mysterious and enigmatical connection, established under the name of union and harmony, really was, it was in force and operation up to the year 1797; that the same sentiments which impelled Omdut ul Omrah to participate in, and conduct the intercourse during the life-time of his father; the same supposed interests—the same attachment to the cause of the sultan that had previously governed and animated his exertions, accompanied him, undiminished, to the throne, where he waited only for an opportunity favourable to his friendship, and an emergency, in which the fidelity he had solemnly promised could be manifested with effect.

Though many additional remarks on the contents of the several papers of the correspondence obviously present themselves, I will not further exhaust the patience of the house by continuing them; and in here concluding this part of the subject, I only regret that a sense of justice to the question before us should have made me feel it a duty to dwell on it so much at length. But, Sir, on the degree of conviction resulting from these documents, much must depend. The inferences I have

\* Appendix, No. 18 and 19.

† Ditto, No. 20

; Ditto, No. 21.

deduced, the conclusions I have drawn, the impressions I have endeavoured to enforce, I must leave to the judgment of the house. I can only say, that to mine they are decisive; and that each suspicion the existence of such a correspondence excites, appears to me to derive validity and confirmation from every step we advance in examining its contents. All the facts they discover are so far from being weakened by the oral evidence (if, indeed, such evidence could weaken the authority of any written documents), that they are more distinctly corroborated and established. Without troubling you by dwelling particularly on the evidence taken at Vellore, but leaving it to those observations which must strike any mind from the most cursory attention to it, allowing also to the witnesses whatever credit can be claimed for them (and some credit, I admit, must undoubtedly be given), there is still nothing of moment that can be collected from them, that either in fact, or by inference, goes to refute or weaken any material part. By what has been stated from the papers, as well as by the concurring testimony of the vakeels, it is proved, that a correspondence embracing political objects *was* carried on; that a connection, under the mysterious and indefinite terms of union and harmony, was proposed on the part of the nabobs of the Carnatic, and accepted by Tippoo Sultaun; that for the purpose of continuing their correspondence, when the departure of the hostages should remove the existing channel of it, a cypher was instituted, that in prosecution of this connection, assurances of fidelity had been given to Tippoo, and intelligence conveyed to him, accompanied with advice for the regulation of his conduct; that in these transactions the utmost precautions of secrecy had been deemed necessary, and the interviews held with the vakeels had been covered with fictitious pretences; and, lastly, that the connection, whatever it *precisely* was (for of its nature little doubt can be entertained), actually subsisted in full force, integrity, and operation, in the year 1797.

It has been endeavoured to defend this correspondence, and to rescue it from the impressions it is obviously calculated to produce, by an explanation resting in part on a connection of simple friendship, and in part on an alliance by marriage, at one time in agitation between the families of the sultaun and of the nabob Wallah Jah. On the fullest consideration of this explanation, I own I have found myself unable to accede to it: the difficulties it presents appear to me insurmountable. If it be possible to suppose a desire of mere friendship, without an object, between persons so situated in relation to each other; if Tippoo Sultaun and Wallah Jah were likely to feel the influence of a pure, disinterested, sentimental attachment; it is yet hardly probable, that a connection, on this ground, should have been solicited with so much earnestness and anxiety, as is manifested by the nabob in the first proposition of it, or an intercourse entered into by him at such mighty risks; nor is so innocent a view of the subject quite consistent with the secret meetings, the various precautions for concealment, the intelligence conveyed, and, above all, with the preparation and transmission of the cypher before adverted to. If, indeed, it is that union and friendship, which, as it is said, ought to bind together the Mussulman powers, if it meant to describe alliance and co-operation, mutual support, and inexpiable hostility against those of a different persuasion,—

It may be nearer the fact, and remove these inconsistencies I have stated; but if it does so remove them, it demonstrates, by their removal, the establishment of that sort of connection, which, no one can deny, was essentially repugnant to the spirit and sense of every engagement under which the nabob stood, and directly subversive of the interests and safety of the British empire in India.

But then there is the marriage! On the discordant accounts of the origin of that affair, as stated by the vakeels, I shall say nothing. I will admit that a marriage might be in agitation; but a marriage, if it be allowed to have made any part, on their own shewing, can account for a very small part only of the communications that are related. It confessedly did not come into question till after the return of Ali Rheza from Seringapatam; but before he went there, it must be remembered that this union of harmony and friendship between the sultan and the nabob, had been proposed, accepted, and established; and, for the purpose of continuing it, a cypher had been already transmitted, of which Ali Rheza Khan was actually the bearer. In addition to this, Sir, as the friendship and harmony commenced before the marriage was agitated, so it continued long after a connection of that kind had ceased to be thought of. Moez ud Deen was the only son of Tippoo, whose alliance was supposed ever to have been the object of a negotiation of marriage. The marriages of this prince, however, and his brother, Abdul Khaleh, are recorded to have taken place in the year 1794, at which time we find ceremonial letters from the nabob were conveyed to Tippoo, congratulating him on the event. From that moment, then, all idea of alliance by marriage between the families must have vanished; but it appears from the letter of Khader Nawaz Khan, the confidential minister of the nabob, that the other connection, which had been established, was still carried on, and possessed, as late as the year 1797, what he called, the *requisite stability*. I need not say more to make it evident, than that neither the marriage on the one hand, nor simple friendship on the other, is sufficient to explain the species of connection thus established, to reconcile the difficulties, or to dissipate the suspicion and the obscurity in which it is involved.

It is affirmed by the Khans,\* and also in Ali Hussein's letter to his agents, that no correspondence was carried on by the nabobs, contrary to their engagements: if a direct correspondence with Tippoo is meant, it may be literally true, and consistent with these papers, for they may be considered as an indirect, and not a direct, correspondence. But so despicable a subterfuge is not worth dwelling upon, or exposing. It is said, too, that all that was done, was done in conformity with the wishes of Lord Cornwallis, who was desirous of preserving peace and conciliating, if possible, the irritated and vindictive feelings of the sultan. That this correspondence should have been carried on with any knowledge or approbation of the governor-general, I venture to pronounce absolutely impossible. Whatever the policy or wishes of Lord Cornwallis might be with respect to Tippoo Sultan, that he should encourage a separate correspondence between this prince and the nabob, at the very time he was changing the expe-

\* Appointed by Omdut ul Omrah ministers to Ali Hussein.

sions of the former treaty of 1787, for the very purpose of more completely and effectually precluding any such intercourse, is, I say, absolutely impossible in itself, as it is inconsistent with the counsel conveyed to the sultaun, in one of the letters above referred to, to pause in the prosecution of his hostile measures till the departure of Lord Cornwallis to Europe. But, Sir, had the nabob felt this to be the case, had he felt that he was acting in support of British views, — in alliance with British interests, why all this mystery? Why all these multiplied precautions to avoid detection? Why the cypher? Why the meetings under fictitious pretences? Why the hazards incident to all these proceedings? Why disguise *that* which, if known, would have been praiseworthy — which breathed nothing but firm attachment, loyalty, and affection to the British power, and zeal for its service, under the mask of deceit, perfidy, and breach of faith? — Is it, then, too much to assume that this could not be? that instead of holding a conduct so repugnant to common sense, and disgraceful to a rational being, the nabob *did* feel that his objects were of a nature to require concealment; that, if detected, they would have excited the utmost jealousy and indignation of the British government; that they would have brought his state and situation into jeopardy; and that they were, therefore, of a nature subversive of his alliance, and in violation of every obligation towards that power which had raised, supported, and protected him. Admit this supposition, and every difficulty disappears, every contradiction vanishes. — all is plain, simple, rational, and consistent. With this is consistent the anxiety with which a connection with the sultaun was desired and solicited. — With this, all the ardent professions of zeal for the support of the faith — With this, the undisguised reprobation of the war and our allies — With this, the intelligence conveyed, and the advice that accompanied it — With this, the assignations under feigned pretences, and the solemn adjuration to secrecy — With this are consistent the prayers of Wallah Jah for the triumphs of Tippoo, and with this, the assurances of his son and successor, that when the occasion should arrive, his fidelity to him should be manifested; and, with this is consistent all the subsequent conduct of Omdut ul Omrah, when, in the course of the Mysore war, in his contemplation, the anticipated occasion *did* arrive; when the exigencies of our situation, when the success of the contest, and the safety of our empire, demanded every exertion, and every proof of his zeal and attachment! At that moment of pressure did he withhold his resources; at that moment did his officers impede the supplies of the army, in some cases resorting even to force to obstruct their passage; and at that moment did they create every embarrassment, and oppose every obstacle within the extent of their power, to the progress of our arms. In short, Sir, such was the conduct we experienced from this *faithful and devoted friend*, that, during the existence of hostilities, and long previous to the discovery at Seringapatam, the governor-general, as it appears, not only entertained suspicion, but repeatedly and pointedly declared, that the perverseness and disaffection displayed by the nabob, was reconcileable to nothing but a connection, or secret understanding, with the enemy.

It has been asked what interest the nabob could have in such a conduct? I do not feel, Sir, that to infer the reality of the conduct, I *am*

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Obliged to assign to it an object of sound and rational policy. It is too much to presume, after all that the times in which we live have exhibited, that projects may not be formed, and designs pursued, that are not warranted by a true and enlightened wisdom. But if the policy of the nabob was not to aid the efforts of the sultaun; if, on the contrary we admit what is stated, that he had little to hope, every thing to fear from their success, it must follow, that it was his real interest faithfully to adhere to our cause, and to contribute, to the utmost of his means in promoting and facilitating the triumph of our arms. That he did the very reverse, is incontestably proved; and, if in so acting, swayed by any imaginary interest, he trampled on every principle of true policy and duty, by which he ought to have been governed, may we not presume that, swayed also by the same supposed interest, he may equally have carried on a correspondence, and formed a connection, at once hostile to his real welfare, to the faith of his engagements, and to the cause he was bound by every tie to make his own.

What beyond a general and mutual aid, as occasions might offer were the precise expectations of Tippoo on the one hand, and of the nabob on the other, I will not detain you by an attempt to explain; or that the question does not turn,—and I venture to call, with some degree of confidence, upon the house, to consider well the case laid before them, and, after adverting to the relative situations of Tippoo Sultaun and the nabobs of the Carnatic, one actually preparing war against us the other our most intimate ally; looking at the correspondence itself confirmed as it is by the oral testimony, in all its facts, with all the precautions for concealment that pervade and characterize it; recollecting the solemn pledge of the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, and the manner in which, when the occasion was presented by the exigences of a war in which we were called on to defend the existence of our empire in India that pledge was afterwards redeemed. Let any man, I say, consider these things, and pronounce, if he can, in the face of God and his country, a conscientious belief, that the nabobs of the Carnatic were faithful to our cause, the duties of alliance, and their own engagement—that the charge against them is without foundation—that the treatie by which they were bound were *not* violated—that a correspondence of a political nature was not carried on, and a conduct resulting from it pursued, hostile to the just rights, and affecting the security of the British empire in India.

If, Sir, the conclusion I feel it my duty to draw, and, as it appears to my apprehension, the only just one that can be drawn from all that has been stated, is the direct reverse of this.—The rights accruing from it to the British government, become the next subject of enquiry and consideration.

The situation of the nabob may be considered in two points of view one with reference to the original dependency of his station, under the Mogul constitution, and the opinion that, in releasing him from his allegiance to his natural superior, we only transferred that allegiance to ourselves, as well as with reference to the revertible condition on which he received the Dewannee, and the state of practical subjection in which he stood controlled in his foreign relations, and indebted to us, both for



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the external defence, and internal security, of all he enjoyed — regarding him, in a word, as a mere feudatory of the British power.

In the other point of view, he may be considered as relying, indeed, upon us for his safety and protection, but possessing, nevertheless, the rights of an independent prince; rights deduced from the circumstance of the condition of his engagements which have been alluded to, having been, on his part, repeatedly infringed, and that infringement never having on ours, been made a pretence for resuming what our friendship had conferred on him — from repeated treaties having been concluded with him, both subsequent to, and in contemplation of, these very breaches of engagement, and his having on these occasions, both treated, and been treated with, in the character of an independent prince. Thus it may be said, as far as related to us, though maintained by the power and protection of our government, he was invested with all the political and personal rights incident to real sovereignty and independence.

To this latter opinion I own myself inclined to accede, but I cannot admit that the treaty of 1763, alluded to in the Resolutions, has any bearing or effect on this question. The article in that treaty which alone mentions the nabob, was introduced for the sole purpose of terminating the disputed claims of Salabat Jung, and Mahomed Ali, in support of which respectively, France and England had carried on the war in the peninsula of India. They therefore joined in recognizing, as far as *they* were concerned, the former as soubah of the Deccan, the latter as nabob of Arcot. What the powers and privileges of each were in their several situations, was a point left wholly untouched, and to be determined by the laws and usages of the Mogul empire.

The character, then, in which I am willing to consider the nabob, is that of an independent prince under the protection of the British power; nor have I a wish to insist on any right, or to appeal to any law in favour of what has been done by our Indian government, which might not be equally appealed to, and insisted upon, towards a prince who was exempted from all reliance on our friendship, either for his defence or security. All I ask, in return for this admission, is, that he may be considered in one only of these capacities, and that it may not be contended that he was at once entitled to the rights of a subject, and to the immunities of a sovereign.

It is superfluous to argue that the nabob Omdut ul Omrah was in conjunction with his father, a party to the treaty of 1792, not merely as his future successor, recognized in that treaty, but individually in his own name and person. He was, therefore, from the period of its conclusion, bound to the observance of all its stipulations; and had, in the same degree with his father, conveyed to us what is called a *perfect right* to the benefits they conferred. If, therefore, the obligation contracted was not fulfilled in both according to its tenor, we acquired, with respect to both, I apprehend, the right of enforcing it, if it was desirable it should be enforced; of compelling reparation for the violation of it, if reparation was deemed beneficial; or of avoiding the treaty altogether, if that should be most consistent with our views of expediency.

I trust, Sir, I cannot be so much misconceived as to be supposed to contend, that every little failure in fulfilling the strict letter of a treaty, is to be a ground for resorting to the exercise of these rights — far

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from it. In my conception, the infringement must be not of the letter only, but of the spirit and intent of the engagement, that, too, in points not trivial, but essential and important. Such are the points that present themselves in the grant of assignments, confessedly made, although expressly prohibited, which involved both the violation of the treaty, and the destruction of the resources on which we depended: and also, in carrying on political correspondence with a foreign power, even destitute of any special aggravations. From infractions of this kind, there is no doubt, we should have derived a clear right to demand present reparation, and future security; and from the refusal of these demands, an unquestionable right of war would have accrued. Were it requisite, it would not, perhaps, be a difficult task to prove, that, under all the circumstances of the case, what we have actually obtained in the Carnatic, does not exceed the bounds of this necessary security; but this discussion would here be mere waste of time. I have adverted to it only to mark that even the accumulated injuries we suffered, have not carried us materially beyond what the infraction of the nabob's engagements, without the aggravation, might have well warranted.

If it is not such infractions alone, but if, in addition to such infractions of the subsisting treaty, there be shewn an association with a prince not simply unfriendly in his character, and opposite in his interests, but in the actual preparation of war, the object of which was our utter extirpation; if it be shewn that this association betrayed itself, not only while war was in contemplation, but continued and operated, during the whole course of the hostilities that ensued; no one, I apprehend, will contend, that from the instant such an association existed, the respective parties did not assume the position of enemies, and that all the rights which a state of war can convey, did not accrue to the injured power; rights co-extensive with the demands of permanent and effectual security, and limited only by the great principles of humanity and justice.

The sudden irruption of the king of Prussia into Saxony, in the year 1756, in the midst of apparently profound peace, is a fact with which every one must be acquainted. What was his defence? he had reason to believe that Saxony participated with other powers in a confederacy for his destruction, and that this gave him the right of immediate war. On this right he acted; and though there were circumstances in the manner in which he conducted his measures, that excited clamour against him at the time, there is no man at this day, I believe, who does not admit, that the act of carrying war into Saxony was fully justified. Such, then, is the right towards a power wholly independent. What is the difference in respect to a dependant and protected one? It is this—that in the case of an independent power, our rights can only be realised through the medium of successful war;—in that of a protected one, we are already in a situation in which successful war would place us; but it will not be, therefore, contended that our rights are less,—it will not be contended that what, consistently with every law, may be justly pursued through all the hazards and calamities of war, we are forbid to attempt when those calamities are dissociated from the acquisition of it—that, the measures which it is our unquestionable right to take against a foreign foe, we may not, legitimately, resort to,

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against a traitor in our very bosom : the rights are the same, though the means of them are widely different.

If these principles are just, let them be applied to the case before us ; and if gentlemen agree with me, in the conviction that the documents adduced, combined with subsequent circumstances, clearly prove a connection to have been established, on the part of the nabobs, with Tippoo Sultan, at the very time he was meditating hostilities against us ; and that, in prosecution of the purposes of this connection, he was not only furnished with intelligence and advice, but, during the contest in which our very existence was involved, Omdut ul Omrah adhered to his cause, and aided him to the extent of his power, by treacherously obstructing our supplies, and embarrassing the progress of our arms, they must feel also with me, that every engagement between us and Ali was abrogated ; and so abrogated as, at the same time, to constitute that case of injury, from which, according to the usages of nations, the rights of war legitimately result.

Had the detection of this correspondence occurred previous to the fall of Seringapatam ; had we, during the actual existence of hostilities, discovered the course of infidelity by which the nabob was betraying our cause, and counteracting our measures ; had we at once, in the moment of indignation, repaid his ingratitude and perfidy, by driving him from the throne, and assuming his country, where is the man that could have hesitated upon the justice of the act ? But, Sir, neither did the discovery take place under these circumstances, nor, when it did take place, did the governor-general so act upon it ; on the contrary, a period of time was suffered to elapse before he availed himself of any of the rights with which the disaffection of the nabobs had invested him. And this is supposed to create a new and different case ! What real difference can be found in it is beyond my comprehension — but so it is contended ; and being contended, I cannot pass it by without notice. — The right of war is one thing, and the exercise of that right is another ; the principle of the first is justice, of the latter expediency. Every one can figure to himself situations in which a nation may stand, where rights of war, the most clear and incontrovertible, cannot be acted upon without the greatest hazard ; and where the sense of the deepest injuries must be (as it often is), for the time, suppressed or dissembled ; but are all the rights arising out of such injuries thus destroyed : or will it be asserted, that, in the event of a country possessing rights, unquestionably just, it can be placed in this dilemma, that it must either consent to abandon them entirely, or immediately to act upon them, at the imminent risk of its own destruction ? Is it possible this can be so ? and if not, the exercise of the right of war necessarily resolves itself into a question of pure expediency, which the circumstances of each individual case must govern. At the same time I am far from saying, that these rights are such as may be laid aside, and stored up for ages, to be resumed at any period that ambition or interest may dictate ; if acted upon, they must be acted upon within certain restrictions, and free from the intervention of any acts of confidence and friendship which imply the relinquishment of every hostile intention. Mere delay, within given limits, cannot, I apprehend, be assumed as a ground on which

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alone to presume such a relinquishment; and what besides took place that could rationally afford the nabob grounds for a presumption, that the guilt of which he was conscious, and which he had reason to believe detected, would not be acted upon, I do not know. If any acts from whence such an inference could be drawn, did occur, I must confess my ignorance of them. The causes of the delay appear in the documents before you—they are to be found in the critical state of important negotiations with other powers,—the condition of the neighbouring provinces, in which rebellion was raging,—the desire the governor-general naturally felt to investigate fully the particulars of the case,—and to receive an intimation, at least, of the feelings of those to whom he was responsible, before he proceeded to take the measures which the situation of the country, and the permanent safety of the interests it was his duty to guard, obviously demanded. These, Sir, were the considerations which, for a time, suspended the exercise of our rights; considerations which must, to every unbiassed mind (if the exercise be as I have stated a question of expediency), satisfactorily warrant the delay, without invalidating the right, and justify the final orders when given, issued from Omdut ul Omrah the security we ultimately obtained for the security, it is said, however, was not, in point of fact, demanded from Omdut ul Omrah, but from his unoffending successor. Why was it not? At the moment when the order arrived, the nabob, who had been long in a state of declining health, appeared to be fast approaching his final dissolution. Insensible and obdurate, indeed, must be the heart that could not sympathise in the last hours of human existence. No such an one was that of Lord Clive. He did feel all the compassion the situation of the nabob was calculated to inspire. He respected the inviolable privileges of a death-bed; and Omdut ul Omrah was permitted to close his eyes in peace, neither molested by accusation, nor disquieted by the consequences of his perfidy and ingratitude. Can it be argued that rights so suspended were thereby extinguished? Was the conduct of a prince merely personal, this might be true,—and on this ground, I presume, it is stated, most unjustly stated, that the British government punished the innocent for the guilty.—I deny that punishment in any respect, however flagrantly provoked, was the object of the British government: its object, its sole object, was security for its own legitimate rights; security which the violation of those rights, and the perfidious and hostile conduct of the nabobs, had imposed on us the duty of enforcing, and the claim to which, according to the best principles of public law, applied as strongly to him who inherited, as to his guilty and faithless predecessor. “It is one of the first principles,” says a distinguished authority on these subjects, “a general equity laid down by the writers on that law, that, an heir or successor, from the very circumstance of his possessing the inheritance, is not only bound for the engagements of the person whom he succeeds but cannot be discharged from the obligation to repair the damage which he deceased may have occasioned by his crimes or offences; neither under the pretext that he derives no benefit from these crimes or offences, *because there may have been no accusation or condemnation against the deceased.*” \* It is a doctrine, as new, as contrary to reason, that th

\* Domat's Compendium of Civil and Public Law.

conduct of princes by whom states and nations are represented, should be considered as the acts of individuals, and perishing with them. As well might it be contended that the enmity and aggressions of Tippoo Sultaun were obliterated when he fell upon the walls of Seringapatam, and all our claims to reparation buried in his tomb; that nothing remained for us to do but to place his innocent son upon the vacant throne, with the undiminished power and dominion of his father! If the principle applies to one case, it applies to the other. Our rights were the same in both: in the one, indeed, we were obliged to establish them by successful war; in the other, we had happily the power of securing them without a similar struggle.

The proposition offered to Ali Hussein has been adduced in confirmation of this principle, and as an acknowledgment, on our part, of the right that devolved to him. A right to what? I do not enter into the question of his legitimacy—I am ready to allow him to be the legal heir of the late nabob Omdut ul Omrah. And what then? he could possess no further right by inheritance than that of assuming the situation his deceased father possessed, rendered subject, by the conduct of that father, to the claim of whatever might be necessary to the effectual security of the British interests. The very proposition made to him, expressly included the condition of his accession to this claim—the place in which he naturally stood—the wish on the part of the governor-general to accomplish this object by the forms of treaty, rather than by an immediate and painful exercise of our just rights, designated him as the person to whom, if any proposition whatever was thought expedient, it should be made in the first instance. But that proposition, dictated as it was by a generous impulse of humanity alone, when refused and rejected, could not have the effect of limiting those rights, which, if they exist at all, are as extensive as the interests they are intended to protect. In fact, Sir, if the conduct of the nabobs was such as to place them in the situation of public enemies; if the rights of war, as it has been contended, justly attached upon them, every hereditary claim was extinguished, and the whole state was submitted to whatever disposition the security of our interests, and the prosperity of the country, might prescribe.

The principle of humanity, and consideration for the family of Arcot, which dictated the offer to Ali Hussein, presided also over the disposition that was finally made, and limited it to the necessary objects that were to be attained and secured. What but this, and the recollection of our alliance with the nabobs of the Carnatic, subsisting almost from the first dawn of our political power in the peninsula?—What but the reluctance to expose to disgrace and humiliation those whom we had adopted as the partners of our fortune, and raised to sovereign dominion?—What but the generosity characteristic of the British nation, could have led us to forget that from the nabobs we had experienced little but faithlessness and ingratitude, and the people committed to their rule, nothing but misery and oppression?—What but these sentiments could have stifled our just resentments, under the accumulated injuries we had sustained, and produced the efforts that were made by our government, to obtain by friendly negotiation, what, as a right, it might have at once confidently assumed? What but these, to continue to their families, as

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We have done, the enjoyment of all the affluence, dignity, and splendor, which belonged to their station, and to which they had ever been accustomed?

On the next point, relating to the manner in which our rights were exercised, and the duty of exercising them to the extent we did, I am happy to think that little doubt can be entertained; indeed, I shall be surprised if, in any part of this discussion, it should be contended, or at least contended by one acquainted with the state of the Carnatic, that any thing short of the transfer of the whole civil and military administration of the country to the British government, was capable of providing effectually for the rights we were bound to maintain, and for the prosperity of the long oppressed inhabitants of a country, which it now became equally our duty to watch over and protect. Though I do not admit the state of the Carnatic, deplorable as it might be, could form any ground on which to found a *right* to adopt the measure that has been resorted to, yet it can scarcely be denied, that when the circumstances of hostility and perfidy before stated, did place the whole country at our disposal, we became responsible for the effects of whatever dispositions we should make, and for the happiness of the people, no less than for our own security: from that moment, on our heads must naturally rest, the odium of every abuse, injustice, and oppression, that was suffered to prevail, and, that it was in our power to avert. — And was there even a possibility of averting them otherwise than by the complete transfer of the administration? Did not the state of things, and long experience, alike demonstrate that every hope of obviating the recurrence of the numberless evils with which the Carnatic was afflicted, founded on any other basis, was but visionary and delusive?

There are many gentlemen in the house, who, from local knowledge and personal observation, are much better able to detail to you, than I can be, the state and condition of that unhappy country. The documents themselves contain abundant and melancholy proofs of the sufferings of its inhabitants, under the operation of assignments made to those, who, having no interest or object but to repay themselves, with usury, the money they had advanced, let loose every species of cruelty and extortion in accomplishing it; nor less under the immediate managers appointed by the nabob, who seem to have been commissioned only to exhaust and ruin the provinces committed to their charge, and to whose uncontrolled rapacity, the insatiable wants of the circar, delivered over, without remorse, an unprotected and unresisting people. For the first, I beg leave to refer to the sickening detail given by Lord Hobart, in one of the papers on your table (it is too long to read, and it is scarcely possible to make selections), in which, after describing the progress of these transactions, through all their circumstances, and tracing a truly afflicting picture of the iniquity and barbarity that accompanied them, he concludes a part of his statement by observing — “After this exposition, no comment can be required to shew, that this species of government, if it deserves the name of government, contains the most grievous oppression of the people, the certain impoverishment of the country, and, consequently, the inevitable decay of the revenue.” In another passage, speaking of the effect of the system pursued, upon the resources, as connected with the state of the country, he says, “Whatever dimi-

nation (and it is considerable) in value the security is gradually, though rapidly, sustaining, carries along with it the destruction of the human race, and the desolation of the country."

With respect to the latter, I shall only beg leave to read the account of the collector of Trichinopoly. Alluding to the management previous to the transfer of the administration, he writes, — "The late management, whether considered in a speculative or practical point of view, presents, generally speaking, as its distinguishing features, a total want of system, where system would have been beneficial, a most baneful spirit of extortion and oppression, and an indifference to the happiness and welfare of the people, as senseless as inhuman. The people never knew when their demands on them were to cease, nor do the managers seem to have known when their extortions were to stop. The assessments, called *sived*, seem only to have been calculated to point out where extortion might be levied and increased, and to induce the inhabitants to cultivate, in the vain hope that no more than the fixed assessment, whether in grain or money, would be taken from them; a hope which returned with every season, but which returned only to blast the prospects of those who too credulously indulged it. I will venture to assert, that if the revenues were, in any one year, collected according to the established rates of assessment, it was only to induce the inhabitants, by this apparent moderation, to increase the cultivation of the succeeding year, and thus afford the managers, or renters, an opportunity of doubling their plunder."

The conviction of the house must anticipate any observations of mine on the effects of such a system, under which, no country, however otherwise blessed by the bounty of Providence, could flourish; rapid decay must have reduced, and speedy extinction impended over, the resources on which our dependence rested.

To arrest the progress of this evil, would have been, in itself, a sufficient motive, were we even incapable of feeling the more noble one of rescuing a suffering people from such calamity. That the transfer of the administration, and that alone, could accomplish these objects, I will not endeavour to make out in argument. By relying, for the proof of its necessity, on the highest authorities, to which, on Indian subjects, we are accustomed to refer, I am sure I shall serve my cause more effectually, more completely, and satisfy the minds of all who hear me. Nor does it rest alone on the authority of every governor who has presided there, but of every individual whose judgment has been of real value, who felt or understood either the British interests, or the interests of the country itself, and who has been free from the participation and taint of the abuses and corruptions known to exist — abuses, which had long and successfully combated every measure, and baffled every attempt to restrain or correct them. I will select only the testimonies of Sir Eyre Coote, of Lord Macartney, and principally of Lord Cornwallis, as stated in the papers on the table. — Sir Eyre Coote marks, in the strongest terms, the effects of the nabob's government on our affairs. — The whole of the argument of Lord Macartney on the subject of considering the assignment, proceeds upon the necessity of our possessing the whole administration of the country, if we would have any chance of security for our interests on the coast. — The opinion of

Lord Cornwallis I shall read at length, as I am aware it is one of deserved weight in this house, and wherever the name and character of that great and excellent man is known.

"I have long seen (says his lordship), with very great concern, the various defects of the system of the government of the Carnatic; and being extremely anxious that some plan should be introduced and established there, that should be better adapted than any that has yet been tried, for securing the country against external enemies, and for promoting its general prosperity, I have been hitherto prevented from making propositions to the nabob to that effect, more by my distance from the scene, or my other occupations, than by the consideration of the obstacles that might occur in the negociation with his highness, or of the disapprobation that interested and disappointed men might afterwards express of my conduct.

2. "The disadvantage and danger arising from the separation of the internal government, and management of the revenue of the country, from the responsibility for its defence, is so obvious, that if there had appeared to be the least chance of obtaining the nabob's voluntary acquiescence, I should, without hesitation, have been ready to propose to him, as the plan best calculated for promoting his own interest and comfort, and the happiness of the inhabitants of the Carnatic, that he should entrust the Company with the *entire management of the country*, in addition to the responsibility for its defence, under an engagement on their part, after allotting certain sums for public purposes, and for the gradual liquidation of his private debts, *to pay to him, regularly, a liberal portion of its revenues, for the maintenance of his family, and the support of his dignity.*"

On another occasion his lordship expresses himself as follows:—

"I must freely own that I could not venture to propose any plan, on the success of which I could have any firm reliance, unless the nabob could be induced, *by a large annual revenue regularly paid, and properly secured to him, to surrender the management of his country, for a long term of years, to the Company.*

"The nabob's age, his long connection with us, his rights to the possession of the country, which, *however, without our assistance, would have been of little value to him, and exaggerated accounts of his former services, may furnish topics for popular declamation, and may possibly engage the nation, upon mistaken ideas of humanity, to support a system of cruelty and oppression.* But, whilst I feel conscious that I am endeavouring to promote the happiness of mankind, and the good of my country, I shall give very little weight to such considerations; and should conceive that I had not performed the duty of the high and responsible office in which you did me the honour to place me, if I did not declare, *that the present mixed government cannot prosper, even in the best hands in which your part of it can be placed; and that, unless some such plan as that which I have proposed, should be adopted, the inhabitants of the Carnatic must continue to be wretched, the nabob must remain an indigent bankrupt, and the country an useless and expensive burthen to the Company and the nation.*"

The state of the country was, indeed, deplorable; and it is with grief



and shame I add, that our fellow subjects appear to have had but too great a share in contributing to produce that state of things, and not less in rendering abortive every attempt to improve or correct it. With reference to this point, and also with a view to the condition of the country, the necessity (if not of the precise change that took place) of a modification of our relations with the nabob, and a new and more effectual arrangement, in order to realize the objects of our connection with him, I adduce, as my last authority, one which will be certainly deemed disinterested, and to which I am persuaded some gentlemen will pay a degree of respect, they may be disposed to refuse to any other testimony that can be offered, I mean that of Omdut ul Omrah himself, the purport of whose conversation with Lord Hobart, is given in his lordship's minute of the 24th of November, 1795, on the subject of the modification of the treaty of 1792, then proposed to him, of which I will take the liberty of reading the following extract:—

“It has been with the deepest regret that I have found the nabob unmoved by my entreaties and remonstrances upon this subject; *not that he has been insensible to the justice and expediency of what I have proposed; but, as he has candidly confessed at several interviews with me, that he has not the resolution to comply; informing me that his native ministers, and European advisers, so perplexed, plagued, and intimidated him, that he could not venture upon the measure, notwithstanding his conviction that he ought to do so.*”

Long experience, not less than the preceding authorities I have quoted, sufficiently pointed out the only change that could, in the nature of things, prove successful. If it was our duty, then, to regard the preservation of our rights, and to fix the happiness of a people, whose fate was placed in our hands, could it be otherwise than our duty to enforce the transfer of the civil and military administration, as the only security for those rights, and the only remedy for the evils endured by the country?

The value and the benefits of a measure of this nature, had been long and universally felt, both at home and in India. That they were so felt is not to be denied, nor do I desire to deny it.—The feeling breathes through every part of the documents on the table. I am aware it may be argued (as, indeed, it has been argued), that this feeling alone dictated the measure we are discussing. But, Sir, there are happily facts to be referred to, that amply refute such an accusation. Had the sense of advantage, independent of the principles of right and justice, been the governing spring of our conduct, why the long-permitted continuance of the miseries of the Carnatic under our eyes?—Why did the various attempts made by us to correct the inadequacy of our relations with the nabob, as successfully as they were perseveringly resisted, prove uniformly abortive?—Why the restoration of the country to that iron rule, which had so abused and oppressed it, in the several instances of strong, under Lord Macartney and Lord Cornwallis, it came into our power, and when policy spoke at least as decisively in favour of retaining it, as it could ever do afterwards for its acquisition. These are the weights it was not to the suggestions of interest alone to which we were of so. It was not till an occasion actually arrived, in which justice

warranted the measure which policy recommended, that we availed ourselves, as I contend we were bound to do, of the means our power afforded, to effectuate an object too long unaccomplished.

I demand then, Sir, of the house—I demand even of those who are most vehement in their condemnation of the transaction before us,—whether they would have found reason to applaud a governor-general, to whom the care of our interests was delegated, who had not availed himself of the contingency that arose; who, when the disposal of the country was submitted to his discretion, had relinquished our rights, had again put to hazard our resources, had deliberately revived the already experienced calamities of fluctuating and conflicting authorities, had restored that blasting and inhuman tyranny, which before subsisted, and again delivered over the inhabitants of the Carnatic to that system of slavery, extortion, barbarity, and oppression, which, to use the emphatic words of Lord Hobart, in diminishing our resources, carried with it the destruction of the human race, and the desolation of the country.

It is urged, however, that measures which, even in point of policy, might be necessary towards a prince, whose misconduct we had experienced, were not equally so towards an innocent, unoffending, untried, young man. In a matter of personal consideration merely, the justice of this observation could not be disputed; but in determining our judgment of the propriety of the conduct pursued, we must look, not to the personal qualities of Ali Hussein, but to his political situation, and to the circumstances in which he would have been left, had a different line been adopted by the British government. If the calamities of the Carnatic had their source in a divided and fluctuating authority, that divided and fluctuating authority would have remained; for I do not think any man is romantic enough to entertain the idea of our abandoning the country entirely to the nabob, or, indeed, that it was safely practicable; if from the influence of that confederacy of European and native harpies that beset the Durbar, and combined to obstruct every effort towards correction or reform, what probability was there that he, young and inexperienced as he was, would have been able to break the shackles which his father had confessed himself unable to struggle with, and was forced to submit to? With respect to his councils, his parent had not, indeed, made it a testamentary obligation upon him to pray for the enemies of Great Britain; but he had done more—he had committed him to the care and guidance of those, with whose assistance all the oppressions of the Carnatic had been exercised; who, having been in his own confidence, and that of his predecessor, must have contributed to, and partaken in, all the projects of faithlessness and disaffection of which they were guilty. Where, then, was the ground of a rational hope, that any one evil would have been corrected? any one danger averted? any attachment found that would have warranted the relinquishment of the smallest part of that security, which alone could be effectual and permanent?

But it may be asked, even allowing this, why degrade the unhappy prince? why not accept the submission that was at last offered, and conclude with Ali Hussein the engagement you ultimately concluded with Azeem ul Dowlah? I say, Sir, we did not degrade him; his dis-

herison (as it is called in the Resolutions) was his own deliberate act ; it was the consequence of his refusal to admit the incontestible rights we were called upon to realize ; those rights were again and again explained to him ; the consequence of his resistance was again and again announced ; he again and again rejected the condition offered to him, and trusted to his fate. Enough was given to humanity ; enough to our own character and his inexperience ; and the treaty was closed. It was not, then, to us, but to his voluntary adherence to the fallacious hopes and delusive confidence with which he had been insidiously inspired ; to the pernicious impulse of that cabal which had betrayed his progenitors, and been the bane of his house, that he owed the change in his fortunes, and the disappointment of all his natural prospects. Under this fatal influence, he firmly pronounced his own sentence, and drove us, reluctantly, to the decisive measure of raising another prince to the masnad. It was possible, undoubtedly, that notwithstanding these circumstances, we might have still given to him possession of the throne ; but would it have been wise, would it have been consistent with our tranquillity or safety ? He had refused our offers, rejected our favour, impeached our justice ; and his whole efforts and resources would have been employed to subvert the order of things we had established. His means, perhaps, to affect us, were not extensive or powerful ; but his object and mind would have been certainly hostile, and we should have created, in the very heart of our empire, a counteracting influence — a centre of disaffection, around which all the dissatisfaction, intrigue, discontent, and turbulence of the country might gather and accumulate — where every hostile movement would find a promoter ; every enemy, foreign or domestic, Indian or European, a friend, an ally, and an instrument. This surely was sufficient to have dictated to us the prudence of consigning the sceptre, nominal, and barren as it appeared, to safer and less doubtful hands.

It is with sincere regret I venture to recall to the recollection of the house, an event so afflicting as the late mutiny at Vellore, but, Sir, nothing can more forcibly illustrate my argument. If a son of Tippoo Sultaun, a prisoner in that fortress, without power, without wealth, without means of seduction, could be supposed to produce such effects, as, by many, are attributed to his intrigues and exertions, what might not have been those produced by the prince of the country, with similar dispositions, and means infinitely more extended ? I will only add, though they would not, perhaps, have shaken the foundation of our empire, they might yet have given birth to such scenes of convulsion, horror, and bloodshed, as would have been long to be remembered and deplored.

It now remains for me to say a very few words (very few, I assure the house, they shall be) on what I own is, in my estimation, a comparatively subordinate part of our consideration — I mean, the circumstances that attended the execution of the measures in question. Indeed, Sir, for the detail of them I am inclined to rest simply on the contents of the documents on the table ; and I do so with the more readiness, because I feel I have already trespassed much too long on the patience of the house, and am certain, whatever I shall omit will be amply and more ably supplied by others, who are likely to take a share in this discussion.

The circumstances are stated in the report of the commissioners, and very differently in a letter, professing to be written by Ali Hussein, and addressed to his agents in England. On that letter some reliance may probably be placed by those who shall follow the hon. baronet in the debate upon that letter, therefore I wish to make a single observation, without entering into any particular refutation of the statements it contains.

It was originally produced by a motion of my own. Having heard that parts of it had appeared in the newspapers, and that it might be produced entire, if moved for, I was desirous of having it before the house, as well as every other document that could be supposed to bear upon, or elucidate the measure under our consideration. In moving for its production, however, I certainly did not intend to convey any opinion of its authenticity; of that I know nothing. The style and sentiments of the letter certainly betray the character, rather of European, than of Indian origin, and do not at all wear the semblance of the unassisted performance of a person of the age of Ali Hussein. There is that in it, besides, which is so averse from all the principles of Eastern governments, that the idea of it could scarcely have entered into the imagination of an Asiatic prince: what I allude to, is the recommendation of an appeal to the British people. Yet, Sir, it may, nevertheless, be authentic; and, if it is, I only entreat the house to allow it the weight it deserves, and no more. Even if authentic, it is but the statement of an individual in his own case, suggesting to his friends applications in his behalf, to every quarter where application might be supposed to be advantageous; supplying them with grounds of appeal to every feeling, every sentiment, every interest which could be conceived capable of creating dispositions favourable to his cause. They are directed to address themselves to the king, to the prince of Wales, to the board of control, to the court of directors, to the house of commons, and, lastly, to the creditors of his predecessors, the nabobs of Arcot, on whom he appears justly and confidently to have relied, as his best allies in overturning the present arrangement in the Carnatic, and effecting his full restoration to the musnud.

That in such a representation facts should be disfigured, and every topic should be insisted upon that could move compassion for unmerited suffering, excite indignation against injustice and cruelty, or fix upon the measures of the British government the odious imputations of oppression and tyranny, is not to be wondered at; but it does not follow that, because such statements are affecting, they are, therefore, entitled to our implicit confidence. It must be remembered, that severe truth is not the distinguishing characteristic of Indian representations, and for the veracity of any one word in this letter, no responsibility whatever exists. On the contrary, the report of the commissioners, which is opposed to it, appears as an official document, authenticated by men of the highest estimation for truth, humanity, and integrity, deputed by the British government, acting under the eye of the British government, and responsible to it for the correctness of every circumstance and fact related in it. Although there are several points of difference on which I should be glad to remark, I shall leave that task to others, and content myself with dismissing these discordant accounts,

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with the single observation I have made, in the full conviction that where contradictions appear (which cannot escape any one in the comparison of the statements), the house will feel on which side the truth is likely to rest, and to which its confidence ought to incline.

It is scarcely within possibility, that, to a transaction of this nature, circumstances of apparent hardship should not be incident; circumstances to touch our best feelings, to call forth our compassion and sympathy, and to afford the materials for much eloquent and impressive declamation; but, before gentlemen abandon themselves to emotions of this kind, I implore them to weigh well, and impartially, all the considerations connected with the case before them. In doing so, I am persuaded they will be satisfied that no degree of attention that humanity could dictate, has been wanting; that every hardship that could be avoided, was prevented; and those which were inevitable, alleviated, as far as was compatible with the secure accomplishment of the measure to be effected. Whatever, as a matter of unavoidable hardship, fell upon Ali Hussein, I unaffectedly regret; his early death I regret also; but in the compassion I may feel for his fate, I cannot forget justice, or consent to admit that his death has any direct connection with the measures that were adopted. Examine every circumstance of it, and no unprejudiced mind will discover even a colourable ground for suspicion. If even his situation preyed upon his mind, and affected his health (of which, however, there is no proof), it may be a matter of concern, but can be none of criminal accusation against the British government. The rigorous severity of restraint and confinement, so loudly complained of, appears never, in fact, to have existed, either with respect to Ali Hussein, or to the princes of the family generally; on the contrary, it is proved incontestibly by the papers, that full liberty was afforded them of quitting the precincts of the palace, if they preferred it to yielding the usual obedience to their constituted head. That they were under the authority of the nabob, is true; but, such were the precautions taken by Lord Clive, such his constant communication with the palace, that no abuse of that authority, no outrage or violence could take place without his knowledge; and in speaking of various representations from several discontented members of the family, he distinctly declares himself enabled to state, "that the facts described in them, are, in some respects, exaggerations of trivial circumstances; in others, absolutely without foundation."

The illness of Ali Hussein commenced, as it appears, in the apartments of his aunt, the Sultaun ul Nissa, one of the most active and avowed enemies of the new arrangements, with whom he had resided for some time, and who would naturally watch over his safety with more than common anxiety and vigilance. There he remained till he removed to the house of his mother, a few days preceding his dissolution, in a state of hopeless insensibility. The first intelligence of his illness was communicated by the nabob Azeem ul Dowlah. Every medical assistance was immediately offered that it was in the power of the governor to furnish: it was, at first, resisted by the prince's attendants, and, when with difficulty admitted, proved too late to be availing. Not an idea seems to have been entertained at the time, that the cause of his death was otherwise than natural; there is no suspicion thrown out;

and even the letter professed to be sent, but could not be sent, by Ali Hussain to Lord Clive, the day before his decease, confirms the innocence of the nabob. The mention of spells and incantations, if they prove nothing on one side, prove much on the other—they indicate the spirit in which the letter, from whatever quarter it came, was composed; and, by a reference to such grounds of accusation, prove the total want of all that was more substantial and credible.—What benefit, in truth, could be derived from such an act, compared with the risk attending it? The establishment of the new order of things was complete; all rivalry was at an end; the determination of the British power was manifested, and its support irrevocably pledged to Azzeem ul Dowlah; had he then felt the idle desire to make assurance doubly sure, by a crime so atrocious, could he have promised himself any advantage to balance the consequences of almost inevitable detection—which must have raised against him the horror and detestation of all mankind, and most of all, I trust, of those by whose favour he had been elevated, and whose indignation could in a moment have dismissed him from the throne, of which he was unworthy, to the obscurity from whence he was taken?

I have now, Sir, traced (I am conscious how imperfectly), the circle I proposed in my outset. If I have had the good fortune to be at all successful in conveying to the house the impressions of my own mind, I can entertain little doubt of the result of this discussion. If I have failed in so doing, convinced as I am of the truth of those impressions, I have the consolation of knowing there are many present who equally feel, and by their superior authority and eloquence, are infinitely more capable of giving them weight than I can pretend to be, and who will do justice to a cause to which my powers are, I am sensible, little equal.

With the views I entertain of the transaction before us, it will not be wondered at that I should not have thought it necessary to inquire particularly whence it originated, whether in the orders transmitted from home, or in the unaided and spontaneous zeal of the government in India. Approved and sanctioned as it has been by the authorities constituted to superintend the administration of our Indian affairs, I consider the measure as an act of the British government; what may be the sentiments of the court of directors I do not pretend to know, but I must remark, that though on many other points Lord Wellesley has incurred their censure into the catalogue of his faults or errors, this has not been introduced; I am, therefore, willing to infer, that in acting with zealous solicitude for their interest, he may have been felt to have deserved, though he has not received, the expression of their approbation. In that sentiment of approbation, whether participated in by them or no, I cordially concur. In my official capacity I have cheerfully declared it, and here, as a member of parliament, with equal satisfaction and sincerity, in the presence of my country I repeat it, and rejoice in the opportunity once more afforded me, of bearing a public, though feeble testimony, to the transcendent merits of the late governor-general. — Under his auspices this great and desirable measure was accomplished. Under the same auspices the British power in India has attained a height that will be the admiration of future times, when the transient feelings of this day are past and forgotten. I rather

wish, for the honour of my country, to dwell on the services he has rendered, than that return of obloquy and persecution with which they have been rewarded. It is true, Sir, in assuming the government of India he found a great and powerful empire; but he found it encompassed with perils; exposed to the rivalry, and threatened by the designs of surrounding powers.—Tippoo Sultaun, cherishing implacable hatred against us, was maturing his projects of vengeance, and preparing, as he thought, our destruction. The extensive resources of the Mahratta confederacy, influenced by councils hostile to our empire and interests, were formidable and unbroken. The nizam, subjugated by a numerous force, under the command of French officers, was a slave in his very capital. A more considerable, and almost independent French power, fixed in Doab, and in possession of the person of the mogul, menaced our most vulnerable frontier on the side of Oude, allied with France, and prepared to co-operate with her, or any other invader of the British dominions.—Mark the change—The sultaun overthrown; his hatred, his name, his kingdom extinguished for ever. The nizam emancipated from French influence, amongst our closest and most attached allies. The Mahratta confederacy broken, disjointed, and humbled by our arms, is no longer an object of anxiety or alarm. The French force, in every part of India dissolved and dispersed, and scarce an individual of the nation remaining on that vast portion of the earth, but by our sufferance and permission; the unquestioned predominance of Britain established, without a rival throughout the Indian world; and the blessings of British justice and government extended to millions of thankful and protected subjects!

In the course of these events much has been added to the British dominions; much to the glory and splendour of the British name; to which no one has more contributed than my right honourable friend near me.\*—But, Sir, the wisdom which guided, and the genius which inspired all the measures from which those effects have flowed, have not so much added to the extent of our possessions, and the glory of our name, as to the permanent strength, solidity, and security of our empire. Contemplating our situation as the late governor-general found it on his arrival, and comparing it with what he left it at his departure, we may well say, *luteritiam invenit, marmorcam reliquit*.

I shall trouble you no further, than merely to acknowledge, with gratitude, the indulgence I have received, and entreat the house to believe, if I appear to have abused it, that I have been induced so long to trespass on its patience, in obedience only to the strongest sense of public duty, and a conscientious conviction, that, in vindicating the acts of Lord Wellesley's administration, I am defending the most important and valuable interests of my country.

Lord ARCHIBALD HAMILTON contended, that the nabob's father and grandfather had lived and died in amity with the British government, and that, by the treaty of 1792, the nabob was not precluded from any political association, or correspondence, with the native powers. No one act of hostility had been committed by the nabob, nor had he proved, in any instance, to have violated his engagements

\* Sir Arthur Wellesley.

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with the Company. He could not agree in the view of this subject taken by the right hon. gentleman who had just sat down, because it appeared by the papers, that the general government in India had the intention to annex the nabob's territories to those of the East India Company, long before any charge of perfidy was imputed to him. What must have been the fidelity of the nabob, if the governor-general could not, from the year 1798 to 1801, find any pretext for the usurpation of his territories, for an usurpation he considered it?

After the clear and able statements of the hon. baronet, it was unnecessary for him to say any thing more on the subject. He was aware how little the house was inclined to entertain a question of this kind. If any thing was calculated to rouse the spirit of that house, the statements lately made in it, relative to nabob of Oude, must have done so. At that time the house must have seen the honour and interests of the country sacrificed; and after the same had been passed over without the slightest notice by the house, it was impossible for the people to look up to its justice with the respect and reverence it had been accustomed to do. He thought nothing but the most cogent and satisfactory reasons could justify the proceedings towards the nabob; and that, as yet, nothing but reasons the most frivolous and inconclusive had been produced. He should certainly support the Resolutions.

Colonel ALLAN felt that, having on a former night ventured to state his opinion upon a question of a nature similar to that which was now brought before the house (the Oude Charge), he should not discharge his duty with satisfaction to his own mind, were he to be silent upon a motion that related to transactions which took place in the Carnatic, where he had resided for an uninterrupted period of twenty years; having, in the course of that time, held a confidential situation under his noble friend Lord Buckinghamshire, during the whole of his administration in India, he had opportunities of knowing many of the facts, which were stated in the papers before the house. As the nabob of Arcot had never wanted advocates (as they had witnessed even that night) to assert that he was an *independent sovereign*, and as many hon. members might not have had leisure or inclination to peruse the papers laid before parliament upon this subject, he wished shortly to draw the attention of the house to the origin of our connection with Mahomed Ali, and to the foundation of his pretensions as nabob of Arcot, in order that a correct idea might be formed of the title and privileges which he actually possessed. He thought he could shew, that it was during the contest between the English and the French, who had gained great influence in the Deccan, and aimed at the exclusive possession of the Carnatic, that Mahomed Ali first introduced himself to our notice, not as the acknowledged nabob of Arcot, but as the competitor of Chuuda Saib, whose pretensions were supported by the French. He thought he could shew, that in that war, which terminated in leaving the English masters of the Carnatic, so little did Mahomed Ali or we think of conquering merely for *him*, that the British colours were regularly hoisted on the forts which surrendered to our arms; that we obtained from the mogul the sanction of his authority, under a commission to Mahomed Ali, as nabob of Arcot; that that office was one of deputation and dependence of a military nature, and quite distinct



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from the administration of the revenues, which belonged to the office of Dewan; and that, through British influence, those two offices were united in his person, under the express condition, that the management of the revenues should revert to the Company, in the event of his being guilty of any secret practices, or of any failure in his pecuniary engagements. But he thought he should best consult the wishes of the house, and certainly his own inclination, by abstaining from these details; he should therefore content himself by observing, that the nature of our connection with the nabob of Arcot would be found accurately described by Lord Macartney, in a letter from the government of Madras to that of Bengal; in which letter, speaking of this *independent sovereign*, his lordship observed, "that he was no more reckoned than the nabob of Oude, among the native powers of Hindustan; that they were both Europeans in connection and dependence."

He was aware that it was irregular to repeat the words made use of by any hon. member in a former debate, but he hoped he should not be considered out of order by slightly alluding to them. An hon. member, who took a different view of the Oude Question from that which he did, having adverted to the situations of the vizier of Oude and the nabob of Arcot, brought the latter below the level upon which Lord Macartney had placed them; observing, that the vizier was more of an independent sovereign than the nabob of Arcot. He certainly was so; he resided in his own capital, at a great distance from the seat of the British government; he had numerous armies, and his forts were garrisoned by his own troops; but he wished to state to the house, and to bring to the recollection of some hon. members of it, the opinion of that great man, Mr. Burke, regarding the independency, even of the vizier. In the 4th Article of charge against Mr. Hastings, presented by Mr. Burke to the House of Commons, in April, 1786, he says, "that the reigning nabob of Oude, by taking into, and continuing in his pay, certain bodies of regular British troops, and by having afterwards admitted the British resident at his court into the management of all his affairs, foreign and domestic, and particularly into the administration of his finances, did gradually become, in substance and effect, as well as in general repute and estimation, a dependant on, or a vassal of, the East India Company." And he would beg to refer hon. gentlemen to Mr. Burke's speech on the nabob of Arcot's debts, for his opinion regarding the independent sovereignty of Mahomed Ali. "The nabob of Arcot," says Mr. Burke, "has, in truth and substance, no more than a merely civil authority, held in the most entire dependence on the Company. The nabob, without military, without federal capacity, is extinguished as a potentate." On this topic, he could also quote the sentiments of a person whose testimony would always be entitled to consideration. He meant Lord Macartney, who, in a letter to the secret committee, July, 1785, observes, that "to conciliate the nabob's mind to his real situation, which he seemed willing to forget; to revive in his memory, without wounding his delicacy or his pride, the steps by which he had risen to elevation; to lead him to feel his obligations to the Company, that whatever rank or territory he had ever possessed, either by his paper titles, or by actual occupancy, he derived from their arms, their influence, or generosity: and that his interests and security were so

involved in theirs, that, to pretend to a distinct, separate, independent sovereignty, as he talked of, or to imagine that he could exist without the Company, or to expect that the Company would go on defending the country at their own expence, without an adequate share of the revenues of it, were absurdities that, though in some measure warranted by former friendship or connivance, he ought no longer to indulge in, as they would prove a fatal deceit upon himself, and must soon end in his total destruction, and in that of his best friends on the coast. — To engage the nabob's mind to a calm consideration of these points, was not an easy task, but it was a necessary one, and was performed with success; the result was, his assignment of the revenues." — The view taken by the government at home of the relative situation of the nabob and the East India Company, corresponded with that taken by Lord Macartney; they say, in the month of June, 1785, "We are ready to admit that Mahomed Ali is the lawful nabob of the Carnatic; at the same time we must observe, that he acquired that title by our means, and is now supported in it by our authority, nor have we the smallest intention of withdrawing that support; but it must be remembered, that the sword, that most prominent and essential mark of sovereignty, is exclusively in the hands of the Company; the nabob can form no alliance, either offensive or defensive, with foreign powers. — Even in the last treaty with Tippoo Sultaun, who had invaded the Carnatic, he is merely recognized as the friend and ally of the Company, and under their protection." The hon. member contended, therefore, that, after what he had taken the liberty of stating to the house, he thought it could not be asserted, that the nabob of Arcot was an independent sovereign; in fact, he was in a complete state of subordination, and totally dependent on the British power.

Under the view of this relation to the Company, the hon. member said he would examine what had been the nature of the conduct of the nabobs of Arcot, in fulfilling the obligations of their alliance with the British power. Mahomed Ali having failed in his first engagements, by which he was bound to liquidate the debt incurred by the war, which had established him as nabob of Arcot, he was called upon, in 1763, to assign to the Company certain districts contiguous to Madras (now called the Jaghire); at first he refused, and wished to annex some conditions on the part of the Company; but Lord Pigot, then governor, informed him, that "it did not become a man, who owed to the Company the situation he enjoyed, to make any conditions under such circumstances; that they did not take any thing from him, for that they, in fact, were the givers, and he the receiver." — After this transaction, no material change appears to have taken place until Lord Macartney's administration, which commenced in 1781. That noble lord found our affairs in the peninsula of India in the most critical situation. Hyder Ali had invaded the Carnatic the preceding year, and it required the exertion of the greatest talents to extricate us from our difficulties. — Lord Macartney soon discovered, that the sole cause of all our embarrassments proceeded from our having most unwisely committed to the nabob the uncontrolled management of the revenues. In a letter to the secret committee, dated in January, 1784, to which the hon. member was anxious to draw the attention of the house, his lordship observed,

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that "the first thing that struck him, as defective in your system, was the nature of the Company's connection with the nabob, by which the resources of a province, garrisoned and defended by your forces in peace and war, was altogether in the control of his highness, under a simple and insecure engagement of reimbursing, by instalments, the current charges of a certain proportion of those forces. This stipulation, even in peace, was, from the constant failure and backwardness of the nabob, a source of perpetual alarm to government, which often found itself absolutely unable to provide for the payment of the troops when it became due: but if such are the inconveniences of this system in time of peace, how totally unprovided, weak, and defenceless, must be your situation under it in time of war." Lord Macartney, therefore, prevailed upon the nabob to confirm the assignment to the Company of the revenues of the Carnatic during the war, and until his debt was liquidated. Unfortunately, however, the assignment was surrendered back to the nabob; but two years had scarcely elapsed, before the embarrassments of government were greater than ever. The court of directors, alarmed at the accounts from Madras, sent orders to Sir Archibald Campbell, then governor, to make a treaty with the nabob, and to stipulate for a subsidy of ten lacs and fifty thousand pagodas. A treaty was in consequence concluded in 1787, by which the nabob voluntarily agreed to pay nine lacs; but, in less than eighteen months, he failed in his engagements, and his arrears, at the commencement of the war, in 1790, were so enormous, as to oblige Lord Cornwallis to assume, once more, the management of the country: certainly on the principles of justice, though not provided for by treaty. The assumption of the Carnatic in time of war, afterwards became an article in the treaty of 1792; upon which occasion, the nabob having represented to Lord Cornwallis the inadequacy of his resources to discharge his pecuniary engagements, an indulgent modification of the treaty of 1787 was framed. Had the treaty of 1792 been adhered to with that good faith which we had a right to expect from the nabob, the country would have found in it a source of increasing prosperity; for, by its wise provisions, a considerable portion of the Carnatic was exonerated from those private assignments, which had ever been productive of oppression and distress to the inhabitants; but the expectations justly entertained from the operation of that treaty, were disappointed, and the evils of the administration of the Carnatic, if possible, increased after the death of Mahomed Ali, in 1795. It now became necessary, continued the hon. member, to examine whether the nabob adhered to the treaty of 1792, and he thought he should have no difficulty in shewing that he had violated, not only the spirit, but the letter, of that treaty. In the year 1794, his noble friend, Lord Buckinghamshire, assumed the government of Madras. It was notorious, at that time, that the nabob had granted assignments on the districts mortgaged to the Company. In the minutes in council of his noble friend, the mischiefs resulting from that practice were fully explained, and the system was traced through all its intricacies. In a letter to the court of directors, dated in Sept. 1796, Lord Buckinghamshire observed, that "the fullest consideration of this important subject, with the contemplation of that ruin in which the nabob's breach of engagement is involving the Carnatic; the daily

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accounts which he received of the oppression and miseries of the unfortunate inhabitants; and the conviction which he had of the progressive annihilation of the resources of the Company; had so strongly impressed his mind with the necessity of a change of system, that he had no hesitation in saying, if there be no doubt (and it is not possible for any man in India to doubt it) of the treaty of 1792 having been violated by the nabob, there can be no question of our right to avail ourselves of every means in our power to enforce such a modification of the treaty, as will guard against the fatal consequences of future violation; and he was not afraid to hazard his character upon the policy, the justice, and the humanity of the measure." Mahomed Ali, the hon. member said, was apprised by his noble friend, that by the infraction of one of the main articles, the whole treaty had been cancelled; and Lord Buckinghamshire endeavoured, but without success, to prevail upon the nabob to agree to a modification of the treaty, by placing under the Company's management a permanent territorial security, equal to the amount of the subsidy; and, as an inducement, offered to give up a claim which the Company had on the nabob for about thirty lacks of pagodas. — After the death of Mahomed Ali, Lord Buckinghamshire made a similar proposal to the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, to which he likewise refused to accede. Omdut ul Omrah was also informed by Lord Buckinghamshire, that he considered the granting assignment on the mortgaged districts, a violation of the treaty. And the government at home, in July, 1796, warned the nabob of the consequences of such conduct; but there is stronger evidence than this, of the nabob's violation of the treaty, for the nabob himself, in a paper delivered to Lord Wellesley, in May, 1798, says, "Having complained that, under the present arrangement of my monthly <sup>2</sup>/<sub>1st</sub>, I was compelled, at particular period of every year, to raise money for the payment of the Company's military subsidy, which money was repaid from my countries in the following manner: viz. supposing a kist of a lack of pagoda was to be paid, we received sixty thousand from the country, and borrowed the remaining forty thousand from some person, and give him an order on that country for that amount, which he receives." It is well known that these assignments extended to the districts specified in the treaty, for it was recorded by Lord Buckinghamshire, in a minute in council, "that the southern districts of the nabob's country, Tinivelly in particular, as being the most distant from the presidency, have been the theatre in which these scenes have been chiefly exhibited; but it is notorious that similar practices have been introduced; and now actually carried on at Nellore, Anaparthi, and Trichinopoly." The house would recollect, that every one of those districts was specified in the treaty. But it had been attempted to be argued by the nabob, that his granting assignments on the mortgaged districts, was not a violation of treaty; and that the only penalty for so doing, was, in the event of those districts being assumed by the Company, that the assignment should be of no value and of no effect.

The 5th section of the 8th article of the treaty of 1792 was as follows and with the leave of the house, Colonel Allan said, he would read "In consequence of the measure whereby the districts mentioned in Schedule, No. 2. become responsible for any arrears that may accrue

the payment of the above stipulated kists, the said nabob agrees that he will not grant tuncaws, or assignments, on any account, on the revenues thereof; and if, contrary to this condition, any tuncaws or assignments should exist when the said districts, or any of them, shall be assumed by the said Company, such tuncaws or assignments shall be declared, by the said Company, and the said nabob, to be of no value, nor shall they remain in effect." He would not, however, attempt to argue what should be the just construction of this clause, as he had no doubt that, if it should be necessary, it would be ably and successfully argued by persons whose opinions would have more weight in the house than his could have; but he must say, that he thought his noble friend, Lord Buckinghamshire, had put that construction upon it which was intended by Lord Cornwallis, who framed the treaty; and that it was, at the time of its conclusion, so understood by the nabob. That he might not mis-state his noble friend, he should make use of his own words, contained in a public letter to the court of directors. "The 5th section of the 8th article of the treaty of 1792," says Lord Buckinghamshire, "is made to affect two parties, the nabob, and the money-lender; if the former grants assignments on the mortgaged districts, he is liable to such penalties as generally attach upon a breach of engagement; if the latter advances his money upon securities upon the districts in question, he hazards the loss of it, on their falling into our hands; how a clause, distinctly affecting two separate objects, can justly be construed to exonerate the one, from all penalty, because its final operation upon the other is specifically provided for, is beyond my capacity to discover." Upon this authority, then, he had no hesitation in asserting, that the nabob, by granting assignments on the districts mortgaged to the Company for the security of the subsidy, violated the treaty of 1792. That the government at home were decidedly of that opinion, is evident from a letter to Madras, in June, 1799, in which they observed, "that his highness has distinctly acknowledged, that he is in the practice of raising money, annually, by assignments of the revenues of those districts which form the security for the payment of the Company's subsidy; as this practice is unquestionably contrary to the letter, and perverse of the spirit of that treaty, we direct, that, immediately upon receipt hereof, you adopt the necessary measures for taking possession, in the name of the Company, of the whole, or any part of the districts, which shall appear to be so assigned."

Colonel Allen then said, that if he had succeeded in shewing that the treaty of 1792 had been violated, the justice of the late arrangement in Carnatic must be admitted. But the nabob had not only violated the treaty by granting assignments on the mortgaged districts, but also entering into a correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun, without the knowledge and consent of the British government. It had been asserted, that an eager examination of the papers of Tippoo Sultaun, was amongst the first acts of the general staff after the fall of Seringapatam. It indeed, the hon. colonel said, to be his lot to be the first British officer who entered the palace of Tippoo Sultaun; he was on the general staff, and in the confidence of the commander in chief, and had opportunities of knowing what was done. Tippoo having been killed in the assault, his sons and generals, who commanded divisions of his army, as soon

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as they were apprised of his death, surrendered themselves to General Harris. Measures were immediately taken to secure the quiet possession of Tippoo's dominions. The records of the Mysore government were carefully preserved; they were examined; and the correspondence of the nabobs of the Carnatic having been discovered, it was, of course, transmitted to the governor-general. Of the nature and object of that correspondence, he admitted, that different opinions might be formed; but we knew that, by the treaty of 1792, the nabob was bound not to enter into any political correspondence with any native power without the consent of the British government; and we also knew that the nabob, in compliance with that stipulation, was in the practice of sending to the government of Madras, for their approbation, not only the drafts of the letters which he proposed writing to Tippoo, but also the letters which he received from the sultaun. Keeping this in their recollection, gentlemen would observe, that among the papers before the house, are numerous letters from the nabob to Tippoo, on the most trivial occasions, merely complimentary, all submitted to the inspection of the government before they were dispatched, clearly showing that the nabob did not consider himself at liberty to hold any correspondence whatever, without the knowledge and consent of the British government. What were we then to infer, when, on the occasion, perhaps on the very day on which the nabob had sent one of these complimentary letters to the government for their approbation, we found that he had also written a letter of a secret, and, at least, a mysterious nature, which he dispatched to Tippoo without their knowledge? — Some of the communications made by the nabob, through Tippoo's ambassadors, were for the purpose of apprising the sultaun, that he was suspected by the British government of carrying on an improper negotiation with the Mahrattas, of advising him to suspend his plans until a more favourable opportunity occurred, and of recommending him to be more guarded in his intercourse with the French; and we must not forget, that Tippoo had, on his part, sent ambassadors to France and to the Mauritius, in order to prevail upon the French to afford him military assistance. What, then, asked the hon. member, are we to infer from the secret meetings of the nabob with the ambassadors of Tippoo? From the communications made only under a solemn oath of secrecy? From a cynically intended, if not for hostile, certainly for political, purposes, and all this at a time, when, it would be recollected, that Tippoo was endeavouring, by every means, to unite all the Mahomedan princes in Hindustan, for the avowed purpose of expelling the English from India. What was this the extent of the nabob's treachery? By no means; for we are informed, that in a conversation held by Mahomed Ali with one of the ambassadors, the nabob reprobated the war carried on by Lord Cornwallis, as a war undertaken for the subversion of the Mahomedan religion; by that war, Tippoo was reduced in power, wounded in pride, and he determined on revenge; he, therefore, determined to support his faith, and to exterminate the infidels, meaning the English. With such feelings on his mind, what was the language of the nabobs of Arcot, the allies of the Company? It will be found in one of the letters from Omdut ul Omrah, which contained this remarkable passage, which desired might be repeated to the sultaun: "In the preservation of

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person is the perpetual permanence of the faith. Let him not remain who wisheth not thy preservation." — The hon. member thought a man would be bold enough to assert, that the nabob would have ventured to have submitted that letter to the inspection of the Madras government; and yet there were persons disposed to offer an excuse for every act of perfidy in the nabob, and to brand with odium the British name in India. In his opinion, however, it was enough, that the correspondence found at Seringapatam was secret, and that it had been carried on by the nabob without the knowledge and consent of the British government; for his part, he thought that no impartial man, who had perused the letters which were submitted by the nabob to the inspection of the Madras government, and had compared them with the letters which were found at Seringapatam, could lay his hand on his heart, and pronounce that correspondence to have been innocent; — the fair presumption was, that it was of a nature hostile to the British interests, it certainly was a violation of the treaty of 1792.

With this impression on his mind on the subject of the nabob's conduct under the treaty of 1792, he should trouble the house with a few words with regard to the policy adopted by the British government on the discovery of the violation of that treaty. In the first place, he would remark, as a general principle, that the policy of some arrangement similar to that which has recently been adopted in the Carnatic, would not be doubted by any person who had looked into the papers. As far back as 1774, the inconveniencies and dangers resulting from the system of the nabob's administration, had been often experienced by the government of Madras, and as often represented to the court of directors. When Hyder Ali invaded the Carnatic in 1780, there was an instant stop to all payments from the nabob. In that dreadful exigency, so eloquently described by Mr. Burke in the speech to which the hon. member had before alluded, the assignment of the revenues of the Carnatic was obtained, without which all our revenues and credit must have been inevitably sunk to no purpose. Of the importance of that assignment, and of the danger of restoring the Carnatic to the nabob, Lord Macartney was so deeply impressed, that, in one of his letters to the court of directors, he says, "From the moment you surrender the assignment, you cease to be a nation on the coast!" and in another, "Without the assignment, I see not a ray of hope for the preservation of the Company, or the security of the nabob." — Lord Macartney justly considered the assignment to be, not only the rock of our strength in the Carnatic, but that the nabob's real interest and happiness, as well as the general security, would have been best consulted in retaining it; and that the Company, upon the same principle that he exercised the right to wield the sword for the common good in time of war, ought to have administered the revenues for the common good in time of peace. Lord Cornwallis perfectly coincided in opinion with Lord Macartney as to the necessity of a radical reform, and he examined the whole system of our connection with the nabob, with a view to that object. The opinion of Lord Cornwallis must have so much weight with the house and with the country at large, that the hon. member was anxious to draw their attention to an extract of a letter from his lordship to the court of directors, in August, 1790. "I must freely own," says Lo

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Cornwallis, "that I could not venture to propose any plan, on the success of which I could have any firm reliance, unless the nabob could be induced by a large annual revenue, regularly paid and properly secured to him, to surrender the management of his country, for a long term of years, to the Company. The nabob's age, his long connection with us, his right to the possession of the country, which, however, without our assistance, would have been but of little value to him, and exaggerated accounts of former services, may furnish topics for popular declamation; and may possibly engage the nation, upon mistaken ideas of humanity, to support a system of cruelty and oppression; but whilst I feel conscious that I am endeavouring to promote the happiness of mankind, and the good of my country, I shall give very little weight to such considerations; and I should conceive that I had not performed the duty of the high office in which you did me the honour to place me, if I did not declare, that the present mixed government cannot prosper in the best hands in which your part of it can be placed; and that, unless some such plan as that which I have proposed should be adopted, the inhabitants of the Carnatic must continue to be wretched, the nabob must remain an indigent bankrupt, and his country an useless and expensive burthen to the Company and the nation." This was not the only proof that this subject had engaged the most serious attention of Lord Cornwallis, for, in a letter written two years afterwards, his lordship observed, that, "If there had been the least chance of obtaining the nabob's acquiescence, he should, without hesitation, have been ready to have proposed to him, as the plan best calculated for promoting his own interest and comfort, and the happiness of the inhabitants of the Carnatic, that he should entrust the Company with the entire management of the country, under an engagement to pay him regularly a liberal portion of its revenues, for the maintenance of his family, and the support of his dignity." The hon. member said, that he need not remind the house, that this plan exactly corresponds with that which was proposed by Lord Powis to Ali Hussein. Of the practical wisdom of that plan no man could doubt, when we find, notwithstanding all that had been done by Lord Macartney, by Sir Archibald Campbell, and by Lord Cornwallis, that the evils of the nabob's administration still continued to exist as late as 1795, and to require correction. Lord Buckinghamshire, in his minute dated in October, 1795, observed, "That no comment could be required to shew that that species of government, if it deserved the name of government, contained the most grievous oppressions of the people, the certain impoverishment of the country, and the inevitable decay of revenue." Impressed as his lordship was with a serious conviction of that truth, he looked with extreme anxiety to the nature of the security provided by the treaty of 1792; and his lordship stated his opinion, that there was no other remedy than placing the districts pledged for the security of the subsidy, in the hands of the Company. The conduct of his noble friend was highly approved by the court of directors, who sincerely lamented that the nabob could not be prevailed upon to adopt the modification of the treaty proposed by Lord Buckinghamshire, which, they observed, was founded upon principles of sound policy, humanity, and justice; they therefore directed his noble friend to renew the proposition in their name. So



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deeply, indeed, were the court of directors and the government at home impressed with the absolute necessity of this arrangement, that they requested Lord Wellesley to make a short stay at Madras, on his way to Bengal, in order to prevail upon the nabob to agree to the plan proposed by Lord Buckinghamshire. But these were not the only testimonies of this branch of the question to which he could refer the house. We find, said the hon. member, in the papers before us, that as late as the year 1801, the opinions of Lord Powis strengthening and confirming those of his predecessors: his lordship observed, that "it was material for him to repeat, and with impressive earnestness, that no security, sufficiently extensive and efficient for the British interest in the Carnatic, can be derived from the treaty of 1792; and that no divided power, however modified, can possibly avert the ruin of that devoted country." The hon. member declared, that, after the opinions of Lord Macartney, Lord Cornwallis, Lord Buckinghamshire, and Lord Powis, publicly recorded, and to which he had endeavoured to draw the attention of the house; after the fullest enquiries on the spot, possessing also, as Lord Wellesley did, every means of acquiring correct information, he could not feel surprised, that Lord Wellesley should have considered the late arrangement in the Carnatic as founded in the wisest policy. Its impolicy, however, had been argued upon grounds, in his humble opinion, quite erroneous. It had been remarked by those who differed from him on this occasion, that formerly we had no invidious duties to discharge, that the nabob's government exacted the revenue and inflicted the punishments, that they were regarded as the oppressors, whilst we were considered as the benefactors of the country; but that now we had changed places with the nabob; and we were then gravely asked, whether it was wise to have taken upon ourselves a task which must render us odious to the natives? To this point, the hon. member said, he could speak from his own personal knowledge, for he was employed for seven or eight years making surveys of the country, and traversed every part of it, and he believed he might venture to say, that, at the time he quitted India, no European had seen more of the Carnatic than himself; he had many opportunities of learning the real sentiments of the inhabitants, and he had no hesitation in declaring, that they invariably spoke in praise and admiration of the system pursued during the period that the country had been under the management of the Company's servants; and with detestation and abhorrence of the nabob's managers, whose oppression and cruelty were so great, that he had known all the inhabitants of a village fly from the nabob's territories, during the night, to seek protection in those of the Company, or perhaps to retire altogether into the dominions of the nizam, or of Tippoo Sultan.

It might be argued, however, (and some had already made the attempt) that, although the late arrangement in the Carnatic was founded in justice and policy, the family of Mahomed Ali had strong claims on the liberality and indulgence of the British government. It may, therefore, continued the hon. member, be worth while to examine how far such claims are well founded. From our earliest connection with Mahomed Ali, we had reason to be dissatisfied with him for his want of faith and honour, instances of which had been recorded as far

back as the administrations of Mr. Bouchier and Mr. Dupré; and the government of Madras had declared, that the nabob's conduct was such as to destroy all confidence in his engagements. Lord Macartney observed, that the records were full of essential failures on the part of the nabob in his pecuniary engagements. In the war with Hyder Ali, in 1780, we applied to the nabob, in vain, for assistance; the same when we were preparing for the war in 1790. In the war of 1799, the government was compelled to call upon the nabob for pecuniary assistance, for when Lord Wellesley assumed the government of India, he found an exhausted treasury, and our credit very low. The nabob promised three lacks of pagodas, no very large sum; but it will scarcely be believed, that he advanced only 16,000 pagodas, or 6,400*l.* private individuals shewed more zeal, and, to the honour of the British commercial houses at Madras, they afforded every possible assistance, and enabled the army to move from our frontier to Seringapatam. But this want of attachment to his allies was not confined to failures in his pecuniary engagements; the nabob actually shewed an indifference to the British interests, which might justly be attributed to disaffection. In a letter from the Madras government to the court of directors, August, 1799, they observed, "We are concerned to inform you, that this is not the only instance in which we have had to lament an indifference to the success of our measures on the part of his highness, for, instead of calling forth the resources of the Carnatic, for the supply of your army, his highness's managers, in every province of his dominions, not only withheld all assistance from their respective districts, but opposed every possible object to the passage of supplies, procured for the use of the army, beyond the limits of his highness's dominions." And the government at home, in a letter to Bengal, dated the 4th of December, 1800, mentioned the particulars of the nabob's conduct regarding the fort of Chanderhagherry, and observed, that "a more decided instance of disaffection could scarcely be imagined."—Under all these circumstances of the nabob's repeated, he might almost say constant, failure in his engagements; of his indifference to the British interests, an indifference amounting nearly to disaffection; of his violation of the treaty of 1792, not only by granting assignments on the districts which were mortgaged to the Company as the security for his subsidy, but also by entering into a secret correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun, the implacable enemy of the British name in India; the hon. member contended that we were justified in considering the treaty of 1792 as annihilated, and in adopting whatever measures we deemed necessary to secure our rights in the Carnatic. With this view, it was the intention of the British government to have made a communication to the nabob, Omdut ul Omrah, of the proofs which they had obtained of his having carried on a secret correspondence with Tippoo Sultaun, contrary to the stipulations of the treaty of 1792. He had previously been apprised of his violation of that treaty by granting assignments on the mortgaged districts. Circumstances of expediency, however, interrupted this communication: it was protracted by the nabob's illness; and his death frustrated the wish of the British government to obtain from him satisfactory security for their rights in the Carnatic. Released from the treaty of 1792, which had been repeatedly violated by the nabob, with

the recorded opinions of Lord Macartney, Lord Cornwallis, Lord Buckinghamshire, and Lord Powis, that no divided power, however modified, could possibly avert the utter ruin of the Carnatic, the opinion of Lord Wellesley was further strengthened in these sentiments by a letter from the secret committee, approved by the board of control, transmitted to him in June, 1799. In this letter the secret committee observed, "In the event of a war with Tippoo Sultan, the respective countries of the nabob of Arcot and the rajah of Tanjore, will, of course, come under the Company's management, and they direct that they be not relinquished without special orders from us, or the court of directors." Without entering into any detailed examination of the contents of this letter, he would be satisfied with merely begging the house to remark, that even upon a general principle of expediency, and without any knowledge of the secret correspondence found at Seringapatam, the government at home ordered Lord Wellesley not to relinquish the Carnatic, even upon the conclusion of a peace with Tippoo Sultan. Therefore, he was clearly of opinion, that, under all these circumstances, it was the duty of Lord Wellesley to form such an arrangement for the future administration of the affairs of the Carnatic, as should result from a full consideration of the relative situation of the nabob and the East India Company; the ruinous consequences of the repeated violations of the treaty of 1792; the interests of the inhabitants of the country; the security of the British government; and the orders that had been received from the court of directors. A difficulty, however, arose with respect to the person who was to succeed to whatever degree of power it might be deemed safe to place in the hands of the successor of Omdut ul Omrah. His legitimate and adopted son was considered entitled to a conditional preference; but when, under the suggestion of those who had been the advisers of his father, he refused to accede to the terms which it had become necessary to annex to the situation of nabob of the Carnatic, the succession, subject to the stipulations required, was offered to, and accepted by, the next legitimate heir, the son of Ameer ul Omrah, and grandson of Mahomed Ali. But it had been said, that that arrangement in the Carnatic was begun, continued, and concluded, with a rapidity which was observable in all the foreign transactions of the Bengal government: it was, no doubt, easy to make, but it certainly was as easy to refute, such an assertion. So far from that rapidity with which the Bengal government was unjustly charged, it appears that Lord Wellesley investigated the business with the most deliberate caution. He appointed commissioners (of whom, in consequence of what had fallen from the hon. baronet who opened the debate, he should say a few words before he sat down) to examine the persons concerned in the correspondence, and to ascertain the nature of the connection between the nabobs of the Carnatic and Tippoo Sultan; he reported the proceedings to the secret committee and to the board of control; and it was not until Lord Wellesley was informed by those high authorities, that their sentiments perfectly coincided with his own, and with Lord Powis's, that he gave his final instructions on the subject, two years after the discovery of the correspondence of the nabob with Tippoo Sultan. The charge, therefore, of precipitancy, was quite unfounded. The treaty with Azem ul Dowlah was concluded in July, 1806; it was

immediately transmitted to England, and it was now only necessary to shew that it was approved of by the government at home. The house would, he flattered himself, agree with him, that a hasty decision had not been pronounced upon that important measure. In September, 1802, fourteen months after the treaty had been concluded, the secret committee having had the papers a long time under consideration, wrote to Lord Powis as follows: "We do not feel ourselves called upon to enter into the detail of the circumstances connected with the case, or to state at length the reasoning upon those circumstances, which has led to the conclusion we have come to, after the fullest and most deliberate caution. It is enough to state to you, that we are fully prepared, upon the facts, as at present before us, to approve and confirm the treaty in question; and we are of opinion, that, acting under the instructions of the governor-general, you stand fully justified (upon the evidence, written, as well as oral, on which you proceeded) in deeming the rights of the family of Mahomed Ali, as existing under former treaties, to have been wholly forfeited, by the systematic perfidy and treachery of the late nabobs of the Carnatic, Wallah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah, in breach of their solemn treaties with the Company. The claims of the family having been thus forfeited, and a right having accrued to the Company of making provision, at their discretion, for the future safety of the Carnatic, we are further of opinion, that the nature of the security which has been provided by the treaty for the defence and preservation of our interests in that quarter, is of a satisfactory description." After having so long troubled the house, he would merely observe, that the view which he had taken of this subject was formed upon an attentive perusal of the papers laid before parliament, upon which alone we could form our judgment. Indeed, the substance, almost the whole, of the speech with which he had presumed to trouble the house, was founded upon those documents, and he should therefore oppose the Resolutions moved by the hon. baronet. The hon. baronet, however, in speaking of the commissioners, had used an epithet, which, the hon. member said, he was sure he would not have done, if he had been personally acquainted with them; and yet a very slight examination of the papers would have enabled the hon. baronet to have known those gentlemen by character and reputation. Whatever opinion the hon. baronet might have formed of those gentlemen, he could assure him that there were not in the house, nor in the country, two men of a higher sense of honour, of more conscientious and honourable feeling. Colonel Close, so highly distinguished by his talents, his zeal, and integrity, was resident at the court of Poona; if he were in this country, he should have wished him to have been examined at the bar of the house, and he was persuaded that the hon. baronet would have formed a different opinion of the secret correspondence from that which he entertained. With Mr. Webbe, late chief secretary to the government of Madras, the hon. member said he had been in habits of the most affectionate friendship; unfortunately for his friends and his country, this valuable public officer was dead; he sacrificed his life in the service of his country; he was a man of the nicest sense of honour, justly looked up to as one of the highest characters in India; he could truly say, that Mr. Webbe's memory was universally revered. His noble and independent mind

would not have allowed him — [Here the feelings of the hon. member so overpowered him, that he was unable to proceed, and sat down.]

Mr. WINDHAM, on account of the lateness of the hour, and the number of hon. members who had yet to speak upon the subject, proposed that the debate should be adjourned to Wednesday, June the 1st, which was ordered accordingly.

## HOUSE OF COMMONS,

*Wednesday, June 1.*

### CONDUCT OF MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

On the motion of Sir Thomas Turton, the order for resuming the adjourned debate on the Carnatic Question, was read. No person rising to speak, the question was put on the first Resolution, and the gallery was cleared for a division; but Mr. Sheridan having suggested to Sir T. Turton to withdraw his Resolutions of fact and distinct charges, in order to bring the whole matter more satisfactorily to issue on the general question, whether Lord Wellesley's conduct in the transactions with respect to the Carnatic, was or was not consistent with justice, or with the character and honour of a British nation? a debate arose on this proposition, on which strangers were again admitted. When the gallery was re-opened,

Mr. WELLESLEY POLE was speaking. He had no objection to come to issue this or any other night upon any charge the right hon. gentleman, or any other person, might have to prefer against Lord Wellesley. He would not sit silent when it was insinuated that his noble relative or his friends wished to stifle inquiry. It was no evidence of a disposition to blink the question, that Lord Wellesley's friends were desirous to come to the vote without provoking a fresh debate. The debate on the former night had closed with a speech from an hon. member (Colonel Allan), who had been an eye-witness of the transactions in the Carnatic, and who was in no way connected with Lord Wellesley, declaring the whole of the matter contained in the charges, to be gross and unfounded calumnies. In the full confidence, not only of the innocence, but of the highly meritorious conduct of Lord Wellesley, he was ready to meet any thing that the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Sheridan) had to urge, however awful it may be to contend with the great talents and eloquence of that right hon. gentleman, matured and methodized on this question by a six years' preparation. He knew the magnitude of the powers he should have to contend with, but in the cause of truth he should not be deficient in boldness. He knew he expressed himself warmly on this subject; but during the last six years, and more parti-

cularly during the last three years, he had exhibited, as every one must allow, no small stock of patience. He did not pretend to be so callous, as not to feel indignation when the hon. baronet who brought these charges, said, that Lord Wellesley's conduct in India had been such as to convince him, that no man could retain honour or honesty in that country. The hon. baronet, in thus expressing himself, only used his parliamentary privilege of freedom of speech, but he had gone to the full extent of that privilege, in using language which he dared not use elsewhere. He contended, that the judgment of the house, however pronounced, after the discussion and investigation that had taken place, would be decisive of the case. If the decision should be unfavourable to Lord Wellesley, he would bow to it as a fair condemnation; if it should be favourable, he would rely on it as a full and fair acquittal. He was convinced that Lord Wellesley had been actuated by no principles but a regard for the honour and interest of his country; and in this conviction he boldly met those accusations, which, if he thought them at all founded in fact, he should shrink from, and hide his face at a distance from this house, and from the society in which he had the honour to associate.

Mr. SHERIDAN regretted that the hon. gentleman had so totally misconceived him. He had never said that that hon. gentleman, or any of his friends, were anxious to blink the question; but he had said the very reverse. He had said, too, what he would repeat, that moving the previous question was not the way to obtain for the noble marquis, the honourable and satisfactory investigation so much wished for by his friends. It was not directly meeting the very serious charges brought against that noble lord. As to the part he took in the present question, the hon. gentleman knew well that he could not be influenced by any other motive than a sense of public duty. As to the fraternal intemperance of the hon. gentleman, he was willing, if not to approve, at least, to overlook it; at the same time he denied that any thing had ever fallen from him that went to impeach the private moral character of the noble marquis; though he always thought, and was still of opinion, that that noble lord betrayed, too often, a mischievous ambition, that might be ultimately ruinous to the British interests in the East. He would repeat his wish, that the worthy baronet would wave his antecedent Resolutions, and come at once to the immediate point at issue, as to Lord Wellesley's conduct with respect to the Carnatic.

Mr. WELLESLEY POLE stated, that when the hon. baronet had opened his Resolutions, an hon. friend of his (Mr. Wallace) gave notice that he would move the previous question on the Resolutions of fact, and a direct negative on the criminating Resolution, for which he proposed to substitute a resolution of approbation.

Sir JOHN ANSTRUTHER thought it a most extraordinary proceeding, that after the course just stated should have been laid down in the presence of the right hon. gentleman, a fortnight since, and he had heard it, and was ready to speak on it without exception, he all at once came forward this night to reverse all that had been done, and substitute a general question. Nothing but the previous question would be a proper proceeding on some of the Resolutions. The others were to be met directly in the most decided manner.

Mr. WALLACE felt himself warranted by the practice of parliament in proposing the previous question on the Resolutions of fact. To the criminatory Resolution he proposed a direct negative, to be followed up with a Resolution of approbation. There could be no question that a decision on these Resolutions would fully convey the sense of the house. The hon. baronet who opened the charge, and every other person who spoke on the question, treated of it in its full extent.

Sir THOMAS TURTON considered that his Resolution ought to be agreed to without a question. On the fourth Resolution, which was criminating, he thought the house ought to go into a committee. Finding that the Resolutions were to be met in this manner, he should divide the house on every one of them; and on the fourth, criminating Lord Wellesley, not personally, but in his acts, he should again state to the house his reasons for confirming the Resolution.

The question being called for, the house divided on the first Resolution. Two divisions then took place in succession. That on the first Resolution was

|                           |   |   |      |
|---------------------------|---|---|------|
| For the previous question | - | - | 102  |
| For the Resolution        | - | - | 18   |
| Majority                  | - | - | — 84 |

On the second Resolution, the numbers were,

|                           |   |   |      |
|---------------------------|---|---|------|
| For the previous question | - | - | 109  |
| For the Resolution        | - | - | 21   |
| Majority                  | - | - | — 88 |

For about an hour after this, strangers were excluded from the gallery. On our return we found

Mr. G. JOHNSTONE addressing the house, and condemning, in strong terms, the conduct pursued towards the young prince of the Carnatic, Ali Hussein, who had been, for no crime, punished with greater severity than was merited by the guilty person who had preceded him; and no man could entertain a doubt as to the manner in which he came by his end, after he had been given into the power of another prince. It had been asked, whether the government of India would put a young man upon the throne of the Carnatic, who was suspected not to be cordially their friend? If there was any foundation for that argument, it was one of much greater validity for excluding Omdut ul Omrah. The father, who possessed his inheritance in the greatest splendour, had much more means of doing mischief than his son. An hon. gentleman who spoke on a former debate, had greatly misrepresented the fact, when he said the nabob of the Carnatic owed his power to the East India Company. At one time it was owing to the assistance the Company received from the nabob Wallah Juh, that our existence was preserved along the coast bordering on his territories, when the French attacked us near fort St. David. It was said the nabobs were only a sort of lords, and that they had no authority in the country. The very contrary of this was the fact. The nabob was a legitimate sovereign, and the East India Company acknowledged him as such, by holding territory from him.—The hon. gentleman then entered into a history of various transactions in India, to shew that it was contrary to the principles and



practice of our government, at former periods, to keep possession of the territory of native princes. At the conclusion of a war with Tippoo Sultan, his territories, which we had taken possession of during hostilities, were restored to him. In opposition to this, and other acts of a similar kind, was our own convenience to be set up as a plea for injustice? The letters of Lord Cornwallis had been quoted, during a former debate, in order to justify this proceeding. But the conduct of Lord Cornwallis was that of his actually giving up the territory he possessed, as belonging to the nabob; and was it not extraordinary that this act should have been quoted for the purpose of justifying an opposite conduct? The act to which the attention of the house was now called, was a sort of a conviction, that to establish our dominions in the East, no part of the territories belonging to the native princes should be suffered to remain in their hands. But he would ask if this system had answered in point of policy? Were we gainers by it, even in mere profit? No: the very reverse was the fact. As soon as we got possession of any additional territory in India, the establishment necessary to support it had eaten up the profit; and it was now a well-known fact, that we received less money, in point of revenue, from the extensive dominions in our possession, than we received when we held them from the nabob. It was evident, therefore, the system had not answered, either in policy, or in pecuniary advantage. As to security, we had acquired none, for every day proved, that the vast extent of our dominions in the East made the security less and less. If the house wanted an example, he would call to their recollection the mutiny at Vellore. It had always been the sentiment of Lord Cornwallis, that it was only by moderation and justice that we could ever expect to render our dominions in Asia secure, and prevent those passions and heart-burnings which so frequently occurred in those distant possessions.

Mr. WHIRSHED KRENE entered into a defence of the government of India, in depriving the nabob of his dominions, because he had shown a manifest disposition to favour and aid the French. The greatest abuses, he said, existed in the Carnatic. The hon. member then went so far back into the history of the Carnatic as the year 1768, and pointed out such abuses as he thought rendered the interference of the India government highly necessary. He spoke at considerable length in exculpation of the noble marquis, and in favour of the previous question. He enumerated the important services he had rendered his country, which were manifest from the documents upon the table of the house: and he was convinced that from a fair consideration of the subject, the house must acquit the noble marquis of the criminal part of the charge. He contrasted the conduct of other governors of India, who had returned with unstained character, with that of the noble marquis, and contended that he, as well as they, was entitled to the approbation of his country. He was well persuaded that no other measures than those pursued by the noble marquis could have secured the fidelity of the nabob of Arcot; and he thought, from the peculiar circumstances of the country, he was fully warranted in the line of conduct he pursued. Any body who could trace the origin of our connection with the nabob, would observe, that the actions of the noble marquis were marked by a degree of prudence and firmness highly becoming his situation in India.



Mr. GRANT said he was reluctant to trouble the house on a subject which had already received so ample a discussion; but he conceived that his situation as a director of the East India Company imposed on him the duty of offering his sentiments on the occasion. As he understood, however, that several other gentlemen, as well as himself, wished to debate the last Resolution, he should propose, from the lateness of the hour, to postpone the consideration of that branch of the question till an early day. (A cry of go on, go on; on which the hon. member resumed his speech.)

The chief causes assigned by the governments of India for the deposition of the family of Mahomed Ali, had been the alleged hostility of the princes of that house towards us, and also a correspondence which they were discovered to have maintained with the sovereign of Mysore, which correspondence was stated to have been utterly subversive of their existing engagements with the British power. But the case had been argued in the house on somewhat different grounds. The nabob of the Carnatic had been represented as the feudatory and vassal of our government, as having abused the charge committed to him by a series of gross mis-government, which had reduced the country to a state of the most dreadful disorder, and as having, therefore, justly forfeited his exalted situation. In order to meet, as far as possible, the different views in which the question had been considered, the hon. director said he would first concisely review the nature and progress of our connection with the nabob; next, he would consider the effects of this connection on that prince's administration, including under this head the disorders with which his administration stood charged; he would then comment on the accusations that had been brought against the nabob of a breach of faith; and, lastly, would shortly examine how far any of the circumstances mentioned had authorised us in our late assumption of his territory.

Anwar u Dien Cawn, Mr. Grant said, the grandfather of the late nabob, had been appointed to the nabobship of the Carnatic by the great Nizam ul Mulek; and, though by no means an immaculate character, had yet been, in this respect, superior to the generality of Indian princes. This person had perished in a battle against the French and Chunda Sahib, who was a pretender to the nabobship of the Carnatic. The eldest son of Anwar u Dien was taken prisoner in the engagement; but his second son, Mahomed Ali, having escaped, applied for assistance to the British. The inordinate ambition of the French had by this time completely alarmed the English Company's governments in the East. It was evident that, under colour of supporting the pretensions of a native prince, the French were forming the most ambitious schemes of territorial aggrandisement in India. This was a prospect in the last degree dangerous to our interests, and nothing remained for us but to contend against those powerful enemies with their own weapons; that is, by supporting a rival candidate for the rule of the Carnatic. Actuated by these views, we embraced Mahomed Ali's proposals, and took arms ostensibly in his cause, but really in our own. Such had been the origin of our intimate connection with the nabobs of Arcot. The general correctness of this statement, Mr. Grant said, would appear from all the historical accounts of these transactions; and, indeed, would

be allowed by every person who was competently informed on the subject.

These admitted facts it was material to keep in view, because our late appropriation of the Carnatic had been vindicated partly on the ground that the nabob was only the creature of our power; and that, consequently, our removal of him from his high station was the mere resumption of an existence which we had ourselves bestowed. Could these premises be even established, it was far from clear that they would warrant the conclusion that was attempted to be drawn from them; and, certainly, whatever might have been our demands on the gratitude of the family of Mahomed Ali, we had, at length, exacted a payment in full; but the fact was, that the premises themselves were notoriously false. It was certainly not likely that, without our aid, Mahomed Ali would ever have been able to establish himself in the sovereignty of his paternal dominions; but, undoubtedly, it was as little likely that, without those advantages, and that hold on the opinion of the natives, which an alliance with the family of Anwar u Dien Cawn had afforded us, we should ever have been successful in a struggle, which, in spite of all the helps that we could command, and the most powerful talents to direct our resources, had, it was well known, long been doubtful and perilous in the extreme. To say the truth, by far the greater part of our political and territorial rights in the Carnatic, had professedly been derived through the title which Mahomed Ali possessed to the nabobship; the very title on which it was now found convenient to throw a slur. How far the nabob might be obliged to us for services which were confessed to be performed from interested motives, the hon. director said he would not determine; but of this he was sure, that the obligations on our part were, at least, equally great, and, consequently, that the argument drawn from the favours which we had formerly conferred on the nabob's family, was exactly as just as it was generous.

Whatever might have been the defects of the nabob's title, we had precluded ourselves from any notice of them, by having fully acknowledged him as lawful nabob of the Carnatic. His title had also been fully recognised by the French, in the treaty of Paris, 1763; by the Subahdar of the Deccan in 1768; and by the Mogul in 1773. The importance of his title to us was evident from the stress which the Company laid on the recognition of it by the French, as would appear from the following words, in a letter written by the directors to the government of Fort St. George, and dated March 9, 1763. "A farther advantage we hope to derive from the recognition of this prince (the nabob), and of Salabadzing, whose title, you will see, is likewise acknowledged, that *it is a confirmation of our title to the territories we hold under grants from those princes*, and a farther security to the peace of the country, leaving the French no colour to interpose hereafter in favour of any other pretenders to the sovereignty of the Deccan or the Carnatic." In 1769, we made a treaty with Hyder Ali, in which the nabob refused to be a party; nor was it then thought competent to us to insist on his participation. Subsequently to our original acknowledgment of the nabob, we had made two treaties with him, in the years 1787 and 1792, in both of which that original acknowledgment had been confirmed.

In full and indisputable possession of those rights, it was necessary

to observe what the situation of this prince, in process of time, became. At the commencement of our connection with him, he was the principal in the wars of the Deccan, and we the auxiliaries; the parties also were, in some sort, on a footing of equality, were involved in a common danger, and their alliance was reciprocally valuable. The course of events, however, insensibly altered their relative position. Our growing territory, wealth, and power in the East, gradually exalted us above our old ally, and threw him into the shade; and this inequality, by necessarily producing a depressing sense of inferiority on his part, and the contrary feeling on ours, had a perpetual tendency to increase itself. By degrees, we became the principals in the wars of the Carnatic, and he only an auxiliary; and, what was more, an auxiliary, who, though he might suffer from our losses, could acquire little or nothing by our conquests, and who, therefore, could not be expected to feel any very warm or lively interest in our success. At length he was prevailed on to dismiss his own troops, and to trust the defence of the Carnatic entirely to the Company, who were, for that purpose, to assume the entire management of his dominions in time of war, allowing him a certain stipulated portion of the revenues. By these steps, which it was unnecessary to describe more in detail, the nabob sunk into a state of political insignificance; and, though still possessed of very important and valuable rights, became, virtually, dependent on our good faith and power.

Now, what was likely to be the effect of this order of things on the character and conduct of the prince in question? It was plainly his interest, and would naturally be his wish, to preserve peace with all his neighbours; war not only would give him nothing, but would, while it lasted, deprive him of almost all that he possessed. Submission, in a certain degree, to his British allies, his circumstances naturally prescribed to him; at the same time it could hardly be expected that his friendship towards them should be extremely zealous, or that the services to which it called him should be performed with great activity. It even could not be considered as surprising if his obedience should be not only languid, but mixed with some feelings of jealousy towards those by whom, under the name of allies, he was so completely overtopped and humbled; and this the more especially, because our occasional assumption of a part of his dominions, and repeated propositions to him to resign the management of the whole, could not but suggest to him some uneasy anticipations with respect to the probable event of these encroachments.

With all this, it did not follow that he was likely to be disaffected to us in any sense which would imply an endeavour to shake off our alliance; and for this short reason, that our alliance, with all its attendant inconveniences, was palpably a far smaller evil than a rupture with us. He had no means, nor could have the faintest hopes of bettering his condition by any change. In point of fact, it could not be disputed that he had acted up to the principle of a common cause, at least till after the peace with Tippoo in 1784. An attempt had, indeed, been made, as the papers on the table would shew, to prove that Mahomed Ali had been engaged in a perfidious negotiation with Hyder so early as the year 1783. This attempt was well worthy of observation. In the records of Seringapatam, there had been discovered some letters

addressed to Hyder from his ambassador at the court of Mahomed Ali, in which the writer reported various complimentary and friendly expressions used by the nabob towards the sultaun. Instantly the Bengal government began to stigmatise this shameful breach of faith in Mahomed Ali, and this antiquated correspondence was used as illustrative of the systematic treachery charged on the unfortunate family of that prince. It had, however, since appeared, that all these professions and overtures of attachment towards Hyder had sprung from the suggestions and wishes of the British government of that time, whose most earnest desire it was that the nabob would so far overcome his rooted aversion towards the Mysorean as to maintain a pacific and friendly intercourse with him. The lessons to be drawn from this memorable fact were too obvious to require any particular comment. But even had the nabob, at that early period, cherished any expectations of emancipating himself from the yoke of our alliance, it was impossible that he should have persevered in such projects, when his means of realising them were every day declining. The British power was becoming more and more preponderant; and Tippoo, the only potentate of any consequence in his neighbourhood, was divided from him by a most rancorous hereditary hatred. Least of all could we suspect him of having indulged in those alleged projects after the war of 1792. Tippoo had then been despoiled of half his territory, the French were entirely destitute of resources in India, and he himself had no army of his own whatever. His only object, then, could be to retain peaceable possession of what he had; or, at most, to conciliate, by his conduct, the good will of his neighbours, with a view to his security, in case, after all, the chances of war should at any time raise up some new preponderating power in the East.

It had, however, been argued on a former night, that if the nabob could so far overlook his true interests as to view with indifference the efforts of his best friends, the British, in defence of their common cause, and even by his extreme tardiness in affording them the assistance which he had promised, to impair and thwart those efforts, then it was perfectly consistent to ascribe to him the further impolicy and folly of conspiring against those friends with his natural enemies. But there was no force in this reasoning. It was not clear that those who were in some one respect unwise, might therefore be rationally suspected of every sort and degree of madness whatsoever. In the circumstances of the nabob, it was natural enough that he should fall into habits of indolence and mis-government; but it was by no means natural that he should be guilty of the palpable and unspeakable impolicy of risking all that he possessed on a speculation of the very last extravagance. The carelessness and weakness of his conduct were so far from justifying the supposition of his having really formed the arduous and desperate projects imputed to him, that they rather countenanced the contrary opinion.

In the situation of this prince, Mr. Grant said, a sufficient explanation might be found of those disorders which had been stated to prevail in his administration. What, in fact, was his interest in the welfare of his dominions? In proportion as those dominions should flourish, he was liable to an increase in the demands of the Company upon him,

Fearing the power of our government, and of those possessing influence in it, and feeling himself unequal to a contest of strength against such decided superiority, he was led to fortify his interests by intrigue and artifice;—hence his lavish grants and his debts. From these causes, in a great measure, the disorders of his country had proceeded. Those disorders had been sufficiently deplorable; but it was necessary to recollect that, for the system which had given birth to them, we were at least as much to blame as the nabob. The *divided government*, of which such bitter complaints had been made, and which we had now taken care completely to supersede, by appropriating the entire government to ourselves, had been one of our own creation; and it therefore seemed hard that its faults should be visited exclusively on the nabob.

From this review of the progress of our connection with the Carnatic, the hon. member did not think it difficult to appreciate the general nature of our relations with the nabob, or the justice of our late assumption of that whole territory. It was of very trifling consequence, and indeed was an idle dispute about words, to enquire whether the nabob had been a *dependent* or an *independent* prince; epithets, neither of which was fully applicable to his situation. His situation had, in fact, been one of a *qualified dependence*, the terms of that dependence being adjusted by formal treaties. The treaties having been framed expressly for the purpose of determining the mutual relations of the two parties, it was plain, if any thing ever was plain, that in all their mutual transactions, they were to hold the provisions of those instruments sacred; and that any interference on either part, under any pretext, beyond the limits marked out by such provisions, was altogether unjust, and a breach of faith. If, with a view, pretended or real, of rectifying the disorders of the Carnatic, we arrogated to ourselves a power which a solemn compact, freely entered into by ourselves, directly withheld from us, we acted exactly like a man who should forcibly possess himself of his neighbour's field or garden, on the alleged ground that his neighbour cultivated such field or garden very badly, and that he himself could cultivate it better! It was impossible to vindicate the forcible assumption of the Carnatic by enumerating the various and successive concessions previously made to us by the sovereigns of that region. Those concessions had been either extorted or voluntary. If extorted, it was high time that extortion should have stopped; and, at all events, the smaller violation of plighted faith could never be considered as a precedent for the larger. If, on the other hand, those concessions had been obtained only by the methods of simple persuasion and remonstrance (which had generally been the case), they formed a body of strong precedents in proof of the injustice of the last and greatest concession, which was admitted and avowed to have been wrung from the party by force.

The hon. gentleman (Mr. Wallace), however, who, on the former night's debate, had first defended Lord Wellesley, had admitted that the disorders of the Carnatic, however great, could not of themselves justify so strong a measure as our assumption of the country; but his argument had been, that when once the perfidy of the nabob himself had absolved us from our engagements with him, it became our duty to consider the disordered state of the country, and to push the rights accruing

to us to the utmost. This argument, to be sure, assumed the perfidy of the nabob, of which he (Mr. Grant) would say something presently; but this admitted, the principle might perhaps abstractedly be just. It was, however, in all cases, a principle very dangerous to act upon, because highly liable to abuse; and, in the present case, there were considerations which made it totally inapplicable and preposterous. These were, that we had ourselves been mainly instrumental in producing the system which had occasioned all the miseries of the Carnatic; that the remedy which we proposed for those miseries was one by which we were ourselves to be the first and the greatest gainers, and that the adoption of the remedy could cost us no other trouble than merely issuing an order. It was monstrous to assert, that a power so situated, and acting under such powerful temptations to its cupidity, should be allowed that sort of discretion claimed for it by the hon. gentleman, of pushing, with whatever purpose or pretence, its demands to the utmost. When we made an *arrangement* (such was the mild appellation given to it), by which the nabob surrendered every thing, and we gained every thing, it would be ridiculous to imagine that a bystander would construe this transaction, however it might be described, in any other light than as an instance of the most criminal ambition; and, what was worse, the construction would probably be right.

Before he proceeded to consider the alleged infractions by the nabob, of the treaty of 1792, the hon. director said he would advert in this place to the supposed policy of our measures on the occasion. An hon. gentleman (Col. Allan) had, in the former debate on the subject, taken great pains to shew the policy of those measures from this consideration, that, in the opinions of the wise and best-informed persons, some of which opinions the hon. gentleman had quoted to the house, the division of government in the Carnatic was the great scourge of that country. All this might be allowed; and yet, in the only admissible sense of the word, the policy of our measures still remained to be proved; for the question was still to be answered, whether they were just. The hon. member, to whom he alluded, had cited the testimony of Lord Cornwallis, with respect to the inconveniencies of the divided system of government, and the advantages which might be expected from a supersession of it. He (Mr. Grant) wished that the hon. gentleman had read the rest of the paragraph, with a part of which he had presented the house, from Lord Cornwallis's letter of the 9th of July, 1792. After stating his wishes to have the entire country placed under the Company's management, his lordship thus proceeds: "But the nabob's own disposition, and the influence of a number of interested people, of a variety of descriptions, left me no ground to hope that he could be brought to give his free consent to an arrangement of that nature and a regard to justice and liberality towards an old ally, as well as to our own reputation in India, equally precluded the most distant idea of making use of any other means than those of persuasion, which I knew would be ineffectual." The fact was, that the late revolution in the government of the Carnatic might have been as easily effected by Lord Cornwallis as by any succeeding governor; his power was equal, and if he had sought zealously for a pretext, one might undoubtedly have been discovered. It was very true that Lord Hobart, while governor of Madras

had proposed to force on the nabob an arrangement somewhat similar to that of Lord Wellesley; he would have had the Company take possession at once of the districts pledged for the security of the nabob's subsidy, and this in spite of the nabob's rejection of the measure. His lordship justified this proposal on the grounds described by the hon. gentleman (Col. Allan); but the hon. gentleman had not informed the house that the supreme government of Bengal had overruled the plan of forcing the nabob into such an arrangement, as being totally inconsistent with the faith of treaties, and that their conduct had met with the approbation of the authorities at home. The exposée of the supreme government respecting this subject, was so excellent, that, Mr. Grant said, he would make no apology for troubling the house with an extract from it.

*Extract from a Political Letter from Bengal, dated the 12th May, 1796.*

Par. 24. "We closed our observations on the subject to the Madras government with the following reflections, suggested by the opinions and propositions in the documents which they had transmitted to us.

25. "That to preserve the public faith inviolate, was a principle not only inculcated by you and by the prescriptions of the legislature, but by reason, policy, and justice; and that we should date the admission of arguments in deviation from this principle, as a certain prelude to the subversion of the British power in India.

26. "That we should not go so far as to assert that no circumstances could exist to justify the deprivation of those rights which the nabob holds by treaty; but before we assented to such a measure, we should require the clearest proof of their existence, and that they were of a nature to justify to the world the violation of those sanctions which we were bound to observe.

27. "That we sincerely regretted with them and the Company the mal-administration under which the subjects of his highness had long suffered; but that if mis-management were to be assumed as a plea for the introduction of the administration of the Company over the territories of the nabob, in violation of the treaty of 1792, the same argument would certainly apply to the dominions of the nabob vizier, and probably to those of the rajah of Travancore.

28. "That what was morally wrong could never be politically right; and that a conduct directed by the principles which we were combating would have a tendency to impress the powers of India with an idea which they have a temptation to adopt, — that our boasted adherence to political obligations was limited by our power or convenience.

29. "That the observation had been made long ago by the late Madhagge Scindia.

30. "That the nabob of Bengal has often been quoted in proof of it; and that it had long been the endeavour of this government to counteract its impression, and establish another more favourable to the interests of the Company, by the strictest attention to all existing engagements."

The court of directors had entirely concurred in these arguments.

and, accordingly, in their general letter of the 18th of October, 1797, to fort St. George, after expressing their hope that Lord Wellesley might be able to effect an arrangement with the nabob of the Carnatic, similar to that which had been projected by Lord Hobart, they thus expressed themselves: — “ But, feeling, as we do, *the necessity of maintaining our credit with the country powers by an exact observance of treaties,* a principle so honourably established under Lord Cornwallis’s administration, *we cannot authorise his lordship to exert other powers than those of persuasion, to induce the nabob to form a new arrangement.*” These extracts might suggest what was the true view to be taken of this question, and illustrate the policy of avoiding all lax interpretations of our treaties with the native powers of India, whatever good ends such interpretations might, at first view, appear calculated to answer.

The hon. director proceeded to consider the alleged violations of the treaty of 1792 by the nabob, violations which we had been pleased to consider as releasing us from the obligation of that engagement. The principal of these were, his having granted assignments on that part of his territory which was pledged as a security for the payment of the subsidy to the Company; his tardiness and negligence in affording us the supplies which he was bound to procure, during the war in the Carnatic; and lastly, his clandestine correspondence with Tippoo. With respect to the former, by the fifth section of the eighth article of the treaty of 1792, it had been provided, that the nabob should not grant any assignments on the revenues of the responsible districts; and that, if any such assignment should be found to exist on any of the districts, when such district should be assumed by the Company, such assignment should be declared by the Company and the nabob to be void. The nabob having, in fact, granted assignments on some of the districts in question, Lord Hobart, in justification of the arrangement of the affairs of the Carnatic, which, as had been already stated, he had recommended, declared that the nabob had violated the treaty, and, in fact, reduced it to a dead letter. To be sure it was obvious that, by the treaty, the nabob was bound either not to assign the revenues of the responsible districts, or, having assigned them, to declare those assignments void, whenever the districts should fall into the Company’s hands. If he did not this, he violated the treaty. But that the simple act of assigning the revenues, when done on pain of having the assignment avoided, should of itself be considered as amounting to a dissolution of the treaty, and as authorising us to re-model the whole of that engagement, seemed to be a very questionable doctrine. Lord Hobart, however, had contended, and his arguments had been repeated on the present occasion, that the avoidance of the grant was evidently a penalty attaching, not on the nabob, but on the money lender; and, consequently, that the former must be liable to some further penalty, since the treaty never could have intended to exempt him from all blame in the event of his making the obnoxious grants. These arguments, when they were first urged by Lord Hobart, had not convinced the Bengal government of that time, nor the authorities at home; and it was for the house to judge whether such a construction of a plain instrument was to be endured, or whether it was consistent with British candour, humanity, and justice, to quibble away the entire dominions of a prince



on such pretences. To say nothing more, it seemed strange that the avoidance of a sovereign's grants should be represented as no sort of injury to that sovereign; and besides this, Lord Hobart, in arguing that the assignments by the nabob, being breaches of his engagement, ought to expose him to some farther penalty, had assumed the very thing in dispute, which was, whether the mere act of assignment, so long as that assignment was understood to be conditional and subject to avoidance, was, in fact, a breach of the nabob's engagement. But it was unnecessary to discuss this matter further; when the whole question was, not whether the nabob had in all points strictly adhered to the treaty, but whether he had so violated it as to incur the enormous penalty which had been exacted from his family. Now, on a point which, to say the least of it, turned on a very doubtful construction, how could so monstrous a proposition possibly be maintained?

As to the tardiness and negligence of the nabob in supplying us with money, provisions, and carriages, during the time of war, this the governor-general had represented as a decisive symptom of systematic hostility of mind. This charge, however, like the rest, was not confined to the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, but had been made to reflect back on his father Mahomed Ali. Both those princes were represented as having been "hostile to the full extent of their active powers, and according to their means and opportunities." The hon. director referred here to what he had already said respecting the peculiar circumstances in which the nabobs of the Carnatic had been placed by their connection with the Company; and argued, that their conduct had been such as we might naturally have expected, and ought to have forgiven. What had been harshly called "*a systematic deception* in the provision of funds," was nothing more than was common to the Asiatics. When we entered into treaties with the nabobs of the Carnatic, we were aware of this. We were, in early times, perfectly well acquainted with the Asiatic character, and had been extremely tolerant of its known defects, so long as such toleration had suited us. Surely it became us to persevere in the same liberal system. As to the systematic hostility of the nabobs, the charge was unjust and cruel. They had been backward to pay, because their plain interest was to pay as little as possible. But was this to be swelled into a proof of hostility? In 1779, when there was a confederacy entered into among the native powers of India against the Company, what was the conduct of Mahomed Ali? Had he been before that time inimically disposed towards us (as had been alleged), he would have hailed this as an excellent opportunity of gratifying his inclinations. He would, at least, have connived at the plot. He would have suffered it to ripen in silence. Did he thus conduct himself? On the contrary, he no sooner received a hint of the existence of such a combination, than he communicated it to the governor-general, and strongly pressed on him the necessity of instant preparation. Mr. Grant said, he held in his hand the letter written by the nabob on this memorable occasion. With respect to the alleged perfidy of Mahomed Ali in 1773, the hon. director said he had already sufficiently explained that matter. What could be worse, than thus to traduce the characters of our departed allies?

But there was another pretended breach of the treaty of 1792 on the

part of the nabobs. He alluded to their clandestine correspondence with Tippoo. On the correspondence itself, Mr. Grant said he would remark presently, but there were some preliminary observations which suggested themselves. It was plain from the papers, that for some time before the discovery of the letters in question, the government of India had been strongly inclined to a very decisive and authoritative interference in the affairs of the Carnatic, and, indeed, to an assumption of a good part, at least, of that country. Now, with this bias on their minds, it might be expected that they would be disposed to seek every possible colour for the measures they were projecting, and, consequently, would be far from impartial judges of any thing in the nabob's conduct that afforded the slightest ground for suspicion and complaint. The truth was, they had read these letters with evil eyes, and had conducted the whole affair of the assumption with such an utter disregard of justice, as was quite inexplicable on any other supposition than that of a pre-determination on their part to seize the country by some means or other. It was allowed on all sides, that the letters contained no direct or palpable proof of the nabob's having conspired against the Company. Those who thought the worst of them, were reduced to a great deal of circuitous construction, and of inference from obscure allusions. It was true that, in order to throw light on the subject, some persons, through whose hands this correspondence had originally passed, and who, indeed, had themselves written some of the letters, had been examined. It was perfectly notorious, however, that this examination had brought nothing of any importance to light, excepting so far as it had satisfactorily explained some of the most suspicious parts of the correspondence. This had been distinctly allowed by the governor-general himself, whose words in one of the documents on the table (letter to Lord Clive of 28th May, 1801) were, "*The tendency of those examinations is of a nature, in some important parts of the evidence, rather to weaken than to confirm the impression made on my mind by the written documents.*" This was curious, and it was curious also, that, notwithstanding the known servility of the Asiatic character, and the strong and manifest indications which had been given to the persons examined, that the discovery of the nabob's guilt would be highly agreeable to the British government, not one of those persons admitted the criminal plots ascribed to the nabob, though some of them at least must have been privy to such plots, and though they were not, nor ever had been, in any way connected with the nabob's family. Under these circumstances, it was impossible for the warmest advocate of the late arrangements, to assert that the case was free from difficulty. Indeed, an hon. gentleman (Mr. Wallace), in a former debate, had allowed that the evidence against the nabob was not such as might be requisite in a British court of justice; he had, however, added, that it was such as nations were compelled to act upon, if they had any regard to their own safety. *Compelled!* Nations in general might be compelled, but *we* certainly had not been compelled. We had voluntarily and deliberately stopped short in our inquiries, at the very moment when we were admitting that some important circumstances of suspicion had been completely explained. We had not asked a single question of any person connected with the nabob, not even of his minister, Khader Nawaz Khan, who was himself deeply implicated in the

suspensions attaching on the nabob, and was residing at Madras at the very time of the examination. But, what was infinitely worse than all, we had, in contempt of the very first principle of justice, altogether refused to hear the accused in his own defence. When the Bengal government had first issued their directions to Lord Clive, to negotiate the transfer of the Carnatic into our hands, on the ground of the nabob Omdut ul Omrah's treachery, that person was himself alive. Those directions were on the table of the house; and, incredible as it might seem, it appeared that the nabob, so accused, and so to be punished, was to be addressed, not with remonstrance, not with a demand of explanation, not with a single question of inquiry: no, the very first communication to be made to him was, that, by his treachery, he had irrecoverably forfeited the whole of his dominions, and that the determination of the British government was final. The instructions of the governor-general on this head were peremptory, and, in fact, they were obeyed with a scrupulous exactness; for, though Omdut ul Omrah had died just before the fatal blow was struck, there could be no doubt that his son and presumptive successor, who then stood in his place, had a perfect right to be heard in defence of his father's fame and his own rights. This, however, was refused. The two khans, under whose guardianship the young prince had been placed by the late nabob, undertook (as the report of the British deputies mentioned) "that, upon being furnished with the proofs of the supposed treacherous intercourse between Tippoo Sultaun and the family of the nabob Mahomed Ali, such explanations should be afforded, and such answers given, as the different cases might require, and that, the proofs being compared, the Company might form a complete judgment." This most equitable proposition was instantly stifled, and the khans were informed, "that in cases of disputed points between independent powers, neither party could erect itself into a judge of the conduct of the other party." The deputies, therefore, in strict conformity with their instructions, refused to hear any more on the subject, and insisted on the immediate transfer of the Carnatic into our possession. Was it possible to conceive a more shameful proceeding than this, or a more extraordinary plea than that which had been employed in defence of it? Undoubtedly, independent powers could not ordinarily sit in judgment on each other. The reason was, because independent powers would not ordinarily submit their conduct to such an inquest, or, if they submitted to the inquest, they would probably not submit to the decision. Still the judicial method of proceeding was always adopted so far as was practicable; for was it not always expected that remonstrance should precede hostilities? or would it be endured, except perhaps in cases of the last necessity, that a power, having reasons, however strong, to suspect another of ill faith and perfidy, should summarily proceed to destroy that other, without a single previous word of expostulation or enquiry? But, in the present instance, we had a power voluntarily surrendering itself to judgment, imploring to be put on its trial, and at the same time notoriously unable to offer a moment's resistance to any sentence that might be pronounced, how harsh and tyrannical soever; and then we had this power completely annihilated without a hearing, on the pretence that independent powers could not sit in judgment on each other! Not the

least extraordinary feature of this transaction was, that we had for once, that is, at the only time when our convenience required it, admitted the nabob to be an *independent* power. But, however inconsistent this might seem, it was exactly in character.

The hon. director then went on to make some comments on the clandestine correspondence between the nabobs and Tippoo. In considering it, he said, it was curious to observe the contradictory explanations given of several parts of it by those who wished to extract from it proofs of the disaffection of the nabobs to the British, and also the manner in which some of those persons had been forced to abandon several of the grounds on which they had at first relied the most firmly. The first paper in the correspondence related two separate conversations between the nabob Wallah Jah and the vakeels of Tippoo; at the latter of which conversations, Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows had been present. In both, it appeared that the nabob had expressed his good will to Tippoo in the warmest terms, and his aversion to the war just concluded; and, on the first occasion, he had expressed his earnest wish for the establishment of a perfect friendship between himself and that prince, whom he complimented as the supporter of the faith. The Persian translator, Mr. Edmonstone, had laid the greatest stress on these conversations, and had asserted it to be his belief, that, though Lord Cornwallis and other English gentlemen were present at one of the two conferences, the discourse referred to between the nabob and the vakeels must have been so conducted as not to be overheard by them. He even added, that it could not be supposed that the nabob "would have uttered such sentiments in the hearing of any person who understood, and might communicate them to his lordship." Unfortunately, however, the very letter referred to shewed, not only that these sentiments had been uttered in the hearing of his lordship, but that the nabob had appealed to his lordship for the truth of what he had uttered. It had then become necessary to take a new ground, and accordingly an hon. member (Mr. Wallace) now discovered a great difference between the expressions used by the nabob on the two occasions. On the first, when the English gentlemen were not present, he had proposed a friendship with Tippoo; of which proposal he made no mention on the second.—Why this difference the hon. gentleman asked. Why, for the plainest of all reasons; because the proposal meant nothing, and was merely one of those hyperbolical complimentary effusions, which, according to the hon. gentleman's own admission, were the ordinary language of ceremony in the East. But, in the presence of Lord Cornwallis, the nabob had not complimented Tippoo as before, on his being a *pillar of the faith*. Accident or politeness towards the English present might have occasioned this variance; but that no importance could be attached to the mention of the religious union subsisting between Mussulmans, was sufficiently proved (if, indeed, any proof were necessary) by the circumstance of Tippoo's more than once dwelling on this religious union in his public letters to the nabob. letters communicated to the British government. Thus, one of these letters contains these words: "Seeing that the princes of Islam are connected with each other by the ties of a generous and zealous fellowship, according to the apothegm, *that hearts influenced by the same religion are better*

*calculated for mutual kindness*, so my friendly and orthodox heart, susceptible of your goodness, reciprocates your kindness." The same observations would apply, in part, to the rest of the letters. What, in fact, did they prove? Absolutely nothing. Nothing but what was easily explicable on the principles already laid down respecting the political situation of the nabobs of the Carnatic. They had wanted peace; they had taken pains to recommend it. They had felt the extreme helplessness of their condition, and therefore sought to conciliate all from whose enmity they had any thing to apprehend, or who might, in the changes of time, eventually become their masters. This view of the matter, and the negociation about a *marriage*, might serve as a key to the whole correspondence. The letters were palpably hyperbolic and insincere. There was no evidence that they were "for purposes evidently repugnant to our security and honour," or that "their tendency was to support Tippoo Sultaun in victory and triumph over his enemies." Much had been said of the transmission of secret intelligence by the nabob to Tippoo. The nabob, apprehending that Tippoo meditated a renewal of hostilities against the English, had desired the vakeels to inform him that his conduct had incurred suspicion; and that he would do well to wait at least till the departure of Lord Cornwallis for Europe; and some months after he caused it to be intimated to the sultaun, that he would act wisely in suspending his intercourse with the French, grounding his advice on this circumstance, that France itself was about to be partitioned out among several other European powers, and that Pondicherry would soon and inevitably be taken by the English. Who could not see, that to advise a suspension of Tippoo's connection with the French under such circumstances, was, in effect, to advise a complete relinquishment of it? And this was in exact conformity with the obvious policy of the nabob, whose great object was peace, and who knew that, on the breaking out of a war, the whole government of his country would be taken from him; only it was done with that finesse, and that hypocritical affectation of friendship and good wishes, which were natural to an Asiatic politician. The dread of the nabob, indeed, lest Tippoo should perceive his true object, had seemed to discover itself at the very time of his making to him these secret communications (which, by the way, it was very possible, had been so far from secret, that they had been made with the concurrence of the British government); but the nabob was represented by the vakeels, as having, in the very strongest terms, conjured them not to misconstrue his views, or to impute his conduct to any motive but the warmest friendship for their master. The only suspicious circumstance in the whole correspondence was the cypher. But what, after all, could be extracted from it? No use had ever been made of it. It was remarkably ill-calculated for use, because remarkably deficient; and if it had been seriously intended for use, why it should have been left so deficient no possible reason could be assigned. If it meant any thing more than one of those idle pieces of Oriental ceremony and affected mystery, which it was difficult for us to understand; or if, at the worst, it had any character beyond that of a false and inefficient token of an attachment merely pretended, still it was impossible to draw from it any such strong presumptions against the nabob as we could safely and

fairly act upon. At the most, it could only be a subject of inquiry and discussion, not of extreme and exemplary punishment.

Mr. Grant said, it was unnecessary for him to remark how many expressions in this correspondence, which had originally appeared suspicious, now confessedly stood explained from the affair of the marriage, and how completely the deductions, so triumphantly drawn from those expressions, had failed. On the whole, indeed, what could be made of this pretended conspiracy between the nabobs and Tippoo, when, upwards of a twelvemonth after its alleged commencement, and just before the departure of the vakeels, who were supposed to have conducted it at Arcot, we found Omdut ul Omrah only then proposing the establishment of a *cordial harmony* between his father and the sultaun? An hon. gentleman (Mr. Wallace) had contended, that by the *cordial harmony*, for the establishment of which the prince seemed so anxious, something much more extensive than the expression ordinarily conveyed must have been intended; otherwise, as he thought, the passage would be nonsense; that is, to prevent the passage from being nonsense, he chose to understand the words in a sense which they had never been known to bear; a contrivance, certainly, by which any sense might be affixed to any passage. The fact was, that the passage *was* nonsense, and intended *for such*; it was nothing but a collection of unmeaning and extravagant professions. The hon. gentleman had asserted, that he was not bound to assign any rational cause for the supposed conduct of the nabobs in conspiring with the mortal enemy of their own family and their allies. Perhaps not, if the fact of the conspiracy were fully and fairly proved; but if, as was the case, this fact was only presumed from the papers, — was confessedly a matter of inference, and of choice between opposing probabilities and difficulties, — then, surely, all those who professed to believe it were bound to reconcile it with all the circumstances of the case. Among other circumstances, too, they had to reconcile it with this very extraordinary one, that a conspiracy which lasted for years should have never ostensibly proceeded beyond vague professions of mutual friendship.

To compensate for the palpable deficiencies in the evidence, another sort of argument had been resorted to. The bare circumstance of a correspondence, however innocent that correspondence might be, between the nabobs and the sultaun, was, it seems, a breach of the treaty of 1792. Now, the true question here was, whether, supposing such a correspondence to have taken place as all would allow to be evidently innocent, any one individual would have been found to maintain that we should have been justified in punishing this venial breach of treaty by disfranchising the nabob of his entire dominions? If not, what was the use of this argument, until it should previously be proved that the correspondence which had taken place was actually of a treacherous and treasonable nature? Why, the argument failed in the only case in which there was any necessity for applying to it.

Mr. Grant then commented on the treatment which the nabob's family had received, which, even admitting the truth of the charges brought against them, and much more when the problematical nature of those charges was considered, he stigmatised as arbitrary, unjust, and cruel. Suppose Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omrah to have re-

duced themselves, as they were said to have done, to the condition of public enemies, was it an usual practice among nations to annihilate their public enemies? To warrant such severity, a very strong case, at least, was requisite, instead of the miserable, constructive, and, at the best, doubtful case, which had been made out by the authors of this transaction. After all, too, that had been said, every mind must feel that it was harsh to enforce the punishment on the unoffending son of the nabob; and, at least, that Omdut ul Omrah's death imposed on the British government a strong additional obligation to investigate the circumstances of his alleged offences. But it was said that these offences had not been personal; and that the heir was bound to make to us that reparation, and to afford us those pledges of security, which we had had a right to demand of his ancestor. Reparation for what? The utmost actual injury which, even according to the elaborate, and certainly not very indulgent reports, of the Bengal government, we had sustained, had been an habitual delay in the provision of supplies; and, by way of reparation, we deliberately seize the whole country! But our 'security.' — Why, what was the amount of the danger? Suppos the late nabob to have been as hostile as he is represented; make, too, the iniquitous assumption that his heir was equally hostile; still, how far did their hostility endanger us? They had not a regiment in their service, nor a pagoda in their public treasury. "But they might be tardy in providing us with supplies." And, to guard against this danger, we hurl them at once from the throne! No doubt there might be occasions when a delay of supplies might be a very great evil; so there might be occasions, when the smallest particle of power in the hands of a foreign state, nay (to put a very strong case made), when such a mere mockery and name of power as we had now left to the nabob of the Carnatic, might, by a strange concurrence of events, prove most seriously detrimental to our interests; and, therefore, if the doctrine of our being justified in securing ourselves against every possible or conceivable danger was to be tolerated, we should be justified in levelling and destroying every thing within our reach, and effacing, as far as we could, every vestige of other independency than our own throughout the world.

A great deal had been said on a former night, as a great deal was said in the papers on the table, of the extreme moderation of the British government, both in their *arrangement*, as it was called, for the Carnatic, and in their having proposed to carry it into effect by the mode of friendly negotiation. As to the former, we had avowedly reduced the nabob to the condition of a mere puppet, without a single shred of his former power; as to the latter, we had authoritatively announced to him this arrangement, and, refusing to listen to any objection, had insisted on his immediate and unconditional acquiescence, on pain of having the very same arrangement carried into effect without his consent, and losing even the name of power into the bargain. Such had been our moderation! such our lenity! qualities which we might parade, but for which we should probably gain as much credit, as we should for having acted from a pure and disinterested benevolence towards the inhabitants of the Carnatic in determining to make the whole of that large territory our own.

On the whole, the hon. director said, he was decidedly of opinion, that not only was there nothing like legal evidence of the offences imputed to the late nabobs of the Carnatic, but even no such presumption as an individual or a nation could act upon with any regard to justice; that, at least, all the inquiry practicable should have been made on the occasion, and that the omission of such inquiry left a suspicion very unfavourable to the authors of the late arrangement; that, at all events, mere presumption, and presumption so formed, could be no warrant for deposing a family of a kingdom; that so strong a measure, even had it been otherwise justifiable, was not required for our security; and that it would be generally set to the account of unprincipled rapacity, and redound to the dishonour of the British name in the East. For these reasons, though he did not, in every point, perfectly accord with the terms of the Resolutions proposed, he entirely acquiesced in the scope and substance of them, and would support them by his vote.

MR. S. R. LUSHINGTON.---Mr. Speaker; differing as I do entirely from the hon. member who has just sat down, from the hon. baronet who opened the debate on a former night, and from the hon. member (Mr. G. Johnstone) who spoke from the floor, I shall state the reasons for that difference, for the consideration of the house. Without following each of those hon. members through the lengthened detail of their speeches, I shall endeavour to reply to the propositions they have laboured to establish, and which were, I believe, in abstract these: that in the beginning of the connection between the East India Company and the family of Mahomed Ali, the Company were indebted to them for their preservation and protection in the Carnatic; that in the progress of that connection, the Company received from Mahomed Ali repeated proofs of kindness and generosity: but that his government and that of his son and successor, Omdut ul Omrah, was distracted by the interference of the Company, and that war and misery resulted to the people from the ambition and usurpation of their governments: that after a long course of faithful and honourable alliance on the part of those nabobs, their posterity have been degraded without cause or justice: that this act of violence has carried its own punishment, for that we receive fewer resources by our possession of the Carnatic than we formerly derived from the willing hands of the nabob. Sir, believing, as I conscientiously do, that the exact reverse of these propositions is the truth; that the Company owe nothing to the father of Mahomed Ali; that to himself they were uniformly benefactors and protectors; that all the faith in the alliance with him was on their part, and all the treachery on his; and that after a long course of suffering and distress from his evil counsels, they have done what true policy, a just construction of the law of nations, and humanity to the people of the Carnatic, fully support; I shall explain to the house the grounds of this opinion. The misrepresentation which has been made of our situation on the coast of Coromandel during the administration of Anwar u Dien Cawn, renders it necessary for me to trouble the house with a short reference to our condition at that early period. Whoever has any knowledge of the records of the East India Company, or of our general history in India, must know, that for more than a century before the arrival of Anwar u Dien Cawn in the Carnatic, the Company had carried on a lucrative



commerce on the coast of Coromandel. The emperor had granted to them a few villages in the vicinity of Madras and fort St. David; and his local officer, the nabob of Arcot, was bound by the emperor's sunnuds to protect, and did actually protect them, in their peaceful occupations. The integrity of their dealings excited the confidence of the natives, and the security enjoyed in their possessions soon attracted a numerous population; occupied in this tranquil manner, the Company coveted no other possessions; trade was the sole object of their institution, and their endeavours were confined to its advancement. But when Anwar u Dien Cawn arrived in the province, the Company were drawn from these peaceful pursuits, and compelled to engage in the turbulent scenes of war. Anwar u Dien Cawn, the father of Mahomed Ali, was charged by the nizam with the guardianship of the minor nabob of Arcot, Seed Mahomed Cawn. This youth was basely murdered in his palace, in mid-day, in a very few months after he was confided to the protection of Anwar u Dien Cawn; and this atrocious act of violence so soon succeeding the murder of Abdalla, cast a yet deeper stain upon the character of Anwar u Dien Cawn. The people of Arcot beheld this action with horror; they recurred with gratitude and affection to the mild and generous administration of the family of Seed Mahomed Cawn; and they saw in the violent death of this beloved youth, the termination of that fostering care which had so long protected them; they apprehended from the intrusion of a stranger into the government of the province, that spirit of ravage which too commonly distinguishes a violent and unjust possession. Unfortunately for the unoffending people of the Carnatic, these fears proved too true; for, from that moment until the hour in which Lord Clive signed the treaty which is now the subject of our deliberations, a period of near sixty years, the people of the Carnatic have been scourged with the plagues of war, famine, neglect, and oppression: but to the English East India Company the succession of Anwar u Dien Cawn proved, in its very beginning, nearly fatal. Dupleix, governor of Pondicherry, soon discovered that avarice was the ruling passion of Anwar u Dien Cawn, and he succeeded in obtaining his connivance in an attack upon Madras, which terminated in its capture by the French, when a large treasure, a vessel laden with valuable cloths, and all their shipping, fell into the hands of their enemies. In vain were remonstrances and intreaties addressed to Anwar u Dien Cawn; he adopted no effectual measures to redress those misfortunes which were accumulating upon the English under his eye; for he withheld that protection which he was bound by the sunnuds of the empire to extend to them. The only territory which remained to us was fort St. David; and although the army of Anwar u Dien Cawn under his two sons, Maphooz Cawn and Mahomed Ali, marched towards Pondicherry upon the plea of punishing the insult offered to the emperor's authority by the seizure of Madras, they actually made an attack upon a party of the French troops in the vicinity of fort St. David, Dupleix soon contrived to purchase their return to Arcot, and carried into execution his design of attacking fort St. David. In vain was the most moving appeal again directed to Maphooz Cawn and Mahomed Ali in this extremity of the English affairs; ineffectually were such sums of money as were then left, offered for their continuance in the neighbourhood until the English fleet should

return, or even for a period of ten days. The French used the treasure they had seized at Madras in bribing higher, and the army of Anwar u Dien returned to Arcot. Happily, however, the English fleet, the nation's best hope in every crisis of her affairs, appeared in the roads of fort St. David, and dispelled the gathering destruction. Such was the nature of the assistance and protection which the English received from the first of the family of Mahomed Ali, and which the honourable member (Mr. Johnstone) has spoken of in such terms of approbation; but when he shall have consulted the records of those times with more diligence, he will find that the confidence of the Company's servants, and the treachery of Anwar u Dien Cawn, involved them in almost irreparable misfortune, from which he left them to extricate themselves. Anwar u Dien had, however, very soon reason to repent his desertion of the English; it left the French at liberty to combine with the relations of Seid Mahomed to avenge his murder; and in a battle fought against a confederated force under Chunda Saheb, supported by the French, Anwar u Dien was slain by a soldier in the French service, his army routed, his eldest son Maphooz Cawn taken prisoner, and his second son Mahomed Ali fled, with a single attendant, to the fortress of Trichinopoly, one hundred and fifty miles distant. At this desperate moment Mahomed Ali, who was only the second son of his father, set out upon the speculative idea, which the turbulence of the times induced him to form, of succeeding to his father; but possessing neither treasures, troops, nor title, he had no reasonable prospect but to defend Trichinopoly with the few adherents whom he could collect, until he should be able to make some terms with his enemies. They were supported by a victorious army, ample funds, and powerful connections; whilst he had no chance of succour but from the English; and even that support which he might have expected to receive from their known hostility to the French, he could hardly hope to derive, after his father's desertion of fort St. George and fort St. David still strongly impressed on the minds of the sufferers. He applied for aid to the Company's government with doubt and diffidence, and it was at first granted in a very limited degree; but Mahomed Ali's poverty and distress, which shut out every other hope of relief when disappointed of the assistance of the soubah, together with the progress made by the French in the Carnatic, induced the Company's servants to espouse his cause more warmly. But notwithstanding the aid he derived from the Company, the ill success of his undisciplined rabble, in some excursions which they rashly made from Trichinopoly, rendered his prospects of success so hopeless, that he formally proposed to retire from the country, and relinquish his pretensions to the Company; he offered to deliver over the whole of his countries to the Company's sole disposal, provided they would allow him an annual income of two lacs of pagodas, and that he would bind himself and his heirs to the agreement for ever. But the Company refused to take advantage of an offer which was urged by his distresses; they chose rather to preserve inviolate their reputation for uprightness and generosity (which in the language of the nabob was 'as the brightness of the day'); they trusted to his gratitude for remuneration when he should be liberated from his difficulties, and be free to act from the spontaneous impulse of his mind. They accordingly rendered him every assistance which their

counsel, their troops, and their treasures, could supply; and after an eventful war of fifteen years, they established him in the government of the Carnatic, at a vast expence of British blood and treasure. I shall now, Sir, advert to the manner in which Mahomed Ail discharged this debt of gratitude. The ambition which had only slumbered in his breast during adversity, awakened with renovated strength after he had subdued all his enemies. He avowed the design of becoming soubahadar of the Deccan; and when he found that to assist schemes of foreign conquest and aggrandisement, and of internal oppression, was contrary to the wise policy of the Company's local governments, he endeavoured to undermine their authority by bribery and intrigue. In the pursuit of this purpose he bought over the worst servants of the Company, with the revenues of those countries which the British arms had acquired and delivered up to him; and he obstructed the counsels and conduct of their better officers by every sort of counteraction and defamation. On one occasion he raised a faction that destroyed the lawful government of the Company; and the uniform principle of his policy was, to pay those who were too low in pride or in principle to refuse money, in exact proportion to the value of those interests of the Company which it was in their power to sacrifice. In elucidation of this statement I shall here read to the house a record of the transactions of those times, before which the hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Windham seconded the speech of Mr. Burke from which the following extract is made) must bow with deference and respect. "Every man who opposes the government and its measures finds an immediate countenance from the nabob: even our discarded officers, however unworthy, are received into the nabob's service. The nabob is in a great degree the cause of our present inability (Oct. 11, 1769), by diverting the revenues of the Carnatic through private channels." In speaking of the nabob's conduct, 20th July 1778: "No sense of a common danger in case of a war could prevail on him to furnish the Company with what is absolutely necessary to assemble an army; though it is beyond a doubt, that money to a large amount is now hoarded up in his coffers at Chepauk, and tankaws are granted to individuals upon some of his most valuable countries. The creditors inspired into the mind of the nabob of Arcot (then a dependant on the Company, of the humblest order) a scheme of the most vile and desperate ambition that I believe ever was admitted into the thoughts of a man so situated. First, they persuaded him to consider himself as a principal member in the political system of Europe; in the next place, they held out to him, and he readily imbibed, the idea of the general empire of Hindustan. In pursuance of this project, they extinguished the Company as a sovereign power in that part of India; they withdrew the Company's garrisons out of all the posts and strong holds of the Carnatic; they declined to receive the ambassadors from foreign courts, and remitted them to the nabob of Arcot; they fell upon, and totally destroyed, the oldest ally of the Company, the king of Tanjore; and plundered the country to the amount of five millions sterling, one after another, in the nabob's name, but with English force, and brought into a miserable servitude all the princes and great independent nobility of the country. In proportion to these treasons and violences, which the people, the fund of the nabob's debt grew and flourished."

And let not the whole odium of these measures fall upon the creditors, to the exclusion of his highness: they were in perfect concordance with the feelings and wishes of his mind. Upon this subject let us again hear what Mr. Burke has said. "But the gentlemen on the other side of the house know as well as I do, and they dare not contradict me, that the nabob of Arcot and his creditors are not adversaries, but collusive parties, and that the whole transaction is under a false colour and false names. The struggle is not, nor ever has been, between their rapacity and his hoarded riches: no; it is between him and them combining and confederating on one side, and the public revenues and the miserable inhabitants of a ruined country on the other, these are the real plaintiffs and the real defendants in the suit. Refusing a shilling from his hoards for the satisfaction of any demand, the nabob of Arcot is always ready, nay, he earnestly, and with eagerness and passion, contends for delivering up to these pretended creditors his territory and subjects. It is, therefore, not from treasuries and mines, but from the food of your unpaid armies, from the blood withheld from the veins and whipped out of the backs of the most miserable of men, that we are to pamper extortion, usury, and speculation." But the most wretched of the consequences which resulted from the infatuated counsels and intrigues of Mahomed Ali, was the sanguinary warfare with Hyder Ali; and which the hon. baronet (Sir T. Turton) has most erroneously charged as one of the crimes of the Company's government towards Mahomed Ali, as if his intrigues had not been the principal cause of that calamity. (Sir T. Turton here rose and appealed to the house whether he had made use of this expression.) Mr. Lushington resumed:—Sir, if I have mis-stated the observations of the hon. baronet, I sincerely beg his pardon; but when the house considers the length of that hon. baronet's speech (more than four hours), it is as probable that he should have forgotten some expressions of it as that I should; certain, however, I am, that the statement which I have made was the impression which this part of his speech left upon my mind; and the general impression which his speech made upon me was this, that under the guise of a meretricious sensibility, he was the pander to the most licentious system of corruption and misrule that ever disgraced the name and authority of this country. Sir, my opinion that the invasion of Hyder Ali was in a great measure attributable to Mahomed Ali's councils, is derived from Mr. Burke, and I shall here read that passage of his works to the house. "From that time forward a continued plot was carried on within the divan, black and white, of the nabob of Arcot, for the destruction of Hyder Ali. When at length Hyder Ali found that he had to do with men who were the determined enemies of human intercourse itself, he decreed to make the Carnatic an everlasting monument of his vengeance; then ensued a scene of woe, the like of which no eye had seen, no heart conceived, and which no tongue can adequately tell; all the horrors of war before known or heard of were mercy to that new havoc." I will not wound the feelings of this house by quoting this description more at large; but I can assure them, from personal observation, and from the sad tales of some who survived the plagues of war and famine, that this is not the language of poetry or fiction; it is a real picture of the most dreadful series of

misfortunes that ever afflicted mankind. And what was the conduct of the nabob of Arcot, whilst this hurricane of misery was raging? Did any compunctious feelings of conscience for the evils which he had brought upon his people, produce any change in his infatuated counsels? Did he shew any disposition to repair his former wickedness, or to repose in sincere alliance and confidence upon the Company's government? The opportunity of returning to a better estimation of his duties and interests was peculiarly favourable, for the nobleman who then administered that government would have upheld him in every wise and virtuous resolution; this, however, did not consist with his highness's views. In an hour of alarm he had consented to transfer the management of his country to Lord Macartney; but he soon removed every claim of merit founded upon this concession, by a system of counteraction that obstructed much of that benefit which had otherwise been derived from it. Sir, my hon. friend (Colonel Allan) who spoke from this side of the house in the former night's debate, traced with so much accuracy and ability the course of Lord Macartney's conduct and sentiments in regard to Mahomed Ali and the Carnatic, that I will not trespass upon the time of this house, or weaken the force of his arguments, by any further references to that period. I shall advance in my statement to the year 1787, when our connection with Mahomed Ali assumed a more definite shape. In that year Sir A. Campbell entered into a treaty with the nabob, prescribing in explicit terms the duties of the two contracting parties. The Company was solely intrusted with the military defence of the Carnatic and the protection of the nabob from all his enemies. The nabob was bound to provide from the revenues an annual subsidy of nine lacs of pagodas, to be paid to the Company, and twelve lacs on account of his creditors; and to put a stop to those mischiefs which had arisen from his intrigues and emissaries in the courts of native states in India, a clause was expressly introduced as follows: "His highness will not enter into any political negotiations or controversies with any state or power without the consent or approbation of the president in council of fort St. George." From this period until 1790, Mahomed Ali held the Carnatic under this treaty; at that time Lord Cornwallis engaged in the war against Tippoo Sultan, and at the close of it restored the country to the nabob, subject to the conditions of the treaty of 1792, which is now the object of our deliberation. With the permission of the house, I will read the preamble of that treaty, as the best explanation of Lord Cornwallis's intentions in making it. "Whereas a certain engagement was entered into between the hon. English East India Company and his highness the nawaub of the Carnatic, bearing date 24th February 1787, for the purpose of cementing an everlasting friendship with each other, and of contributing mutually towards the defence of the Carnatic and countries dependent thereon; whereby it was stipulated that the said Company should maintain a military force, and that the said nawaub should pay annually a certain sum of money arising from the revenues of the Carnatic, and should furnish sufficient and satisfactory security, under certain conditions expressed in the said engagement, for the regular payment of the sum stipulated to the said Company; and whereas it appears by the representations of the said nawaub, that the revenues of the Carnatic are not competent to enable him to perform

the stipulations in the said engagement; and whereas it further appears that the security which the said nawaub agreed in the above-mentioned engagement to furnish for the due payment of the stipulated sum to the Company, is in its nature inadequate to the end intended; wherefore the engagement aforesaid shall henceforth be considered by the contracting parties as annulled, and in lieu thereof the following articles agreed to." From this preamble to the treaty of 1792, it will be seen, that in forming a new treaty with Mahomed Ali, Lord Cornwallis had two principal objects in view; first, the generous one of relieving the nabob from a payment which he believed burthensome to him, and his lordship accordingly reduced his annual payments from twenty-one to fifteen lacs of sicca pagodas; secondly, to obtain a real security for the payment of the subsidy to the Company in all time to come. The security provided was the mortgage of particular districts, which were to be taken by the Company in the event of failure; and that these districts might not be injured by that system of extortion and usury by which the people had been so cruelly oppressed, and the Carnatic so much exhausted, it was stipulated that his highness should not, on any account, grant tuncaws, and in order to render the breach of this part of the treaty more improbable and difficult, it was further stipulated, that any tuncaws which might be granted should become void, in event of the districts coming into the Company's hands; thus providing a double security against the violation of this article of the treaty: the first part of the clause pledging the nabob's faith as our ally, the last part operating on the fears of the money-lenders. The importance which Lord Cornwallis attached to the security provided by the clause of the treaty here alluded to, and to the preservation of that security from acts of injury and waste, is sufficiently shewn by the relinquishment of six lacs of pagodas annually. This large cession had been unjustifiable on any other ground, but if the nabob had fulfilled this part of the treaty it had been well bestowed. The evils which had arisen from this system in past times were well known to Lord Cornwallis, and his humane mind anxiously desired to prevent the possibility of their recurrence. We know what a scene the Carnatic had presented during these operations; they had been described by Burke in the following words: "In consequence of this double game, all the territorial revenues have, at one time or other, been covered by those locusts, the English soucars; not one single foot of the Carnatic has escaped them, a territory as large as England. During these operations, what a scene has that country presented! The usurious European assignee supersedes the nabob's native farmer of the revenues, the farmer flies to the nabob's presence to claim his bargain, whilst his servants murmur for wages, and his soldiers mutiny for pay; the mortgage to the European assignee is then resumed and the native farmer replaced, again to be removed on the new clamour of the European assignee. Every man of rank and landed fortune being long since extinguished, the remaining miserable last cultivator, who grows to the soil, after having his back scored by the farmer has it again flayed by the whip of the assignee, and is thus, by a ravenous, because a short-lived, succession of claimants, lashed from oppressor to oppressor, whilst a single drop of blood is left as the means of extorting a single grain of corn. Do not think I paint; far

very far from it; I do not reach the fact, nor approach to it; men of respectable condition, men equal to your substantial English yeomen, are daily tied up and scourged, to answer the multiplied demands of various contending and contradictory titles, all issuing from one and the same source. Tyrannous exaction brings on servile concealment, and that again calls forth tyrannous coercion; they move in a circle, mutually producing and produced; till at length nothing of humanity is left in the government; no trait of integrity, spirit, or manliness, in the people." It was under impressions such as are here described, that Lord Cornwallis had written to the court of directors in the year 1790, in the terms quoted by my hon. friend (Colonel Allan) in the former debate; and after two years further experience and local observation of the state of the Carnatic, Lord Cornwallis determined to relinquish six lacs of pagodas annually to the nabob, without acquiring any other concession for the Company than the following clauses, intended to put an end to that clandestine influence which the worst Europeans had so long exercised at the durbar, and the right to collect the poligar tribute at the Company's own expence and risk. "In consequence of this measure, whereby the districts mentioned in the schedule No. 2, become responsible for any arrears that may accrue in the payment of the above stipulated kists, the said nawaub agrees that he will not grant tuncaws or assignments on any account on the revenues thereof; and if, contrary to this condition, any tuncaws or assignments should exist when the said districts or any of them shall be assumed by the said Company, such tuncaws or assignments shall be declared by the said Company, and the said nawaub to be of no value, nor shall they remain in effect." It appears to me quite evident, as I have already stated, that the intention of Lord Cornwallis in framing this clause was, first to bind the faith of the nabob against the breach of it, and secondly to operate upon the fears of the tunkhadars, so as to restrain them from encouraging the nabob to the secret violation of it. But the men who had established an usurious connection at the durbar, saw from the moment that the treaty of 1792 was published, that the faithful execution of these clauses would destroy their profit, by putting an end to that secret influence which had so long alienated the nabob's confidence from the local government of the Company, and precluded the possibility of any reform in his administration: it was therefore suggested to the nabob, that as the clause contained a specific penalty which attached only upon the money-lender, his highness might break his faith with the Company without fear of any evil consequence to himself; and as he had always contended with eagerness and passion for delivering up to his pretended creditors his territories and his subjects, he again indulged in this invidious habit. The calamitous process of these tuncaws has been most ably and minutely described by Lord Hobart, who was continually embroiled with the durbar and its agents on account of the breach of this part of the treaty. Whoever has read the minute and the letter of Lord Hobart to the court of directors, dated 15th September 1792, will recollect, that Lord Hobart regarded the granting of these tuncaws by the nabob as a fundamental violation of the letter and spirit of the treaty of 1723. Nor was his lordship singular in this opinion; I speak from personal knowledge when I say, that all the best servants of the Company

entertained the same opinion; and we know that the government at home, and the court of directors, fully concurred in this conclusion,\* as appears from many of their public dispatches, and particularly the following, dated 5th June 1799, to the government of fort St. George. "We have been advised by the Earl of Mornington, that the nabob continues to oppose a determined resolution to the modification of the treaty of 1792, which has been repeatedly proposed to him. At the same time we observe that his highness has distinctly acknowledged that he is in the practice of raising money annually by assignments of the revenues of those districts which form the security for the payment of the Company's subsidy. As this practice is unquestionably contrary to the letter, and subversive of the spirit, of that treaty, we direct, that immediately upon the receipt hereof you adopt the necessary measures for taking possession in the name of the Company of the whole or any part of the said districts, the revenue of which shall appear to be so assigned; and that you continue to hold the same, and collect the rents thereof, in order that the Company may not in future be deprived of the only security which they possess under the before-mentioned treaty, to answer any failure in the nabob in the discharge of his subsidy: you will immediately communicate to the nabob the determination we have come to, and the orders you have received relative to this point." I have entered into this detail, to shew that the interpretation subsequently put upon this article of the treaty (and the conduct of Omdut ul Omrah, in regard to it) by Marquis Wellesley and by Lord Clive, was not an arbitrary or hasty construction of those noble lords; but that it was the impartial concurring judgment of the Company's best servants at fort St. George, of Lord Hobart, of the court of directors, and of the board of controul, for a period of seven years. If, therefore, the arrangement made with Azeem ul Dowlah upon the death of Omdut ul Omrah, and the absolute refusal of Ali Hussein to give the Company a security against the future breach of the treaty of 1792, had rested on this ground alone, I should have contended that it was warranted by the letter and spirit of the instructions transmitted by the court of directors to India (who had also expressly ordered that the country should not be restored to the nabob in the event of war, until a better arrangement could be made with him); that it was justified by the law of nations, and the duties of humanity to our fellow-creatures.—But the house know that the arrangement made with Azeem ul Dowlah, is supported also upon other grounds; I mean of course the treacherous correspondence discovered at Seringapatam, coupled with the embarrassments opposed by the nabob to the collection and movement of our supplies during the last war with Tippoo. I shall now briefly examine that evidence. This part of the question has already received a very ample discussion in India, where every argument and objection could be best felt and appreciated. It has been carefully investigated by men possessed of that knowledge of the Eastern languages and manners, which rendered them peculiarly fitted for this trust; men whose characters were never tainted by the breath of slander until the hon. baronet delivered his speech in the former debate; and who, far from deserving such treatment, are entitled, for their public honour and public usefulness, to the protection and applause of this house. The right hon. member who



spoke second in this debate on a former night, delivered his sentiments with so much perspicuity and judgment upon the nature of this evidence, that I shall confine my remarks to those impressions which local knowledge, and a tolerable acquaintance with Persian correspondence, have suggested to me during the examination of it. In doing so, I shall follow the order in which the correspondence is recorded; not imitating the example of the hon. baronet, who, in pursuit of his purpose of throwing a ridicule upon this evidence, thought fit to postpone the burden of examining the cypher (which he knew to be the document of the most hostile tendency, and essentially necessary to give the true meaning of certain passages in other letters) until he had slurred over all the other documents. In examining the first number, I am reminded that the hon. director, in adverting to this evidence, stated that nothing could be more unjust than to attach any imputation upon the character or truth of Wallah Jah or Omdut ul Omrah on account of this correspondence, since the parts regarded as most obnoxious were communicated in the presence of Lord Cornwallis and Sir William Meadows. Sir, it is evident to me that the honourable director has not accurately examined this correspondence. Those professions where Wallah Jah attempts to raise himself in the estimation of Tippoo by a gross calumny against the British government, his ally, were not made in the presence of Lord Cornwallis and Sir W. Meadows, nor was any part of the correspondence communicated to either of them. The instance to which I allude, is where Wallah Jah speaks of the war undertaken by Lord Cornwallis against Tippoo Sultaun in the year 1780. Wallah Jah knew perfectly well that Lord Cornwallis had engaged in that war from the generous resolution of protecting our helpless ally the rajah of Travancore; and yet Wallah Jah tells Tippoo Sultaun's vakeels, "May God long preserve Tippoo Sultaun, who is the pillar of the religion of Mahomed! Night and day I used to be absorbed in this contemplation, and to pray for his highness's prosperity: I call God to witness this fact, because the confederacy of the three allies was for the subversion of the Mahomedan religion." It is solely to be attributed to the divine goodness, that the prayers of us sinners have been accepted; believe it true that I from my heart desire the welfare of the sultaun." Three days afterwards, when Lord Cornwallis and Sir W. Meadows were present with the vakeels, Wallah Jah took occasion to observe, "that we (the vakeels) considered him to have been an enemy; whereas he declared in the presence of God that he was not, and is not; that on the contrary he was a friend and well-wisher; and that he had opposed the breach between your majesty and the allied states to such a degree, that every one decided in his own mind that inwardly your majesty and his highness were one; and he desired us to ask Lord Cornwallis and Sir W. Meadows, who were present, whether he said true or not." Every person acquainted with the situation of Wallah Jah, knows that he did oppose the war, and the cause of that opposition. We know he feared, if war did take place, that Lord Cornwallis would be necessitated to assume the temporary possession of the Carnatic; and rather than this should happen, Wallah Jah was perfectly willing and anxious that the rajah of Travancore, like himself, a helpless ally of our government, should be abandoned by the British government to the violence of Tippoo. Let those who are

acquainted with the mind of Lord Cornwallis judge what would have been his feelings if Wallah Jah had told the vakeels of Tippoo in his lordship's presence, that he had attacked their master, not in defence of the rajah of Travancore, but to subvert the Mahomedan religion. This communication was however made by Wallah Jah, but to the vakeels in secret, not in the presence or with the knowledge of Lord Cornwallis; far therefore from considering the offensive nature of the first speech to the vakeels on the 10th of June, as done away by that made in the presence of Lord Cornwallis on the 13th of June, or that any part of the criminality of the whole of this correspondence is explained by any communication that took place with Lord Cornwallis, it appears to me that the reference made to Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows in the presence of the vakeels, was one of those studied contrivances in which his highness was so fertile, and by which he endeavoured to gain, by general professions of friendship for Tippoo in the hearing of Lord Cornwallis, the confidence of the vakeels in his previous defamation of his lordship's motives for entering into the war. In the few remarks which the hon. baronet bestowed upon the cypher, he declared that the use of such instruments was a common occurrence in India; and that it was impossible to conceive a cypher like this, so simple and limited in its expressions, capable of being intended or used for any treacherous or hostile purpose. I certainly differ entirely from the hon. baronet in his opinion of the frequent use of cyphers of this description in India; in the affairs of private life such instruments never are used, and even in political transactions the use of a cypher is a very rare occurrence. But the hon. baronet would prove nothing by proving the use of such cyphers in political correspondence in India, because Wallah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah were wisely interdicted by the treaty of 1792 (as they had been by the treaty of 1787) "from entering into any negotiations or political correspondence with any European or native powers without the consent of the said Company." It has, however, been suggested, that this cypher was intended to conduct a marriage between the families of Tippoo and Wallah Jah. I will not detain the house by going into all the reasoning founded upon other parts of the evidence, written and oral, to shew the absurdity of this proposition; but I will state plainly, upon a view of the cypher itself, the utter impossibility of applying it to any purpose of marriage. The only expression in it which might lead to such a supposition in the mind of a person ignorant of Eastern manners and languages, is the word 'ring;' but as a ring is not used in Eastern marriages, it can have no reference to that ceremony. Rejecting, therefore, this absurd, irrational proposition, which is directly contradicted by the evidence of the vakeels, and all the circumstances so forcibly stated by the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Wallace) in the former debate, I must look for a different explanation of the intention of this cypher. Upon the first view of this document, the opprobrious terms in which the three allies are designated, cannot fail to strike attention; but it has still been asserted to be so limited as to preclude the use of it in any matter of policy or secrecy. This assertion made a due impression upon me when I first heard it; and I felt it my duty to put it to the test by composing a letter that should describe an atrocious intention (such as the massacre at Vellore), and then endeavour to render it into the lan-

guage of this cypher, so that it would be unintelligible to a person not possessed of it, and easily understood by a person having the cypher. I can assure the hon. gentleman opposite that I found no difficulty whatever in applying this cypher in this manner, and further, that this sort of metaphorical cypher best corresponds with the genius and character of the people. The next document which was particularly objected to by the hon. baronet was, the translation of a copy of a letter of Tippoo Sultaun to Wallah Jah, in which some of the terms are actually used. The hon. baronet asked, as this was only a copy of a letter, "who could say that the original was ever sent? it might have been composed by Tippoo for amusement, and honourable members in this house well know that themselves sometimes composed letters which they did not afterwards send." Sir, when I recollect the manner and the place where this letter was found, that it was discovered in the office of Tippoo Sultaun, and when I recollect the remarkable regularity of the sultaun in matters of business, I cannot subscribe to the puerile idea of the hon. baronet, that this letter might have been composed for amusement. The hon. baronet, and others of us, may write letters, or compose speeches intended to be spoken, and which we have no opportunity of speaking; but in affairs of state, when I find in an office of state a copy of a letter sent, I cannot reconcile to my mind the absurdity of denying all credit to it because there is a bare possibility that it might not have been sent. This sort of objection may be very proper in a court of law; but I trust that those who have to guard the safety of this country from foreign treachery, will not wait for this sort of evidence before they act against impending danger. The objection made by the hon. baronet to the next number was, I think, of a nature equally unreasonable. It is a translation of a copy of a letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Omdut ul Omrah, the nabob of the Carnatic; and as this letter is dated 29th November 1792, when Omdut ul Omrah was not nabob of the Carnatic, this circumstance made the letter look to the hon. baronet like a forgery. The hon. baronet dwelt very largely upon this point; but, divested of all the inflated language in which he represented it, the matter is very simple. The title given to Tippoo Sultaun and Omdut ul Omrah, is probably not one tenth part of the original Persian title; the title must be regarded as the arbitrary act of the translator, who did not chuse to waste his time in translating all the nonsense of these titles; but knowing that Omdut ul Omrah was nabob of the Carnatic at the time he was translating the letter, he gave him the title which he then possessed: such is the obvious solution of this great mystery. The next letter which I shall notice is No. 11: it is from the vakeels of Tippoo to their master, where Omdut ul Omrah says: "You will give my respectful compliments by way of remembrance to his majesty, and inform him that he may consider me from my heart attached to him; and that, please God, at a proper occasion, my fidelity towards him shall be made manifest to him." Sir, I am disposed in the examination of this correspondence to make the largest allowance for the exaggerated professions of friendship which the natives, and particularly the princes, of India, are in the habit of making to each other; but when those professions are accompanied by actions, we can no longer doubt the sincerity of the intention. I remember what anxiety

the British government suffered from the treacherous conduct of Omdut ul Omrah, in promising money which he afterwards withheld, and from the hostile obstructions of his officers to our supplies in the war against Tippoo in 1799; and I do firmly believe that he did then fulfil the professions which he had made in 1792 to the sultana, to the utmost limit of his power, consistent with the prudent concealment of his purpose from Lord Wellesley's discernment. The hon. baronet treated with a considerable degree of ridicule, "a translation of a note written with a pencil upon a half-sheet of post paper, with an envelope of English paper, by his highness Omdut ul Omrah, apparently addressed to Gholaum Ali Khan." This letter, though signed Gholaum Hussein, was imputed to Omdut ul Omrah, and without any evidence was assigned to Gholaum Ali Khan. These objections of the hon. baronet are easily removed: Omdut ul Omrah often signed the name of Gholaum Hussein to his letters, and frequently made use of English paper and a pencil. I have myself received a letter of this description from him; and Mr. Edmonstone, the translator, than whom, perhaps, there never was a gentleman in India more skilful in Persian writing, knew Omdut ul Omrah's hand-writing perfectly well. In regard to the letter being apparently addressed to Gholaum Ali Khan, it is almost impossible to assign it to any other person. From the contents of the letter, it was certainly addressed to a syeed in the confidence of Omdut ul Omrah, about the person of Tippoo, and connected with Ali Rheza Khan: such was Gholaum Ali's situation; he was a syeed, and had been, jointly with Ali Rheza, the channel of communication between Omdut ul Omrah and Tippoo, and was still at Seringapatam. The last letter which I shall notice is one written by Omdut ul Omrah to Gholaum Ali Khan, in the year 1797, when he was nabob of the Carnatic. To this letter and the contents of it the hon. baronet objected, as being of the most trivial nature; and in regard to the communications alluded to in it as having been made by two of Tippoo's agents, Mahomed Ghyyass, and Mahomed Ghose Khan, "it was not possible to consider that they could be charged with any communications hostile to the British government, being men of low rank and character." I am perfectly aware that these men were very different in their qualities and dignity from Gholaum Ali Khan and Rheza Ali Khan; but I contend that they had enough of both for any purpose of treachery or violence against us. This is the sort of person generally employed in India upon such occasions; and as a proof that such is the custom, I will here read to the house a passage from Orme's history very applicable to this question. Orme says: "The secrets of the princes of Hindustan are very difficult to be discovered; in affairs of consequence nothing except in the most equivocal terms is ever given by them in writing; and whenever the matter is of great importance or iniquity, it is trusted to a messenger, a man of low rank and great cunning, who bears a letter of recommendation testifying that he is to be trusted in all he says; so indefinite a commission reserves to the lord who gives it the resource of disavowing the transaction of his agent, and this he never fails to do whenever the iniquity is discovered." Deriving my knowledge of India from this pure authority, and from a local residence of eleven years, I deem it my duty to state to the house, that I regard this correspondence as the evidence of a treacherous spirit of hostility on the part of

Wallah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah; and far from being surprised that the proof is not of that nature to satisfy the interested feelings of the partisans of those nabobs, or the doubting minds of some few of the gentlemen opposite, I am rather surprised that so much has been discovered in writing; for I must repeat upon my own knowledge, what I have already stated upon the authority of Orme, that in matters of great iniquity seldom is any thing committed by the natives of India to writing; they thoroughly understand the arts of verbal prevarication: in the examination of a witness, so little does he regard the truth, that he will vary his testimony according to his feelings and interests, and according to the impression which he thinks his first assertion may have made upon you. The exposure of his verbal contradictions he scarcely regards, and never considers his case hopeless until a document appears against him. In this case I am satisfied from the evidence in writing, connected with what I knew of the conduct of Omdut ul Omrah during the war against Tippoo, that he had cherished the counsels and intentions of that prince, defamed the character of our alliance, and had violated the letter and spirit of the treaty of 1792, for purposes hostile to our interests and security. It has been contended that, although the hostile conduct of Wallah Jah and Omdut ul Omrah had forfeited their right to the Company's protection, yet Ali Hussein, the innocent heir of the latter, not having partaken in his guilt, ought not to have suffered for it. Sir, I am sure no person could feel more sincerely than Lord Clive for the necessity which called upon him to act against Ali Hussein; and the whole of the proceedings upon your table shew how anxiously and humanely that noble lord endeavoured to preserve to Ali Hussein a situation of affluence and dignity. But Lord Clive was not at liberty to intrust the rights and security of the Company in the Carnatic to those very ministers who had been the counsellors of Omdut ul Omrah, and were the guardians of Ali Hussein; and therefore he exercised that which is the right and duty of nations, to call upon the son to repair the mischief of the father. The extract which I hold in my hand, written by Mr. Domat, upon the public law of nations, appears to me unanswerable upon this point, and I shall, with the leave of the house, read it to them. "An heir or successor, from the very circumstance of his possessing the inheritance, is not only bound for the engagements of the person whom he succeeds, but cannot be discharged from the obligation which the deceased may have occasioned by his crimes or offences, neither under the pretext that he derives no benefit from their crimes or offences, nor because there may have been no accusation or condemnation against the deceased. For though the offence or injury committed by the deceased were of such a nature as never to have yielded any positive profit to himself, yet the heir or successor, as he reaps advantages by the inheritance, is bound for the reparation of the damages occasioned by the offence of the person to whose possessions he succeeds."—Having thus shortly stated to the house my opinions upon the evidence, founded upon a tolerable knowledge of Persian correspondence, I have no hesitation in giving it as the unbiased feeling of my mind, that Lord Wellesley and Lord Clive would have deserved the reproaches of this country, if, knowing as they did how grossly the treaty had been violated in granting tuncaws, and in maintaining a secret hostile correspondence,

they had been restrained by any fear of the personal enmity which it might excite from insisting upon an arrangement like that concluded with Azeem ul Dowlah. For nearly fifty years the Company had been wasting their other revenues, and accumulating an immense debt in support of the expences of their connection with Mahomed Ali; from the year 1760 until 1786, the Company were satisfied to protect the whole of the Carnatic for a payment little exceeding four lacs, leaving his highness to riot in corruption and personal ostentation upon a revenue of 260,000 lacs annually; and when at length this connection is broken, after the waste of the Bengal revenues, after the waste of torrents of British blood, there is a debt of ten millions upon the country, composed in some instances of bribes, paid in the shape of bonds, for obstructing the Company's government, and equal in its amount to all the nabob ever paid to the Company for their protection. Having already described, from the works of Burke, the nature of the nabob's government down to the year 1782, and subsequently from the opinions of Lord Macartney, Sir A. Campbell, Lord Cornwallis, and Lord Hobart, I may assert, without any appearance of arrogance, upon my own personal observation, that all I ever saw of his highness's government, either at Madras, where I resided six years, or in the interior of the provinces, where I continued five years, has fully confirmed to me the literal truth of every thing stated by those illustrious persons. With such impressions of the calamity resulting from this management, I could not but rejoice in the measure which extinguished the source of so many evils, and as there seems to be a doubt entertained of the benefits which have been derived to the people from the change of government, I shall explain to the house, in a few words, in what great particulars this difference between the government of the Company, and that of the nabob of the Carnatic, consists. And first I would say a few words upon the pecuniary consequences of this arrangement, which have been so much mis-stated by the hon. member (Mr. G. Johnstone) who spoke from the floor. That hon. member has declared that the Company have received, since their possession of the Carnatic, less, as a net revenue, than they before derived as subsidy from the nabob. In the opening of his speech that hon. member avowed that he took shame to himself for not having studied the voluminous papers before the house, so as to speak in the manner he desired upon this great question; and certainly, Sir, the part of his speech in regard to the revenues of the Carnatic, is a very perfect illustration of the justness of this his confession. Had that hon. member read the statements which (at my instance) have been laid upon the table of this house, he would have seen that the net average revenues derived from the Carnatic since the treaty made with Azeem ul Dowlah by Lord Clive, have been nearly eighteen lacs of star pagodas yearly, which is exactly double the amount received in subsidy annually from Wallah Jah or Omdut ul Omrah. Such are the happy consequences of this arrangement upon the Company's finances. The house will, I trust, pardon me, if I detain them for a short time longer in explaining the effects of the change of government upon the people of the Carnatic. Sir, that country is refreshed by few living brooks, or running streams, and it has rain only at a season; great part of the cultivation of the lands (and of course the subsistence of the

people) depends upon the preservation of these rains in large reservoirs or tanks, which are to be found in every village, the sacred works of former princes and benefactors. To keep these tanks in repair, requires means far beyond the faculties of the common farmer, or cultivator of the soil; and if not repaired they soon fall into decay, whereby great part of the benefit they were intended to dispense is lost. To these works Mahomed Ali and Omdut ul Omrah paid scarcely any attention; every where the tanks were in a state of ruin, whilst the revenues, which arise almost entirely from the cultivation of the lands, were rigorously collected according to the old accounts of cultivation in the villages. Hence the continual oppression of the people, whose miseries were embittered by reflecting that their poverty was owing to the parsimony of their ruler. In the Company's districts, large sums have always been expended upon the tanks; and I do, Sir, exult in the prospect of that plenty which the repair of the tanks in the Carnatic will unquestionably dispense through every village. The next great difference between the government of the nabob and the Company, regards the religious and charitable establishments of the people. The hon. gentlemen opposite are, I dare say, not aware that nearly one-tenth of the revenues of the Carnatic are under various heads applicable to these establishments. These are also the pious gifts of the Hindoo princes, and the due appropriation of them is regarded with the deepest interest by all the classes of Hindoos in the Carnatic. Under the nabob's government these religious allowances formed the fund upon which his unprincipled servants preyed with impunity; and it has been the wise determination of the Company's government to secure this sacred resource from fraud and speculation, and to apply it wholly to its original pious uses, the support and repair of the pagodas and choultries, and the subsistence of thousands whose livelihood and comfort altogether depend upon the faithful application of these grants. Sir, I know what happiness this measure extends through those extensive provinces, and I trust that it will ever be continued. The last point which I shall notice is the administration of justice, and this, in fact, comprises every thing. Under the nabob's administration there was no justice at all: it was an annual struggle between his tyrannous exactions and the endeavours of the people to evade them; hence the great mass of the people were discontented, and ever looking to a change. Upon the rumour of an internal commotion, or the approach of an invading enemy, they endeavoured to increase the general disorder, instead of feeling an interest in quelling it. The Company have established in part, and propose to institute throughout the Carnatic, a fixed assessment of the landed revenue; and regular judicial courts, where justice is to be administered by a person liberally rewarded, and whose honour and interest it will be to decide impartially and diligently. This system protects, with equal justice, the persons and property of individuals against each other and against the government, and, if rightly administered, will soon substitute the blessings of good order for the miseries of tyranny and injustice. Upon the whole then, Sir, I rejoice in the treaty, made with Azeem ul Dowlah; I see that it is justified by the law of nations, that it is in the highest degree beneficial to the Company, and above all that it dispenses happiness to millions; I shall therefore cor-

dially vote against the hon. baronet's motions, and in favour of the previous Question and Amendment, as proposed by the right hon. gentleman who spoke second in the former debate.

The house then became clamorous for the question, when a division took place:

|                           |       |       |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|
| For the previous Question | - -   | 128   |
| For the Resolution        | - - - | 17    |
| Majority                  | - - - | — 111 |

Before the gallery was opened, the house again divided on the fourth Resolution,

|                           |       |       |
|---------------------------|-------|-------|
| For the previous Question | - -   | 124   |
| For the Resolution        | - - - | 15    |
| Majority                  | - - - | — 109 |

Sir THOMAS TURTON, on his return into the house after this division, observed, that the numbers on his side were so few, that he should not now proceed to move his other two Resolutions, but would consent to postpone them, if the right hon. gentleman (Mr. Wallace) would consent to postpone his Resolution of Approbation.

Mr. WALLACE said, that after the complete defeat which the cause of the hon. baronet had sustained, he might well forbear moving any Resolution of Approbation; for what approbation could be stronger than that testified by the majorities with which the hon. baronet's Resolutions had been rejected? He saw no reason, however, for entering into any further discussion on a future day; but would now read the Resolution with which he intended to close the business. It was as follows: "That it is the opinion of this house, that the Marquis Wellesley and Lord Clive, in their conduct relative to the Carnatic, were influenced solely by an anxious zeal and solicitude to promote the permanent security, welfare, and prosperity of the British possessions in India."

Sir T. Turton determined not to proceed any further, but moved that the other orders of the day be now read, intimating, that on Friday, June the 17th, he should move his other two Resolutions. The Chancellor of the Exchequer and Sir John Anstruther were perfectly indifferent when the hon. baronet should move them. What had passed in the debate of this night, and in the former debate, had completely shewn how unanswerable were the arguments which had been urged on their side; and they were confident that when the public saw the state of the divisions, after so many boasts, and so many procrastinations, they would not fail to form a just opinion of the nature of the whole proceeding.



## HOUSE OF COMMONS.

*Friday, June 17.*

## CONDUCT OF MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

Sir THOMAS TURTON, in rising pursuant to his notice, felt it necessary to premise that, whatever might be his individual impression, it was not his intention, in consequence of his deference to the decision of the house, to submit any Resolution directly tending to criminate the character of the noble person, whose measures gave rise to the Resolutions he had to propose. But he considered it necessary, in vindication of the justice of this country, that that house should come to some Resolution respecting the nature and circumstances of the transactions in the Carnatic, and also declaratory of its intention to discountenance such proceedings hereafter. The hon. baronet, therefore, reserving himself for that opportunity which would be afforded him by the indulgence of the house in reply, should then content himself with moving his two remaining Resolutions, as follow :

- “ That it appears to this house, that the person of the prince Ali Hussein, the rightful nabob of Arcot, was committed to the custody of the said Azeem ul Dowlah, who had, through the undue exercise of the power of the Company, usurped his dominions ; and that the said prince Ali Hussein, notwithstanding the frequent remonstrances and representations made to the British government, by himself and others, of the humiliating and degrading state to which he and his family were reduced by such confinement ; notwithstanding his representations of the imminent danger to his life, which he anticipated from being placed in the power of his enemy and the usurper of his throne ; was suffered to continue in such custody, until the 6th of April, 1802, when he died.
- “ That policy, as well as justice, loudly demands the vindication of the character of Great Britain in India, from the reproach of the above transactions ; and that the interests, if not the preservation, of our empire there, call for some public act, which will convince the native princes, that a religious adherence to its engagements, will, in future, characterise the British government. Consistently with these sentiments, and at a time when our implacable enemy attempts to justify his atrocities and despotism in Europe by the example of our conduct in India, it is peculiarly incumbent on the house, in the name of the people of England, to declare openly to the world, that the British parliament never did or will countenance any act of oppression and injustice in its Indian government. And, as evidence of its sincerity,

this house resolves forthwith to appoint a committee, to inquire into the before-mentioned act of the assumption of the Carnatic, the alleged motives thereof, and the particulars of the treatment of the family of our late ally, the nabob Mahomed Ali, and of the prince Ali Hussain, the lawful successor to the musnud of the Carnatic; and that it be an instruction to the said committee, to inquire into, and to report, whether any, and what reparation can, or ought to be made to the said family, for the injuries they have sustained by the usurpation of the said Azeem ul Dowlah; and that they may further report their opinion by what means the British character can be most effectually rescued from the obloquy and odium incurred from the above conduct of its servants, and how the British interests in India may be best secured from injury thereby."

The first Resolution being read, the gallery was cleared, and a division took place:

|          |   |   |   |   |   |     |
|----------|---|---|---|---|---|-----|
| Ayes     | - | - | - | - | - | 11  |
| Noes     | - | - | - | - | - | 34  |
| Majority | - | - | - | - | - | —23 |

On re-entering the gallery, we found

Sir SAMUEL ROMILLY on his legs, stating, that although convinced of the culpability of Marquis Wellesley, he did not impute to him corrupt motives or personal feelings. He had acted in a manner which he conceived to be for the advantage of the East India Company and the country: much was he mistaken in so conceiving! But the question was not upon the motives by which the noble marquis was actuated, but whether what he did was not prompted by a false ambition for the aggrandisement of his country; and whether that ambition was not gratified by the violation of every principle of justice. What effect would such conduct have on the British character? It was said the good of the country was promoted. It was for the house to decide on this, the materials were before them; every paper was produced; they were masters of the subject; and it was for them to determine whether they should, or should not, make these actions their own, and sanction a policy, as it appeared to him, so remote from wisdom or justice. This was a serious and important question; and, for the honour of the British character, he was grieved to witness such a division as had just taken place. Of late years, many wicked and designing men had, by their writings and actions, endeavoured to bring the parliament of the country into contempt; they had maliciously attempted to bring disgrace on the legislature of the empire; but he would seriously ask, whether all such persons could do, or any species of malice or abuse, had one-thousandth part of the effect of such a circumstance as this going out on a question which involved the national character, in the nearest degree, for policy, justice, and humanity, with only four or five members more than were absolutely requisite to decide on the most unimportant business. This was not a sound for the moment; it was not a transaction to be speedily forgotten. The papers now before them would be read and considered by future ages. It was not the character of the governor-general of India alone, it was the character of the British

nation which would be recorded and commented on by the historian. From his pen it would appear to future times, that, after a lapse of years, the affairs of the Carnatic were brought before the British parliament; that every paper and species of information was in their view; that the subject had been frequently and amply discussed; and that even such was the notoriety of the circumstances, that not a single member could be excused for not being perfectly conversant with them. It would then be seen, that they had not the manliness to adopt and applaud those measures, but that they endeavoured to get rid of a decision upon them by miserable previous questions, and other unworthy expedients. It would be seen, that the very confidential ministers of the crown had never delivered their opinions on these vast objects of policy and justice; and those who read the story would wonder what subject could possibly be of sufficient importance for them to speak upon. They would be in amaze, and utterly at a loss to divine how they came repeatedly to vote, with willing majorities, on so grand a question, without ever having the condescension to express their sentiments, or offer their reasons for so determining. When he entered the house, he had no design of being the first to bring on this discussion, and was astonished to see that such a task fell on him by the mode in which the question (on Sir T. Turton's last Resolution) was on the point of being disposed of. Thus situated, he might, perhaps, be guilty of some repetitions. He would not, however, repeat the subsisting treaties between the nabob of the Carnatic and the East India Company, or debate the question whether he was a sovereign prince, or a vassal of the Company. In one respect, at least, he was independent: he was put in the situation of a sovereign prince by the treaty negotiated with him by the Company. Even after the pretended records of his treachery were discovered, he was not used as a rebel who had thrown off his allegiance, but, as an independent prince, required to enter into a new treaty. The learned gentleman then went into a detail of the papers found at Srirangapatam, and read extracts from the letter from Marquis Wellesley to Lord Clive, on the occasion of appointing an inquiry thereupon, to shew that a resolution was formed, whatever might be the result of that inquiry, to seize the civil and military government of the Carnatic. These letters were not considered as sufficient evidence against the nabob, or it would have been unnecessary to examine witnesses on the occasion; neither did the evidence of Ali Rhea prove that the nabob was hostile to the British; on the contrary, it shewed that the most decided enmity subsisted between him and Tippoo. It was, therefore, monstrous to say that there was any thing in these proofs, as they were called, to affect the nabob. — He then commented at length on the instructions given to the commissioners appointed to examine the witnesses, and asserted, from the parts he read, that they were intended to intimidate them to give such evidence as would be agreeable to the Company, upon whom they were entirely dependent. Such witnesses would not have been received in this country, and he was glad to see his learned friend (the solicitor-general), taking notes of what he said, as, being accustomed to the justice of Britain, he would doubtless be prepared to shew that equal justice had been distributed in India. This examination must have been either judicial, in which case the accused person ought to have been heard in

his defence, or it must have been for the purpose of publishing to the world a justification of the future measures adopted in consequence of it. If the latter, it was more than ever incumbent on the commissioners to be careful that no grounds of doubt should be left. But what was the case? The examinations, though taken in the Persian language, were put down in English, and the reason assigned for this was, that from the first question put to Ali Rhea, the examination, it was found, would not take the turn expected. Thus, when every thing turned on the construction of an ambiguous sentence, and whether certain words were meant as compliments, or had some concealed meaning, instead of writing down these words, the commissioners exercised their discretion, and translated them into another language. Both the witnesses examined fully exculpated the nabob. The evidence of Ali Rhea went to prove nothing, and that of Gholaum Ali Khan was reported by the commissioners to be full of contradictions. But what was the construction put on these examinations by Lord Wellesley? He would not give up his favourite hypothesis against the nabob of the Carnatic, but he said, "because these witnesses will give no material evidence, they must have a knowledge of some atrocious fact, which not even our assurances of personal forgiveness, and even reward, will induce them to disclose." He would venture to say, that such a construction as this was unrivalled in the annals of injustice. The collection of the judicial atrocities of the darkest times, compiled by Voltaire, did not contain such a fact. Although it was known to the witnesses that the more atrocious their discoveries were, the more agreeable it would be to those on whom they depended, yet, with all the promises and threats held out in the instructions before their eyes, they did not confirm a single suspicion entertained of the connection between Omdut ul Omrah and Tippoo Sultan. There were other witnesses examined, but because their testimony did not establish any fact consonant to the wishes of the governor-general, no notice was taken of the facts they communicated. The learned gentleman now turned his attention to the cypher, and commented on the very great improbability of any such mode of correspondence being adopted in a communication on indifferent subjects, if even it had been intended as the vehicle for secret matters. It was monstrous and ridiculous to say that there was any thing mysterious in this, where all the mystery consisted in calling Tippoo "the pillar of the faithful," the English, "the new comers," and Wallah Jah, "the well-wisher of mankind." By the same rule Gibbon's History might be called a cypher, when the attributes of persons were assigned to them as names, as Virgil's being called "the poet," and Claudius "the emperor." If such serious and melancholy consequences had not followed from such proceedings, they would have been more worthy of ridicule than serious discussion, and might, instead of having resembled a tragedy of Racine, have had the appearance of a foolish tale. When the inquiry was first instituted, the object was said to be, to guard against the power and treachery of Omdut ul Omrah; but from his death happening in the interim, the same design was executed against a child who could have no power, nor be supposed disaffected towards the British. Before these measures could be justified, it ought to be proved, that the son was a party with the father (if he was guilty), instead of having recourse to that mon-

strous proposition which was laid down to the unfortunate Ali Hussein, namely, that Omdut ul Omrah having acted in such a manner as to become a public enemy, he, his child, by inheritance, entered into the condition of his father. "But this curious and unfounded principle of national law did not enter into the conception of the parties, till occasion called on them for some such apology. If Ali Hussein would have consented to become the "proper instrument" of the governor-general, it would never have been heard of, nor would those delicate hints of his not being the son of Omdut ul Omrah have been circulated. Azem ul Dowlah, now said to be the legal heir, would have been left to the poverty and obscurity from which he was elevated to the musnud. Twenty-four hours were given for the unfortunate prince to determine on the acceptance of the terms offered him by the Company. This was called a treaty, but it was not so; it might be a cession, or a surrender, but could not be called a treaty, where one of the contracting parties gave up independence, and indeed every thing he possessed. The prince, young as he was, determined not to disgrace the memory of his father; he rejected the proposal: and if there was a heart in the house, not entirely devoid of humanity, they must feel in the most acute manner, when he read the narrative giving an account of his noble behaviour. Here the learned gentleman read the description of the conduct of prince Ali Hussein, as transmitted by Lord Clive. It had been often observed, that there was but a short interval between the deposition from the throne, and the grave; it was verified in this case. He did not mean to say that violence was used, only that so it happened. The defenders of the measure said it was good for humanity, and for the inhabitants of the Carnatic, to have an European substituted for a native government. If this were true, it ought to have been done openly, and by force, and not by having recourse to base arts, false pretences, and a mockery of justice. He hoped some of the ministers would now break silence, and give a satisfactory statement of an affair which seemed so horrible to those who agreed with him. He could wish the statesmen among them to defend its policy, and his learned friend (the solicitor-general) to shew that it was not a perversion of justice. How could they reconcile it to their consciences, to give silent votes on what so deeply concerned the character of that empire of which they were chosen the directors? For this was not a vote upon the conduct of Marquis Wellesley, but upon the honour of the British nation. It was to declare, whether the acts of government in India were consistent with British justice, and to give an example to all future governors in India. It was either to tell them that we were determined to be just, or that the house would sanction and approve of seizing the dominions of our allies, and of violating every principle of justice and humanity.

Lord CASTLEREAGH observed, that from the manner in which this question was discussed, it might be supposed that it was only in its commencement; but he would ask gentlemen whether they could so soon forget that the house had already come to a grave decision upon it? The house had resolved, by a great majority, that there was no ground whatever for the most material part of the charges relative to the Carnatic Question, and negatived the motions containing such charges. The house was then in the singular situation of being called on to give

redress in a transaction, of which it had already, by its vote, expressed its approbation. No question had ever met with a more marked decision on the part of parliament than the present, if he was to take the sense of parliament from numbers. The learned gentleman who spoke last, observed, that ministers had taken no part in this discussion. That was not precisely the fact; but if they took so small a part, it did not arise from any want of conviction as to the opinion they entertained on the subject. For his own part, he entertained great doubts whether the speech of the learned gentleman would produce any good. Did he think any public utility could arise from the house of commons reversing the decision it had come to? and if he did, ought he not to blush at the idea of his friends not having brought the question forward before this time? Did he think that the house could so far forget its character as to reverse a decision it had so lately made? If this was the opinion of the hon. baronet, he ought to more than blush that no effort had been made, before this time, to call the attention of parliament to a transaction which had occurred so many years ago. If his object was to blacken the character of the British parliament throughout Europe, and to shake the faith of the country by this posthumous effort of his abilities, never were faculties less usefully directed. He could not see any reason of practical utility that could have induced him to pursue this course, unless it was to establish a maxim, which had already been established in that house, that every man who went out to India discoloured his ideas of public virtue from his mind. He could not suppose that it was more unjust, than to hold forth a notion that individuals of high rank would so far forget every thing due to themselves and their country, as to abandon the principles by which they had acted all their lives. The house was now examining a transaction which took place five years ago, a charge was made against the individuals concerned in that transaction. Their character was not to be impeached, their innocence was to be presumed until the contrary was proved. As the question remained asleep, until the hon. baronet rose, could he now contend, or suppose, that persons were to be impeached in that house, who would have pressed this subject long ago, if that quality which some gentlemen supposed? The learned gentleman opposite (Mr. Sheridan) have suffered for four years, if he thought he could have done so, if the right hon. gentleman had said, on a former occasion, that he would interrupt the harmony which prevailed in the house, supported. Did he mean, then, to impute gross negligence, and such an abandonment of duty, as to suppose they would have passed a transaction, were it so nefarious a one as it appeared, if the right hon. gentleman have sacrificed the convenience of a party? Was it likely that he would have quitted a part in almost all other questions of gross injustice against individuals, and an abandonment of his public duty, as not to defend the national character? He was not going to say anything like personal authority, but had it been such as was

described, it would have been brought forward by others long before this time. He had, however, much better evidence: namely, that which was contained in the papers themselves. To go into a detail of these papers would extend the discussion far beyond the limits of a single debate. He would merely state his view of the outline of the business, without pressing on the patience of the house. The question could only be argued on the ground of a treaty. He did not mean to contend that the sovereigns in India were not possessed of rights which the British government could not shake, without committing acts of injustice. But the question now to be considered was a mere question of treaty; and he was prepared to argue, that in the treaty made with the Arcot government, there were stipulations which prohibited the nabob of Arcot from holding any correspondence whatever with any native power, unless the consent of the British government was previously obtained. He suspected that the learned gentleman was not able to make a connected defence for the princes of the Carnatic, in consequence of his having taken up the question in this manner, and of his having, at the end of his speech, entered into a dramatic declamation on the interval between the imprisonment and the death of prince. This allusion could not have applied to the question; and therefore making it, the learned gentleman could only have been wasting strength. He contended, that it was not the duty of Marquis Wellesley to rest the safety of the British dominions in India on any rule proceeding which might be laid down in parliament, but on the principles of policy and jurisprudence. The learned baronet had that the grounds on which the removal of the family of Arcot place, were contrary to the rules of evidence; but he did not say that it was not a question between one subject and another, a sovereign and a subject, but that we were trying a sovereign prince, with a co-estate. Lord Wellesley, then, could only act on the principles of the laws of nations; on which, according to which a declaration of war would be just if public safety required any particular mode of proceeding. It was necessary to have such evidence as would be required by the law. When, during a period of profound peace, a treaty was sent by Buonaparte to Egypt, to shake the foundation of political and commercial relations in that part of the world, of commons, at the time the question of war was proposed, we require any more evidence of that fact than the fact itself. We merely went on the question of fair presumption. These were the views of the enemy. When a treaty was carried on between certain persons in France, it did not require the strict rules of evidence. What were the circumstances that carried it on? Would the learned gentleman say, that no evidence had been found at Seringapatam? He did not acknowledge that they carried on any correspondence with Mysore; and he wished to know the grounds of this correspondence, and how it existed between the British government and the Mysore government, and at which the correspondence

Whatever the nature of the correspondence might be, it must, however, be allowed, that the same having been carried on at the time of the treaty made by Lord Cornwallis, it was amply sufficient to justify the jealousy of our government; and Marquis Wellesley would have acted a strange confiding part, highly detrimental to our interests, if, after the discovery of such correspondence, he had left the government of the Carnatic where he found it. Here the noble lord referred to the several letters written by the nabob to the prince of Mysore; and said he should prove that the nabob of the Carnatic knew these letters were in direct violation of the treaty. They were not letters of mere compliment, but they were communications of political importance, which he knew he could not openly convey without breaking the treaty. But they were made privately; and if the nabob only wanted to convey expressions of mere civility, as were stated, that might be easily done upon giving a proper intimation to the government. It was said, that the correspondence was for the purpose of bringing about a marriage between the two families. If that was the case, what occasion was there for making use of a private cypher, which had no reference whatever to a marriage? It was a cypher by which hatred had generally been expressed by the native powers to the British government, and that was a curious sign to make use of in negotiating a treaty of marriage. Although, when he first read these papers, it was impossible for him to think that they were an innocent correspondence, yet, from his intimate habits of intercourse with Lord Cornwallis, he inquired particularly of that noble person what was his private opinion as to this supposed treaty of marriage, and what his knowledge was of that transaction. He expressly stated he had never heard of any such treaty of marriage, although he was said to have been privy to the treaty. It had been asked what good or what object could Mahomed Ali have attained, by conspiring with the Mysore government against the interests of Great Britain, particularly so, when he was a man of good understanding, and must have known how fruitless his attempts might be? It was no difficult thing to suppose, that the family of Arcot could have taken such a view of their right to empire in that country, as might make them indulge a feeling that the effective dominion of that country ought to belong to them, and not to the India Company. They might, partly from a feeling of ambition or mortified pride, and religious prejudices, imagine that they might have a more extended sovereignty over the country, and shake the power of the British government. These views might induce them to correspond with the Mysore government. Mahomed Ali, in a letter to Hyder, spoke of arms; here there was nothing about a marriage, the letter talked of their long enjoying the prospect of the sea from an eminence. What could that mean but a secret wish that the English gentlemen (to use their own expression) should be expelled from the country, so that they might have an uninterrupted possession of the whole? But this was not the only political correspondence that took place between the Arcot family, and the family that was hostile to the English interests in India. A rooted jealousy and hostility of the British power could plainly be collected from the whole correspondence. It was a wise jealousy of Lord Wellesley to take alarm at this correspondence. He was persuaded



there was most evident proof of hostility; yet it did not rest on Lord Wellesley's judgment alone, but was the favourite opinion of every governor in that country, that the family of Arcot, as well as the Mysore, were plotting the overthrow of the British power.

When Lord Macartney took the government of Madras upon him, no man could act with more deliberate and disinterested justice, nor with a greater desire to conciliate the native powers; yet he afterwards declared, that the family of Arcot was hostile to us, and nothing but its deposition could produce tranquillity for us in India. Such was likewise the opinion of Lord Clive; and at last Lord Wellesley was so convinced of it, by the evidence he had before him in India, that he proposed in council to do the act which was done. He saw that this family denied us all succour; that they were acting with hostility in every instance; and therefore his decision did not rest on the opinion of those governors who went before him, but on his own immediate observation. The very arrangement now so much reprobated as injurious to the British character, was the same which Lord Cornwallis had recommended before that time as necessary to be acted upon, and as beneficial to both the parties. If it should be contended, that the punishment went beyond the measure of fair security, there might be an argument as to the question of the treaty of 1792. ~~But the world would not allow it to be~~ In the treaty, Lord Cornwallis incorporated a condition, that the whole administration of the Carnatic should, in case of war, be taken into the hands of the British. The whole military and civil power of the state was to be in our hands. At length, when the treason between father and son came to light, did Lord Wellesley push the right he possessed to an extent that could be called severity? The only difference was, that he did that in time of peace which by treaty he was entitled to do in time of war. The defective stipulations of the treaty perfectly justified them in their departing from it.

The next question was, whether it could be considered as harsh to extend the severity exercised towards the father to the sons of the nabob? The learned gentleman who argued so much on criminal law, knew very well, that, in cases of treason, under which principle this question must be decided, the innocent must be involved in the consequences of the guilt of others. When the house of Stuart was driven from the throne of this country, the whole of the descendants were excluded also. It cannot be supposed that such descendants would hold different sentiments from their ancestors. Was it to be supposed, that the son of Mahomed Ali would not entertain the same hostility against us which his father had done? and could Lord Wellesley suffer him, consistently with the British interests in India, to remain on the throne from which his father had been removed? He might have had a disposition favourable to the British, but he was surrounded by a tribe of harpies, who had claims and expectations upon him; who altered his disposition, and persuaded him to think that justice would be done him in England. How was it possible, under such circumstances, to expect friendly sentiments from a person so beset, and with interested defendants, so perverted in his station? He was sure, that if the right hon. gentleman had a just view of this question, nothing would have induced him to let

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it sleep for the space of four years. After the practical decision of parliament was twice had on this subject, he greatly lamented it was again brought forward. It had the effect of lowering the character of the country and of the parliament in the eyes of foreign countries; because foreigners were repeatedly told the British government were giving sanction to those principles that characterised the conduct of the ruler of France. It would be a fatal moral to hold out to the world, and was, besides, a gross injustice, to attempt to run down the character of such men as Lord Wellesley, after they had performed a most difficult public duty, in high situations, without giving them an opportunity of vindicating themselves; and thus to represent the British governors as having committed, and the government as giving sanction to, enormities similar to those practised by our enemies. For a considerable time, the attention of parliament had been occupied in hearing charges of this kind, accompanied with strong allegations, which it was difficult to refute. Fortunately, however, Lord Wellesley had now completely vindicated his character; and he was now so completely in possession of the public opinion, that every possible degree of confidence might be reposed in him, and his character stood higher than ever it had done before.

Mr. SHERIDAN felt, that after the personal allusions so frequently made to him, he should not act respectfully towards the noble lord if he continued silent on the present occasion. The noble lord concluded a speech, filled with the strangest and most monstrous doctrines he had ever heard, with a solemn appeal to the justice of the house, calling upon it not to establish so bad a moral as that of exposing the delinquency of public servants, for fear their conduct should be compared with the enormities of our enemies! It was with reluctance he entered on any of the enormities committed in India. In making such a declaration, the noble lord was not aware of the libel which he pronounced on an hon. friend of his, who was lately chief justice in India! Here Mr. Sheridan quoted a speech delivered at the time of Mr. Hastings's impeachment, by Mr. (now Sir John) Anstruther, in which that gentleman dwelt on the enormities practised in India, and insisted on the necessity of investigation and punishment. But now the house was to understand, from the speech of the noble lord, that no governor in India, let his crimes be ever so great, was to have his conduct at all inquired into. He maintained, that the best way to hold out to the world that we practised no enormities, was to punish those who committed any.

The noble marquis, whose conduct was now the subject of discussion, had lately made an observation, that the attack upon Copenhagen, and the seizure of the Danish fleet, was an event at which Englishmen ought to rejoice, because it would grieve Buonaparte. It was unwise in the noble marquis to make such a declaration; because he believed it to be entirely the reverse of what was the fact. He sincerely believed, that Buonaparte never felt more joy at any event than what this act of ours gave him. In that act he saw our character blended with his own. He found in it an indemnity for the past, and security for the future. The noble lord's code of political morality was the worst he had ever heard broached in that house. His desultory term, 'Will o' the Wisp speech,' had not put down a single argument advanced by his learned friend, to whom he felt grateful for the sentiments he had delivered. He did not

feel a wish to say any thing uncivil towards the noble lord, particularly so, after the very handsome manner in which the noble lord spoke of him the evening before last. But he should have supposed, had he not known his assiduity, the noble lord had never read the papers relative to this subject. He had said that Ali Hussein had forfeited his right to the throne, inasmuch as he inherited the treason of his father. He could never have been a party to a treason which had not been communicated to him, and with which the father had not been charged in his life-time. He never knew a more monstrous attempt than this to impose on the credulity of the public. There was no analogy in this case to that of the house of the Stuarts, in which a country chose its own magistrates, which every people had a right to do; but here was an independent prince, who was an ally; and what right had any man to say, that we should dismiss from the throne of his ancestors the lawful heir to that throne, against whom no charge whatever could be made? But what became of all this argument, when the fact was, that Azem ul Dowlah was put on the musnud over the son of a person who was actually proved to be an enemy to the British interests? The noble lord shewed the grossest ignorance of the papers; for the very correspondence he referred to was carried on with the consent of the government of Madras. As to the cypher, he appealed to the hon. baronet who had been chief justice in India, and would ask, if he would suffer a man to be convicted on such evidence [Sir John Anstruther signified that he would not], he was happy to hear his hon. friend say he would not. Yet it was on such evidence that an innocent young prince was deprived of his throne, and placed in a situation in which he lost his life. Mr Sheridan then read some correspondence, in order to shew that the British government in India considered it as likely to be favourable to their interests, to have an intimate correspondence and connection carried on between the house of Arcot and the Mysore. It was attempted to justify this transaction, on the ground of state necessity. But this act of injustice and robbery could not be an act resulting from state necessity, because there existed no necessity for it, or at least none had been shewn, to influence their decision. The right hon. gentleman next read some papers, to shew the steady attachment of the nabob to the English; and he defied any governor to say, that there existed the slightest proof of the hostility of the father or the son, except what was extracted from the trash found at Seringapatam. The arguments that had been used to prove that the nabob was considered as a vassal to the India Company, were as unjust as they were unfounded. The important documents on the table put that question out of all doubt, for it would appear by an address actually signed by his majesty, counter-signed by Lord Cornwallis, and addressed to the nabob, dated the 13th of May, 1790, that he was considered not only as an independent sovereign, but actually called the "faithful ally and friend" of the British government in India. Here the right hon. gentleman read a long extract from the address alluded to, from which it likewise appeared that the very first acre of ground the English became possessed of round Madras, was acquired through the friendship of the nabob of Arcot; yet, he argued, after such an unqualified declaration under his majesty's own hand, of the independency of this prince, such

degrading language was to be held out! Was it to be endured for one single moment, that the rights and laws of nations were to be thus trampled upon with impunity, merely upon the alleged policy of the measure? From a very patient perusal of the very important documents on the table, they established this proposition in his mind, that there was no ground whatever for any suspicion of the faithfulness of the nabob of Arcot and his son towards the British government. There was one part of this question which he could not but consider as a great dereliction of principle in the noble marquis. It was said that he took every possible care for the protection of Ali Hussein, the deposed nabob. Could it be thought for a moment, that the deposed nabob would be safe in the hands of a man who threatened him with instant death if he ever attempted to regain the throne of his father? From these circumstances he concluded, that the young nabob was not safe in those hands. He did not feel disposed even to enter into all the motives that might have actuated the noble marquis in his conduct, and he was less disposed to argue the accusation urged against him of his being actuated by pecuniary interests in his administration; but looking at his general conduct as a governor of India, he must say there was no parallel in the history of that country which presented so unbridled an instance of insatiable ambition. The sum total of what the country knew of his conduct as governor was, that he succeeded to the government after Lord Cornwallis. He found India in a great and increasing state of prosperity. He found a system of equity and economy in the public expenditure, admirably calculated for the solidity of our establishment in that country. But when he left it, he left behind him an example of the most pernicious prodigality and profuseness. When he landed, he found a disposition in the Company's servants to revere the laws, and to abide by the decrees of his majesty; but when he left it, the utmost contempt prevailed of the laws and regulations of the Company. When he went there, the native powers of India placed the utmost confidence in the faith of the British government; but he left them entertaining in their minds the most irreconcilable sentiments of disgust and enmity, on account of its treachery and oppression. In short, the result of the noble lord's administration was this, that when he went to India, he found Great Britain without a foe, and when he departed, he left Great Britain without a friend. Upon these grounds he felt himself called upon to say thus much, not from any personal enmity to the noble marquis, but from a principle of preserving his own consistency. He took this opportunity of defending himself from the insinuation thrown out by the noble lord in the commencement of his speech, that he had departed from principle in seeming to neglect the cause he had so strenuously undertaken to advocate on former occasions, by stating that his sentiments upon this subject had never been in the least altered from the first intimation he received of the oppression and tyrannous dethronement of the young nabob, and the subsequent information that arrived in this country of his murder. On that occasion his mind was so horrified by the atrocity of the act, that he resolved immediately to institute an inquiry into the causes of so gross a violation of the laws of civilization and humanity. Circumstances, however, had prevented him from carrying the desired object completely into effect personally. He saw no prospect then of pursuing the investigation in

that administration, and from these considerations he did not preist. He had, however, moved from time to time for a great number of documents, which must remove at once every suspicion of his having cooled in the cause. He concluded by declaring his fixed determination at all times never to shrink from the task he had imposed upon himself, of representing the noble marquis's conduct in the plain and unvarnished manner in which he fully persuaded himself the various documents on the table exhibited the circumstances of his administration to the country.

Mr. FULLER contended, that this was a most extraordinary discussion, and made on the opposite side a question of party rather than of principle.

Dr. LAURENCE supported the Resolution. The proposition of the noble lord, that this was held to be a grave question by the house, might well be doubted, if they were to judge from the manner in which they had decided upon the evidence adduced in support of the charges against the noble marquis. Upon what principle it was that the house intended to act in its decision upon this subject, he was at some loss to conjecture. Although it might be argued in favour of the noble marquis, that he was not actuated by motives of pecuniary aggrandisement, yet there were a thousand other bad passions which might actuate a minister, equally as mischievous and destructive to the interests of a nation, as those connected with the most sordid motives. Inordinate ambition must on all hands be admitted, in a moral point of view, to be the most pernicious of all the passions that actuated the human mind. That such was the motive of the noble marquis in his administration, must depend upon what degree of credit the house would attach to the evidence of the papers on the table. In his opinion, formed upon the consideration he had given to those documents, the accusations were unanswerable. Here the learned gentleman combated the arguments used to justify the policy adopted by this country towards the native powers of India. Nothing was more unjust and unprincipled, nothing was more opposite, not only to the laws of nations, but those of nature, than the system of oppression practised upon the unfortunate nabob of Arcot; whose rights and privileges were violated upon the most unwarranted and unjust pretence of having broken a treaty, when, in fact, the most barefaced act of tyrannical policy obtruded itself throughout the whole transaction. He related the history of the first transactions of the British government with the nabob of Arcot, until the period of his contracting his debt with them, and detailed the various pretences urged by them for increasing that debt, which he considered as the over-reaching principle which universally characterised the conduct of the India Company's servants, and brought the narrative down to the period of their interposition in the affairs of the Carnatic, under the pretence of the discovery of the secret correspondence with the neighbouring potentates, for the purpose of forming a confederacy against the British interest. In considering the evidence in support of the allegation, that a violation of treaty was the ground of their interference, he contended that there was a previous determination of the government of India to adopt that measure long before any knowledge of such pretended correspondence was re-

ceived. He knew of no law of nations that could warrant so unjust an interference, on our part, upon presumed evidence of danger. He did not deny the principle of self-preservation, as the first law of nature; but the fact of real danger must be clearly justified and substantiated, before we could presume to violate every law both human and divine. With respect to the stress laid so strongly upon the mysterious information contained in the cypher, he argued, that there was nothing in it, if the context was considered, that could justify such a construction as that put upon it by the advocates of the noble lord. This cypher was to be used as a breach of treaty, and consequently was not a sufficient justification for the acts of tyranny practised upon the nabob. The treaty stipulated that the nabob was not to go to war without the consent of the British government. Now, supposing even that this correspondence did contain sentiments of a political nature, was it just or reasonable to infer that any breach of treaty with the British government was meant? He was persuaded that out of twenty letters which had passed from the nabob to the other powers, his allies, not a single phrase had been used which could attach to the nabob any violation of treaty. Taking the whole of the evidence, and the arguments upon this question urged by the gentlemen on the same side of the house, he was decidedly of opinion that this act was not founded in justice or sound policy, which were inseparable from humanity and benevolence.

MR. WINDHAM said, he was not disposed to enter into a discussion upon the merits of this question. He was restrained in doing so, not merely from the lateness of the hour, but really from a sort of despondence he entertained that any arguments which could be offered could have any weight with a majority of the house, who seemed, in opposition to reason and evidence, disposed to pass a vote rather of approbation than censure. He could not suffer the subject to pass by without making a few observations upon some of the arguments urged by the noble lord. The principle contended for by the noble lord in support of the policy of the East India Company in India, reminded him of the last line of a song, written by Dr. Swift for a highwayman, "Every man round may rob if he pleases." In the annals of injustice, and in the annals of romance, what could be more preposterous than this principle? In alluding to the manner in which the evidence upon this subject was forced from Ali Rhea, it was impossible to come at the truth by such a mode of examination as that adopted on that occasion. The effect of torture was not to produce truth, but to produce only that which the person inflicting torture wished to be told. The construction put upon this evidence reminded him of a passage in the works of Lord Shaftesbury, in reference to torture, that he would produce out of the words, 'My son Tommy has got the piles,' a very good plot against the house of Hanover! He regretted extremely that the house had not the aid of his learned friend (the solicitor-general) on this side of the motion, who made so great a figure on the trial of Mr. Hastings; but, it would seem, the principle by which we were to be guided, was, that the natives of India had no rights, that we had no duties, and that all was to depend upon the decision of our majorities. He firmly believed, that for the enormities committed by the British power in India, in all

the enormities under all the successive variations of the French revolution, and by no means recently under Buonaparte, no parallel was to be found. If, then, they could not find a parallel in Europe for the enormities committed in India, how could it be supposed that the votes of the house of commons were to effect any reformation? He would wish he could separate the man from the conduct, but, unfortunately, both must be taken together. As to the motives of the noble marquis, what was the use of any inquiry about them? A man might have a motive to get money for his family, a laudable one, to be sure; but, then, if the motive were carried into effect by a violation of all justice, were we to excuse him for his motives? The right hon. gentleman concluded by lamenting most sincerely what had happened; lamenting that men in the situation he saw could be found to defend it; and lamenting, more than all, that a British parliament should sanction it. They were not to look at this affair with the eyes of others; the papers were before them, and, from the decision they gave thereon, the world would pronounce sentence upon them.

Sir THOMAS TURTON, in reply, said — Sir, at this late hour of the morning (two), wearied as the house must be with a subject on which I am fearful few have bestowed any pains, and many have not even attended to; I shall detain the house as shortly as possible, in reply to the observations and statements (for arguments I have heard none), on the charge I have brought against the government in India. I must previously, however, notice the complaint of an hon. gentleman (Mr. Wellesley Pole), whose fraternal feelings I can readily allow for, and to which I attribute that excess of warmth which has characterised his speech. The hon. gentleman has been pleased to observe on the manner in which I have opened the charge, as combining, with the total absence of proof, the most unwarrantable epithets of abuse — that I have stated his noble relative; and all persons in his situation going to India, as devoid of common honour and honesty; and that, in fine, I have uttered such opinions, and used such language, under the protection of the house, that I would not have dared to use out of it. Sir, whilst I defy the hon. gentleman to produce a single instance on the records of parliament of a charge so serious, attended with circumstances so outrageous and wanton, having been brought forward with so much moderation in language or conduct, either towards the act charged or the persons accused, I can assure him, that he has wholly mistaken my character, if he supposes that I am capable of screening myself, on this or any other occasion, under the protection of this house; or that, what I have said in my place here, I have not often said; and, when occasion may call for it, shall repeat any, and every where. But, at any rate, I cannot suffer myself to be misrepresented. I never said that the noble lord had neither honour nor honesty. I never attributed the absence of these qualities to any man in India. What I said was, that there appeared to be a kind of geographical morality, and that I found a difficulty in accounting for the conduct of persons in India, who appeared not to be destitute of the common feelings of justice and humanity when in this country; and I then quoted an observation of Mr. Burke, attributing this change to their being dipped in crossing the Line. — So much for this charge of

the hon. gentleman, whose speech I shall no further notice, than to observe, that if he, with the natural partiality attached to his view of the case, considers the defence made by the two hon. members to whom he has alluded, as unanswerable and satisfactory, it is useless to address myself to *him*. But to the house I shall venture to express my opinion, that never was so serious and direct a charge met by reasoning so inconclusive, statements so unfounded, and pretexts so unworthy as the present. In my opening, I anticipated most of them, but, I must own, not all. The defence which has been made, adds another to the many instances we meet with, that the most atrocious and disgraceful acts may, for a moment, be stripped of the horror they excite, by the aid of sophistry and ingenuity. Indeed, the hon. gentlemen have had an hard and serious task, and their powers have been proportionably exerted; but, with the exception of the hon. gentleman and the other friends and relatives of both the noble lords, is there one man in the house who will say, that this act really merits any other epithets than those I have applied to it? Happy am I to find, that no one of his majesty's ministers, except the noble lord (Castlereagh, himself implicated in the transaction), have chosen to stand forth in defence of it. And that noble lord will forgive me in observing, that whatever might have been his knowledge of the facts at the time, he has wholly forgotten them since. We need only refer to the documents of early date on your table, to be satisfied that his statement of the ancient hostility in the old nabob to the British government, evinced (as the noble lord says) by his letters to Hyder Ali, is an entire misrepresentation; he will there find, that at our request only, and against the advice and remonstrance of the nabob himself, he was compelled to commence a correspondence of civility with Hyder Ali. Indeed, the noble lord appears not to have had leisure to read through half the papers on your table, for, if he had, his statements would be inexcusable.

The right hon. gentleman opposite (Mr. Wallace), who has gone into the defence of this act at great length, has commenced his speech by observing, that I have erred in my statement of historical facts, and asserts, "that our first connection in the *Carnatic* was with Wallah Jali, whom we raised from the dust." Is the right hon. gentleman really serious? Is a member of the board of control ignorant of our earliest relations with the powers of Hindustan? What was the commercial charter granted to us by Ferocksere? Did that form no connection between us? Had we no connection, no correspondence with Anwar u Dien himself? Did we not owe to him and his assistance the safety of St. David's, after Madras was taken in 1745? What, then, does the right hon. gentleman mean by raising Wallah Jali from the dust? Does he mean to impress the house with the idea, that this family was created by the bounty of the Company? Does he recollect, that in 1745, Anwar u Dien was powerful enough to command the British fleet under Commodore Bannet, consisting of two sixty gun ships, a fifty, and a frigate, not to commit hostilities against the French at Pondicherry, he (Anwar u Dien) having engaged to observe a perfect neutrality in Arcot; and that, notwithstanding the remonstrances of the Madras government, he persisted in his resolution, and threatened, in case of disobedience, to attack Madras? In consequence of this, we de-



sisted from our attempt. But does the right hon. gentleman merely mean, that Wallah Jah himself, experiencing adverse fortune, was assisted by us? I have before stated, that he was under no obligation to us; we espoused his cause, because the French adopted that of Chunda Sahib; and if we look into the particulars of our assistance, it will appear, that his obligations are not increased by the manner or extent of it. When, after the battle of Amboia, in which Anwar u Dien fell, and his eldest son was taken prisoner, Mahomed Ali fled to Trichinopoly, and applied to us for assistance, what was the force we sent to him? 620 European soldiers: whilst we suffered Boscawen, with his fleet full of troops, to sail to Europe, leaving the French interest in possession of the Carnatic. So, when his tributary, the king of Tanjore, applied to us for aid, we sent him (I think it was) *twenty* men; however, a mere nominal assistance: and, when we talk of raising Mahomed Ali from the dust, we have surely forgotten our noble exploits at the battle of Trivadi, where, by our desertion of him, he lost the battle. It was not to us, but to Nazir Jing, son of Nizam ul Mulek, that the family of Anwar u Dien owed its restoration to the musnud of Arcot. We shall be able to judge from this, of the correctness of the historical knowledge of the right hon. gentleman. But now for his reasoning, if we can dignify it by that name. He is willing to admit that the evidence on your table is not legal evidence; but he contends, nevertheless, that we ought to admit it; not for the purpose of grounding a remonstrance to the nabobs, if alive, or of requiring an explanation of any conduct which might have appeared doubtful in them, but for that of dethroning and imprisoning their innocent and lawful successor. — I should have been glad to hear the right hon. gentleman's definition of this crime of the nabob's; I think he calls it, somewhere, an *hostile conspiracy against the interests of the British government* — by whom? by sovereigns he acknowledges independent. — I would ask him, in what page of the code of the public law of nations he finds this crime in a sovereign; and of a crime, too, which he acknowledges was only in embryo, and though conceived for several years, he does not pretend was ever acted upon. — I think the utmost which that right hon. gentleman attributes to these poor sovereigns, who had sinned beyond forgiveness, is, “*a correspondence exciting suspicion of sinister designs.*” — Ah! Sir, how must the right hon. gentleman have stretched his ingenuity, to have framed this bill of indictment; and what a jury must he have to find a verdict of guilty! But, let it be remembered, that the right hon. gentleman argues the whole of this case, as if the messages and letters said to be sent and written, were sent and written by the nabobs. Here is the fallacy of his argument. So far from this being proved, they dared not attempt to prove it. They had the means in their hands, either of proving or disproving them. Khader Nawaz Khan could have explained the whole business of the cypher, and of the messages said to be sent at different times by him to Tippoo's ambassadors; and there was no reason to fear his partiality towards the nabobs, for this was the only khan who bowed the knee to the usurper, and, of course, he was a fit object for our designs; but him they dared not examine. Is not this of itself a sufficient proof that the government did not believe one word of the alleged conspiracy? After this,

who will credit any part of the story? But we will leave these disgusting pretexts to themselves and their authors; and I shall only observe, that if the sacred names of justice and humanity were ever prostituted to disgraceful and wicked purposes, it is where the right hon. gentleman uses them as applied to our conduct towards the dying nabob. — “Insensible (he says) must be the heart which could not feel for the nabob, extended on the bed of sickness.” — And does this expression of sympathy come from the advocate of this nefarious act? Can the right hon. gentleman forget the orders of the British government to Colonel M’Neil, at the time when they knew the nabob’s situation, and which *his humanity* alone, on the representation of Major Grant, induced him to disobey? But the right hon. gentleman surely is not serious, any more than when he gravely informs us, “that the *principles of humanity and regard for the prince’s family regulated the proposals made to him.*” Can we hear this statement without a conviction that the right hon. gentleman is laughing at us? or can we hear the reference to Domat’s Compendium of Civil and Public Law, to justify the deposition of the prince on the ground of reparation (and which I had anticipated), without feeling a regret that doctrines so monstrous, and as applied to the present case, so extravagant, should meet countenance from a quarter so respectable. It is impossible that the right hon. gentleman can seriously think them applicable. There is only one observation more that I shall make on the speech of the right hon. gentleman. — In his justification of this act, he has alleged the sanction of that respectable nobleman, Lord Cornwallis. Does the right hon. gentleman mean to insinuate, that this outrageous act received the countenance of that revered person? Does he mean to state, that the general administration of Lord Wellesley met his approbation? What a censure must he then pass on the noble lord near him, and on that administration who sent Lord Cornwallis to heal the wounds which Lord Wellesley had inflicted on suffering India. Need we the testimony of the papers on your table to know, that, from the moment of Lord Cornwallis’s landing in India, his efforts were solely and exclusively directed to the subversion of that system, which aimed to establish the greatness and power of this country on the breach of public faith, and the sacredness of treaties? that amongst the last instructions given by him, were those to the residents at Poonah, and Hyderabad, directing them to abstain from any further interference with the respective governments? that respected nobleman, expressing his apprehensions lest the natives should be led to believe, from the system which had lately been pursued, “that the English aimed at universal dominion in India.” His exertions to undeceive them were the unceasing objects of the short remainder of his life. I trust his example will not be lost on those who succeed him.

An hon. gentleman, who spoke from the floor (Mr. Whistled Keene), talks of the happiness of millions being insured by this act. Whilst I do not admit our right to overturn a government, even to improve the situation of its subjects, I must ask the hon. gentleman if he is quite sure that this is the case? If I am not mistaken, as far as pecuniary impositions affect happiness, the state of the country, instead of being improved, is deteriorated. I moved for an account of the revenue collected since we had taken the civil administration into our hands.

If I had obtained them, the house would have seen that this country, which has been snatched from the baneful influence of the nabob's government, and participates in all the luxurious enjoyments of British protection, is at this moment paying for the blessed exchange three times the sum in taxes which it paid whilst under the government of its ancient masters. I know that I have under-rated the amount of increased pecuniary oppression; nor will it less surprise the house to be informed, that, notwithstanding these additional burthens on the natives, the money actually coming into the treasury of the Company is less than under the treaty. What, then, becomes of the charges of misery and corruption of the nabob's government? or how will the hon. gentleman prove that the exchange has rescued millions from oppression? I much fear, the reign of the English sircars (as they have been termed) is not wholly over, but that oppression has not changed its nature, though dressed in the garb of European civilization. An hon. officer (Colonel Allan) has informed us, that the cypher was intended for political purposes; but he has contented himself with this statement, without advancing any proof, or even an argument to sustain it; but suppose it was so intended, you have proof it was never so acted on; how, then, is it a violation of the treaty? The treaty says, "The nabob shall carry on no political page of these paltry documents do you find a word with the army through the Carnatic, and that the natives all exclaimed against the nabob's government, and expressed a strong desire to be placed under British protection. The appearance of a great and conquering army often effects a wonderful change in the language and conduct of the countries through which they march. The tyrant of Europe has often discovered this; and if we are to believe his Moniteurs, an universal desire to be incorporated with the French nation prevails in every country which his desolating arms have laid waste; the desire has, I dare say, been in this case equally sincere: how, otherwise, can we account for the letter of remonstrance written by Lord Hobart to the nabob, on his permitting the subjects of the British government, residing in the Jaghire round Madras, to settle in his (the nabob's) territories? The thing is wholly unnatural, and improbable; but, if true, does not justify the atrocity of the act, or add one argument in its favour.

Sir, I think that I have shortly noticed all the main points of defence which the defenders of this act have brought forward. I shall only observe, that, however respectable these hon. gentlemen may be, they are, nevertheless, connected either with the act or the actors, and I am not, therefore, surprized at the line of argument they have taken; but I am not sure that the defence of the hon. gentleman (Mr. Keene) is not the more manly and honest of them all: he says, "India is not to be governed but by the sword; you can have no dependence on the faith of these sovereigns of Hindustan; violence alone will do with them." One can understand this; and if we cannot subscribe to the reason or policy of it, we do to the frankness of the avowal. Indeed, this has been the sad and abominable system you have pursued; whilst it

has made us bankrupt in character, has it even enriched our pockets? Ask the East India Company; they will tell you, that the noble marquis has increased the revenues of the Company seven millions, and the debt sixteen more; that your wars and conquests have occasioned this; but even this I deem a very subordinate consideration. The great question is, how has your policy affected the character and interests of Great Britain? True, you have greatly extended your territories, you have added twenty millions of subjects, but you have done it at the expence of every sacred principle of moral obligation or national faith. Have you not reduced your allies to be slaves, your tributaries to be mere cyphers of state, and when you had no more sovereigns within your grasp to dethrone, no more provinces to devastate, no more forts to raze, no more chiefs to hang up, or nobles to expatriate, unsatiated with the wretched havoc of desolation and blood you had occasioned, in the wantonness of malice, in the plenitude of folly, you determined to attack their *religious prejudices*, their ancient and venerable customs; those prejudices, which had resisted with effect the enthusiasm and cruelty of the Mahomedan conquerors, who soon learnt the wisdom of institutions, which, admitting no proselytism, presented no danger, it was reserved for the mildness and liberality of Christians to attack. Those ear rings, and marks of cast, which, if we are to believe Pliny, Arrian, and Herodotus, have existed more than two thousand years, it was reserved for Britons, in the nineteenth century, to tear from the forehead and ears of the patient and meek Hindoo. What! were the conquerors of Plassey, of Chunar, the heroes of Seringapatam, and Laswarree, enervated by these baubles, or unfit for military service if their whiskers were not cut to a pattern? *Quæ te dementia cepit.* But I will dwell no longer on this hated subject: on our conduct there cannot be two opinions — you must alter your system, or India is gone.

Sir, I have done; whatever is the fate of these resolutions, and particularly of the last, I feel I have discharged my duty; and I know, if only those give their votes who have made themselves masters of the subject, and bring an impartial judgment to its decision, I shall attain my object. I am, however, far from sanguine, when I look round the house; yet let me intreat gentlemen to reflect, that, by crushing this inquiry by the previous question, you do not wipe away the guilt from the accused; you only declare, that the parliament of Great Britain, where alone the wrongs of India can be inquired into, shuts its ears to their cries. What will be the effect of this proceeding in India, I shudder to think! Certain it is, that if the means should be afforded to the natives to resist your power, you have not one native prince who would not rise against you, and extirpate you from that land, where your progress has been only marked by tyranny and injustice. Once more do I conjure the house; again do I intreat his Majesty's ministers to pause, before they vote for the previous question; if their feelings are deadened to the calls of humanity and justice, they must be alive to those of interest: that will prompt them to do justice to India, and to join me in declaring to the world, that the British parliament will never sanction one act of injustice, committed in its name, towards any description of persons, however distant their situation, who are entitled to its protection. This sentiment will do ministers more credit, and

eventually more service, than any support they may derive from espousing a cause which dares not meet investigation, but shelters itself under the protection of a *previous question*.

Sir, I thank the house for its indulgence, and I shall no longer keep it from its decision.

The gallery was now cleared, and the house divided :

|                            |     |
|----------------------------|-----|
| For the Resolution - - - - | 19  |
| Against it - - - - -       | 97  |
| Majority - - - - -         | —78 |

Mr. WALLACE then rose and said, that after what had passed on this and former discussions, it was unnecessary for him to introduce the Resolution which he was now going to move, with any preface; he should content himself simply with moving the following Resolution: Resolved, "That it is the opinion of this house, that the Marquis Wellesley and the Earl Powis, in their conduct relative to the Carnatic, appear to have been influenced solely by motives of anxious zeal and solicitude for the permanent security, welfare, and prosperity of the British possessions in India."

Sir JAMES HALL said, that he only differed from the right hon. gentleman who had made this motion, in thinking it did not go far enough: it was high time that parliament should do that justice to this illustrious character, which the meanest, the most degraded subject of our laws, had a right to demand. After submitting the conduct of the noble marquis to the severest scrutiny, during a long course of years, and after deciding, by very great majorities, that he had done nothing wrong, the house was bound to grant him a deliverance, not only to free him from the present charge, but to protect him from all future attempts on similar grounds. It would become the justice, the honour, the gentleman-like feeling of the house, to do a great deal more; not only to clear the character of the noble marquis from blame, but also to declare their high opinion of the services he had rendered his country, in such a manner as to revive the recollection of those services, which seemed to be in a measure forgotten. If the consequence of such a declaration were to be what a right hon. gentleman (Mr. Sheridan) had deprecated, were the noble marquis raised to a high station in the ministry, he should rejoice in the experiment, by which there was reason to expect that our councils at home might be animated by that astonishing efficiency which had shone so conspicuously in his Indian administration.

Sir THOMAS TURTON said he had a trifling amendment to propose, which was, to leave out the words after the word "influenced," and to insert the following words: "By a desire to extend the British territories in India, in contempt of all treaties, and in violation of the national character."

Mr. S. LUSHINGTON supported the motion.

Mr. M. FITZGERALD felt extreme uneasiness in giving a vote on so personal a subject; but with all his esteem for the private character of Marquis Wellesley, and looking only to his politics as a public officer in India, he must give his vote against the Resolution.

The house then divided.

|                   |   |   |   |   |     |
|-------------------|---|---|---|---|-----|
| For the Amendment | - | - | - | - | 19  |
| Against it        | - | - | - | - | 98  |
| Majority          | - | - | - | - | —79 |

Mr. Wallace then moved the original question of the Vote of Approbation, upon which

Mr. HOWARD addressed the Speaker thus: Sir, the house is called upon to determine on the noble lord's motives: there is no human tribunal competent to decide on them. The merits of the noble lord must be tried by his actions: if you try him by the fundamental Resolutions of this house, or by the laws of his country, show me the resolution or the law which he has not violated. If you try him by the opinions of the directors, there is scarcely an act of his government which they have not condemned, and given such reasons for their opinions as were unanswerable, and therefore they were suppressed. If you try the noble lord by the effects of his government, let us look at the results, at home, at retrievable ruin, look to India, you find there a territorial revenue of fifty millions, falling short of the expenses of its establishments upwards of two millions annually, loaded with a debt of thirty-two millions, increasing daily, the native powers of India distressed, their minds filled with jealous apprehensions of our ambitious encroachments, disgusted with our humiliating control, disgusted with the disgraceful subordination in which they have been placed, and in this last instance, of our perfidious policy to the miserable victim of our rapacity, the unfortunate Hussein Ali, disgusted with the business of our iniquity. The mass of Mahomedans in the Carnatic are seeking only for a period to their sufferings, in the subversion of the British government, and even your Sepoy establishment, the last native resource you had to trust to, ready to take up arms against you, every financial resource exhausted, not a rupee in your treasuries: this, Sir, is the state into which Lord Wellesley's mal-administration brought India, this is the state in which he left it, and this is the state in which Lord Cornwallis found it. The noble lord opposite (Lord Castlereagh), has repeatedly introduced the name of Lord Cornwallis to the debate of this night. I would ask the noble lord, I would ask any member of the house, for what reason, for what purpose, was such a man as Lord Cornwallis, at his advanced period of life, not merely called upon, but solicited, entreated, as one of the greatest service he could render to his country, again to undertake the government of India? Was such a man wanted to pursue the system, and tread in the steps of Lord Wellesley? No, Sir, he was sent out for very different purposes. Does the house know how that lamented nobleman was employed from the first moment of his arrival at Calcutta, to the latest period of his existence? He was employed, Sir, in reversing every measure, in cutting down every political act of his predecessor, in endeavouring to repair, or, at least, to put a stop to, the universal mischiefs produced by the measures of Lord Wellesley. This house voted a monument to Lord Cornwallis. If you approve of the conduct of Lord Wellesley, be consistent, at least, and begin where, on this principle you ought to begin, by order-

ing Lord Cornwallis's monument to be pulled down, and then on its ruins you may erect a statue to Lord Wellesley! But, at last, we are told, that the noble lord's motives were always good, that his zeal to serve the Company was always ardent: I have already said, there is no human tribunal can take cognizance of his conscience, or penetrate into his motives, abstractedly from his conduct. In my mind, Sir, the noble lord has done all with his eyes open, caring, as it seems, but little for the consequences; secure of protection here; and so he has found it; but before this house proceeds to pass a vote, which, as an hon. director (Mr. Grant) has told you, will be attended with incalculable mischief in India, I trust it will reflect, and I call upon his majesty's ministers, before they lend their aid to a measure so pregnant with disgrace to the British name and character, to reflect on those duties which they owe to their sovereign, to their country, and, in truth, to their own characters. I thank the house for the indulgence it has shewn me, I shall trespass no longer, but shall give my decided negative to the present question. — The house then divided,

|                             |               |
|-----------------------------|---------------|
| For the vote of Approbation | - - 98        |
| Against it                  | - - - - - 19  |
| Majority                    | - - - - - —79 |

*List of Members who voted in the Minorities.*

Astell, W.  
 Creevey, T.  
 Fitzgerald, M.  
 Folkestone, Lord  
 Grant, C.  
 Hamilton, Lord A.  
 Herner, F.  
 Howorth, H.  
 Johustone, G.  
 Lushington, S.  
 Laurence, F.

Martin, H.  
 Moore, P.  
 Ossulston, Lord  
 Romilly, Sir S.  
 Sheridan, R. B.  
 Smith, W.  
 Smith, G.  
 Turton, Sir T.  
 Western, C. C.  
 Whitbread, S.  
 Windham, W.

## A P P E N D I X.

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APPENDIX to the Declaration of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council of Fort St. George, bearing date the 31st of July, 1801.

### No. I.

Extracts from a Letter from Gholam Ali Khan and Ali Rheza Khan to Tippoo Sultaun, dated the 26th of Tuckee, 1220 (answering to about the 15th of June, 1792).

The following conversation took place at a visit made by the princes to the nabob Wallah Jah, on the 21st of Tuckee, 1220 (answering to about the 10th of June, 1792).

We presented nuzzurs of eleven gold mohurs to the nabob Wallah Jah, of which his highness took one, and rising, embraced us, and said, "May God long preserve Tippoo Sultaun, who is the pillar of the religion of Mahomed. Night and day I used to be absorbed in this contemplation, and to pray for his highness's prosperity: I call God to witness this fact, *because the confederacy of the three allies was for the subversion of the Mahomedan religion.* It is solely to be attributed to the divine goodness, that the prayers of us sinners have been accepted. Believe it true, that I from my heart desire the welfare of the sultaun."

When the princes and we took leave of the nabob Wallah Jah, and were going away, he came up to us, and, with a great deal of warmth, desired us to stay, as he had something to say to us. We replied, we were ready. He then told us, that his life was now drawing to a close; that for what had hitherto taken place between his highness and your majesty there was no remedy; *but now, merely out of a regard to the faith (of which your majesty was a pillar), he was desirous of establishing a cordial harmony with your majesty;* and if we, having in view the claims of both parties (upon our endeavours), would, in the presence of God, exert ourselves for this purpose, the Almighty would reward us, and both parties would reap the benefits of this event, which were great and numberless; that, although his highness wanted to prevent the war between your majesty and the three allied states, yet that Nizam Ali Khan, at the latter period of his life, was thus preparing for futurity, by exerting himself for the destruction of religion. It was solely from a regard to the faith that his highness did not encourage the measure, and that he now declared, that, in a thousand points of view, it was advisable that perfect harmony should reign between your majesty and his highness. We replied, that we would undoubtedly report all this to your majesty.



*Farther Extract.*

On the 24th of Tuckee (13th of June, 1792), Wallah Jah, Omdut ul Omrah, and Hussein Nawaz Khan, younger son of Wallah Jah, Lord Cornwallis, and General Meadows, came to visit the princes. They sat two hours (three quarters of an hour English), and talked a great deal with them. His highness took occasion to observe, that we considered him to have been an enemy, whereas he declared, in the presence of God, that he was not, and is not; that, on the contrary, he was a friend and well-wisher; and that he had opposed the breach between your majesty and the three allied states to such a degree, that every one decided in his own mind, that inwardly your majesty and his highness were one; and he desired us to ask Lord Cornwallis and General Meadows, who were present, whether he said true or not.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
Persian Trans. to the S. G.

## No. II.

Extract from a Letter from Gholaum Ali Khan and Ali Rheza to Tippoo Sultaun, dated the 3d of Sumree, of the year Schir, 1220, A. N. Mahomed (answering to about the 21st of June, 1792).

We had the honour to receive your majesty's most gracious letter, dated the 8th of Turkee (about the 28th of May, 1792), giving cover to a slip of paper, upon which were written two couplets, on the 28th of Turkee. We have from the first understood the writing, your majesty knows of, as your majesty has explained it; and, when occasion requires, will act in conformity to your majesty's commands. Your majesty has desired that we will not disclose this subject to any person. God is our witness that we have, from the commencement of our service to the present time, inviolably kept your majesty's commands, which we consider as a religious obligation; and we declare to your majesty that we have not divulged, neither will we divulge them to any one. We are the servants of God, the disciples of Mahomed, and the dependants of your majesty, during our lives, and never will. An observance of the secrets of our masters is enjoined by the khoran. By the grace of God, and through the blessing of the salt of your majesty, the king of kings, we have never infringed, and never will infringe, this injunction, in the slightest degree, upon any occasion.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

## No. III.

Translation of an Arzee from Ali Rheza Khan and Gholaum Ali Khan to Tippoo Sultaun, dated the 4th of Sumree, of the year Schir, 1220, A. N. Mahomed (answering to about the 22d of June, 1792).

On the 14th of Jaffree\* (about the 23d of July, 1792), we had the honour to receive by two messengers your majesty's letter, dated the 8th of Sumree\* (about the 26th of June, 1792), inclosing a slip of paper containing a couplet. We were before acquainted with the meaning of the couplet, as explained by your majesty, and accordingly have, before this, written to your majesty in conformity thereto, and will still continue, as occasion may require, to write to your majesty. Your majesty desires that we will not divulge the circumstance to any one. Refuge of the world! we consider the concealment of the

\* There is evidently an error in these dates.

commands and secrets of our superiors in the light of a religious duty: not to divulge the orders of princes is enjoined by the khoran, and this is a duty imposed upon all servants by the word of God. Who would be so forgetful of his God, and regardless of religion, as to sacrifice, by a disclosure of secrets committed to his charge, his present and future happiness? In the presence of Almighty God, we declare unto your majesty, that, from the time we entered your majesty's service to the present moment, a term of eleven years, none but Almighty God is, or shall be, privy to the commands with which you have entrusted us. Such is our fidelity, that Divine Providence may, perhaps, through its blessings, prosper us in this and a future state, and keep us supported in respectability and credit near your majesty. All further particulars will be fully made known to your majesty from the arzees which we have successively dispatched to you. The princes, who are in health, beg to offer their most humble respects to your majesty.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone.

#### No. IV.

Extract from a Letter from Gholaum Ali Khan and Ali Rheza Khan to Tippoo Sultaun, dated the 16th of Jaafree, of the year Schir, 1220, A. N. Mahomed (answering to about the 4th of August, 1792).

On the 8th of Tehejeh (29th of July, 1792) the nabob Wallah Jah sent a message to us by Mahomed Abdoolah Khan, that the following day, being that preceding the Eed, he would, if we desired it, pay a visit to the princes, as he was very anxious to see his sons (as he called them). In reply, we begged he would give our respects, and represent to his highness, that the houses of the princes, and they themselves, were his own, and that the princes were his guests; that he was their superior, and his company there would afford them much happiness; but that, if he wished it, we ourselves would most readily attend him. Accordingly, at One Pans of the following day (about nine o'clock), Wallah Jah, accompanied by Omdut ul Omrah and Hussein Nawaz Khan, paid a visit to the princes, and taking them upon his knees, for about two hours, blessed them, and said, May God long and permanently preserve the shadow of Tippoo Sultaun extended over you and me, since in this age the preservation of religion depends upon him alone. I have passed my eightieth year, and in that time many are the things I have seen, and done, and experienced. What is passed is passed, and God only knows what futurity may bring to light. At present, the maintenance of religion rests with Tippoo Sultaun; and may God preserve and keep him victorious and triumphant. I do not say this merely in your presence; but I say it, taking to witness Him who knows all that is hidden. Night and day, after the prayers of the day, and on Friday, after public devotion, I offer up my prayers (meaning for Tippoo Sultaun), and require the people also to do the same. His highness spoke to us also in terms of great warmth and friendship; and, after sitting two hours, went away. As Wallah Jah had paid a visit to the princes, it became necessary that they should return it, and, consequently, they waited upon him the next day, which was the Eedoo Zoha (or Feast of the Camel); the nawaub, accompanied by Omdut ul Omrah and the other sirdars, came out to meet them, as on the feast day, and having assisted the princes in alighting from their palanquins, took them within the house, where he repeatedly caressed them both, and said—"God preserve the sultaun in safety, for through him alone these rituals and observances of the faith (alluding probably to the Eed) yet remain."—He then observed to us, "*In my first conversation with you, I spoke to you upon the subject of establishing a friendship and harmony between me and Tippoo Sultaun. Have*

*you intimated it to him; and have you received a favourable answer?"* — We replied, that we had set forth to your majesty, word for word, the friendly sentiments his highness had expressed; and that your majesty had written, in reply, that friendship, union, and brotherly regard, had, from the beginning, been established among the professors of Islamism, as was evinced by the testimony of the holy book; agreeably to the prescriptions of which, your majesty wished that cordial friendship and attachment should, without prejudice or partiality, be established between the followers of the faith, as the means of supporting the religion of Mahomed; and that your majesty added, "God preserve the nawaub Wallah Jah, who is a prince, and one of the leaders of the faithful, and a pillar of the faith." — At the term, "a pillar of the faith," the nawaub could not suppress his tears, and said, "I am what I know myself to be. — Tell the sultaun that *he* is the pillar of the faith; and may God preserve him, and grant him a long life, since I and all Mussulmans derive support from him; for otherwise the state of affairs here is evident. — That which is evident does not require explanation." — We also, in conformity to your majesty's commands, mentioned to his highness, in a becoming and suitable manner, whatever there was to state upon the subject of friendship and attachment. His highness replied, "In consideration of the complexion of the times, the state of which is manifest, and that the support of the religion of Mahomed in this country entirely depends upon the sultaun, my nightly and daily prayer is offered up for his good." He then said to the princes — "Oh! my sons! if my life and property can be of any service to you, God is witness that I will not refuse them to you." — He then gave orders to the superintendent of the gardens to carry every day fruits and flowers to the princes, before his (the nabob's) own children; and said to us — "You are not acquainted with the state and order of affairs here. Consider me from my heart your well-wisher and sincere friend; and at all times be assured, that in whatever I may be able to effect your benefit, either by word or deed, I will not decline my exertions. What I said and wrote to his lordship upon the subject of making peace, God well knows who was then or is now desirous of it. His lordship, however, possessed uncontrolled authority, was a man of wisdom, and listened to the advice of others," and my observations made an impression upon him. God preserve you and me from the wicked designs of others. Major Doveton, and another officer, being of the party, his highness appealed to them, observing, that they had been present at the time, and could speak to the truth or falsity of what he said. Major Doveton replied, that it was very true; and that several English gentlemen were consequently much displeased with his highness. That one day when his highness had assembled all the gentlemen, under pretence of giving them an entertainment, but really for the above purpose, and had accordingly suggested pacific measures, the expediency of which he urged in a thousand ways, they were so displeased that they went away without partaking of the entertainment; nay, that to their animosity might be attributed the assumption of his highness's country; that when the orders were received from the King of England to restore the country, they framed the pretence among themselves that his highness was too much attached to Tippoo Sultaun; and that the restitution of his country would, consequently, be an impolitic measure: but his lordship maintained his opinion singly, and, disregarding the animosity of all the others against his highness, delivered him (his highness) the country, agreeably to the directions of his majesty. The story is very long. We have only written to your majesty a very small part of it. At present, the commanding officer of the fort, and the other English gentlemen who are here, behave towards the nawaub Wallah Jah as if they were his servants. The princes staid two hours with his highness, and at the time of departure were presented by him with two khellauts of embroidery for the tenanch, two khulgus, and two surpaishes of the finest jewels. We made

endless apologies, and requested that he would excuse our acceptance of them. He said, "This is a festival, and I have given to my sons and my whole family new garments. These are also my children, and I entertain for them even a greater degree of regard, and I must not neglect them; these things possess little value, and it is not your province to interpose between me and my children." In like manner, his highness presented Gholaum Ali Khan, with a khellaut, consisting of a khulgi and surpaish, me with a surpaish and khellaut, and Shirkh Soliman Khan with another. He then took a hand of each of the princes, and descending from the upper part of his house, accompanied them to the outer door of the Tushuk Konnah, where he took leave of them. Omdut ul Omrah, and his other sons, attended them to the road, where they left them, after seeing them into their palanquins; and the nabob, at parting, embraced them with the greatest warmth.

We have thus communicated to your majesty the particulars of the friendly conduct of the nabob Wallah Jah and the other sirdars; in fact, the disposition of all ranks of people is equally favourable, for whenever the princes go out any where, thousands of them stand in the street, and offer up prayers for your majesty's prosperity. On festivals and on Fridays, in congregation, all the Mussulmans first offer up their prayers for your majesty's preservation. May God fulfil them! Upon our return, dancing girls and musicians, &c. were sent with the prince's retinue, and after our arrival at the prince's house, and sitting there for two hours, danced, and were then dismissed.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

No. V.

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

Extract from a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Ali Rheza Khan and Gholaum Ali Khan, dated at Seringapatam, the 16th of Hejree, of the year Schir, 1220, from the birth of Mahomed.

I have received and understood the contents of your arzee, intimating the distinguished kindness and regard with which the nawaub Wallah Jah treats my sons, and the sincere friendship which he entertains towards me. It is evident that the nawaub is a pillar of the Mahomedan religion, the elect of the Almighty, a man of dignity and worldly experience: whatever favour and attention he may shew towards my sons, who are his guests, and you, I shall assuredly consider as a kindness conferred upon myself. This circumstance has afforded me much pleasure.

My hopes from Almighty God and his divine messenger are, that the nawaub will do whatever may tend to the support of the religion of Mahomed, and that he will give the necessary attention to this point. You will mention to him that he must consider my sons as his own; that, in conformity to the command of God and the prophet, the improvement of friendship among the professors of Islamism will be beneficial to various concerns both spiritual and temporal; and that, deeming me attached to our common religion and to his highness's person, he will direct his attention accordingly. You will also state to the nawaub the other points of friendship, which you have repeatedly heard from my mouth.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

No. VI.

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

KEY to a CYPHER found among the Records at Seringapatam, and received at Calcutta on the 2d of March, 1800.

\* OH God, glorious and exalted! Oh prophet of God! May the blessing of the Lord be upon him. Religion. Bishteh.

\* These words are written by one of Tippoo Sultaun's moonshees.

## APPENDIX.

The nabob Wallah Jah,  
*the Friend of Mankind.*

Ali Rheza,  
*the Distinguished in  
Friendship.*

The Power of God,

*A Saddle.*

Hearts,  
*Sons.*

The nabob Tippoo  
Sultaun,  
*the Defender or Protector  
of the Faith,*  
Nothing or Nonentity,  
*Nizam ul Dowlah.*  
The Victorious,  
*A Scymitar.*

A State or Dominion,  
*A Ring.*

The Faith, Religion,  
*Gholaum Ali Khan.*  
Nawaub Saheb,  
*The Spring, a Flower  
Garden.*

*A Letter, an Interview.*

*Benevolent, the Hand.*

*A Heart, a Seal.*

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

The English,  
*New comers.*  
The Mean or Despi-  
cable,  
*The Mahrattas.*  
A Flower,  
*A Present.*



The Restorer of the  
Faith,  
*Omdut ul Omrah.*



The Writing of  
*Omdut ul Omrah.*

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

## No. VII.

Translation of a Letter from Gholaum Ali Khan to Tippoo Sultaun.

The departure of Ali Rheza Khan at this time, in conformity to the orders of the presence, is very expedient, especially for the purpose of bringing to a favourable issue the propositions of Lord Cornwallis, and the \* *Well-wisher of Mankind*, which is most ardently to be wished.

There are many points which cannot be committed to paper, and can only be communicated in person; at this time the friendship and good-will of both sirdars is from God, and the royal auspices: the particulars of this summary, which is an unlooked for good, will be made known to your majesty by the verbal representations of Ali Rheza, who attends the presence especially for that purpose. Although it is contrary to the rules of respect to presume to give an opinion upon this subject, yet I am emboldened by my long attachment and my sense of the duty I owe your majesty, when your majesty shall have maturely deliberated upon, and fully brought home to your mind, the representation of both the sirdars, from a consideration of the changeableness of the times, your majesty's agreeing to this affair — (upon the principle recommended in the words of Hafez, of Shiraz; the mercy of God be upon him! With friends, cordiality; with enemies, dissimulation) — seems highly expedient and advantageous to your majesty's interests.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone,

&c. &c.

## No. IX.

Translation of a Copy of a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Omdut ul Omrah,  
*the Nabob of the Carnatic.*

After reiterated praises and unbounded adoration to the Almighty, who hath adorned the multitude of the professors of Islamism with the gem of religion, and lighted the torch of friendship for each other in the region of the heart; and endless thanks worthy of the last of the messengers of God (Mahomed), who, with his prophetic tongue spoke this divine saying, "That all Mussulmans are brothers;" and who was pleased to take upon himself the task of intercession for all believers; and after intimating my desire of personal communication, and which, as it exceeds the power of the pen to describe,

\* The designation of the nabob Wallah Jah in the cypher.

must be left to the heart to conceive, I set forth my object. By the grace of God, the most sincere attachment and perfect unanimity have, from the beginning, been established among the believers of the enlightened doctrine of Mahomed; but every event has its proper season; and hence, no opportunity has yet offered for the external demonstration of our mutual regard. Now, however, the receipt of your kind letter, replete with the friendly sentiments with which our hearts are mutually impressed, has doubly added to my sincere attachment and cordial regard; when I learnt also from the intimation of the high in rank, *the distinguished in friendship*, the trusty, of your great and noble qualities, and the sincere friendship and cordiality you entertain towards me, my happiness was greater than language can adequately express; may God realize this source of happiness; that is to say, that perfect attachment and union among the followers of Islam, which is the greatest gift of the Almighty, and than which nothing is more essential to the temporal and eternal interests of mankind. May God render it attainable, and may he maintain us firm in the faith of Mahomed, the boundless benefits resulting from which will, by the divine grace, be manifested.

I am confident that you will direct your attention to the adjustment of affairs between me and the *Well-wisher of Mankind*, who is the chief and principal of the professors of Islamism; and that, deeming me from my heart your well-wisher, you will always keep me in your recollection by your friendly letters. All other particulars may be made known to you from the representation, of the high in rank.

May prosperity and happiness attend you!

Dated the 15th of Zakru, of the year Schir, 1220 (answering to the 29th of November, 1792).

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone  
&c. &c.

#### No. X.

Translation of a Letter from Gholaun Ali Khan to Tippoo Sultaun.  
(Without Date.)

On the second of Rehinany, of the year Schir, 1200, Mohummudee (answering to about the 11th of January, 1793), the nabob Wallah Jah sent a message by Khader Nawaz Khan to this effect. — Whatever animosity and estrangement formerly existed between us (meaning himself and Tippoo Sultaun), are now, thank God, completely removed. If the slightest trace of them remain in my heart, I am no Mussulman, nay, of another sect; and, on the part of the Hyderce Sircar also, I am confident the same friendly sentiments are entertained God knows, and the prophet is witness, on the most deliberate reflexion and deep consideration. I see no one sirdar who has at heart the interests of the true faith, except Tippoo Sultaun, and after him this sinner (of whom the same may be said in some degree). In the second place, the sight of the prince gives new force to the attachment and regard that my heart feels; indeed, it is superfluous to express this; hence I offer up my most sincere prayers to God for the welfare of the sultaun, and the prosperity of the affairs of the Hyderce Sircar. From the impulse of these sentiments, it is requisite that I should communicate some articles of intelligence, which are as follows: — I have always kept stationed in Bengal several persons of the higher class, for the purpose of collecting and transmitting secret intelligence daily. In the paper of intelligence which came on the 25th of Rubuossance, 1207 (10th of December, 1793), it is stated that Sir Charles Mallet, the English resident at Poonah, has written to Lord Cornwallis, that numerous messengers from the Khodadad Sircar daily pass to and fro between Seringapatam and Poonah; whence it would seem that Tippoo Sultaun was endeavouring to form a close connection

and alliance with the Poonah government, and through that government with the Mogul (Nizam Ali Khan); and that, deeming this information of importance, he had written it to his lordship. The members of council in Bengal, on hearing this, are said to have stated their opinion to his lordship, that Tippoo Sultaun was infringing the settlement which had taken place between him and his lordship, and was entertaining views of a sinister nature; that, for example, the sultaun withheld payment of the kists, as prescribed in the treaty, and refused to release the European and other prisoners, subjects of the Company; that this sort of discourse had excited some degree of suspicion, nay, even of alarm, in his lordship's mind. Such is the present state of affairs. What, in the judgment of this well-wisher, now appears expedient, is this: in a short time his lordship will go to Europe; the princes, please God, will soon return, and the kists are in a course of payment; after his lordship's departure, the liquidation of the kists and other points, whatever may be his highness's (Tippoo's) pleasure, will be right and proper; at present it is better to be silent upon every thing, because at this time his highness's honour would, at all events, be called in question. When another shall arrive from Europe, the imputation will, in every respect, and in every measure, fall upon him.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

*Note.* — The following extract is preceded by an account of the nabob Wallah Jah's having invited the princes to an exhibition of fire-works, on occasion of the Eed, or Festival. The governor of Madras lent his garden for the purpose.

#### No. XI.

Extract from a Letter from Gholaum Ali Khan and Ali Rheza Khan to Tippoo Sultaun, dated the 22d of Ahmedy, of the year Schir, 1221, A. N. M. (answering to about the 2d of May, 1793).

The princes having arrived at the garden, the nawaub Wallah Jah sent Omdut ul Omrah to them, desiring him to remain in attendance on the princes as long as they should stay at the entertainment. Omdut ul Omrah accordingly attended the princes at the exhibition of fire-works, until nine o'clock at night, when he took leave, and went away. At parting, Omdut ul Omrah said to us, "You will give my respectful compliments by way of remembrance to his majesty, and inform him that he may consider me from my heart attached to him; and that, please God, at a proper occasion, my fidelity towards him shall be made manifest to him."

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

#### No. XII.

Extract from a Letter from Gholaum Ali Khan and Ali Rheza Khan to Tippoo Sultaun, dated the 25th of Behauree, of the year Schir, 1221, A. N. Mahomed (answering to about the 5th of June, 1793). DC

Refuge of the World! Yesterday the *Well-wisher of Mankind* sent the following message by Khader Nawaz Khan: "At this time a complete rupture has taken place between the English and French. The story of the king of the French, and their domestic commotions, are well known. Six or seven European powers have united for the destruction of the French, and you will soon hear that the whole of the French territory has been divided amongst others. The English (troops) here at Madras, will proceed in a day or two against Pondicherry. Although there is a body of troops in that place, yet domestic dis-

sensions have risen to the utmost pitch there, and nothing will be done, and the place will at length be taken. My object in mentioning this event is this:—The vakeel of the Ahmedy Sircar, who was at Pondicherry, has lately, it seems, returned to the presence (Tippoo Sultaun). Please God, there is no doubt that the sultaun keeps in view all the ups and downs of the time. At this time no kind of assistance will be afforded; but out of that friendship which I feel for the sultaun, I recommend that the vakeel remain a short time at the presence, and also that epistolary correspondence be discontinued for a short time. Although a friendly connection has long subsisted with the French on the part of the Ahmedy Sircar, yet, considering the circumstances of the times, it is not advisable (that is, to maintain an epistolary correspondence with the French); should there be any point of urgency to communicate, there is no objection to do it verbally. For God's sake, let not the sultaun ascribe what I say to a wrong motive; I am actuated solely by my good wishes in making this communication. Since the day that a cordial union took place between us, let me be no longer a Mussulman, nor a servant of God, if I have not always offered up my prayers for the sultaun's good, and afterwards for my own. May the Almighty preserve firm and uninjured the Mahomedan church, and the safety of the sultaun.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

### No. XIII.

Extract from a Letter from Gholau Ali Khan and Ali Rheza Khan to Tippoo Sultaun, dated the 15th of Sumrec, of the year Schir, 1221, A. N. M. (answering to about the 23d of July, 1793).

The nawaub Wallah Jah has repeatedly sent word to us, by Khader Nawaz Khan, that he had something of a secret nature which he wished to say to us in private; adding, that if we would go under pretence of seeing a mosque which his highness has built, he would send Omdut ul Omrah alone to meet us. Accordingly, on the 17th of Tuckec (answering to about the twenty-first of June, 1793), we went to the mosque, whither Omdut ul Omrah repaired also. On the left of the mosque is the tomb of a celebrated devotee (by name Futtah Shah), who died about six months ago, erected at his highness's expense. Under pretence of performing the fautehah (or prayers for the dead), Omdut ul Omrah took our hands and carried us into the tomb. When there, he asked us whether we had full powers from your majesty, or were under the necessity of making reference upon every subject. We replied, that we had been a year and more in attendance here, during which period many points of business had been negociated, and continued to be negociated, by us; and that, please God, our proceedings were and would be approved and confirmed by your majesty; and that with his (Omdut ul Omrah's) knowledge of this, his question appeared very extraordinary to us. That it was proper to put vakeels, that we were only servants and well-wishers of the sircars; and that we had powers to act any thing that appeared to us calculated to promote your highness's interest and welfare; but in the other case, not. Omdut ul Omrah was much pleased, and, smiling, said to us, "So it ought to be." He then delivered the following, on the part of the nawaub Wallah Jah:—That for a very long time there had been, without a cause, a veil (or want of cordiality) between his highness and your majesty, which had been productive of injuries to both; but now that, by the favour of God, a system of harmony, such as is becoming among the professors of Islamism, had taken place, his highness confidently hoped from God, the prime cause of all, that the time past might be amply redeemed; that for his highness's own part, considering from his heart, himself, his country, and his property, to belong to your majesty, he



had made it a testamentary injunction to his children and family, taking God and his holy prophet to witness, to pray night and day for the pillar of faith (that is to say), your majesty; and to consider their prosperity and welfare as inseparably connected with your majesty; that we must ascertain your majesty's wishes on this head in a manner satisfactory to both, and if your majesty should be, from your heart, solicitous of this proposed cordial harmony, his highness would, under the testimony of God and his prophet, detail to us his sentiments fully at the time of our departure, which, please God, would soon take place. May it please your majesty! his highness is in expectation of an answer from you to these points, and we shall represent to his highness whatever reply your majesty may direct us to make. Please God, we shall hereafter have occasion to address your majesty, notifying our succession. the affairs you know of.

May the sun of prosperity, &c. &c.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

#### No. XIV.

Extract from a Letter from Gholaum Ali Khan and Ali Rheza Khan to Tippoo Sultaun (without date).

Prior to this, we communicated to your majesty the circumstances of the nawaub Omdut ul Omrah's coming to the mosque; our meeting there, and his communicating to us several points, with which particulars your majesty must ere this have been acquainted. On a subsequent day, the third of Sumree, we sent a message to him, purporting that we were going to the garden to see and arrange the effects we had with us; and that if he also would come there, 'under pretence of taking the air, we should be very happy. Accordingly, on the next day, we went to the garden with Omdut ul Omrah. We sat together for four hours (about an hour and a half English), and Omdut ul Omrah discoursed, in the most undisguised manner, on the part of the nawaub Wallah Jah, as well as on his own, of the sincerity of their friendship, attachment, and regard.

He also made use of some particular expressions of his attachment, requiring us, upon oath, not to commit them to writing, but to defer the communication of them until our return to your majesty. "Since," said he, "I have expressed myself as I have done merely from my regard for the faith, and from my friendship and good-will towards the *defender (or protector) of the faith*. Please God, you will shortly be with his majesty, when you will communicate them in person." We answered, that we would act as he desired, and not divulge what he had said to any one.

Protector of the world! concerning the affair with which your majesty is acquainted, we have, under suitable pleas, and a proper introduction, prevailed upon Omdut ul Omrah to lay the foundation of it, and he is exerting himself with zeal in this business. Please God, we will inform your majesty of the result.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

#### No. XV.

Extract from a Letter from Tippoo Sultaun to Gholaum Ali Khan and Ali Rheza Khan, dated the 28th of Sumree, of the year Schir, 1221, A. N. M. (answering to about the 6th of August, 1793).

I have understood what you have written relative to the conferences with Omdut ul Omrah: I desire that you will privately commit to paper his dis-

course with you, and add the same to me. You will also write me information of the transaction with which you are acquainted.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

No. XVI.

Translation of a Letter from Gholaum Ali Khan and Ali Rheza Khan to Tippoo Sultaun, dated the 24th of Jaafree, of the year Schir, 1221, A. N. M. (answering to about the 31st of August, 1793).

[After the usual form of address.]

We have had the honour to receive your majesty's two gracious letters, giving cover to a paper containing a form of obligation,\* and a question of orthodoxy, by the hands of Mahomed Dewan. — We assembled all the servants, high and low, belonging to the sircar, and communicated every thing to them; and enjoined them, that on the next day, which was Friday, they should all bathe, put on their best clothes, and attend us. On that day Gholaum Ali Khan was indisposed (as he still continues), and therefore I, Ali Rheza, carried all the servants of the sircar with me to the Jaumah mosque. There were present the cauzy of the city, the khuttub (or preacher), Syeed Mahomed, a person of great learning, and others, to the number of near a thousand; and likewise the sons of the nawaub Wallah Jah. As it happened, the kostba was well adapted to our purpose. After the Friday's prayers were over, I caused all of them to sit down, and first applied to the cauzy, and other persons of learning who were present, to have the kostba delivered in the Hindoostanee language, in order that every body might understand it. One of them accordingly explained the contents of the kostba, which comprised the command of God to wage holy wars; not to take to flight in combating with infidels; to form an union among all the professors of Islamism; and other obligations of the faith. I then asked the cauzy, what was the law if any Mussulman acted contrary to these commands? to which the cauzy replied, that, according to the duties and obligations of Mussulmans, whoever neglected to act up to the commands, was a sinner. Upon which I remarked, it was very extraordinary that, notwithstanding the notoriety of this, and the great plurality of Mussulmans, they should so depart from the obligations of the faith as to take up their abode in such a place, and choose to render obedience to those of a different persuasion. God grant it may turn out well for the Mussulmans of this place! I then said, it is written that the prayers which are offered up in the kostba in favour of a prince who fights for the faith, are accepted of God; but the prayers in favour of those who do not, are rejected. Either reconcile the law in this instance to the care of him\* in whose name name you have read the kostba, or else conform to the law; why are you knowingly guilty of sin? To this he replied, "All things depend upon their appointed season." After this, I asked, according to the law of the faith, what was the duty of servants? he answered, the sentence of the Khoran is plain, "Obey God and his prophet, and those of yourselves who are placed in authority over you." — In other words, the most high God hath blended obedience to the sovereign with obedience to himself, and to his messenger; hence, it is incumbent upon all servants to do that which belongs to fidelity, and to the interests of religion. I answered, that although this, that is, obedience to the prince, was a duty indiscriminately binding upon all Mussulmans, yet I wanted, after prayers (the blessing which I prayed might descend upon every individual), to take an obligation from the servants of the Khodadad Sircar. Accordingly, after I and all the servants of

\* Shah Allum.

the Ahmedy Sircar had finished the prayers, in conformity to your majesty's commands, I addressed all the people, and said, "The error of which you have hitherto been guilty, is, for the sake of God and of his messenger, forgiven on the part of his majesty." — Upon this, they, one by one, arose and declared, that since all their errors had been forgiven on the part of your majesty, they now, under the testimony of God, his messenger, and the holy book, bound and engaged themselves, that hereafter, as long as they lived, their conduct should manifest nothing else than fidelity, devotion, truth, and zeal; that they would never be guilty of flight in the face of an enemy, of theft, of lying, of injuring, wishing ill, or of enmity towards those who wished well to the Khodadad state, nor of any thing that belonged to treachery and ingratitude; adding, that they would never swerve from this engagement a hair's breadth; that they would cultivate friendship and union with the followers of the faith, and among one another; that they considered the honour of all Mussulmans as an object of individual concern, and would never commit oppression and violence upon any one, either by word or deed. After this, a fautehah (or service for the souls of the dead) was performed, and prayers that the Khodadad Sircar might be triumphant and victorious. We then came out of the mosque, and halting in the area of it, I took an engagement from the Hindoos with me to this effect: That as they derived their support from the Ahmedy Sircar, they engaged upon oath, and upon the faith of their pooranas, that they would be faithful to the duties committed to their charge; that their conduct should ever manifest fidelity, without their ever being guilty of theft, or false speaking or writing. To this they added, that if they departed a hair's breadth from this engagement, they should consider it tantamount to their having killed and eaten of a cow in the holy city; and that they should be considered as delinquents against the sircar.

Protector of the world! Mahomed Dewan verbally communicated to us your majesty's commands, that we should not suffer ourselves to feel any apprehension in fulfilling this ceremony. Cherisher of the world! We can only feel apprehension and hesitation in not obeying the orders of the presence. What apprehension can we entertain in obedience and submission to commands, such only is the apprehension we felt in the present instance. The commands of the presence are imposed upon their servants, not upon others; princes and governors who entertain servants, do so for the purpose of experiencing from them obedience and devotion to their interests; and if they exact from them the obligations and conditions of obedience, fidelity, and devotion, what harm is there in it? others, who every Sunday assemble in church, and, according to their laws and regulations, deliver precepts and admonitions, who entertain troops, and exercise them daily, do so with a view to the adjustment of their own concerns. If we also, with a view to the arrangement and adjustment of our concerns, take obligations and engagements from our servants, where is the objection? Please God, this measure, which your majesty has suggested, your having taken obligations and engagements from the servants in attendance upon your majesty, and your directing us to do the same here, is highly proper, expedient, and advisable; and in sight of men of understanding, the good effects and benefits of it are endless and without bounds. The measure was necessary too; for what is the meaning there should not be an union among the professors of the faith; that they should not devote themselves to the interests of their masters; and that, disregarding the claims of gratitude, they should turn their backs upon the enemy in the day of battle: these engagements and obligations are very proper, and involve many advantages. Further particulars will be made known to your majesty by the verbal representations of Mahomed Dewan, who attended, and was an eye-witness to all that passed. A list of

the servants who are here present, and who entered into the engagements, is enclosed.

(Signed) (A true translation.)

N. B. Edmonstone  
&c. &c.

#### No. XVII.

Translation of a Note, written with a Pencil upon Half a Sheet of Post Paper with an Envelope of English Paper, by his highness Omdut ul Omrah apparently addressed to Gholaum Ali Khan.

Good faith is the law for (or practice of) sycods. I complain of frequent neglects; let me be sometimes called to remembrance; at all events, the intelligence of the marriage of the princes has rejoiced me. The presents usual on such occasions from my father will be sent, or (it may be interpreted) are now sent. Repeat the following couplet on my part to the nabob Tippoo Sultaun.

In the preservation of thy person is the perpetual permanence of the faith.

Let him not remain who wisheth not thy preservation.

Make my complaints to his highness of his not writing to me; if permission be required (for stating those complaints) you will obtain it. To the princes respect; to Rheza Ali Khan compliment. Gholaum Hussein.

Dated the 11th of Mohurram, 1209, (corresponding with the 12th of August, 1794).

(Signed) (A true copy.)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

#### No. XVIII.

Translation of a letter from Mahomed Ghyauss and Mahomed Ghose Khan, ambassadors from Tippoo Sultaun to his highness the Nabob of the Carnatic, dated the 6th of Takree, of the year Shaud, 1223, A. N. Mahomed (answering to about the 17th of December, 1795).

The humblest of the servants of his majesty, the shadow of God, Tippoo Sultaun, king, defender of the faith, may his dominion endure for ever! Mahomed Ghyauss and Mahomed Ghose, after performing the ceremonies of obeisance, humbly represent to those who stand in the enlightened presence,

Prior to this, we had the honour to forward an address to your majesty from Ryacottah, whence we proceeded, and, by regular stays, arrived on the 28th near Tirmulkerry.

From that place we wrote a note to Khader Nawaz Khan, which we dispatched by hircarrabs. A reply arrived, signifying that the nabob Omdut ul Omrah was much rejoiced at our approach, and desired that we would proceed with all possible expedition; adding, that an habitation was prepared for our reception. At about three o'clock in the afternoon we arrived there, and immediately a gentleman waited upon us, and told us he was come to perform the rights of hospitality. We answered, that it was perfectly conformable to his highness the nabob's known kindness and urbanity. He then caused fire-wood and earthen pots to be brought, and told us he had brought a hundred rupees for our immediate expences. We answered, that we were come on an occasion of condolence, what occasion was there for money? He was very importunate with us to accept it, but we made him carry it back. He returned with it, however, again, and again we sent him back with it. About eight o'clock at night, Khader Nawaz Khan himself came, and told us that the nabob was much displeased; however, if we would not accept the money, he would send us dressed provisions. We replied, that, as we were his highness's guests, he might do so for a day or two. After paying Khader Nawaz Khan the compliment of the paun and ottur, we let him take leave. In the morning, his highness sent us provisions from his own kitchen: this was continued for three days, and was

continuing longer, but we sent word to Khader Nawaz Khan, in the most earnest manner, that for three days it was very well, but if the practice was continued, we should be under the necessity of sending the provisions back.

Immediately on our arrival at Tirmulkerry, we sent our compliments by a choldar to the governor, who returned for answer, that he was happy to hear of our arrival. The next day an European named Grant, who commands the governor's body guard, came to see us, and invited us to wait next day on the governor, who would conduct us to the nabob Omdut ul Omrah. We accordingly next day went to the governor's, to whom we delivered your majesty's letter, and the khelaut (or honorary dress). The governor asked after your majesty's health, and we replied in suitable terms; after complimenting us with the paun, and flowers, and rose water, he told us that he would introduce us early the next morning to the nabob. We then took leave, and returned home, and sent notice to Khader Nawaz Khan, that the governor had postponed the intended visit of that day, but that we were desirous only of consulting his highness's pleasure, and should act as his highness might direct; he returned for answer, that it was no matter, we might come the day following. Early the next morning we went to the governor, and, taking him with us, we proceeded to the nabob Omdut ul Omrah, and delivered the khelaut of mourning and letter of condolence; his highness was very much pleased, and conversed about your majesty's health, and other subjects. A whole hour (23 minutes). He then complimented us with the paun and ottur, and bade us to depart. On our taking leave, he took our hands, and observed to us with a great deal of anger, that we were his guests, and it was not proper for us to decline receiving provisions, conjuring us for God's sake not to send back the provisions which he had sent us while we remained here. We resisted as much as possible by argument, but his highness would not listen to our refusal, and again conjured us, by oath, not to return the provisions which should be sent to us while we remained; we could say no more, and returned home. The next day, his highness having sent for Nussur ul Dowlah, appointed the next day for our again attending, and we then delivered the khelaut and letters which were for him (Nussur ul Dowlah). He also made enquiries after your majesty's health, to which we made a suitable reply. His highness then gave us the ottur and paun, and suffered us to take leave. The day after, we again went to the durbar, taking with us the letter and khelaut of congratulation, the jewels, and horses. We delivered the letter and khelaut, presented muzzurs of five rupees each, and sat down. His highness, with the highest degree of kindness, placed us close to himself, and launched out into great praises of your majesty, and appeared delighted with the subject, telling us that it was his intention to send for us, and say what he had to say in private; adding, that our arrival at this time was extremely proper. His highness told us, that he had committed the late nabob Wallah Jah's body to the earth, at the shrine of the saint named Mucktdoom Sahib, at Mylapore, to be removed in four months.

May the sun of prosperity always continue to shine.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

No. XIX.

Translation of a letter from Mahomed Ghyauss and Mahomed Ghose Khan, not dated by Tippoo Sultan to the nabob of the Carnatic, to the former (without date).

After dispatching our arzee, the nabob Omdut ul Omrah sent for us, and spoke on the subject of friendship between the two states; and then said both come on the part of my friend, and I do not design to us, "You We replied, that we certainly considered both states as

one; but that at present some pressing business required our return, and therefore we must request him to give us leave to depart. Upon which he said, that, please God, he would soon do so; but, said his highness, it is not proper in you to send back the provisions, as you have repeatedly done so. I swear to God, that as long as you remain here, I shall send you provision, and you must also, for my particular satisfaction, wear clothes that I will provide you; you must not return them. We said, in reply, what appeared suitable to the occasion; but his highness would not listen to it, but renewed his abjuration, and, giving us the ottur and paun, dismissed us. The next day, the 12th Takree, at three in the afternoon, Khader Nawaz Khan came with cloth and tailors, and told us it was his highness's command to him, to see the cloth cut out before us, and fitted to us. We contested the point to the utmost with Khader Nawaz Khan, but he told us his highness had taken an oath, and that it was not proper in us to refuse. At length he caused four pieces of spotted muslin, and four pieces of \* for each of us, to be cut out, and set the tailors to work, with injunction to get the whole ready by the evening.

From Sunday, during five or six days, the rains were incessant. On the sixteenth, when it ceased a little, Khader Nawaz Khan sent a message, that the rain had latterly prevented our receiving our dismissal, but now the khelauts for your majesty, the elephants and horses, &c. would be sent on that day, and that the following day his highness would send for us, and give us our dismissal. Accordingly, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, an elephant and five horses, two khelauts of embroidery, and two pieces of jewellery, one a khulgu, and the other a surpuish, besides a large box, sealed, in which were khelauts of spotted muslin, &c. and another box also sealed, containing the otturdawn and paundawn, were brought by Daood Khan, and the keeper of the wardrobe, &c. who desired us to take charge of these articles, and convey them safely to your majesty; that his highness had, moreover, sent two khelauts of embroidery for us, and that he would send for us the following day; and after having communicated to us what he had to say, would give us leave to depart. At their desire, we took a memorandum of the articles. The next day we were prevented from waiting upon his highness by the violence of the rain. On the 3d day, at about nine o'clock, A.M. his highness sent word to us to come in the clothes which had been newly made, as it would be a great gratification: to please him, we accordingly did so. After many salaams, his highness, with the appearance of great satisfaction, arose, and taking our hands, said, Now I am extremely happy. We then sat in a private place, when his highness expatiated during two hours with great warmth upon the subject of union and friendship; after which, he gave us the ottur and paun, and suffered us to take leave, and we returned home. At three o'clock in the afternoon we received a note from Khader Nawaz Khan, stating that his highness sent 2,000 rupees for our horses, and 300 rupees for the three duffadars, Naik of Hircarrahs and Duffadar (or Hoad) of Khidmutgaes. We, in the presence of his highness's Naik of Hircarrahs, made presents to his highness's servants out of that 2,000 rupees. We write this for your highness's information.

(A true translation.)

(Signed)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

*Note.* — The original of the following translation is written in the same hand as the nabob of Arcot's letters invariably are; but on the cover, in place of the seals, are written the name of "Gholaum Hussein," and in the place of direction, "Gholaum Ali." The date of its receipt is the 9th of Rejeb, 1211, (corresponding with the 8th of January, 1797).

## No. XX.

Translation of a Letter from the nabob Omdut ul Omrah to Gholaum Ali Khan.

After a lapse of time, and the moment my heart was desirous of learning accounts of your health, I had the pleasure to receive your friendly letter: and I was gratified by the news of your welfare.

I have fully comprehended the several points contained in that letter: you will become acquainted with the circumstances alluded to from the communications of Mahomed Gliyauss and Mahomed Ghose Khan. Deeming me desirous of receiving the pleasing accounts of your health, you will gratify me by communicating them.

[Endorsement on the Letter by one of Tippoo Sultaun's moonshees.]

Received the 10th of Rehmauny, of the year Shaud, 1223, A. N. Mahomed, answering to the 9th of Rejeb, 1211, Hegeree (corresponding with the 8th of January, 1797).

(Signed) (A true translation.)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

## No. XXI.

Translation of a Letter, under the Seal of Khader Nawaz Khan, to Gholaum Ali Khan.

Deeming my desire of the honour of a meeting, which is replete with happiness beyond the power of writing or speech to express, I proceed to represent the purpose of this address.

Your kind letter, intimating that you had been indisposed after your leaving this place, but that your health was completely restored, has reached me, and its contents have been understood. Although I am concerned at the account of your indisposition, my thanks are offered up to Almighty God for your recovery. What you write of the satisfaction of the nabob Tippoo Sultaun Behaudar, — may his shadow be extended! upon the intimation of my attachment, has called forth my highest thanks and endless praises; and I beg you will present my respectful acknowledgments for his kindness and favours towards me. I have been from first to last endeavouring, that, through the favour of God, the degree of union between these two chosen of the Lord (meaning the nabob Omdut ul Omrah and Tippoo Sultaun), which is calculated to promote the happiness of God's people, may daily be strengthened and cemented, and mutual friendship and attachment be confirmed and established; and thanks to the Almighty, that the system of harmony and union has acquired the requisite degree of stability and firmness (literally, that as it should be, so it is). — Always believe me anxious for the news of your welfare, and constantly praying for your health and happiness.

[Endorsement on the Letter by one of Tippoo Sultaun's moonshees.]

Received the 10th of Rehmauny, of the year Shaud, 1223, A. N. Mahomed, answering to the 9th of Rejeb, 1211, Hegeree, (corresponding with the 8th of January, 1797).

[Superscription on the cover.]

Be it honoured by the respectful perusal of Syeed Gholaum Ali Khan Behaudar, Musheddy (i. e. Mushud, a place in Khorosan.) — Be his favour perpetual!

(Signed) (A true translation.)

N. B. Edmonstone,  
&c. &c.

FINIS.

SUBSTANCE  
OF THE  
*S P E E C H*  
OF  
RANDLE JACKSON, ESQ.  
DELIVERED AT A  
GENERAL COURT OF PROPRIETORS  
OF  
*East India Stock,*

ON TUESDAY, MAY 5, 1812. \*

UPON THE SUBJECT OF THE NEGOCIATION WITH HIS  
MAJESTY'S MINISTERS, FOR A PROLONGATION  
OF THE TERM OF THE COMPANY'S  
EXCLUSIVE CHARTER.

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*Printed by Desire of the General Court. -*

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FIFTH EDITION.

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1812.



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S U B S T A N C E  
OF THE  
S P E E C H  
OF  
*RANDLE JACKSON, ESQ.*

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**T**HE Chairman (Sir Hugh Inglis) having informed the Court, that they had met agreeably to adjournment from the last meeting, which had been summoned by the Court of Directors, who wished their opinion and directions as to the course which they should pursue in the future negotiations on the subject of the renewal of their Charter. The Court, he said, was well aware of the unfortunate change which seemed recently to have taken place in the sentiments of his Majesty's Ministers ; the papers being all printed and now before them, himself and his colleagues invited a full, fair, and free discussion of their contents.

Mr. JACKSON then rose, and observed, that the Court was met at a period of the utmost importance to its interests and its honour, but of greater importance still to the best interests of the Country ; for those interests must still go hand in hand ; they were identified with, and inseparable from each other. Under this impression, the Company had uniformly acted, they even now sought no advantage which they could not show to be for the good of the State ; and he thought he might safely appeal to the first resolution which the Court had come to

on this business, as a proof, that however justifiable they should be in debating there their particular interests, they had considered themselves as standing in that Court in their higher character of British Citizens, and as such challenged the strictest animadversion on their conduct \*. He was confident that

\* At a General Court of the United Company of Merchants of England, trading to the East Indies, held April 2, 1812.

Resolved Unanimously, That this Court having perused the papers laid before them at the last General Court, desire to express the high sense which they entertain of the great ability, zeal, and fidelity, with which the Directors have maintained the interest of the East-India Company. They return them thanks for the powerful and convincing arguments by which they have shown which the nation has derived, in strength, revenue, Emancipation, and character from the capital and the exertions of this Corporation.

That although this Court will feel it their duty, on all occasions, to bow to the determination of the Legislature, they cannot but observe with extreme concern, that no proposition is suggested of an increased or further dividend, either now or hereafter, or advantage of any kind whatever, to the Proprietors of East-India Stock; notwithstanding the negotiation for the renewal of the Charter, in 1793, begun with a proposal for an increase of dividend of two per cent., which Charter opened the trade but in a limited and partial degree; and notwithstanding that, while such great and progressive advantages have been obtained for the Public at large, the Proprietors themselves have made little more than common interest for their money. That now to be called upon to part with an undefined proportion of a trade thus established, and maintained hitherto at their sole expense, without any consideration for the same, seems to them to be wholly inequitable. Under these impressions, this Court confides to the Honourable Court of Directors the care of its interests in the farther negotiation for a new Charter, trusting

he should be able to show, that all which their Directors had so nobly contended for was warranted by the experience of ages, and by the declared sentiments of the profoundest Statesmen, not excepting his Majesty's Ministers themselves. It was true, that by a recent recession from those sentiments, they had placed the Company in a very awkward and painful situation; but he had a right, in argument, to avail himself of their previously declared opinion, and should do so, leaving the world to judge of the validity of those motives, to which they would most probably ascribe the alteration. It

to the justice of their fellow citizens, as well as to his Majesty's Government and to Parliament, that they shall receive that liberal treatment, which they regard themselves as so eminently entitled to at the hands of their Country.

And that the Directors be requested to report their proceedings, from time to time, to this Court.

That this Court cannot contemplate the essential change proposed in the constitution of the Company, by an unrestrained trade to and from India, without great concern and apprehension; not so much on account of the injury to which it will subject the Company in their commercial privileges and profits, as on account of the tendency which such a change must have to affect the system established by the Legislature, for the civil and political government of the Company's territorial possessions, whilst it is not at all likely to afford to the commercial interests of this Country the advantages expected from it.

Should, therefore, the opening of the trade to India be the ultimate determination of Parliament, this Court cannot but express its hope, that all due care will be taken, to accompany the enlargements which shall be given to individuals in the Indian trade, with such regulations as shall most effectually guard against the dangers to which those enlargements might expose the existing system of Indian administration.

was not surprising that when this change was first announced to the Proprietors at the last General Court, if they should have expressed themselves with warmth, at a conduct which they not only considered as a departure from those principles which were understood to have been agreed on between his Majesty's Government and the Company, but as treating the Company on the part of the public with ingratitude and injustice. The Proprietors were now however met, finally to make up their minds as to what line of conduct they should adopt under the circumstances in which they found themselves, and with reference to the whole of the papers laid before them. <sup>are powerful and convincing</sup> He trusted, therefore, that they <sup>would have</sup> ~~would have~~ pursue their deliberations with that calmness

which could alone invest them with dignity; with that dispassionate and patient investigation which could alone give them weight with the public; and though a question of high political consequence, he trusted that nothing like party feeling would be discernible in its discussion; he had had the satisfaction of observing, much as that spirit might rage elsewhere, that it had not for many years disturbed that Court, not that the Members of it could be supposed insensible to political predilections they were in general persons too well educated, and of too high a station in society to be supposed free from such impressions; but they had always thought it most becoming to confine themselves within the character which the State had been pleased to assign to them, and to limit their debates to the commerce and to the government of India. He

had no hesitation, for his own part, in avowing the sense which he entertained of his Majesty's Ministers; he thought highly of the endowments of several of them, and he believed their integrity to be unquestionable; but, upon the present occasion, he should speak of them as they appeared to him through the medium of the negotiation before the Court; yet, while he treated them with freedom, he hoped he should not depart from due respect; he would make no observations but such as the printed papers warranted, and as the resolution which he meant to have the honour of offering to the Court would be grounded upon those papers, he should have occasion frequently to call their attention to the leading points which they contained; he must do this somewhat minutely, being anxious that their adversaries might not have it in their power to charge them with wandering either in their resolutions or debates from the known facts and recorded documents of their case.

Before he commented upon the papers, Mr. Jackson said he would shortly notice the numerous petitions which had lately been presented to the Houses of Parliament; many of them undoubtedly deserved great respect and attention for the able and enlightened expositions which they exhibited; while others of them teemed with every species of absurdity, mixing up the leading topics of popular complaint without order or discrimination, and that in a manner which showed to demonstration that they were the result of artful excitement, procured with the most malignant motives, and containing

doctrines but little understood by those who signed them. Some of them had indulged in the wildest theories, and instead of reasoning upon the probable extent of Indian export and import, talked of the inalienable privileges of human nature, and the imprescriptible rights of man! treating all colonial regulation, as at best but qualified usurpation, and contending that every British Subject inhales with his first breath, a right to trade to every part of the British dominions, and to traverse Bengal Bay, Botany Bay, or any other bay, without let or hindrance from the parent state! He was sorry to hear that such doctrines had found an advocate in an eloquent Member of the Upper House, a Noble Lord, who had formerly been one of the most ardent champions for social order; but who upon this occasion (such seemed to be the fate of ardent minds) was found ranged on the side of the opposite extreme! These Petitioners, he was informed, had numerous delegates in London, who formed general and sub-committees, which had not been inaptly called committees of coercion, whose functions, besides procuring petitions from every hole and corner of the United Kingdom, were to canvas and cross-canvas Members of Parliament; and when personal applications in London failed, then to procure a broad hint from some of their constituents in the country, as to which way it was expected they should vote; so that there, perhaps, never was a great public question on which Members were less free to follow their own cool and unbiassed judgments, than that which related to the prolongation

of the Company's present right of trade. He himself (Mr. Jackson said) felt less apprehension from the petitions than many other persons; they would have but their day. The actors had over-acted their parts, they had already disgusted the audience, and, he had no doubt, would soon think it wise to withdraw a great proportion of their pretensions from that sound understanding, and true discernment, which he had never yet known to fail the British Public, after it had had time and the means of duly examining both sides of a question.

With regard to the documents on their table, Mr. Jackson said, he was glad to observe that nothing more was said respecting the Indian Army, and he hoped the fate of the Empire was not about to be tampered with, respecting so mighty an engine of its defence; he should, therefore, regard that part of the negociation standing as it did when he had the honour of addressing them at the Court before last, and consequently forbear any observation upon the subject. As to the trade of the Company, the main proposition of the Directors was, That the commerce of the Company, and the government of India, were absolutely inseparable: they had been born and bred together; they had grown with each other's growth, and strengthened with each other's strength; they had fed, nourished, supported, and considering the difficulties which their commerce had encountered and subdued, he might add, fought for each other; united, they formed the grandest and most stupendous edifice the world had seen; separate them, they will crumble and fall,



and with them the resplendent glory of our Country, thus shorn of its brightest beam. Such he would show to have been the opinions of most able Statesmen, and such was the influence under which the Directors evidently wrote their letter of the 16th December, 1808, which might be said to be the first material paper. That letter professedly avoided "any detailed specification" of proposal, but desired to offer "suggestions of a general nature, as the principal foundations on which a new agreement between the Public and the East India Company might be placed." It said in substance, but, as he thought, in less assuming phrase than the facts warranted, "It is now upwards of a century that the East India Company have acted under a charter distinctly defined, sanctioned, and continued by various acts of the Legislature : during that period, notwithstanding we have had difficulties to encounter, and expenses to struggle with, which must long since have overwhelmed and annihilated any other concern, or any other people, we have acquired for our Country, not for ourselves, for we have rarely derived more than common interest for our money, the most splendid territories upon the face of the globe ; we have obtained for you sixty millions of subjects, to whose happy situation, attachment to, and entire confidence in us, we refer you for the character of our Government ; they swell our armies, they venerate our laws, and choose us for their judges. These territories yield a gross revenue of sixteen millions, and Ministers have thought their capacity for yielding an annual net surplus of a million sterling a moderate calcula-

tion. We maintain an army of 150,000 men, we will only say of them that by their means all India is kept in peace towards the Company ; however, the native Princes may molest each other, the name of England is its shield, the most powerful Sovereigns of India acknowledge our superiority, each European Power has been removed in succession, and though it is not many years since France disputed with us the palm of Oriental rule, not a Frenchman remains in India. The domestic benefits which we have been enabled to confer on our Country are of no ordinary description. We and those connected with us have exported through the medium of the Company, £2,320,000 per annum, besides the privileged goods of Commanders and Officers to a considerable extent; and our imports have netted, in duties to Government without risk, trouble, or material expense, upwards of £4,000,000 per annum. Our tonnage amounts to 101,797 tons. Our trading ships are men of war, and so armed and navigated as successfully to have coped with the ships and frigates of the enemy; their crews consist of one thousand six hundred accomplished commanders and officers, and of eight thousand seamen for whom our trade is a perpetual nursery. We besides maintain in this great City a prodigious Establishment ; and numerous, indeed, are the families who owe their reputable means of living and their comfort to our well-conducted commerce. Is it too much then to ask of his Majesty's Government, (not, we repeat, so much for our own sakes, as for the sakes of the thousands and tens of thousands

that depend upon us, and whom we are bound by every tie of honour, gratitude, and affection to protect) "that we may be allowed to continue our course, a blessing to our Country beyond all historic example, the wonder of Europe, and the envy of its malignant Master."—Such was the prayer and such the general pretensions of the Company on opening the negotiation. He would, however, state the first proposition which that letter contained, *verbatim*, in order the better to apply the answer which followed. The Directors say, "The system by which the Legislature has continued to the Company the government of the territories acquired by it in the East, *with a regulated monopoly of the trade*, has been held by the most eminent persons conversant with that quarter and its affairs, to be the most expedient both for the foreign and domestic interests of this Country."

Lord Melville's reply is dated the 28th December, 1808; to this part of the Directors' letter he says, "Concurring *in substance* with the proposition contained in the first article, I shall not enlarge upon its details. I have not yet heard or read any arguments against the continuance of the system under which the British possessions in India are governed, of sufficient weight to counter-balance the practical benefits which have been derived from it, in their increased and increasing prosperity, and the general security and happiness of their inhabitants." He adds, "any alteration, therefore, which may be suggested in this part of the system, will probably be *only in its details*." Thus it is plain, continued

Mr. Jackson, that Lord Melville admits the increased and increasing prosperity of India. The only alteration which he contemplates in their commerce he explicitly states to be, "That merchants and manufacturers shall trade to and from India and the other countries within the limits of the Company's exclusive Charter, in ships or vessels hired or freighted by themselves, excepting the *the dominions of the Empire of China*." He concludes with an assurance, "that it will be the earnest desire of his Majesty's Government to suggest to Parliament such a *system only*, as shall be conformable to the *principles on which the regulations of 1784 and 1793 were founded*." Now, the leading *principle* of 1784 and 1793 was well known to be the conducting of the trade of India by a "well-regulated monopoly." The eminent Statesmen of those days held that opinion, and particularly the Noble Lord's father. Mr. Jackson said, he used the term *monopoly* because he found it there, and by way of distinction; but it was a solecism to call that trade a monopoly which admitted the whole Country to a partnership in its eventual gains, as provided by the Act of 1793, and other acts; and which allowed any merchant or trader to export to, or import from, India, an extent considerably beyond what had ever been claimed. For the Act of 1793, a fact not generally known, so far opened the trade of India as to allow Private Merchants the privilege of trading thither, and consigning to, and receiving from, their own agents, to the amount of three thousand tons per annum; this privilege, he believed, was unknown

to much the greater part of the Petitioners, who he apprehended, were still less aware, that out of this three thousand tons, not more than one thousand two hundred and eleven tons per year, on an average of eighteen years since 1793, had been claimed, and of this, on an average, four hundred and thirty tons per year were of wine and beer, though unlimited permission was now so loudly demanded: nothing appeared from the letter alluded to, to show that even indiscriminate *export* was intended, or that the ships of Private Merchants should proceed from any other port than that of *London*; and as for any other kind of *import* than through *London*, he believed it had not then been thought of; on the contrary, Lord Melville declared the principles of 1784 and 1793 to be his groundwork, with which such mode of import would be entirely incompatible. This declaration, Mr. Jackson said, had come from a man of no ordinary ability, one who was known not to commit himself lightly, who seldom acted without proper deliberation, and who, however unassuming in himself, perhaps yielded to few in the wisdom of his conclusions. Mr. Jackson said, that before he proceeded to show how inconsistent a late communication was with this letter of Lord Melville's, whose principles it went not to regulate, but totally to subvert, he would notice another part of his Lordship's letter, which fully warranted what himself had said at a former Court respecting an increase of dividend; he had been much misapprehended on that subject, and particularly by an honourable friend of his (Mr.

Geo. Johnstone), who had treated his argument as if he had proposed to stipulate for an immediate increase of dividend, whereas the objection which he had taken was, that the negotiation neither stipulated for any present or prospective advantage to the Proprietors; and as it now stood, they might go on for twenty years more without the legal possibility of deriving any; he had observed on that occasion, that the former negotiation of 1793, which took but a small part of the exclusive trade away from the Company, commenced with a proposition of an increased dividend of two and a half per cent. which it grounded upon an expected surplus from India; it was evident that the same expectation existed in the present Lord Melville's mind, and that he also thought that the Proprietors should not be kept thus out of sight. Lord Melville says, in this same letter, "I think it very desirable that no measure should be adopted, in the renewal of the Charter, which would have the effect of reducing the value of the capital stock of the East India Company, and that *due care should be taken to secure their proper share of advantage, in any future amelioration of their affairs.*" That his Lordship looked for such an amelioration was evident, from the following sentence: "The most sanguine expectations of a result even more favourable (that is, than bringing the expenditure within the income), and of a large surplus revenue above your ordinary expenses in time of peace, have recently been conveyed to you by Lord Minto." In a subsequent letter is again expressed the confident expectation of a considerable surplus; surely then it was but

reasonable to require that some provision should be made in any act which might pass, that the Proprietors, the real merchant adventurers, and owners of the whole concern, should not be the only persons forgotten in the arrangement. He had not meant absolutely to contend for a present increase of dividend, equitable as it might be; but as the Indian debt had notoriously been contracted for political purposes, for the advantage of the Country, as well as by its orders, and that even a part of the profits of their commerce had aided its liquidation, he thought it but common justice, that when a certain portion of it had been paid off, say five millions, an increase of dividend should take place out of the next surplus, and so on progressively, in proportion as they should discharge that debt. As for a remission of the property-tax, he had not approved of applying for it upon the present occasion; he thought that the saddling it personally upon the Proprietors might at the first have been avoided, but he thought it now, if meant by way of satisfaction, not worth their acceptance, and beneath their entreaty; while the other mode which he had suggested was a broad and a fair proposition, which he should think it grossly unjust to resist.

He had before observed, that although Lord Melville had intimated, as a *sine qua non*, that the goods and ships of private merchants should be admitted to trade with India, no demand had yet been made that they should be permitted to proceed indiscriminately from the *Outports*, a measure which the most experienced persons believed to be big with danger to our Indian empire; an

exception had been made even as to their trading at all with the Chinese dominions, an exception which Lord Buckinghamshire's letter had since in fact overruled, for whether such trade should be direct or indirect it was the same thing: if admission to those seas were conceded, the Company could not go on with propriety a twelvemonth longer. Mr. Jackson said he would go regularly through the papers, which would clearly prove, that the idea of indiscriminate *import* had been but recently taken up: how produced, or under what influence, was not for him to say.

The next material paper was the letter of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, Messrs. Grant and Parry, dated January 13, 1809. It was quite impossible for him (Mr. Jackson said) to do justice to this paper; it contained a most masterly review of the whole question, so much so, that no person who should read it, could well plead ignorance hereafter. Its reasoning was so clear and dispassionate, it contained so much sound sense, and true British philosophy, as well to entitle it to the praises which it had universally received, and to the impression which it was known to have made upon reflecting and impartial men. As many of the propositions contained in that paper were found among the subjects of subsequent discussion, he should not then enter particularly into its contents; suffice it to say, that it seemed irrefragably to prove, that the only safe way of letting the private merchant into the trade of India, was through the medium of the Company's shipping, and subject to the



- wholesome regulations of the Company's own commerce ; and that any other mode, for the reasons therein set forth, would be extremely perilous to the interests of the Country ; it showed the means and the energies which had been employed to force a greater export trade to India, and satisfactorily proved the moral impossibility of further extension, among a people whose habits of life admitted but of so limited a use of European manufacture ; it showed any material increase of *import* to be equally unlikely, and exposed the fallacious grounds upon which hopes of a different kind were built, and how certain they were to end in disappointment, though perhaps not till irreparable mischief should have been done to that settled system, which had hitherto proved so wonderfully beneficial to the Country, that it would in fact be opening the trade to all the world ; that smuggling would be the leading pursuit, and rise above all control ; that colonization, with its long prospective train of political evils, would necessarily ensue ; that the China Trade, that staff of the Company, must consequently fall ; and that, in short, so completely would the indiscriminate opening of the trade subvert those principles of 1784 and 1793, which Government had professed to consider as its landmark, that “ with the prospect of all these consequences commercial and political before the Court, it is impossible that they, as faithful guardians of the interests committed to their care, or as men truly solicitous for the welfare of their Country, could advise their constituents to seek a renewal of their Charter, on conditions which would

despoil it of all its solid advantages, deprive the Company of their most valuable privileges, and incapacitate them from performing for themselves, and the nation, the part hitherto assigned to them in the Indian system."

This letter seemed to have had great and deserved weight with his Majesty's Government. as Lord Melville, in his next, dated December 17, 1811, refers to it without pressing any one of those points which had been thus strongly objected to, but declares his readiness to discuss with the Directors the *details* of the system ; " if they are willing, that *the ships* as well as goods of merchants may be admitted into the trade with India, under such restrictions as may be deemed necessary." This was the condition which he had laid down from the first ; to this he had uniformly adhered, but up to that hour it had been on no occasion required by Government that such ships should be allowed to proceed *indiscriminately from the* OUTPORTS, and the Directors still hoped, that the evident peril of such a licence would prevent it from being conceded ; indeed, it was evident that his Lordship at that time contemplated only the single change of admitting the *ships* of Private Merchants, as well as their *goods*, he makes it a preliminary to the arrangement of the debt itself, saying, " If the Court of Directors are willing that these discussions, on the renewal of the Charter, shall proceed in so far as relates to the question of *the trade*, on the *principle to which I have adverted*, I shall be ready to receive from you

any suggestions you may have to offer on the subject of the debt," &c. &c.

The next paper of importance was a letter of March 4, 1812, from the Chairman and Deputy Chairman, Mr. Bosanquet and Sir Hugh Inglis. This letter, Mr. Jackson said, was likewise written with great ability; it indicated a thorough knowledge of the subjects on which it treats, derived from that best of all sources long experience, and the writers of it fortify their statements by a variety of accounts, showing the imports and exports of India, through the different mediums of the Company; of their commanders and officers; of private traders; of Americans; and of foreign Europeans; with their respective proportions of bullion, and of goods and stores. In this paper is exhibited what is called the *outlays* of the Company at home and abroad; and their various contributions at different periods to Government, either by way of aid to their Country, or in consideration of the Charter; which appear to have amounted, from the year 1768 to 1812, to the sum of £5,135,319; and it concludes with an account of the duties of customs and excise on goods imported and exported by the Company, which for the year ending Jan. 1811 amounted to no less than £4,213,425! This letter begun with assuming it to be the final determination of Government "that the trade with India should be extended to the *ships* as well as *goods* of Private Merchants, under such restrictions as might be deemed necessary." The Chairmen repeat the solemn conviction of

the evils which must follow such a measure ; they express the reluctance with which they shall be obliged to offer it to the Proprietors, with whom alone the power rests of consenting to such a fundamental change in the constitution of the Company." But " the Court hopes that in the extension of the trade which the Company now enjoys, his Majesty's Ministers have not had in view the hazardous experiment of dispersing over all the Ports of England and Ireland a trade now brought with so much advantage both to the Company and the Public to the single *Port of London*." It was plain therefore that up to this period the *indiscriminate import* lately called for, had not even been intimated ; so far from it, he would show from the next paper to which he should refer, that it was expressly, and in terms, declared, not to be the intention of Government to allow it. It was observable (Mr. Jackson said) that this letter noticed, and refuted, two of those subjects of declamation in which their adversaries had so much indulged ; the one was a charge that they called upon the public for sums of money to enable them to prosecute ruinous undertakings ; the other was a convenient allegation, that the Company gained nothing by its commerce, and that consequently it ought to be less tenacious of its preservation. The Chairmen answered both of these points, with great force and equal simplicity ; they show that so far from our requiring public aid for our *commerce*, our need has arisen out of that political course which the Public had directed, through its Government, to be pursued, and to satisfy debts which

their commands had thus created, but that the *commercial affairs* of the Company, which were all that were now left to their unrestrained management, had produced advantages sufficient to allow of a moderate dividend to the Proprietors, over and above which, a surplus has been applied, arising from this source, towards the extension of that territory, the acquisition of which has been under the immediate direction of his Majesty's Ministers." A statement then follows, which shows the skill with which the Company's affairs must have been managed, to have carried on so vast a Concern with so limited and so unequal a capital. When it is recollected that the East India Company rank higher for the punctuality of their payments and general credit than almost any other Concern whatever, public or private, this consummate skill, and its effect, can perhaps be only attributed to that system, which ages had consolidated, with high integrity for its foundation, and experience for its guide; yet such was the system which it was now sought to subvert and utterly to overthrow !

The remainder of this enlightened paper, again brought to view the train of advantages which the Country has derived from that stupendous object of its own creation, called the East India Company, and aptly enforces, among other considerations, that " the whole of a vast revenue has been brought into the Exchequer of the Public, without the Public having been called upon for any direct contribution for the preservation of the source from whence such advantages have had their rise."

Another most important observation presented itself from the perusal of this document. It contained, among other information, an account of the American Trade to India, which seemed to prove beyond the possibility of doubt or contradiction, that the *Export* Trade to India and its dependencies has already been pushed as far as it would admit of. The Americans were known to sail to the Indian seas under every possible advantage; they united great skill and enterprise, with two of the most decisive qualities for commercial success, rigid economy, and avidity for gain; they were under no restraints in seeking a market, but had access to every port or creek in India or the Eastern Isles; and though there was scarcely a place of the least note in which the Americans had not made their appearance; yet, with all these advantages and incentives, they had not been able in six years to export more than £667,654, in merchandise and manufactures including those of their own country, to £4,543,662 of bullion, which article generally averaged about seven-eighths of the amount of their Indian export. The Americans had vast depôts of British Manufactures among themselves; they were continually in this Country, where they could obtain them to any amount upon almost unlimited credit: the profit upon them, if they were really in demand, must, in the nature of things, be much greater than that upon bullion; the policy of exporting the wares of their own country must be as evident as with us, and yet such was the miserable portion of British and American goods in their

aggregate Indian export. The reason was obvious : the almost only consumers of British manufacture were the European Residents ; the market for their supply was frequently glutted, as the Company themselves annually exported upwards of one million of goods and stores, their Commanders and Officers nearly half a million more, and the Private Traders, who were let into the Indian Trade by the Act of 1793, about £400,000. Compare this considerable export with the wants of the Europeans in India, and it was plain that they were fully supplied. It was equally plain that the British manufactures have already all the orders which India can furnish, with this difference, that at present they work for long-established and settled connections, but, if their petitions be complied with, they must themselves become the merchant Adventurers, or trust their property to persons of a very different description from those who were now their customers. Persons who reflected for a moment upon the natives of India, their climate, their habits, manners, and religions, must be convinced that no attempt could force or seduce them into the consumption of European manufactures ; nature, taste, and a capacity for purchase, were all against the probability. But even this experiment the Americans had tried to the utmost, and the amount of their manufactured exports showed it to have failed. Did this then, he would ask, afford any prospect of advantage, to be for a moment balanced against the known and admitted perils of indiscriminate access to India ? and did it not completely confirm

the opinion declared by their Directors, that ruin and disappointment must fall upon the speculators in such a trade, after all the mischief which may have been occasioned to the Country and the Company by the licence allowed to them? Nay, he would show from a succeeding paper, that such was the expectation of Ministers themselves, though unfortunately they seemed about to give way to the rash and perhaps fatal experiment.

Mr. Jackson observed, that he had stated that up to this period Government had not unfolded any purpose with respect to their trade beyond that which Lord Melville had declared as *the principle*, upon the concession of which he would only commence discussions as to *details*. At this period (the 2d March 1812), the Deputation of Directors presented to his Lordship a string of twenty-five propositions, entitled *Hints*, as was done in 1793; they were all of great importance, but he should only notice such as bore immediately on the question of *Indiscriminate Private Trade*, and he would show from them that the Directors did not then understand it to be the determination of Government that the ships of Private Traders should proceed even *outwards*, otherwise than from the *Port of London*, and that *both* Government and the Directors, decidedly, emphatically, and in terms, agreed, that the China Trade should not be put in hazard, but be left upon "its present footing." Its present footing was known to be a direct, unequivocal, exclusive privilege, without the enjoyment of which, they had been fairly told by the Direc-



tors, that the Company could not continue to pay its dividends, or discharge its functions; in short, it could not go on; or, if it should go on for a year or two, or more, it must be under circumstances of progressive and increasing weakness. Whatever might be the fate of the Company, no man could say that the Directors had not spoken out; it was under, and on account of such an intimation, that the Court was now met, and the plain English of the question for their deliberation was, Whether they should begin to wind up their affairs now, with all the legal advantages which they still possessed, or a very few years hence, when comparatively destitute of strength, and much less able to cope with any disposition there might be to oppress them? Whether their exclusive trade to China should be affected immediately or consequentially, it must be equally fatal to their commercial existence.

The Deputation offered their first three Propositions in the following terms:—1. “No British or Indian ship to sail directly or circuitously from a British Port in Europe to China.”

2. “No British Subject to be permitted to reside in China, without the Company’s licence.”

3. “No goods the growth or produce of China to be *imported* into any Ports of the United Kingdom, except by the East India Company.”

It should be observed, that Lord Melville’s answers to these Propositions, are not like his first intimations, such “as have occurred to him,” but not, “matured in concert with his Majesty’s confidential servants;” these answers, on the contrary,

profess to convey “ the sentiments of his Majesty’s Government on the several points to which the propositions relate ;” and the Court was now to judge what in candour and plain dealing those sentiments amounted to.

In answer to the three first propositions, Lord Melville says, “ 1st, 2d, 3d, It is deemed advisable, and with a view to the security of the Revenue, and to other objects connected with the Trade to China, to leave it *on its present footing*, and to guard, by proper regulations, against any encroachment on that branch of the Company’s *exclusive privilege*.” —“ Its present footing” (Mr. Jackson repeated) was a secure footing, arising from the positive prohibition to any private British Subject to import a single article from China, or even to sail into those seas, or into any of the Company’s Eastern territories, without their permission.

The Deputation of Directors, by the frankness of their Propositions, had put all ambiguity out of the question, and left no room for doubtful construction. Their sixth Hint comes immediately to the point as to the *Import Trade*. “ 6th. The whole of the Indian Trade to be brought to the *Port of London*, and the goods sold at the Company’s sales, and to be, as at present, under the Company’s management.” Nothing could be more explicit than the language of this proposal; the answer given by Lord Melville, in the name of his Majesty’s Government, was no less so. Nothing like doubt or hesitation appeared, but full and perfect admission of the validity of the suggestion and consent to its

adoption. “ 6th Answer:—The adoption of the regulation suggested in this proposition, will probably tend to the security and advantage of the Public Revenue, in collecting the duties on all articles imported from the East Indies and China, as well as other countries to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope.” Here was a direct agreement and understanding between the Directors and Government, that all Indian *Imports* should be to the *Port of London*. How, without a most extravagant violation of all rules of construction could a departure from this important and vital principle of the negotiation be now treated as an “ alteration in the *detail* of the business ?”

The Directors offer their Eighth Proposition in terms equally explicit; and though the answer is not favourable, it is equally frank and intelligible; the Directors still adhering to the opinion which they had so seriously taken up, and so well supported, as to the deep impolicy of *indiscriminate export*, propose,

8th. “ No private ship to be permitted to sail *for India*, except the *Port of London*.”

Answer.

8th. “ There does not appear to exist sufficient reason for preventing ships from clearing *out* for the East Indies from *other Ports* of the United Kingdom, besides the *Port of London*.”

But aware of the danger to which such permission would expose the China Trade, the Directors pray, in their Twenty-fifth Proposition, that such ships may not be allowed to sail further eastward and northward

than certain points. The answer to this proposal still shows the understanding that the China Trade should not be placed in any predicament of danger. Lord Melville says, If this object "can be obtained by exclusion from the Dominions of the Emperor of China, and a prohibition to import the *Produce of that Country* without a licence from the Company, it *will be preferable* to the mode herein suggested," clearly admitting that if the China Trade cannot be put above hazard by any other mode, private ships should be totally excluded from the Eastern Seas.

The letter from Lord Melville, which accompanied these answers was dated the 21st March, 1812, his Lordship, as Mr. Jackson had before observed, declares them to be "the present sentiments of his Majesty's Government;" he adds, "public discussion on such an important question may possibly produce an alteration of opinion on some *of the details*, and though the subject *has been fully considered*, it may be deemed necessary, in the further progress of the measure, to propose on some points *regulations* of a different description from those which are suggested in the enclosed observations." His Lordship, in the subsequent parts of this letter, clearly shows that he himself continues of the opinion which he had expressed in December 1808, that the principles of 1784 and 1793 ought to be the basis of the agreement; that every departure from them has been against his better judgment and that he concurs with the Directors, and with every thinking man acquainted with India, that

disappointment must follow even the concession to which he has yielded, he says, " You will do me the justice to recollect, that in all our discussions on this subject, both recently and on former occasions, the admission of *the ships* of Merchants in this Country into the trade of India, in concurrence with those of the Company, has never been urged as a measure, from which much immediate benefit would, in my opinion, be derived, either to the *Country* or to the *Individuals* who might embark in the speculation ; and I certainly am not without *considerable apprehensions* that at least on the first opening of the trade, the public expectation, as to the British territories in India affording any considerable outlet for British manufactures, beyond the amount of *our present exports*, may be disappointed." Could there be a more significant admission, from a Statesman, that he was yielding to clamorous solicitation that which his judgment would withhold ? He further admits himself fully to concur in the apprehensions of the Directors respecting the " unrestrained intercourse of Europeans with the territories of the Company or of the Native States in India," and allows that it will be the duty of Parliament not only to consider " whether it may be *safe* to prolong the whole or part of the Company's monopoly, but whether it may be *unsafe* to abridge or abolish it." In short, let any person connect the sentiments contained in this letter with those in his Lordship's letter of the 28th December, 1808, and it will be impossible to doubt, but that he agrees, cordially agrees, in the opinions of his eminent

Father, which Mr. Jackson said he should presently quote, namely, that the principles of 1784 and 1793 were the true, sound, political principles for the Sovereignty and Trade of India, and that in order to insure the preservation of both, the mode of the latter ought to be what has been styled “ a well regulated monopoly.”

The next, and indeed the last. letter from Lord Melville, who soon after quitted the India Board, was dated 23d March, 1812, which Mr. Jackson said he referred to, merely to prove that his Lordship uniformly contended, that from the reduction of expense which had already taken place, and which still might be effected, “ a confident expectation might be entertained, of a large annual surplus available towards the reduction of debt.” This was on all hands admitted to be a political debt, incurred by territorial acquisition and defence, which purposes it had been shown had been materially forwarded and aided from the profits of their commerce ; surely, surely, it was not too much to ask from reason and justice, that as this debt should be progressively liquidated, some advantage should be extended to the Proprietors beyond the common interest of their money !

He had now (Mr. Jackson said) travelled through the first set of papers, and he thought they strictly warranted, the Directors as to the conclusion which at that time they believed themselves to have come to with Government, and which had been so forcibly and emphatically stated by their late Chairman, Mr. Bosanquet, namely, that their army and the

China Trade were to be left entire, unmolested, and unexposed. And that, although the *Ships* of Individuals were to be let into the Trade of the Company, there still remained hope that Government would be convinced of the wisdom of confining their *oufit* to the *Port of London*; but that at all events it was understood and agreed in the language of the Sixth Proposal, the answer to which he had read to the Court, that “The whole of the Indian Trade was to be brought to the *Port of London*, and the goods sold at the Company’s sales, and to be as at present under the Company’s management.” Such had been the communication made to the Proprietors by the Court of Directors, and such was the impression under which he himself had opened the business of the General Court on the 2d of last month.

It would now (Mr. Jackson said) be his painful task, to notice the subsequent part of the negotiation as it appeared from the second set of papers which had been laid before them at the last Court, from whence it would appear that Ministers had since unfortunately taken another view of the subject.

The first document material to the question (Mr. Jackson said) was the Resolution of the Court of Directors dated the 9th of April. The annual election was then over, new Chairmen had succeeded, as well as other Directors, and a new Deputation was now appointed to confer with his Majesty’s Ministers. A minute dated the 13th April, appeared stating, that the Chairman and Deputy had had a conference with the Earl of Buckinghamshire on the preceding Tuesday, the

7th instant. It was fair to suppose, that the letter he was now about to observe upon, which was from the Deputation to his Lordship, dated the 15th April, must at least refer to the then state of the negociation. The Deputation apprise his Lordship of the recent Resolution of the General Court, and propose to themselves the honour of continuing the correspondence. They notice the opposition which had begun to shew itself to propositions, “respecting the necessity and importance of which his Majesty’s Government and the East India Company appear to have entertained similar sentiments,” and desire leave to remark “on the outlines of the negociation as far as it *has hitherto advanced* ;” they again express, in terms as manly as disinterested, their deep conviction as to the ills which must follow the opening of the trade, and their firm belief that the commercial advantages expected from that measure will not take place, while it may eventually endanger the security of the British possessions in the East. They say, “We must desire, on the part of the Court of Directors, distinctly, and in the face of the Country, to state this opinion, not as advanced without conviction to serve a cause, but as the genuine result of such knowledge and experience as the Court possess upon a subject respecting which they have better means of information, than any of those associations who are now eager to take full possession of the Eastern Trade, and upon which also it is certainly material that the Public should form just ideas.” In order to enable Government and the Public to form these



just ideas, the Deputation take a masterly review of the whole question, such a one, indeed, as he (Mr. Jackson) should have thought would remove each particle of doubt from every impartial and reflecting mind. They observe, that till lately the Private Merchants affected only to ask for such portion of the Indian Trade as the Company's Commerce did not embrace, but that now they in fact sought a transfer of the Company's own Trade to individuals in the *Out-ports*, and they impute the extravagant and increasing demands of the Petitioners to the too easy concessions of Government in the first instance. They show the absolute impossibility of separating the Government from the Commerce, a proposition for which he should prove they had the highest authority, and are confident that it cannot be the intention of Ministers to break down and despoil the latter, it being of such vital importance to the Empire of India, they trust, therefore, that the wisdom of Parliament and the justice of the Nation will resist those rash and violent innovations, evidently suggested from a deplorable ignorance of facts. They again refer to the propositions which had been made to Government, and to Lord Melville's answers; they examine them respectively, *seriatim*, and at large, particularly those which relate to the *export* and *import* of Private Traders. Upon the subject of the China Trade, they observe, that great as the question of revenue is, that is not the only point to be considered. Justice to the Company, was quite as obligatory a consideration. The China

trade had been given to them by the nation, for national purposes, and to such it had been most beneficially and faithfully applied. They show that competition in this trade would prove hurtful to the public interests. The corporate capacity of the Company, say they, was given to them in perpetuity: they must, at all events, be formidable rivals to any new adventurers. The Company already supplied tea enough for the whole United Kingdom, and they exported to China in the metals and woollens of this country to the annual amount of a million sterling, though frequently at a loss to themselves. The Chinese would raise the price of their articles as soon as competition should appear, while ours would, for the same reason, fetch less; a struggle between the Company and Individuals, continue the Deputation, must produce ruinous consequences to both. The jealousy of the Chinese Government would soon be awakened by the ingress of indefinite numbers of unconnected Englishmen. It was already either so indifferent to European intercourse, or so suspicious of it, that it allowed but one port throughout its vast Empire, to that purpose; and even from that it banished the Europeans to Macao; as soon as the ships had sailed, disorder must follow indiscriminate access to those seas, and general exclusion from Canton would as certainly succeed, and involve in its consequences four millions of revenue! a million of export! the employment of a large and most excellent fleet of ships, each of warlike equipment! the ruin of private speculators! the palsy of the functions of the Company! and the deprivation of

an article which had now become to all ranks of British Subjects a necessary of life!

Upon the dangers of the ships of private Indian traders being allowed to *proceed from and return to the Out-ports*, the Deputation are in this paper equally clear, emphatic, and convincing. They show that from the first institution of the East India Company its trade had used the *Port of London* only; and that the open, honourable, and satisfactory mode of selling all their imports to his Majesty's Subjects by public auction, is nearly coeval with the Company. They state the endless frauds and injuries to which altering this mode would open the door, considering that the Indian trade comes now in fleets, at stated seasons, and that the sales are at stated periods, which are well known to the merchants of Europe, who frequently resort to them in person, and are thence led to the purchase of many other articles, and consequently to the enlargement of British connection, or if that be not convenient, they know that through a broker, they can purchase upon precisely the same terms as if they were citizens of London, and present in the sale room.—So high was the Company's character with foreign Merchants, that purchases were made by them “on the faith merely of the descriptive marks; and goods on their arrival on the Continent frequently pass through various hands, before they are finally unpacked.” They truly add, “nothing so effectual could be devised for that security (meaning the Revenue), as to bring the imports to one place; to have them lodged under

the keys of the Government Officers ; to have them sold publicly in the presence of those Officers ; and finally to have the duties (upwards of four millions per annum), thus carefully ascertained, collected through the medium of the Company, and with hardly any charge to Government ! In short," say they, " the present system affords the most complete provision that can be imagined against defect, fraud, or expense, in realizing this branch of the revenue to the Public." How different, they argue, would be the case, if all individuals were allowed to import into all the *Out-ports* of the Kingdom, especially with small ships that could run into obscure ports in the remotest parts of England, Scotland, and Ireland?—Control would be impracticable. Legions of Custom-house and Excise Officers would be appointed, in spite of whom smuggling without end must be expected. If private ships were allowed to go to the *Eastern Islands*, they could find means to procure the article of *Tea*, and if also allowed to return to the *Out-ports*, smuggling would be by far the most gaining trade, and in fact, however covered or disguised, would be the real and principal object ! The certain consequence must be, a very great and serious abridgement of the Company's sales, and, if so, the Company's finances must sink, their great establishments be given up, their vast fleets, which at present were the means of transporting troops, stores, and warlike means to India, must be laid up, their buildings, wharfs, warehouses, and other articles of dead stock formed at a prodigious expense, and suited only to the Indian Trade which had so

long been theirs, must become useless and deserted ! and all this (supposing the best) in order to transfer the same quantity of oriental commerce to the *Out-ports*, an advantage so fatally overbalanced by the evils enumerated, and by the uncontrolled intercourse of Europeans with the East, a consequence which no regulations could prevent or avert. Surely, they say, such objections ought to be very clearly and satisfactorily answered, before so great a change is attempted, before a Concern which has subsisted for ages, and so succeeded as to be the wonder and envy of the world, is subverted and destroyed, either on the instigation, or theoretical reasoning of men, whose avowed object is the possession of that trade which they propose to take from the Company. The Deputation then remind Government, that they pointed out three years ago the effects of so great an innovation to the President of the Board of Control, and they conclude from his silence that he admitted those effects would, as they had stated, “ amount to the destruction of the Company’s Indian Trade, their Indian commercial establishments, their Indian shipping, and finally leave the China monopoly so insulated and unsupported as to bring that down also, and with it the whole fabric of the Company.”

Upon the 14th Proposition, which asked that no private ship of less than 400 tons burthen should be admitted into the Indian Trade, the necessity of which prohibition Lord Melville in his answer had not agreed to, the Deputation now argue very fully : Mr. Jackson said he had felt some surprise that

Lord Melville had not at once seen the importance of a regulation, which he (Mr. Jackson) thought must appear obvious to others. The Deputation observe, that at a very early period of the Company's history the smaller class of ships were dropped, and none employed of less than 500 tons burthen. That large ships gave a respectability to the British character in the eyes of the inhabitants of India, a distinction which they had strongly noticed in the case of the American ships. That not merely the respectability of the ship was important, but many, even political as well as commercial considerations were connected with the use of large ships. The Officers were gentlemen of education and took rank in society. They had great reputation for nautical skill, their discipline was known and admired, their conduct could be depended on, the vessels were equipped and employed as ships of war, and as such commanded respect for their country, and due obedience to it. The length of the voyage called for accommodations for a variety of officers, such as surgeons, and petty officers, such as carpenters, &c., that were not taken on board small ships, which proceeded to sea without the means of medical and other important aid. That the lives and health of seamen had been found to depend so much on the size of the ships in distant voyages, that even West Indiamen, which accomplished their passage in six weeks or less, were from 400 to 500 tons burthen: that small ships were not under the same kind of discipline, they could go into minor ports, more easily form connec-

tion with the Natives; and their intercourse, and consequent irregularities would be such as neither the vigilance or power of the Indian Governments would be able to discover or control. In short, if a mere chance *outward*, for the sake of smuggling *homeward*, was the speculation and the object of adventurers, undoubtedly small ships would best answer their purpose; but if an honourable commercial intercourse with India was the object of Government, it could only be maintained by ships of a respectable size and suitable equipment as to stores and force, under the conduct of able and responsible commanders and crews.

With regard to the 25th Proposition which asks that private ships may not have access to the Eastern Islands, respecting which Lord Melville in his answer had expressed some reluctance to comply, "provided the China Trade could be secured exclusively to the Company without such restriction." The Deputation show, that private ships having access to the Molucca Islands, could not be important to their owners, with any view to *mere legitimate commerce*, as the Company now grew spices in their own settlements. That one or two of their ships would carry enough for the consumption of all Europe, and that even were it otherwise, Government cannot imagine that the Company would continue to defend and maintain those Islands at a great expense, if the trade in their produce were thus to be taken from them. The Deputation, however, expresses apprehensions of a still more serious nature, and in his (Mr. Jackson's) opinion unquestionably

well founded, namely that this Eastern Archipelago would hold out irresistible temptations, to lawless European settlement, enterprise, and adventure, before which, the Company's China Trade must sink, as the maritime resort would certainly become the very focus of dangerous and illicit intercourse with the Continent of India!

Such (Mr. Jackson said) was the substance of this most excellent paper, as far as it respected the question immediately before the Court. He had gone more fully into it, in order to enable the Proprietors the better to judge of the letter which he should next notice, *viz.* that from Lord Buckinghamshire, dated the 27th of April, which seemed to take so new, and so totally a different view of the subject, and which was in fact a departure by Ministers from their preceding admissions and agreement, it passed over those detailed and enlightened discussions which had hitherto had so much weight, and into which himself (Mr. J.) had that day so fully entered, in order to convince the Court and through them the Public, of their unquestionable validity; these his Lordship in the name of Government seemed at once to bound over, or discard, and to tell the Company with the brevity of Power, that induced by *recent representation*, His Majesty's Ministers had concluded, that the *imports* from India, and the Eastern Isles, should not be confined to the *Port of London*. The answer of the Directors was equally brief, but it was the brevity of despair!—Then, say they, the Company cannot proceed. It was puerile to talk of pro-



fective regulations, their commercial system must give way, and with it must fall that mighty national Establishment the English East India Company.

As they were now assembled (Mr. Jackson said) to come to some resolution suited to the awful circumstances in which they were so unexpectedly placed, and as he meant to submit to them such a one as would comprise the material points of the discussion, as well as convey to the Directors those Instructions which they so honourably called upon their Constituents to give to them, and as he was anxious, not only that the Public should see that every part of their resolution was grounded on documents of high authority, but that every Proprietor who might honour it with his support, should depart satisfied that he had yielded to no passionate appeal, but to palpable inference arising from plain exposition, he should go particularly into his Lordship's letter, and the Directors' answer to it, which was the last document in the papers before them, and which brought the Court to the fearful point on which they at that moment stood.

It appeared (Mr. Jackson said) from paper No. 48, that Lord Buckinghamshire and Sir Hugh Inglis, their Chairman, held a conversation on Sunday evening, the 19th. April, which this Honourable Baronet, had very properly committed to writing; this amounted to no less than a notice "that it was the determination of His Majesty's Ministers to recommend to Parliament to permit Private Ships to clear out from *any Part* of the United Kingdom,

but that they should only be permitted to *import* into those places where the warehousing system existed." That is to *import* into various *Out-ports* of the United Kingdom. This was so entire a departure from the principles of the Acts of 1784 and 1793, which professedly regarded London as the Emporium, and the India House as the Mart and Depot for the Products of India ; so adverse to the answer of Lord Melville to the first, second, and third Propositions for the security of their exclusive Trade to China, and so directly repugnant and contradictory to the terms of the Director's Sixth Proposition, as well as his Lordship's consent thereto, namely, that " The whole of the Indian Trade should be brought to the *Port of London*, and the goods sold at the Company's Sales,"—that it was no wonder that the Honourable Baronet should, with a warmth of zeal for his Constituents, which claimed their gratitude, and did himself so much honour, have declared it " as his opinion, that the Court of Directors in the first instance, and the Court of Proprietors, when laid before them, would resist by every means in their power, a measure so fatal to the vital interests of the Company, and to the Public Revenue, as would be the measure of allowing the ships of individuals to *import* into any place but the *Port of London*, and that situated as he was, he should consider it his duty to resist, and recommend to the Court of Directors, and ultimately, to the Proprietors, to resist the Proposition." This declaration was approved by the Honourable Chairman's colleagues, upon his communicating it to them ; and he, Mr.

Jackson, had no doubt but that the Directors would find in the General Court on that day at once coincidence and firm support.

On the Saturday following, the Deputation of Directors, had an interview with the noble Earl, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Mr. Wallace. The important question of *importing* to the *Out-ports* was again discussed, when the Deputation had the misfortune to find “that the impressions which his Majesty’s Government had received respecting it, *since the date of Lord Melville’s letter, dated the 21st March*, were not in consonance with the sentiments of the Court of Directors.” The Ministers declared their intention of conveying their sentiments in writing, and Lord Buckinghamshire addressed the Court accordingly on the 27th April. That letter was of course an act of Government, and must be so treated; he mentioned this, lest it might be imagined that himself, in freely canvassing its contents, departed for a moment from the great respect he bore his Lordship, who had formerly been their faithful and highly-approved servant; but the contents of this letter appeared to him most singular, and not to be accounted for by any one preceding part of the negotiation: His Lordship says, that in consequence of the conferences which had taken place with the Directors since the 3d instant, “it is unnecessary for me to enter upon the discussion of the Hints and Observations, which have been the subject of the correspondence between the late President of the Board of Control and yourselves.” Mr. Jackson said, he

discovered no reason for dispensing with what appeared to him a most important duty, namely, that of giving detailed and specific answers to the Company, and to the Country, before Government should propose so serious a measure as opening the Trade of India. The Directors had propounded a series of Hints or Propositions, on the 2d of March; Lord Melville had answered them *seriatim* by way of "Observations," on the 21st of March. The Directors had, on the 15th April, as he had shown, reviewed his Lordship's Observations upon their Hints, and amplified their reasoning upon the latter, and again so powerfully enforced them, that he believed there were few persons of understanding that should read them, who would hesitate to pronounce that, until Government shall have succeeded in refuting them, their recently avowed intention of opening the *Out-ports* of the United Kingdom to the *imports* from India, must be regarded as rash and ill-considered, or as a dangerous concession to clamour, and palpably pregnant with calamity to the Country. Indeed, the Noble Earl, seemed conscious that this alteration of sentiment required some explanation; he therefore observes, that Lord Melville, in his letter of the 21st March, said, that "the farther progress of the measure might require alteration in some of the *details* as well as *regulations* of a different description from those which were then suggested." *Details! Regulations!* Why the proposed change was a dereliction of first principles! The complete subversion of those of 1784 and 1793, for which so much veneration had

not altogether unlike a representation which was said to have been made to Sir Robert Walpole, an Applicant to whom had begun and ended his address by reminding him of the extent of his Parliamentary influence! From whatever cause this determination of Government proceeded, its consequence to the Company was most serious; in fact, if they persisted in it, the Company could not go on, as appeared from the frank declaration of the Directors; and it would be much more advisable to begin now to wind up their Concern, than be obliged to do it three or four years hence, under still more unfavourable circumstances, and with still more impoverished means.

The Directors could only answer this intimation as they did, by their letter of the 29th April; that was, by repeating their solemn conviction, as men of character and honour, of the ills which must follow the resolution of Government. They justly observe, that their objections have not been answered, nor their reasoning refuted; that they are ignorant what kind of representations those are to which Lord Buckinghamshire alludes, and express some curiosity as to the *regulations* by which Ministers believe it possible to avert those national evils to which they admit the measure in question will be necessarily exposed without these magical restraints! It was observable (Mr. Jackson said) that his Lordship did not even hint at the nature of them; surely Government must have already digested them, though they had not availed themselves of the experience or assistance of the Directors or their Officers; it

never could be imagined that Ministers would propose this commercial revolution to Parliament, till the code of counteraction, without which they admitted its baleful consequence, was completed! yet certainly hitherto, this work was not even guessed at; and if Government had determined upon its nature, they had hitherto shown impenetrable reserve; but so wholly incredulous were the Directors as to the efficacy of this intended anti-smuggling system, that they protest altogether against the measure which calls for it, as one fatal to their commercial profits, which they say, “enable the Company to discharge the political functions assigned to them in the management of the Indian Empire. Without this resource, the dividend cannot be continued, the value of the Company’s Stock will be diminished, and the Company be brought to a state of dissolution.—” They show that with their decline will be thrown out of activity and employ twenty-one millions of capital, 1400 Commanders and Officers, 8000 Seamen, 12000 Tradesmen, 3000 Labourers, and 78 of the finest Ships in the world, equipped for war as well as commerce!

Mr. Jackson said, he could not yet persuade himself that Ministers would persist in this ruinous submission to known combination, and over-bearing importunity! who was there so short sighted as not to see the evils which must follow? Government talked of confining the *Indian Imports* to such Ports as are allowed the *Warchousing System*, this could not be—they knew it could not be, the imprescriptible rights of man were in their way! If this universal

inherent right to trade with every part of the British Dominions was a fundamental principle, as Government seemed now to admit, what Port so obscure on the English, Scottish, or Irish Coast, but might justly claim the same privilege? Like the principles of Magna Charta, such a claim must override the Legislature itself. If it be an inherent right, upon what ground withhold it from our Colonies? Why should not they import the products of India into their own ports, and re-export them to South America or elsewhere, to any people with whom we are allowed to trade, without visiting at all the Ports of Britain? Upon what ground deny to Halifax or Quebec, that which you allow to New York and Philadelphia?—Have the Petitioners themselves considered these things?—Did they see no danger of the Trade being lost altogether in this attempt to change the hands that carried it on? Did the Manufacturers and Workmen of Manchester and Paisley see no danger in calling for large importations of ready-made goods into the neighbouring ports of Liverpool and Glasgow? Could they afford to suspend their own looms and deal in the muslins and calicoes of India, in preference to making those fabrics themselves? Did they see no danger of the annihilation of their trade altogether, by driving out of fashion the article which so many thousands of them were employed in imitating? Rival sellers would run it down; an inferior commodity would be imported to meet the reduced price; that which now was fashionable, on account of its price and variety, would first become common, then

vulgar, then be exploded ; the imitation would cease to be in demand, when the original ceased to be in vogue, and India and British Muslins would alike lose their sale. Could Birmingham or Sheffield reasonably expect to sell a piece of hardware more, after seeing that the Export Trade is at its utmost extent ? They might have new Customers without an increased demand ; it was for them to consider whether their present regular Customers, or the new Adventurers, were most to be depended on ?

If *Tea* really were, as Lord Buckinghamshire asserted, “ a necessary of life,” who but must be convinced, that the revival of the Smuggling Trade, would again introduce, as formerly, a bad, spurious, fraudulent, and perhaps deleterious article ? Mr. Jackson said, he really believed that the Company was now standing by their resistance, between the Public at large, and the rashness or cupidity of a part of their fellow citizens, and that many of the Petitioners themselves, when they come to know the true merits of the case, which at present was scarcely known without those walls, would be candid enough to own their error !

Did the persons interested in the *Tin Trade* see no danger in pressing their pretensions beyond the bounds of generosity or justice ? If they were wholly insensible of the advantages which they had derived from the Company since 1793, had they no fears, that when the Petitioners shall have succeeded in breaking all subsisting ties, laying open the Trade, and thus leaving the Company free to purchase Tin from the best market, that China will be



supplied from Malacca, Banca, and other places in the eastern parts of India, where Tin is produced in great abundance, and upon terms with which the Gentlemen of Cornwall cannot compete ! Can they be ignorant that the Company have, knowingly, and upon public grounds, encountered occasional loss in order to swell their exports ? And when this honourable obligation shall cease, may not the advantages which the persons interested in the Tin Trade, now enjoy, become extinct ?—Are the Manufacturers of woollen cloths sure, that even supposing the rabble of ships about to be admitted into the Eastern Seas, with their motley and ungovernable crews, should not be the means of hermetically sealing the port of Canton against the English, that they shall find Customers, who, like the Company, will consent to a loss of £50,000 a year upon this single article, in order to encourage to the utmost the Manufacturers of their Country ? Did they who thought our Island and Coasting Trade so vast a nursery for seamen, and consequently so great a national blessing, did they see no difference as to the encouragement of so desirable a nursery, between allowing vessels to sail to India immediately from, and back to, their respective *Out Ports*, and their making a voyage to London, in order to collect or dispose of their Cargoes ?—Do consumers in general apprehend no difference between the certainty which they now possess of obtaining articles of unquestionable goodness, and at a price unquestionably fair, at the Company's public sales, and what may be their chance when cast for their sup-

ply upon the cupidity, specious pretences, and chicanery of thousands of individual Importers and Dealers?—Surely these were points that deserved great consideration before the decree should go forth, that was to open the Trade of India!

Mr. Jackson said, he took it for granted, that Government had now made up its mind, as to the *colonization* of India, and rather wished for such an event! For he could not think so disparagingly of Ministers as to suppose they would take the certain means of producing an event, of which they had not weighed the consequence. He admired their nerves, it was an event which the most courageous Statesman had hitherto shrunk from the contemplation of!

Mr. Jackson observed, he had set out with saying that the principles which the Directors had uniformly maintained during this discussion, namely, “That the Commerce and Government of India were inseparably identified, and that the former could only be efficiently conducted through the medium of a well regulated monopoly,” had the sanction of the ablest Statesmen. No subject could undergo more thorough discussion than the India Trade, and Government did, in 1783; yet Mr. Fox never suggested the opening of the Trade to the Private Merchant!—Mr. Pitt framed the Act which bore his name, immediately after, and which governed the Company till 1793 but which introduced no such measure!—Mr. Pitt took a considerable share in the Act of 1793, and although then possessed of a long experience, and of every

means of forming a proper judgment, he continued the Company as the only legal medium of trade with India! The late Lord Melville he believed yielded to no man as an Indian Statesman, he had left his sentiments on record in terms so clear and unequivocal, that he should quote them ; and as no charge of venality could attach to him for praising the dead, he should say a few words respecting that eminent person. The noble Lord had been, about thirty years ago, the Chairman of a Committee of the House of Commons, for enquiring into the affairs of the Company, and the state of the Indian Government. He possessed naturally a very strong and comprehensive mind, and at that period, dauntless industry; he acquired in the course of this investigation, a great insight into Indian business, and the able reports presented to the House by that Committee were imputed to his Lordship's pen. This gave him great advantages over his antagonists in the discussion of Mr. Fox's bill, and afterwards placed him at the head of the Indian Department ; in that it was known that he always read with his own eyes, and wrote with his own hand, so much so, that it was used to be said, his Secretary's place was a sinecure! Some years since the questions of Private Trade, and India-built Shipping, were much agitated between the Directors, Government, and other parties, they were questions upon which some of the best friends of the Company differed ; it had been his misfortune to differ in opinion upon these subjects with a man, with whom he had agreed upon every other topic of Indian affairs, a man who,

to a mind naturally powerful, added great clearness of thought and expression, most honourable sentiments, and the sincerest attachment to the East India Company; he meant Thomas Henchman, who, as his friend and supporter, had so often addressed that Court. He had taken up strong opinions on the subject. The Marquis Wellesley, and an Honourable friend in his eye (Mr. George Johnstone), inclined to the same way of thinking. Lord Melville, then Mr. Dundas, offered his sentiments to the Directors, observing that both parties had run into such opposite extremes, as to induce him to hope that he might be able to suggest some proper medium between them. His Lordship wrote this letter which he (Mr. J.) was about to quote in the year 1800; at this time he had devoted about thirty years to the consideration of the affairs of India; he had been, as Mr. J. had before observed, Chairman of an important India Committee, of great and extensive scrutiny and enquiry, and he had then for many years, been the laborious head of the Indian Department; no man it must be admitted could write with a higher claim to confidence in his judgment; add to this, that at the time of writing he was in some degree of difference of opinion from the Directors, he thinks them in error as to their jealousy of Private Trade, but repeats in the most emphatic terms, his continued, firm, and decided conviction, that through the Company, and the Company only, should the Trade of India be conducted to whatever extent it might be capable of being carried. The sentiments of the Noble Lord

were too apposite to the present question, not to be given verbatim, and he would beg permission to read them.

April, 2, 1800.

“ In the first place, I set out with disclaiming being a party to those opinions which rest upon any general attack of the monopoly of the East India Company either as to the Government or Commerce of India. My sentiments, in that respect, remain exactly the same as they were when I moved the renewal of the Charter in 1793 ; and if any thing, I am still more confirmed in the principles, I brought forward at that time. That a direct interference by Government in the affairs of India, is necessary for their stability, and uniformity, I am more and more convinced ; but that the ostensible form of Government, with all its consequent extent and detail of patronage, must remain as it now is, I am persuaded will never be called in question by any but those, who may be disposed to sacrifice the freedom and security of our constitution, to their own personal aggrandizement, and ill-directed ambition.

I remain equally satisfied as to the propriety of continuing a monopoly of trade in the hands of the East India Company. Those who maintain the reverse, appear to me to be misled by general theories, without attending to the peculiar circumstances of the Trade they are treating of. Viewing it even as a mere commercial question, I believe this proposition to be a sound one ; and if the Trade were laid open, the supposed advantages thence arising are at

best very problemetical, and would certainly be very precarious and short-lived. *It is, however, totally to forget the question, to treat it as a mere commercial one ! The same principles which prove the necessity of the present form and mode of Indian Government, evince the necessity of the monopoly of Trade. The Government and the Trade are interwove together !* and we have only to recur to a very recent experience, to learn the immense advantages which have flowed from that connexion of Government, and Trade.

By the commercial capital of the Company at home, acting in connexion with the public revenues under their administration abroad, they have mutually aided and administered to the wants of each other ; and the result has been, the fortunate achievement of those brilliant events, upon the success of which depended the existence of the Government, the territorial wealth, and the trade of India."

Mr. Jackson said, he had now endeavoured to establish from the papers before them, that their Directors had acted with wisdom, as well as with integrity, and that the principles which they had maintained not only accorded with the judgments of those, among the Proprietors and the Public, who had addressed much of their attention to Indian affairs, but stood sanctioned by those of the ablest Statesmen that had lived. He did not pretend to say that the regulated monopoly for which he contended was not susceptible of great im-

provement ; on the contrary, he thought that qualifications of their present system might be introduced, of incalculable benefit to the Company and the Country : but sure he was, that the measures now proposed would place the whole in eminent peril ! He was glad to hear that the business was not likely to be brought into Parliament this Sessions, it would afford time for cool deliberation ; he indulged a hope that Ministers, be whom they might, -would have the fortitude to adhere to the principles of 1784 and 1793 ; he was convinced, that they would have with them the real voice of the Country. Nay, satisfied he was, that they had the dispassionate, and disinterested part of the Public with them already, he meant, that part of the Public which had no interest in begging for petitions, and artfully inciting all descriptions of persons to demand commercial privileges upon grounds which the Petitioners evidently did not understand, and respecting which they were wilfully misled by intriguing Agents. The reasoning part of the Public, which always had, and would ultimately prevail, was sensible how wonderful a machine the East India Company was in the hands of the Country. They gazed with admiration on the perfection to which it had been brought ; they saw its innumerable ramifications of benefit abroad, and blessing at home ; they exulted in the character and the strength which it had given us in the opinion of our Enemies, and how much it had raised us above other Nations ; they did not deny but that it was capable of amendment ; but they trembled at the

experiment, lest disturbing it should make it worse, and check its present salutary operations; but, above all, they reprobated the idea at present afloat of taking it to pieces in order to put it together again in a different way, they justly doubted if there were among the sons of men a political artist to be found equal to so delicate and complicate an undertaking. The Directors, he repeated, had acted most laudably towards to the Company and the Country, in endeavouring to preserve this machine in its present useful form; he thought them entitled to all the countenance which the Proprietors could give them, and he was of opinion that assistance could not be better conveyed than by such a resolution as should convince them and the Public that theirs was not only a firm but enlightened support, a resolution which, embracing the leading points of the discussion, would satisfy their countrymen, that throughout the whole of their conduct, they had in truth united the character of Proprietors of East India Stock, with their paramount duty as Citizens of the British Empire! Being himself obliged to attend a professional duty before the Upper House he should leave such a motion for their wisdom to deal with, as the best offering he could make to them under such circumstances; he hoped they would regard the engagement he had alluded to as an apology for his absence during the discussion of his own motion. That Court and himself had now been long acquainted, he had never addressed them upon a subject of more importance, and he trusted they would give him



credit for the most earnest and disinterested wishes in behalf of the Company. He had, on all occasions used his utmost endeavours to promote its welfare, and not entirely without success, he having, as their records would show, been humbly conjunctive in the saving of many millions sterling to their funds, without, he might truly say (and he hoped he should be pardoned upon such an occasion for saying a word of himself), without seeking for any personal gratification, and without having directly or indirectly upon the hour that he was then speaking, received any, beyond that honest fame to which he had aspired, and that professional adoption on the part of the Public, which he could not help, in some degree attributing to the countenance and confidence with which he had been so uniformly honoured by the General Court.

Mr. Jackson then moved as follows, which motion was seconded by Henry Smith, Esq. and carried unanimously :

“That this Court has learnt with deep concern and surprise that his Majesty’s Ministers have been induced to change the view they first entertained of the propriety of confining to the port of London the returns of the trade to India now to be permitted to all British subjects ; that the measure of opening the Outports to vessels of all descriptions from India, comprehending in that term the Eastern Islands, appears to this Court to be fraught with consequences ruinous to the Company, and all the long train of interests connected with it ; by removing from the port of London the greater part of the Indian trade, which it has hitherto enjoyed ; by rendering useless many of the extensive establishments formed there for the merchandise and shipping of that trade, and throwing out of bread many thousands of persons who now derive constant employment from it ; by de-

ranging the practice and frustrating the end of stated public sales, which are useful and important both to the Country and the Company, who are necessarily restricted to this practice; but, above all, by affording facilities for the smuggling of teas into the ports and harbours of England, Scotland, and Ireland, to an extent unlimited, and, as this Court apprehend, uncontrollable; that the consequences of this must be the destruction of the Company's China trade, their best source of commercial profit; the failure of their dividend, the depreciation of their stock, and unless a fund is provided from some other source for the payment of the dividend, inability on their part to continue to perform the functions assigned to them in the government of British India. That if the constitution by which the Indian empire is now administered should thus be subverted, the excellent system of civil and military service formed under the Company, and maintainable only by such a body, will be broken down, the tranquillity and happiness of the vast population which that Empire contains, the interests of this Country in Asia, and its constitution at home, will be imminently endangered.

“ That the professed object for which the proposed changes are to be made, and such immense sacrifices hazarded, namely, the increase of the Commerce of this Kingdom, cannot be in any great degree attained; there being no practicability of extending materially the use of our manufactures among the Indian people; the tonnage allotted by the Company, or afforded by Indian ships in the management of individuals, for such exports, not having been fully occupied; neither does it appear practicable largely to augment the importation of profitable commodities from thence; of all which the example of the American trade to the East is a proof; British manufactures which they could easily have procured, making no part of it, nor their returns exhibiting any new articles of importance. That therefore the trade now enjoyed by the Company and Individuals will be the only certain trade to which new Adventurers can have recourse; and this will be no addition to the commerce of the Country, but only a transfer from one set of hands to another; so that old Establishments will be subverted, without substituting any thing equally good in their place, and to all appearance with great detriment to the Nation, particularly in the defalcation of a large part

of the duties now collected on Tea to the amount of four millions sterling per annum; for all which defalcation, whether one, two, or three millions, new taxes must be laid on the people.

“That the cause of the Company has been deeply injured by prejudice, ignorance, erroneous assumptions, and of late by extensive Combinations, and by unfair representation, canvas, and intimidation; in all which, the merits and rights of the Company, the political interests of British India, and of this Country as connected with them, have been left out of sight, and the single object of the extension of Commerce, an object only of speculation, in opposition to past experience, is the governing principle.

“This Court, however, confidently hope that Parliament will not decide the fate of the Company, on the representations and demands of private interests, but on just and comprehensive views of national policy; and the Court must also believe that his Majesty’s Ministers are too enlightened, and equitable, finally to adopt any measure calculated to destroy the commercial profits of the Company, and thereby to disable them from performing their political functions. This Court therefore entirely approving, both of the firmness which their Directors have shown in maintaining the interests of the Company, and of the manner in which they have, in the papers now produced by them, defended those interests, doth recommend it to them to persevere in the negotiation with his Majesty’s Ministers upon the same principles; assured of the determination of this Court to support them to the utmost in maintaining the permanence of the Company and the national interest, which are involved in their stability.





# EAST-INDIA QUESTION.

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## FOUR LETTERS

RESPECTING

## *THE CLAIMS*

OF THE

## EAST-INDIA COMPANY

FOR

## A Renewal

OF THEIR

## EXCLUSIVE PRIVILEGES.

of which breaks out and blazes with too great an Evidence to  
be denied.

LONDON :

Printed for J. BLACK, York Street, Covent-Garden.

1813.

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Printed by T. Morrell, Wych Street, Strand.

## PREFACE.

*The following Letters, with the exception of the last, have been submitted to the Public, through the medium of a periodical Journal;—such a mode of communication, however, being too limited to afford that general information, which is so desirable for a due appreciation of the East-India Company's claims, the author has been induced to offer them in their present shape. He is fully sensible of his want of ability to do the subject ample justice; he however regrets this circumstance the less, because the Facts, which these Letters contain, are so strong in themselves, that they cannot fail to carry conviction with them to the mind of every impartial reader.*





# LETTERS.

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## LETTER I.

26th January, 1813.

THE following remarks of a foreign author, M. Rubichon, "*On England*," as to the very important services which the East India Company, under its present form of administration, has rendered to the nation, appear so apposite to the question now pending between that honorable body and His Majesty's Ministers, that I cannot, in justice to my country, refrain from laying them before the public at large.

It will be proper to premise, that the author is treating of the opposite system pursued with regard to the government of

our East and West Indian possessions respectively, shewing the impolicy of the latter, and the evils which have resulted therefrom to the mother country: and, on the other hand, briefly depicting the benefits and advantages which she has derived from the different policy adopted with regard to our East India possessions.

“ Here, in London, we could observe,  
 “ for these twenty years past, that, as soon  
 “ as England was in hostility with Italy,  
 “ and that she could not draw any more  
 “ from her the SILK necessary to her ma-  
 “ nufactures, the Company caused mulber-  
 “ ry trees to be planted in the East Indies,  
 “ and furnished annually SILK to England  
 “ by thousands of bales ;—that, as soon as  
 “ England was in hostility with Spain, and  
 “ that she could not draw any more from her  
 “ the INDIGO necessary to her manufactures,  
 “ the Company caused that plant to be

“ cultivated in the East Indies, and fur-  
 “ nished annually INDIGO to England by  
 “ thousands of chests ;—that, as soon as  
 “ England was in hostility with France,  
 “ and that she could not draw from her  
 “ the CORN necessary to her consumption,  
 “ as in 1801, that she was exposed to a  
 “ famine, the Company imported all her  
 “ ships loaded with the RICE of the East  
 “ Indies ;—that, as soon as England was in  
 “ hostility with Russia, and that she could  
 “ not draw any more from her the HEMP  
 “ necessary to her Navy, the Company  
 “ caused that plant to be cultivated in the  
 “ East Indies, and furnished the requisite  
 “ supply. England, threatened with the  
 “ hostility of the Americans, will not be  
 “ sufficiently supplied with COTTON WOOL ;  
 “ the Company will furnish what is neces-  
 “ sary to her manufactures. Finally  
 “ England, in hostility with herself, des

“ troy's her own dominions, her Colonies ;  
 “ the Company will furnish the SUGAR and  
 “ the COFFEE necessary to Europe. There  
 “ has been for these twenty years past,  
 “ and there will be for the future, neither  
 “ crimes, folly, or misfortunes in Europe,  
 “ of which the Company has not been,  
 “ and will not be, the redresser ; for one  
 “ may suppose that the Company does not  
 “ redress gratuitously ; we may judge of  
 “ it by the Docks which she has excavated ;  
 “ by the number and the greatness of the  
 “ buildings which she has erected ; by the  
 “ considerable quantity of English goods  
 “ which she has exported ; by the punctual-  
 “ ity with which her manufacturers, car-  
 “ riers, packers, ship-owners, have been  
 “ paid ; we may judge of it by the means  
 “ she has to bring into the market the  
 “ commodities which she imports, *only in*  
 “ *a quantity relative to the demand ; by*

“ the means she has to maintain a *fair*  
 “ *price*, and thus to secure, as a support,  
 “ the capital of the speculators, who know  
 “ that they will be supported by her ; final-  
 “ ly, we may judge of it by the exactness  
 “ and the liberality with which the divi-  
 “ dends are paid to her stock-holders.”

This is not an overcharged representa-  
 tion ; on the contrary, many benefits, which  
 the East India Company have rendered to  
 the nation at large, are omitted in M. Ru-  
 bichon’s statement ; but as these are too  
 long to be detailed in the present address, I  
 propose to make them the subject of another  
 letter.

VERAX.

## LETTER II.

4th February, 1813.

HAVING, at the conclusion of my last letter, signified my intention of stating the additional benefits which the East-India Company have rendered to the nation beyond those contained in the remarks of “ M. Rubichon,” I trust, the public will not be less ready than that enlightened foreigner, duly to appreciate the advantages which the nation has derived from the *present form* of administering the Government of India, not any of which advantages could have arisen, and consequently the benefits derived therefrom to this country, must have been lost, had the open trade to India, as now contended for, at that time existed ; and should such an improvident measure be hereafter adopted, no such future advantages can be obtained.

Manifold, however, as those benefits are, which M. Rubichon has stated, still, though it is the *truth*, it is *not* the *whole* truth. M. Rubichon has omitted, what, from his ingenuous frankness, I conclude he was not aware of, viz. the *accession* rendered by the Company, in a time of need, to the Navy of England, who, at one period, transferred to Government no fewer than ten large ships, of from 1200 to 1400 tons each, which were speedily converted into sixty-fours, and, under the command of the gallant Commodore Trollope, added to the numerous trophies of the British Navy; which great event, but for this timely aid, could not have happened. And here let me ask, *could* this aid have been granted had an *open trade* then existed? The reply to this question must be self-evident. And are such great, important, certain, and vital interests of the country at large,



to be sacrificed for the *visionary hopes* of the individual gain of *deluded speculators*? I trust to the good sense of the thinking and *informed* part of the community, and to the enlightened wisdom of Parliament, that such egregious error will be avoided.—I may be here permitted to say a few words upon the term “*Monopoly*,” as nothing can be more falsely and absurdly applied than this term is to the East-India Company—for a monopoly not only implies an exclusive right to *buy*, but to *sell* also, and upon the monopolist's *own terms*. Now those persons at all acquainted with the nature of the Company's commercial dealings, know that the Company *do not* possess the power to *do* either the one or the other; that is, to *buy* or *sell* upon their *own terms*: and that they are obliged, *by law*, to put up to public sale at *stated periods*, the articles imported, not at rates fixed by

themselves, but at rates named by the buyers, who bid against each other. A monopolist, strictly speaking, will *only sell* when he can get the *price* for his commodity which he *himself has fixed*, and of which, from his being the *exclusive possessor*, *unfettered by any legal restrictions*, he will not dispose, till the state of the market, from the supply being *withheld*, insures to him the inordinate profits he anticipates. This is *not* the case with the East-India Company, who do not possess the power, and therefore, even if so disposed, are *restrained by law from becoming monopolists*; besides, being obliged by Act of Parliament, always to keep a supply of Tea in hand of upwards of 6,000,000 of lbs, equal to at least three months consumption. As a proof of their disposition to discourage monopoly I will relate a fact:—At the time when, Captain Dance (now Sir Nathaniel)

was commodore of a China fleet, anxiously expected with a large supply of tea, and which was then much wanted, the apprehension of the capture of that fleet by a French squadron, commanded by Admiral Linois, had the effect of inducing high bidding, and consequent increase of price, at the periodical sales of teas at the India House; but the Directors, with a magnanimity worthy so respectable a body, not wishing to take an undue advantage of the public distress (which in all probability would have ensued from the capture of the fleet above mentioned), or allowing others to do so, and instead of yielding to the tempting lure, which would have poured thousands of pounds, beyond what was calculated, into the Company's treasury, actually *repressed* this spirit of speculation, and with a view of moderating the bidding to its usual level, declared, that they would instantly advertise an additional

sale of 500,000 lbs. of Tea. This had the desired effect of keeping down the price to its usual standard! — What would open traders have done under similar circumstances? The usual practice of *individual monopolists* will best answer the question. Every poor subject of this realm, whose principal beverage is Tea, would have felt, in the additional drain on his slender finances, the consequences of such a state of things.

As a proof this, I beg leave to select one of many instances of **INDIVIDUAL MONOPOLY**.

A few years ago, some persons engaged in an extensive speculation in the article of Allum; they not only bought up the whole of what they could obtain in England, but they possessed such influence, even over the continental markets, as soon to become the sole proprietors of that article. The exor-

bitant price they, in consequence, demanded for it, occasioned the discovery of a *substitute*, by which the value of the *real* article became so reduced; that the monopolists were entirely ruined ! Such would in all probability be the case in many articles of Indian produce, were the trade thrown open. Thus it is, from the boundless desires of *individual speculators*, that the evils of unrestrained monopoly are to be dreaded; whilst, on the contrary, the wholesome restraints under which the Company's trade is placed, are a security for the regular and due supply of the public demand, at a moderate and fair price ! But, to return to the Tea ; here let me ask, what would have been the result, had that necessary article, as above mentioned, been importing in *out-port* ships of 400 tons, instead of the large and efficient ships of the East-India Company ? not one, in all probability, would

ever have reached any of the ports of the United Kingdom. Admiral Lincolns will best answer that ; and he, who is now a crippled prisoner in England, would have been enjoying in his native land, the profit of a capture as valuable as, hitherto, rare to our enemies ; while the Company and the country, instead of having to congratulate each other in the preservation, to the country, of ships and property to the value of more than £1,000,000 sterling, would have had to lament so vast a sacrifice, from the adoption of a most impolitic, unwise, and ruinous system, in the room of one tried by the test of experience—one “ that has been weighed in the balance, and *not* found wanting ”—which has contributed largely and advantageously to the *naval strength of the British Empire* ; a cause, in itself, sufficient to entitle the Company (under whom it has so risen) to

the gratitude of the country. But when coupled with other causes, so numerous and powerful as have been, and still may be urged, it forms together such a mass of *conclusive evidence*, in favour of the Company possessing their exclusive privileges of trade (as much to the advantage of the country generally, as to the benefit of the Company) that I cannot for a moment suppose Government will commit such an act of *suicide* as to destroy that, which has produced such beneficial results to the empire; and of which it must ever after be deprived, if the ruinous measure of an open trade to and from India be adopted.

VERAX.

## LETTER III.

*18th February, 1813.*

A WELL informed and judicious writer on India Affairs has truly said, that “ the consequence of general indifference upon the subject, has been general ignorance.” The existence of this lamentable fact is perhaps to be traced to the want of general information, as to the affairs of the East-India Company ; and upon no part of those affairs does information appear to be more wanted, than upon the subject of the Company’s Debt.

I propose therefore to consider the causes from whence such Debt has arisen, and the reasons why the means intended for its liquidation, have not hitherto attained the end proposed.



The cause of the pressure upon the Company's home treasury arises from the transfer of a great portion of the Indian Debt to Europe, which Debt was incurred for *political*, and not for commercial purposes, and which it was not within the power of the Company to control. The public are perhaps not aware that, by the Act of the Legislature passed in 1793, all orders of the Directors to the Company's Governments in India undergo the revision and approbation of the Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, before they can be transmitted to those Governments. This Board is composed principally of the highest Members of the Administration for the time being, and is appointed by the Crown; the Company cannot therefore be answerable for the consequences resulting from the orders of this controlling Board; so that, in equity, the Debt which has been

contracted in India, is not chargeable to the Company.

In order to meet the demands upon the Company's treasury here, arising from the transfer of the Indian debt to this country, supplies of bullion were provided by the Company's government abroad for transmission to England, they have been however prevented in many instances from carrying these intentions into effect, on account of the sums which had been so provided having been applied to His Majesty's service in that quarter.

I have an instance of this now before me, in a letter which I received from a friend of mine in Bengal, by His Majesty's ship *Modeste*, lately arrived in England, who asserts it as a matter of public notoriety in India, that last season, when a very considerable supply of bullion was actually packed up for transmission to England, it

was suddenly ordered to the Mauritius to supply the urgent want of the King's Government at that island. Hence the disappointment the Company then experienced, and which compelled them last year to apply to Parliament for a larger sum than otherwise they would have required. It is fit, also, that the public should know, that the pecuniary assistance occasionally granted by Parliament to the Company, and generally considered as loans, are, in fact, advances only on account of monies absolutely due by the public to the Company; and I have good reason to believe, that if a balance of account were now struck between the Public and the Company, it would be found very highly in favour of the latter.\* Thus the Company stand, in

\* This belief is fully confirmed by the Company's Petition to Parliament, made public since the above  
letter

reality, in a very different point of view to that in which their opponents (most of them ignorantly, I imagine) would wish to place them ; and that, instead of reproach, at having incurred so large a debt, they are, on account of the supplies so seasonably afforded to the Public, and at so great a sacrifice of their own interest, entitled to its gratitude and support.

**VERAX.**

letter was first written ; by which it appears, that the Public are indebted to the Company a balance on account of upwards of £2,200,000 !

## LETTER IV.

22d February, 1813.

THE ostensible ground for refusing the claim of the Company to a continuation of the exclusive privileges, which they have so long possessed, is, that the *country at large* should participate in the Indian trade; how far the real fact agrees with this assertion, it is highly important to enquire.

It appears, that instead of this great sacrifice of the Company being made to the nation at large, a very few of the outports, only, are to enjoy this privilege; and for these, and these only, are such great important *national* interests to be hazarded! How far His Majesty's Ministers will be able to reconcile the unsuccessful petitioners to this downfall of their hopes, and disappointment of their expectations, I know

not ;—it is indeed “ robbing Peter,” not, however, “ to pay Paul,” but to *cheat* him ! For if the Company’s just claims are thus to be denied, whilst only three or four out-ports are to have, what are termed, the advantages of an open trade ; how the public *at large* are to be benefited I am at a loss to conjecture. But leaving this extraordinary paradox, whose solution is (to me) past finding out, and supposing, for an instant, that the intended measure is actually to be carried into effect, I beg to ask, will the Ministers make it a *sine qua non*, that the exports of the favoured outport adventures shall, in a certain proportion, consist of *British Woollen Manufactures and of Tin* ? which articles the Company now export, annually, to a great amount, and at a loss ! and which is consequently a drawback, to the extent of such loss, upon the profitable articles of the Company’s export ;—but the

Company are content thus to lessen the aggregate of their profits, in order that these important branches of our manufacture and produce may be benefitted ! But will these *patriotic* merchants, of *themselves*, submit to carry on such a losing trade ? • That is not likely. Unless, then, conditions be imposed, to compel them so to do, what will become of the interests of these two great branches of our staple manufactures ? for upon no pretence of justice could the Company be compelled to export these articles, if the outport adventurers were exempt from such obligation. The cloathing counties, which now derive a great part of their support from the Company's exports, would become sufferers to a most serious extent, were the vend for their manufactures thus to be stopped !

With regard to the article of Tin, the benefit which the county of Cornwall has

derived from the Company's export of that article, may be gathered from the printed Papers, No. 2, published at the East-India House. A short extract from the letter of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman to Lord Melville, under date the 21st March 1812, page 91, may here suffice, although the whole letter is most worthy the attentive perusal of every person desirous of information on this important subject.

The extract is as follows.

“ That in consequence of the arrange-  
 “ ment with the Company in 1789, where-  
 “ by the surplus quantity of Cornish Tin  
 “ has been taken out of the London market,  
 “ the price of that Tin has risen to £100,  
 “ £120, £150 and even £171 per ton,  
 “ whereby the miners have been enabled to  
 “ work their deepest mines, and to meet the  
 “ pressure of the times, in as much, that



“ the agency of the Company, in this particular, has been termed the political salvation of the county.”

It may be well to apprise the public—that in the immediate neighbourhood of the Company’s own possessions in India, Tin can be obtained in abundance, and at rates far below that which the Cornish miners can afford to supply it—but with all these advantages, so closely within their reach, have the Company foregone their own *profit*, in order to benefit the inhabitants of their native soil ; and it is worthy of the most serious consideration, whether they shall be enabled to continue their powerful support to the numerous bodies employed in this branch of their exports, or whether they shall be compelled to revert to other sources, from which all the great benefit, now confined to this nation, will be most decidedly lost to it !

It is for His Majesty's Ministers to weigh well the force of these facts.

The conduct of their illustrious predecessor Mr. Pitt (in whose steps they profess to tread), was in general regulated by the "evidence of facts." I trust that, on the present important occasion, they will adhere to *his* wise and politic system; in so doing, they will adopt the principles of that great statesman, which were decidedly in favor of the Indian trade remaining exclusively with the Company, as will appear evident from his speech delivered in the House of Commons on the 11th March 1793; and I cannot more appropriately conclude this address than in Mr. Pitt's own words, quoted from that speech; *viz.* "I have no hesitation in saying, that  
 "when all the circumstances are fully  
 "before the House, I am confident that  
 "a renewal of the Company's Charter

“ will appear to be much for the interest  
“ of the Country !”

VERAX.

THE END.





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**SUBSTANCE**  
**OF THE**  
**SPEECH**  
**OF**  
**JOHN BRUCE, ESQ. M.P.**  
**MAY 31, 1813.**

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SUBSTANCE  
OF THE  
*SPEECH*  
OF  
JOHN BRUCE, ESQ., M.P.  
IN THE  
COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,  
ON THE  
Resolutions  
RESPECTING  
INDIA AFFAIRS,  
MAY 31, 1813.

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LONDON:  
Printed for BLACK, PARRY, and Co. Leadenhall Street, Book-  
sellers to the Honourable East-India Company.

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1813.



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ON the 31st May 1813, on the Motion, in the Committee of the Whole House, that the First Resolution, respecting East-India Affairs, should be taken into consideration, Mr. Bruce introduced his observations on the subject, by stating, that his object was to submit to the consideration of the Committee, in the shortest practicable manner, the series of events, which had marked the progress and actual state of the East-India Company's affairs; leaving it to the unbiassed judgement of Members to draw, from facts only, such inferences as might enable them to form their opinions on this great national question.

If the arrangement of Indian affairs, at this crisis, led only to the abstract question, whether an open trade, or a regulated trade, would

be most for the advantage of the kingdom, little more could occur, than arguments leading to conclusions, upon which a speculative system of Indian affairs might be devised ; but if the question shall be allowed to assume its true character, whether British India, and the trade to the countries within the Company's limits, could be best preserved for the public advantage, by adhering to the system which now exists, with such modifications as could, in any way, consistently with the preservation of that system, meet the expectations of the numerous claimants for the open trade?—or, whether the existing system of Indian affairs shall be, at once, abandoned ? it would require, indeed, very serious reasons to support such a measure, and will impose an awful responsibility on those, who may devise or bring about such a political and commercial innovation. The following subjects, Mr. Bruce observed, would necessarily require attention, before any decision, founded on fact, or on experience, could be effected :—

1. *The successive Rights of the Company, in the*

the exercise of which they have acquired and administered the Indian Empire, and the commerce which has been inseparably connected with it.

2. *The Experience of more than two hundred years, during which the commerce of Great-Britain, with the East-Indies, has been preserved to the realm, by means of Exclusive Privileges, notwithstanding a succession of attempts at partial, though not equally great changes with those which are projected.*

3. *An enumeration of the Losses and Dangers in India, and to the China Trade, which, he apprehended, a deviation from the existing system of Indian affairs might produce.*

4. *A short examination of the Sources of the Applications for an Open Trade ; of the proposed Resolutions ; and of the Evidence subsequently laid before the House by the Company.*

Before entering upon any of these subjects, Mr. Bruce observed, that it was not his intention to enter into any discussion respecting monopolies, or whether the East-India system could be classed, by any man of sound sense, under that unpopular denomination; because, however acceptable this species of reasoning might be, to those who are accustomed to argue from hypothesis only, all that could be said on the subject, would, to men of experience and knowledge of Indian affairs, appear useless, and to those who were resolved to be the dupes of their own speculations, irrelevant.

He, therefore, proposed to limit the whole of the observations which he had to offer, to the subjects which he had enumerated.

In adverting to the *Rights* of the East-India Company, in the exercise of which they had acquired and administered the Indian Empire, and preserved a direct trade between England and the East-Indies, he shortly detailed the following series of facts.

The Company were constituted by Queen  
Elizabeth

Elizabeth, a Body Politic and Corporate, with succession, with power to acquire and dispose of property in England, and to acquire by purchase, or by treaties with the Native Princes, such stations, within their limits, as might become factories or seats of trade. In explanation, he remarked, that this Charter, like a law, was perhaps better understood by referring to the events and circumstances under which it was granted, than by the mere letter of the charter itself.

The connection between England and the Seventeen Provinces of the Netherlands had existed for ages, and had been of commercial importance to both countries. When Charles V. reduced the whole of the Seventeen Provinces to his obedience, he allowed the Seven Northern Provinces to retain many of their civil rights; and as, at this period, the reformed religion, of which the Queen was the avowed protector, had made considerable progress in those Provinces, she secretly encouraged the Protestants in the Netherlands, at the time that Philip

II. was endeavouring to establish absolute power, and the Inquisition, in his Flemish dominions. These circumstances produced the Union of Utrecht, in 1579, and laid the foundation of the government of the States General of the United Provinces, which, under the direction of the first Prince of Orange, asserted and maintained the independence of the Dutch.

The territory which the Dutch possessed was narrow, and, with the exception of its natural maritime strength, afforded resources that were unequal to raise and to maintain a force sufficient to oppose the armies and fleets of Spain. The States, therefore, armed and equipped ships, which they sent to the East-Indies, partly with a view of making prizes from the Spanish-Portuguese fleets (Spain and Portugal being then united under the same sovereign) and partly with a view of finding resources from trade, by which they might defend the independence of their country in Europe.

The success of the Dutch, in this enterprize, was necessarily known to the English merchants,

chants, who formed, in London, *an Association of Merchant Adventurers for trade to the East-Indies*, and applied to the Queen for a Charter of Incorporation, that, by their equipments and trade, they might open a direct intercourse between England and the East-Indies.

With that cautious policy, which distinguished this wise sovereign, the Queen, (though induced to listen to the application of the Merchant Adventurers, from their desire to enlarge that maritime power by which she had preserved the independence of her crown against the Armada of Spain, in 1588,) required a report from them on the countries to which they proposed to trade, that she might not involve herself in contests with the maritime powers with which England was in alliance; and, after subjecting this report to the examination of the celebrated Fulke Greville, she granted the Charter to the London East-India Company, the terms of which have been mentioned; leaving



leaving thus to her country an example, that the grant of the Charter was founded on a previous and full examination of the facts and circumstances, which induced her to accede to the wishes of the Association which had solicited her protection.

The Queen, also, anxious for the encouragement of the commerce and navigation of her subjects, and, at the same time, willing to confer her protection on that portion of them who had advanced their property, and were about to adventure their lives, in the undertaking, granted them *Exclusive Privileges* of trade for fifteen years, that she might have opportunities to ascertain, by experience, whether the plan would tend to the benefit or advantage of the realm. Hence the rise of the distinction between the *Chartered Rights* of the Company, and their *Exclusive Privileges of trade*; the one making the Company a Corporation, with succession, the other conferring a temporary privilege, which the Crown

was

was to continue or not, after a limited term, according as the measure might be found advantageous, or not, to the kingdom.

The result of this wise policy was not known when Queen Elizabeth died : and her successor, James I., had scarcely assumed the reins of government, when his narrow resources induced him to grant licences to Michelbourn and others, to try experiments in the East-India trade, in direct opposition to the existing privileges of the London Company, which he professed to support ; but the experience of a few years convinced the King, that the innovation was dangerous, as (putting the losses and sufferings of the London Company out of view, either of the few factories which had as yet been formed, or of their ships and property) it threatened the very existence of the direct trade between England and the East-Indies ; and therefore, in 1609, the King renewed the Charter of Queen Elizabeth, with more ample powers for acquiring new factories and possessions, and granted them

them the exclusive privileges of trade to the East-Indies “*for ever* ;” with the same reservation, however, as in their first Charter, “ that “ should this trade not be found profitable to “ the kingdom, it was to cease and determine “ after three years’ notice.”

The effect of this Charter was to produce additional subscriptions from the Adventurers, and larger equipments, which excited the jealousies of the Dutch, who, by this time, were subverting the Spanish-Portugueze power, and establishing their monopoly of the finer spices in the Banda and Molucca islands, and at Ceylon ; which led to those massacres, at Amboyna, &c. which had nearly overset all the rights that the London Company had either purchased or acquired ;—and it is memorable, that this Charter of 1609 was granted in the same year that the Truce of Antwerp was obtained by the Dutch, which indirectly recognized their independence ; and that the massacre at Amboyna took place nearly at the expiration of this truce, when the independence of the  
States

States General was recognized and established.

It is painful to look at the difficulties which the London Company had to meet, during the reign of the unfortunate Charles I. ; though it is only a simple reference to facts to mention, that, during this period, the Dutch power became predominant in the East-Indies, and that the King, from his want of resources, granted licences to his own subjects (Courten and others) to make encroachments on the Company's trade, and to form rival factories, at stations where it was supposed the Company had not established seats of trade. This Association, from not being under any regular direction at home, had nearly overset the connection between England and the few seats of trade which the London Company had acquired ; and, indeed endangered their factories, from the then powerful empire of the Moguls, which embraced almost the whole of the coasts of the Peninsula of India ; while the consequences were, that

these Adventurers themselves experienced the calamities, which they had previously brought on the Company's trade and servants; and hence, from temptations to return with some proportion of gain, they mingled their trade with piracy.

Amid the domestic calamities which overset the monarchy, the Usurper was fully aware of the importance of extending the navigation and commerce of the realm; but, having been raised to power, by the prevailing disposition to innovation, he, at length, listened to the speculations for an open trade to the East-Indies; yet, after an experiment of three years, he and his Council of State, after a full examination of the London Company's Governor and Committees, and of the Merchant Adventurers, decided, that the direct trade to the East-Indies could only be preserved to the realm by restoring their rights and exclusive privileges to the London East-India Company.

After the Restoration, while advantage was  
taken

taken of the experience acquired by the extension of the navigation and commerce of the kingdom, during the Interregnum, the rights of the East-India Company were fully restored to them, and the attempt of forming a government and trade at Bombay (to take possession of which, as a settlement of the Crown, ceded by Portugal, as part of the dowry of the Queen, the Earl of Marlborough, and Sir Abrahram Shipman were sent out with a naval and military armament) terminated in the King transferring the Island, such as it then was, to the London Company to be held, not as a sovereignty, but as a freehold property, for a quit-rent payable to the Crown.

The King also subsequently granted to the Company, by Charter, in 1674, the island of St. Helena, in a similar manner: so that now the Company not only had two possessions equivalent to freeholds (Bombay and St. Helena) granted to them by the Crown, but by five successive Charters of Charles II., a confirmation of

of their rights to those settlements which they had purchased and acquired in the Peninsula of India ; and a right to embody and govern by martial law, the guards of their factories ;—and, by a Charter of King James II., in 1686, they were allowed to coin any species of money usually current in India,

The change of government, in 1688, produced two new events ; one on the revenue of the kingdom, and the other on the trade to the East-Indies. The revenues, which hitherto had been narrow, and not equal to maintain either the alliances, or the armies and fleets required to resist the general monarchy projected by Louis XIV., called for loans, to meet the permanent interest of which, taxes were imposed ; and thus was created what has, since that period, been termed the National Debt. The other change was, that as those loans could only be drawn from an enlargement of trade and navigation (for the plan of forming a Bank by the landed interest failed), demands were made on  
the

the mercantile interest, in general, and on the East-India Company, in particular, for a proportion of those loans.

The Company offered seven hundred thousand pounds, at three per cent. ; but this sum not being equal to the wants of the State, a new Association of Merchants offered two millions, at eight per cent., which was accepted. The *General Society* was accordingly formed, which was to proceed on the plan of each stock-holder being entitled to trade, separately, according to the amount of his subscription. This project was only a cover to the scheme of subverting the London Company ; and what is memorable is, that it was conducted by their old servants, many of whom had returned to Europe, under feelings of disappointed ambition. In two days, however, after its establishment, the *General Society* applied for, and obtained a Charter, constituting them a new East-India Company, distinguished from the London Company, by having their Charter founded on an Act of Parliament, while the London Company had, hitherto, rested on grants, from



from the Crown only. Experience, however, and a knowledge of the natives, favored the Old, and obstructed the New Company; while a conviction, in the Sovereign, and the result of experiments abroad, led the King to recommend an union of those rival companies, the basis of which was settled, during his reign, and effected by the award of Lord Godolphin, early in the reign of Queen Anne, which formed the existing "*United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies.*"

From the Union of the two Companies in 1707-8, to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, in 1748, the chartered rights of the United Company were successively recognized and extended, by a series of Acts of Parliament during the reigns of Queen Anne, George I., and George II; for by the Act, 10th Queen Anne (1713), it was enacted, that the exclusive privileges of trade to the East-Indies should be continued to the Company, till three years after the 25th March 1733; and by an Act, 3d George II. (1730), it was declared, that the Company should continue a Body  
Corporate,

Corporate with perpetual succession, with a right to trade to the East-Indies, in their corporate capacity, notwithstanding the redemption of their capital stock, and the determination of their exclusive privileges ; which exclusive privileges were, by this Act, farther renewed to the Company for thirty-three years, or till three years after the 25th March 1766.

This Act was farther confirmed by the 17th George II. (1741), when the Company's exclusive privileges were extended, for fourteen years longer, or to three years after 1780 ; they thus had their exclusive privileges uninterruptedly continued to them for fifty years, or from the 25th March 1733, to the 25th March 1783.

Several important events occurred, in the long period from the Union of the two Companies, to the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, which gave a new character to the situation of the United Company's possessions and trade, both in England, and in the East-Indies.

The French power and trade, in India, were rapidly increasing on the Coromandel Coast, while the events in the Peninsula of India, from

the fall of the Mogul and Marhatta empires, and from the death of the Nizam-ul-Muluk, led to the rise of lesser independent states, founded by military adventurers, who were considered, in England, as Native Princes. These events not only changed the relative situation of the Company with their foreign stations and trade, but began to hold out temptations to the rival European Companies, particularly the French Company, to acquire territory in India, and to expel the English from their factories and trade. Hence the Maritime Powers in Europe were forming stipulations, in treaties, suited to preserve the interests of their respective Companies, at a time when the political anarchy in Hindostan was not understood in Europe:—the rights of the Company, therefore, were considered to be important subjects of public interest, and their exclusive privileges of trade, the necessary means of enabling them to hold out against the encroachments of their European rivals.

The rights which the Company had acquired, by their former charters, to their factories or possessions,

possessions, were continued to them, from 1748 to 1763, and were extended and explained by successive grants, during this period, viz. to erect courts of judicature, to make distributions of prize-money, &c. The Company's factories, during this eventful period, which, hitherto, had been protected by small guards, were turned into military stations, and distinct armies formed, whose conquests on the Coromandel Coast, under General Lawrence and Colonel Ford, and, in Bengal, under the great Lord Clive, acquired what has, since that period, been termed "*British India*." Though the Company were assisted in making these conquests, by a small proportion of the King's forces (Adlercron's and Draper's regiments), yet those regiments were disbanded in India, at the Peace, and many of the officers and men embodied with the Company's troops.

The situation of the East-India Company's affairs, from 1763 to 1784, from the magnitude of their territorial acquisitions, soon after the Peace of 1763, became subjects of parliamentary inquiry and report. Exclusive privileges of  
D 2 trade

trade had been previously granted to them, by the Act 1741, up to March 25th 1783; but as an opinion prevailed, on the one hand, that the Public were entitled to a proportion of the revenues of the conquered provinces, and the Company, on the other hand, considered them as acquisitions which their armies, aided by the King's fleets, had obtained, it was agreed by the Act, 7th George III. (1767), that the Company should pay £100,000 per annum, for two years, to the Public, that they might be enabled to consolidate the government of the territories which their armies had acquired. In 1769, a similar agreement was made by the Act, 9th George III., by which the territorial acquisitions were to remain with the Company, for a farther term of five years, on paying to the Public the sum of £100,000 per annum.

In 1773, however, the Company, being under considerable pecuniary difficulties, were obliged to apply to Parliament for a loan of £1,400,000; and it was agreed, by the Act, 13th George III., that the Public should  
forego

forego their claim to any participation in the territorial revenues, till such time as this loan should be repaid, and the Bond Debt of the Company reduced to a specified sum.

The Company, in 1779, having fully repaid this loan, and reduced their Bond Debt to the specified sum, it was agreed, by the Act, 19th George III., that the territorial acquisitions should be continued to them for one year longer, or till the 5th April 1780, without paying any compensation to the Public; and in this Act, the clause, "*saving the rights of the Crown, and of the Company,*" was first introduced. Previously to the expiration of this last Act, it was deemed expedient to continue the territorial acquisitions in the possession of the Company, for one year longer, or to the 5th April 1781, which was accordingly enacted by the Act, 20th George III. (1780); but no compensation was paid by the Company to the Public for the same.

The Company's exclusive privileges of trade, granted under the Act 1744, being, at this time, nearly expired, they petitioned Parliament

liament for a renewal thereof; and having agreed to pay to the Public the sum of £400,000, in discharge of all claims in respect of the territorial acquisitions, up to the 1st March 1781, it was enacted by the Act, 21st George III. (1781), that the exclusive privileges of trade should be renewed to the Company, till March 1st 1794, and that the territorial acquisitions should remain with them during the same period, without making any additional payments to the Public for them. In this act, the clause is again introduced, “ *that nothing therein contained should extend to prejudice or affect the rights or claims of the Public, or of the Company, respecting the said territorial acquisitions or revenues.*”

An important change, however, was introduced in 1784, and which has been continued to the present time, in the administration of the Company's domestic and foreign affairs; or allowing the administration, as well as the trade, to continue with the Courts of Directors and Proprietors, but constituting a Board

Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, with powers to superintend their *political*, *financial*, and *military* operations, and leaving the management of their commerce to the Directors, as the representatives of that body, whose property, or stock, under its various amounts, had created, preserved, and brought the East-India trade to its existing magnitude and importance.

The interests of the East-India Company, domestic and foreign, from 1784 to the present time, as far as regarded the mixed administration of their affairs, at home, by the Court of Directors, and by the Board of Commissioners, remained nearly in the same situation, till the passing of the Act, 1793, which, like the preceding Act, waved the question of the respective rights or claims of the Public, and of the Company, to the territorial acquisitions, and revenues, yet left them in possession of the Company. It is memorable, on this occasion, that the exclusive privileges of the Company, and the claims of those who wished to participate in the trade, were fully examined, before the resolutions were



were formed, on which the Act was to proceed : —The claims from the Proprietors of Mines in Cornwall, from Exeter, from Manchester, &c. were sent by the President of the Board, to the Chairman, and explanations received from the Committee of Correspondence : —The resolutions were then sent to the Directors, and communicated to the Court of Proprietors, and then finally returned to Ministers, and, by them, brought forward, as the basis of the Act of Parliament.

Several events had occurred in India, which required that a considerable proportion of His Majesty's military forces should be stationed, permanently, in the East-Indies. — The restoration of the French settlements, at the Peace of 1763, had again given an opportunity to that restless government, to attempt, during the war which followed in Europe, to excite commotions among the native chiefs, that menaced the safety of the provinces which the Company had acquired, at the Peace of 1763; and though it is unnecessary to describe events,

events, which live in every man's recollection, it is impossible not to refer to the able policy of the venerable Mr. Hastings, and of Lord Cornwallis, and to the energy and wisdom of the Marquis Wellesley, which tended to confirm the English provinces in their allegiance, to expel the French, and to establish the paramount power of Britain in the Peninsula of India.

In the course of the wars, during this period, which were supported chiefly by the resources of the Company, conquests were made jointly by their armies, and by the King's troops. A political change, however, took place in the countries within the Company's limits; for the Cape of Good Hope, Ceylon, the French Islands, and recently the Dutch Islands, have been placed under the Crown, while the trade to them has been, in a great measure, conducted by the Company.

From the whole of these events and facts, regarding the Charters granted to the London and to the English Company, and the Charter to the United Company, extended and explained by a

series of Acts of Parliament, it follows, that the  
 “ *Permanent Rights* of the Company are, *to be a*  
 “ *Body Corporate, with successsion ; to purchase*  
 “ *and alienate lands in Britain ; to form settle-*  
 “ *ments, build forts, appoint governors, coin money*  
 “ *in India, erect Courts of Judicature, and raise*  
 “ *and maintain forces in India ; and to trade to*  
 “ *the East Indies on a joint stock, though their*  
 “ *exclusive privileges of trade should cease and*  
 “ *determine ;*” and their exclusive privileges of  
 trade were, by the Act 1793, so far accommodated to the demands of the private merchants,  
 as to afford them a proportion of tonnage for  
 their imports and exports, in the Company’s  
 fleets, without incurring the risks of illicit trade  
 to foreign countries, or of smuggling, by making  
 the exports and imports subject to the regulations  
 at the India House, and to the governments of  
 the Company abroad.

The question, therefore, that is now to be  
 decided is,—whether the *Permanent Rights* of  
 the Company can be taken from them ; and if  
 this can be done, whether they have not a legal  
 and equitable right to reimbursement, for the  
 immense

immense sums which the acquisition of them has cost, for more than two centuries ?

Mr. Bruce next requested the attention of the Committee *to the Experience of more than two hundred years*, during which the commerce of Great Britain with the East-Indies, has been preserved to the realm, under exclusive privileges of trade, notwithstanding a succession of attempts at partial changes.

On this subject he observed, that it would be proper to advert to the circumstances, that the exclusive privileges were originally conferred on the Company, to enable the adventurers to obtain a fair return for the capital which they had embarked, for establishing a direct trade between England and the East-Indies; next to enable the Company to enter into a competition with foreign Companies, and to draw the balance of the East-India trade in favor of Britain; and, lastly, to enable them, through their trade, to realize, for the Public, the commercial advantages and revenues which were connected with the territorial possessions.

The first infringement made on the Company's exclusive privileges, was the licences granted to Michelbourn and others, by King James I., and to the Associations of Courten, &c., during the reign of Charles I., which terminated in successive losses to the Company's trade and factories, in the exposure of many of their servants to imprisonment and death, in the ruin of the licensed individuals and associations, and in the introduction of piracy in the Indian seas.

A second infringement on the Company's exclusive privileges took place during the Usurpation, by the Merchant Adventurers, who were allowed to fit out large equipments. By the interferences of those merchants, they not only overstocked the Eastern markets with European commodities, and lowered the prices of them, but raised the prices of Indian produce, and brought goods of inferior quality into the European markets; and this notwithstanding the strong hand with which the Protector over-ruled the Dutch, obliged him, and his Council of State, to recognise the principle of preserving the

the trade of the East to the kingdom, by restoring to the East-India Company, their exclusive privileges.

An indirect attempt on the Company's exclusive privileges took place in 1679-80, by private English merchants fitting out ships at Cádiz, for trade to the East-Indies. The crews of these *interloping vessels*, (as they were then denominated,) frequently became pirates, which exposed the Company's factories to heavy losses, and their servants to great danger, from their persons and property being seized to make good the losses of the natives : hence this project, also, was laid aside.

Another infringement on the Company's exclusive privileges, took place during the reign of King William, who, from being partial to the Dutch establishment of several Companies, formed the English East-India Company, in the manner which has been described, with the object of creating a competition in trade, between the two Companies; but the experience of a very few years satisfied this wise sovereign, that by  
such,

such competition, the East-India trade and factories might be lost, and induced him to recommend an Union, which (as has been observed) was effected in the reign of Queen Anne.

The next infringement, in point of time, on the Company's exclusive privileges, was *indirect*, arising from foreigners, combined with the speculations of English and Dutch smugglers.

After the Port of Ostend was declared a Free Port, in 1714, Dutch and English ships were cleared out, on Dutch and English capitals, and opened a trade, under the Imperial Flag, with the East-Indies, to the detriment of the British trade and revenue; the evils from which, formed the subject of remonstrances to the Court of Vienna, and of successive Acts of Parliament to prevent smuggling of Indian produce into England.

Another infringement on the Company's trade, arose from the circumstance of the Danes having factories in the Peninsula of India; and so far their trade was not an infringement of the exclusive privileges of the Company; but this suggested the project of fitting out ships  
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at Copenhagen, on British capital, and obtaining returns, not from the sales of the cargoes only, but by *Respondentia Bonds*, for money advanced by British subjects in India, bearing a high interest, and payable nine months after the arrival of the ships at Copenhagen ; a project which diminished the British re-exports to the North, and produced a considerable smuggling of Indian goods into Britain.

The last infringement on the Company's exclusive privileges has arisen from the French Revolution, which has involved this country in war for more than twenty years, during which period, the Americans have interfered in the India and China trade, as *Neutrals*, without being exposed to the charges of maintaining settlements, and have been allowed the advantages of this trade, in the vain hope that it might prevent their co-operation with France, in its revolutionary wars; and it is certainly a hard circumstance, that the policy of the State should allow such an indulgence to our now enemy, and harder still, that their success, as *Neutrals*, under  
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this indulgence, should be founded on by the petitioners against the Company, as a reason for divesting them of their privileges; though, in the exercise of those privileges, the Company have acquired the Indian Empire, and preserved to the kingdom almost the exclusive trade to the East-Indies.

Mr. Bruce stated, that his third object was, *an enumeration of what appeared to him to be the losses and dangers in India, and to the China trade, which a deviation from the existing system of Indian affairs might produce.*

The losses in India, he explained, might be considered, both as *commercial and political.*

The first commercial loss might be, that the *regular annual demand of the Company would be diminished, and the provision of investments would no longer be an encouragement to the cultivators and manufacturers of Indian produce.* This danger was best illustrated by a reference to former revolutions in India. After the fall of the court of Delhi, there remained no seat of luxury and magnificence for the consumption of the finer productions

productions of the East ; and it was the event of the establishment of the Company's power, that revived this demand for the produce and manufactures of India :—The encouragement given by the Company's governments and servants to the natives, has placed them in a state of safety and prosperity, unknown under the arbitrary governments to which they had been subjected ; and, at the same time, prevented the irregular and dangerous interference of European adventurers with their superstitions and usages, who, without such controul as has been kept over them by the Company's servants, might have produced an anarchy leading to the loss of an empire, founded, as Mr. Hastings termed it, “ *on the breath of opinion.*”

A second commercial loss might be, the *depriving the natives of that pecuniary assistance which they, at present, receive, by advances of money from the Company's governments.*

It is this advance of money to the native cultivator, manufacturer, and merchant, that enables them to provide articles to be ready at the

season of export, and thus affords a regular supply for the British and European markets;— This no private merchant could attempt, because, whether his capital be equal to such an undertaking or not, is not the question; for the natives, from habit, have a confidence in the Company's servants, which they cannot be supposed to place in strangers, as the private merchants would be, notwithstanding any regulation which the wisdom of government might devise.

A third commercial loss might be, *the interruption of the circuitous commerce of the Company in the countries within their limits*, which consists of a *Country Trade*, under regulations by government, which are fully understood. This arrangement enables the Company, though with frequent losses, or inconsiderable profit on particular articles, not only to supply the several parts of the Peninsula, but also to furnish to China, proportions of bullion and Indian articles, which have progressively lessened the demand for bullion from Europe, which that country, for many  
‘ ‘ years,

years, would alone take, and which foreigners, particularly the Americans, are obliged to pay.

The last commercial loss might be, *the interruption, if not the total ruin of the China Trade.* The idea of opening the trade to India, but not to China, must have arisen with those only, who did not advert either to the existing relations between the Indian and the China markets, or to the peculiar and impracticable character of the Chinese government.—If the trade should be opened to India, and the exclusive trade to China be proposed to be continued with the Company, the scheme would be found unwise, if not impracticable ; both because the strictest regulations have been established by the Directors, and the Company's foreign governments, to prevent irregularities in the country ships which proceed from India to China ; and though these regulations have, in general, been effectual, yet the Company's supracargoes at Canton have been exposed to serious disputes with that singular government,

in consequence of occasional irregularities. It will be recollected, that the Chinese have established a company, of what are termed *Hong, or Security Merchants*, who are responsible to the government, and that the least irregularity requires the persons committing it to be seized and punished; or if he cannot be found, the punishment is inflicted on some other British subject. It is, therefore, the high character of the Company's servants, for regularity in their conduct and dealings, while they remain at Canton, that has alone preserved the trade, and no regulations that could be established in Britain, would be attended to by the Chinese government: hence this most valuable branch of the Company's trade would be endangered, if not lost. If the free traders should be allowed to pass the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, and to enter the Chinese seas, they not only would have opportunities of smuggling opium into China (which is prohibited by the Chinese government), but could obtain China produce, though of inferior quality, from the  
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junks, and find places of deposit for them, both in the Spice Islands (the Moluccas and Bandas) and at the other Malay Islands, (Borneo, Celebes, &c.) where, as in former times, there might be a probability of piracy, which would break the connection established between the Company and the port of Canton, and bring disgrace on the British character.

If these *commercial losses* are probable, the *political losses* are equally to be apprehended.

In the first place, it would be impossible to preserve the *Allegiance of the Natives*, in the British Indian provinces, to any form of government, but that which they have been accustomed to consider as engrafted on the Mogul, or native establishments; and though the Company can act as feudatories of the native governments, it would be a difficult circumstance, indeed, to find any new body, subordinate to the Crown, in England, in which this feudatory character could be vested, on the extinction of the East-India Company;—and, therefore, though in theory, regulations might be framed for this purpose,

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the attempt to carry them into practice, by force, would produce that anarchy, which might terminate in the loss of the British possessions.

The introduction, in the next place, under any regulations, of adventurers not under controul, would necessarily produce *Colonization*. If the plan be to allow an entrance to the European traders to the principal seats of government only, the impossibility of preventing the entrance of individuals into the interior is obvious, and the consequences have been fully established, by the evidence before the House and the Committee.

The greatest, and perhaps the most obvious political loss, in the third place, would be, that of dismembering the *civil and commercial relations* by which the British possessions are, at present, maintained, and of alienating the *attachments and allegiance of the native military force*, by which their territories have been acquired and are still preserved. The fullest evidence has been obtained of the character of the natives,

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the simplicity of their habits, and their attachment to their usages ; and it has been an uniform instruction to the civil and military servants of the Company, on no occasion to offend against them. Whether the prejudices and the usages of the natives, or indeed of any other people, accord with European, or rather British, notions of propriety, is not the question ; for among every people, and in every age, prejudices and usages have been found an over-match for reason, and frequently for morality.

The last political loss would be, what is obvious at home ;—the loss of an *auxiliary marine*, which, in the hour of danger, has, on so many occasions, been an important addition to our navy, and contributed to our national safety ;—the loss of establishments, formed at the expence of many millions, for creating and preserving this marine ;—and the loss of a revenue (amounting, at this time, to about £4,500,000) from the Company's trade, collected with facility, and with moderate charges:

and



and it is yet to be ascertained, what compensation more than *one hundred thousand people* must receive, who are either directly employed under the Company, or indirectly supported by the exports they send to India and to China, and by the sale of the imports they bring from both countries ; without saying any thing farther, than by a reference to the capital stock of the East-India Company, amounting to the sum of twelve millions sterling, and subscribed for, in the year 1793, on a reliance on the continuance of the Company's government and trade.

Mr. Bruce next requested the attention of the Committee, to a few remarks on the *sources of the Applications for an Open Trade*;—on the *proposed Resolutions*, printed by order of the House, on the 22d March 1813;—and on the *Evidence* subsequently laid before the House, by the Company.

The first source of these applications, as far as can be ascertained from facts, was *a supposed increase of Tonnage, Exports, and Imports*. It has

has been assumed as a fact, but without either estimate or evidence to support it, that the Open Trade to India, and subsequently to China, would rapidly tend to increase the tonnage to an indefinite extent. It has not, however, been even attempted to be shewn, either by estimate or evidence, that the ships of the private merchants, of 350 tons, from the river Thames, and much less the ships from the Out-ports, would equal the known tonnage of the Company. That they would do so, is mere assertion, and assertion by classes of petitioners, many of them inland, and none of them presuming on any thing, but that the free trade, would extend their shipping to an immense amount. It has not, in the same manner, been attempted to be shewn, either by estimate or otherwise, what the amount of the exports would be ; for not a single new article has been specified as intended to be exported. In like manner, it has been asserted, that there would be a great increase of the imports of Indian produce : but if Indian manufactures could be brought home,

and sold in fair competition with our home manufactures, the free merchant and manufacturer would probably be soon as much at variance with each other, as they are now united against the East-India Company.

Another source of these applications is, the general right of all British subjects to trade to all countries, subject to the British power, or connected, by the relations of amity, with Britain.

Had the territorial possessions of the Company been, like our ancient North American Colonies, formed and maintained for centuries, by the British Government, and defended by the British arms, the general right of British subjects to trade to them would be undeniable; but the Indian possessions do not come under this description, for the ancient factories of the Company were purchased, or acquired, by cessions from the Native Powers, for valuable considerations. It is little more than half a century since the Indian possessions were conquered by the Company's arms, and administered

on

on the basis of the native governments, of which they were the professed subordinates : and can an equal right be asserted by those, who have had no share in embarking either their property in acquiring such a territory, or risking their lives in preserving it, as by those who have actually acquired and preserved our Indian dominions ?

On the *proposed Resolutions*, Mr. Bruce observed, that he must confine himself entirely to those which were laid before the House, on the 22d March, the alterations, or additions to which, he had only been possessed of, for a few hours ; and then stated, that though the first Resolution proposed to continue the Company's privileges, the exceptions to it, in the subsequent Resolutions, so weakened those privileges, as to render the exercise of them impracticable. Is it to be understood by "*the continuance of their existing privileges,*" that the Company's right of property to their ancient seats of trade, is to be admitted, and their claims to the territorial acquisitions waved, as in former Acts, and

that the exceptions in the subsequent Resolutions, referred to the trade only ?

2. That though the *exclusive trade in Tea* is, by the second Resolution, to remain with the Company, the other China exports (nan-keens, raw-silks, &c.) are not specified. If the Open Traders are to be allowed to pass the Straits of Malacca to the Spice Islands, &c. they might then interfere, as has been stated, with the China trade, and thus not only all kinds of China exports, but even *Tea*, by illicit connections, between the Eastern Islands and the coasts of China, might become part of their homeward assortments, and thus most materially diminish the Company's sales, for home consumption, and the re-export of that valuable article: and it is remarkable, that no provision is made, in any of the Resolutions, for the same open sales and public competition at the Out-ports, which have been carried on, with ~~so~~ much benefit to the Public, by the East-India Company; nor is it specified, whether the usual exports from Eng-  
land

land to China, and from India to China, are to be, as at this time, exclusively carried on by the Company, or not. Can any security be given, that the Open Traders, if they are allowed to enter the China Seas, will not purchase Banca tin, at a cheaper rate than they can carry out the tin of Cornwall? Is it to be a provision, that they are to export Devonshire Long Ells, even at a loss; or is that export to be given up? and is there any security, that the Open Traders will return to Britain, and not go to North America, Spanish America, or even to ports in Europe, where they may sell both ship and cargo?

3. That the exception, in the third Resolution, which *lays open the trade to India to such ports as have warehouses, wet-docks, or basins, or may volunteer the building of them*, certainly renders the imports of the Company, from India, less, by the proportion or quantity which the Open Traders may import to the Out-ports; and if the capital stock of the Company is proposed to be employed in this trade, it will make the  
returns

returns inadequate to pay, even the existing dividend on it.

4. That the *Appropriations of the Territorial Revenues in India*, by the fourth Resolution, (*viz.* to the payment of the civil and military establishments in India, and interest on the Indian debt) can leave but a small surplus, either for investment, or for remittances to China. Is it intended that the Company are to keep up their commercial establishments in India, when the commerce is to be divided between them and the Open Traders? If so, the proportion of trade which they are to carry on in India, and the China trade, would be liable to the same charges, as at this time; though the whole now yields to the Proprietors, little more than the legal interest of money in England.

5. That the *Appropriations of the Commercial Profits in England*, by the fifth and sixth Resolutions (*viz.* to the payment of bills of exchange, debts, interest, commercial charges, dividend of ten and a half per cent. on the capital stock,

and

and reduction of the Indian Debt, and Bond Debt in England) seem to be utterly impracticable. It cannot be expected, that the Company can pay even their commercial charges in England, amounting to above £190,000 per annum, (including £22,000 per annum to the Commissioners for the Affairs of India) and the dividend of ten and a half per cent. on their stock, from the crippled trade to India, and from the profits on tea only, to say nothing of the other extensive appropriations; nor can Government suppose, that the India Proprietors, will feel their stock to be safe, if it is to be employed in a commerce so narrowed and so burdened; for, if they do so, an ultimate, if not an immediate bankruptcy must be the result.

6th. That by the eighth Resolution, the Company are *to be farther limited from granting pensions and gratuities to meritorious and deserving officers*, though this is the only mode they have left to them, of rewarding long and approved services. It need not be mentioned, that the Company have no honors to confer, but  
only



only such rewards as they may consider eminent services may merit; and if divested of this power, their servants would be left, in many instances, friendless, or perhaps in distress. If a provision of this description had formerly existed, the venerable Mr. Hastings, to whom may be ascribed the preservation of the conquests of Lord Clive, and who gave so impressive a proof at the bar, of talents and services, could not, in his own elegant language, “ have received that “ bounty from the Company, from which he “ now derived his subsistence.”

7th. By the Act of 1793, the appointment of Governors and Commanders-in-chief was left with the Company, as well as an express power of recall; but, by the ninth Resolution (March 22d 1813), though the appointment, nominally, is to remain with the Company, yet the King’s approbation is to be given under the Sign Manual, countersigned by the President of the Board of Commissioners; and it is not specified, that any power of recall, in case of mismanagement, is to be left to the Company: so that, in  
fact,

fact, a *Congé d'Elire* is to be issued, to the Company to appoint, provided the King and the President approve ; but without leaving to the Company the selection of those persons who, from long and faithful services, might be presumed to be best qualified to fill those situations ; or the power of recalling those, who, in fact, were to be appointed independently of their choice, and whom they might find inadequate to the discharge of the first and most important duties.

On the subject of the Evidence laid before the House, Mr. Bruce observed, that though he had attended the examination of the witnesses, both in the House, and in the Committee, every day, he considered it to be impracticable to form a just opinion of the subject, till the whole of the evidence had been completed ;—nor did he conceive, that even the great Lord Chancellor Bacon would have undertaken to examine and decide on a body of evidence, consisting of nearly six hundred folio pages, in a few hours :—all, therefore, that an

individual, like himself, could attempt, was to state the following general facts, which appeared to be established by this great body of evidence.

—That the administration of the British Indian Provinces had, hitherto, proceeded on a system engrafted on the ancient native governments; and, from the fixed character of the natives, had preserved the allegiance of our Indian subjects, and yielded a large and permanent revenue.

—That the regulations, which have hitherto been adopted, by the Company, had prevented the indiscriminate intercourse or interference of British subjects, or of Europeans, in general, with the prejudices of the natives, in favor of their ancient opinions, usages, and manners.

—That, from the fixed character of the natives, particularly the Hindoos, the produce and manufactures of India have been found equal to their wants and their desires; and that the climate, and their habits, afforded no prospect of an increase of demand for British goods; particularly when it has appeared, that British artists have settled

settled at the different Presidencies, and employed native workmen, who can furnish the same articles at a cheaper rate than they can be imported from Britain; and, in fact, that British goods are chiefly, if not exclusively, purchased by the European inhabitants.

—That the export trade from Great-Britain had not only been equal to the demands in India, but, in general, so far above them, that, in many cases, the Company, and their naval officers, who carried out their little investments, freight free, and the Indian agents, were often obliged to sell the goods at and below prime cost.

—That the imports from India had, hitherto, notwithstanding all the heavy duties imposed on them, been equal, not only to the home consumption, but to the demands for re-exportation, though this branch of the trade, for reasons of state, had been materially injured by the *neutrality* allowed to the American traders.

—That the smuggling of cargoes, by the Company, on the evidence of the first revenue officers, was impracticable, as there existed no  
H 2
temptation

temptation to make the attempt;—that smuggling had been farther prevented, by the trade being carried on in large ships, with the safeguards of the East-India docks and warehouses; and that, from the lists of seizures, the smuggling had been chiefly detected in smaller articles, seized from the crews and passengers.

—That the vessels from the Out-ports, of three hundred and fifty tons, either in the outward or homeward voyages, would have greater facility in defrauding the revenue, by going to foreign ports to dispose of their cargoes, to the prejudice of the re-export trade, or by smuggling, in innumerable ways, into Great Britain and Ireland.

—That, from the positive evidence of the Revenue Officers of Customs and Excise, the smuggling of Indian and China produce will encrease, by dividing the trade between the river Thames and the Out-ports, at which the revenue cannot be so efficiently collected, as at the sales of the East-India Company.

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Mr. Bruce concluded his observations, by asking, whether it would be wise, in the present convulsed state of Europe, and of the world, and in the actual state of the British resources and revenues, to interfere with such an old establishment, as that of the East-India Company; if so, it was surely contrary to the practice of a nation, distinguished for resting all its institutions on experience, leading to improvements, not on theories in politics, or speculations in trade. The last twenty years, he observed, had shewn enough of theory and speculation, by the events which had desolated Europe; and it would be a most cruel event, indeed, while the insidious interferences of foreigners have been unable to shake the foundations of our government, or of the institutions subordinate to it, if our own innovations should weaken the one, or destroy the other.

Supposing, however, that these evil forebodings should be realised, and that the Company should be dissolved, and their trade annihilated, the justice of the British Government will surely

ly

ly grant a full indemnity to the East-India Company, whose enterprize, conquests, and administration, have acquired and preserved the Indian empire; and to the proprietors of the shipping and establishments which have been formed, at the expence of many millions, under the conviction of the stability of the Company, and of the navigation of its ships and trade being confined to the river Thames. It would, to himself, be a melancholy reflection indeed, to have lived to see one political and financial error lose to the country its American Colonies, and to be convinced, that the proposed Resolutions, if passed into a law, in opposition to a most full and complete body of evidence, would, in a short time, probably lose its Indian Empire to Great Britain.

THE END.

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**LONDON :**

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# DEBATE

AT

THE EAST-INDIA HOUSE,

AND

GENERAL COURT OF PROPRIETORS

OF

EAST-INDIA STOCK.

ON

WEDNESDAY, THE 1ST SEPTEMBER, 1813

ON THE SUBJECT OF

*Procuring competent Authority to charge the  
Property Tax on the Dividends upon the  
Territorial Revenues of the Company,*

AND FOR

*Increasing the Salaries of the Directors.*



BY AN IMPARTIAL REPORTER.



LONDON :

Printed for BLACK, PARRY, and Co. Booksellers to the  
Hon. East-India Company, Leadenhall-street,  
Where all the former Debates may be had.

1813.

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## PROCEEDINGS, &c.

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EAST-INDIA HOUSE, *Sept. 1, 1813.*

A Special General Court, of Proprietors of East-India stock was held this day, at the Company's House, in Leadenhall-Street, in conformity with the request contained in a requisition, signed by more than *nine* Proprietors, which had been presented to the Court of Directors.

The minutes of the last Court (including, amongst other points, the unanimous vote of thanks from the Proprietary to the Directors, for their unwearied exertions, during the negotiation with His Majesty's Ministers for the renewal of the Company's Charter) having been read—

The *Chairman* (Robert Thornton, Esq. M. P.) stated, that the present Court was specially assembled, in conformity with the written requisition of more than nine Proprietors; which requisition should be immediately read, and the Court might then proceed to business.

The requisition, dated August 13, 1813, which was signed by Peter Moore, Esq. M. P. and a great number of most respectable Proprietors, was read accordingly. (See *Appendix*.)

Mr. P. Moore. Mr. *Peter Moore* then rose and said, that, perhaps, he need not offer any apology for having, in conjunction with those honourable colleagues, whose names had just been read to the Court, given the Proprietors the trouble of assembling at that period of the year; particularly as he found it necessary, in common with those honourable colleagues, to follow up the resolutions of the last Court, which had that day been laid before them for confirmation. Considering this necessity, and also the propriety of revising their different establishments, in making such alterations, as the means placed in their hands, by the renewal of their Charter, would permit, he had been anxious for the assembling of the present Court. He was sure that he could easily call to the recollection of the Proprietors, the enthusiastic approbation with which, during the late negotiation, the conduct of the Court of Directors had been received; and particularly by those persons who had the best opportunities of witnessing it; it, therefore, had struck him, as his duty, feeling the share he took in the House of Commons, in revising the establishment of the

Board of Commissioners, to pursue that principle Mr.P.Moore. which he there professed, and on which he had acted, by extending it to the Court of Directors, whose services could not be too highly prized, nor too liberally rewarded.—(*Applause.*)—Having felt this, as he still did, he hoped it would be received as an apology, for his not having, conformably with the usual courtesy, communicated to the Court of Directors, the resolution which he meant to propose relative to that body. In not having made the resolution known, he was guided entirely by motives of delicacy, not by those of disrespect. But, still retaining those feelings and sentiments which he expressed at a former Court, he hoped he should be excused for following them up in the best manner which his abilities would allow him. In renewing their Charter, every man wished to see, as distinctly as possible, the whole powers, privileges, and possessions, of the Company; and it was necessary to look up to them as to the standard, from whence every thing was to flow hereafter: and he thought the first object to be contemplated was to embody the gratitude they had already felt and expressed, by using these privileges and possessions, as the source of remuneration to those, who had so ably supported their commercial interests; who had nobly fought their



Mr. P. Moore. battles; who had wisely conducted their political affairs; to those who were the pride of this institution, and the envy of others! It was in vain, as he had stated at the last Court, to hope for a succession of men, like those who had so recently supported their rights, with dignity and success, in another place, if their zeal, their exertions, their abilities, were not gratefully and liberally recollected by the Proprietors. At that Court, it was proposed to give votes of thanks to particular individuals, who were supposed to have rendered themselves eminently conspicuous in the course of the negociation: but, in answer to that suggestion, it was said, that it would be a very invidious thing for the Court of Proprietors, who were indebted to *all*, to make any selection; and that, if any distinction were to be made, it would be much better that it should originate with the Directors themselves, who might proceed in any manner they deemed most proper. On this account, many votes of thanks, which would otherwise have been proposed, were not brought forward. Fully approving of the conduct of the Court of Directors, and sincerely thanking them for the course they had pursued, he was desirous of encouraging that independant spirit and those honourable principles, which had been manifested in a long struggle for the rights

of the Company, by something more solid and substantial than a mere vote of thanks ; although he by no means meant to depreciate that honour. Anxious for the prosperity of the Company, he wished to place those who then were, and would hereafter be, their trustees, in an independent situation ; he wished to grant them a remuneration commensurate with the greatness of their responsibility, and worthy the dignity of the honourable office they were called on to fill. This was the scope and view embraced by one of his resolutions ; and he trusted it was of sufficient importance to justify him and his friends, in the liberty they had taken, of calling the Proprietors together at that unusual period. His other proposition related to the Proprietors in general. This proposition, though he had placed it last in point of order, should be offered the first for their consideration. Before he stated what it was, in precise terms, it would be necessary to examine the situation of the Company ; to point out the services they had rendered to the country ; and to see what benefits they had themselves derived. By the capital of the Proprietors, fresh strength and fresh resources had been added to the ordinary powers of the state ; by their operations, and by their money, what he should ever call a *second world*, had been obtained for the Empire. Yes, he would repeat it, by the admirable

Mr. P. Moore

Mr. P. Moore. management of the Company's affairs, for a long series of years, a *second world* had been given to the Empire, without costing the parent state a single shilling!—(*Applause.*)—This had been done solely by the East-India Company—this was entirely their work—for, as he had stated elsewhere, their plans had never been interfered with by any other power, without an evident deterioration! Under such circumstances they were surely entitled to some advantages beyond those which the act of parliament gave them. And here he particularly alluded to an exoneration from the payment of *property tax* on their dividends; a point which, on every principle of justice, he conceived ought to be given up, as it formed a very great drawback on the moderate profits derived from that capital, which had operated in such wonderful effects for the country in general. He was aware that former applications for this purpose had failed; but the circumstances in which they were at present placed, might give to another application a weight and an influence, which those, heretofore made, did not possess. An idea had gone abroad, that it was in the power of their own Trustees (the Court of Directors) to take this burden off the Proprietors, by discharging it from their contingent funds. This, however, was a mistake, and he was sorry for it; because, he was convinced, if such a power existed with their

Trustees, they would, at once, have done<sup>d</sup> that Mr.P.Moore<sup>d</sup> which would have been a common boon to the Proprietary at large. To effect this purpose, he had, at two General Courts, moved resolutions, that His Majesty's Ministers should be applied to on the subject. These resolutions were carried, and the applications were made; but, unfortunately, they were answered in the negative. Independent of these applications, three others, he believed, were made by the Court of Directors, without the knowledge of their constituents, which had precisely the same effect. Standing on the ground of a great public body, which was hourly pouring wealth into the coffers of the nation, by whose means the country received a continual influx of property, which added substantially to its resources; by whose exertions, a large empire had been acquired, without, as he had contended, and should ever contend, the State having contributed at all to procure such pre-eminent advantages; they should, he thought, in justice, have received a different answer; and the property tax, to procure a remission of which was the object of this resolution, should not have been insisted upon.—(*Applause.*)

He would now beg leave to state to the Court, as a justification of the line he was then pursuing, with reference to the Court of Directors,

Mr. P. Moore. that the principal was not a new one; for when it was formerly proposed to augment the establishment of the Commissioners for the Affairs of India, it was observed, that the alteration was no longer applicable to any particular set of persons, but was rendered necessary for the dignity of the situation. And, in his opinion, they ought to exercise, with reference to the Court of Directors, the self-same principles which had been acted upon in another place, with respect to the Board of Commissioners. The establishment of that Board had progressively increased with the augmented resources of the Indian empire, which the Company had obtained, and the controul of which was vested in the Commissioners. It commenced with an honourable superintendant, who, being a sinecure officer of State (he believed the second paymaster) was to receive no remuneration, as he had nothing else to do, but to amuse himself with the performance of those duties connected with the controul of Indian affairs. The establishment subservient to him, however, was paid £5000 per annum, which was a very handsome remuneration. In 1793, when the Charter was renewed, the charge was increased to £16,000. A short time ago, another augmentation took place, by construction rather than otherwise;

and, at the present moment, the expence was *Mr.P.Moore.*  
£26,000 a year. When this last rise was about  
to take place, it was stated in the House of Com-  
mons, by an honourable gentleman, who had  
filled the situation of advocate-general in India,  
and whom he should be glad to see in that  
Court, that the proposed sum was too large.  
But, on better recollection, he changed his mind,  
and acceded promptly to the amendment which  
he (Mr. Moore) had the honour to propose.  
The Court of Directors battled for every shilling  
of the augmentation, meaning to allow every  
thing consistent with the dignity of the situation.  
It was at first proposed to give £25,000; but it  
was stated by an honourable Member of the  
Board of Controul, who happened to sit near  
him (Mr. Moore) in the House, that there would  
then be a deficiency of £400 a year, and that an  
additional £1000 would set the business at rest  
or ever: he had, therefore, agreed to the in-  
crease; observing, "I think you are moderate,  
" because the alteration in the circumstances of  
" the Company will require more attention than  
" you are aware of." He was willing at the  
time to have granted £30,000; but the state of  
the House did not allow him to make the propo-  
sition, and £26,000 was finally agreed to. He  
stated these circumstances to shew, that the prin-

Mr. P. Moore. ciple, he was then acting on, had not originated in that Court, but that it was one which he had supported in another place, and which he thought it necessary to follow up. He was sure, when he reverted to the conduct of their Executive Trust, which had been so highly, so generally, and so deservedly applauded; when he referred to their transcendant services, to their integrity and ability; when he called to mind all those lively impressions of respect and esteem, which the Proprietors must entertain for their honourable zeal and unrivalled talents, and then compared the remuneration received by them with what was given to the clerks acting under the Board of Controul, the Court must at once see, that it was necessary for them to revise their establishment; they must immediately feel, that what might have been very proper twenty or thirty years ago, was not at all suited to the circumstances of the present day! As a new order of things was now begun, he thought it a very proper time to commence that revision of their establishments, which might, both at the present time, and hereafter, insure to the Company a constant succession of talent. In making this observation, he meant no allusion to the gentlemen behind the bar, with whom he had had no communication on the subject; but he referred to those individuals who might

hereafter be induced to offer themselves; and **Mr.P.Moore.** sure he was, that £300 per annum was totally unfit to be offered to men of ability, and of extensive business, as an adequate remuneration for their services, in the arduous situation of Directors. (*Applause.*)

The first resolution which he should lay before the Court related solely to the dividends which they received; and he did think that the honour and justice of the nation would still be exerted in behalf of the Proprietors of East India stock, by whose capital such transcendant services had been performed—services which demanded the gratitude of the country.—(*Applause.*)—Under the Act of Parliament, their dividend could not be enlarged. It was limited; but it was his great object, that, fixed as it was at 10 per cent., that profit should be freed from any drawback. If he could induce the Court to assist him, he wished their Directors to be instructed to call on His Majesty's Ministers to give up that drawback, the Property Tax, in future. Their profits had been much spoken of; but let them look to other establishments, and contrast the advantages. While *their* capital was hourly adding to the resources of the country, *they*, the Proprietors of India stock, had been constantly falling short; but the dividends of



**Mr. P. Moore.** corporate bodies, whose capital had been dormant and quiescent in the empire, were rapidly increasing. He would instance the Bank of England. They had it in evidence before the House of Commons, that the capital stock of the Bank of England had been doubled; that the dividends had been doubled; and that millions more than the capital stock had been distributed amongst the Company in *bonuses* of one sort or another. But the Proprietors of East India stock (not those who had bought in lately under the gloomy aspect of the Company's affairs, but individuals who had purchased when the scene was very different) were not receiving 5 per cent. for their capital. The difficulty might now be stated, as it was in former times, that there was no fund from which the drawback could be paid. He should be extremely sorry to hear such an observation at this period, knowing, as he did, the immense resources and vast wealth of their Indian Empire; which the State owed entirely to their skilful management. Whatever the property tax on their dividends might amount to, it ought to be procured by the single dash of a pen, authorizing improvements in any one quarter of India. Those who knew what the value of that country was, what it was capable of, and what it ought to do, would agree

with him, as to the ease with which the amount Mr. P. Moore. of the property tax might be paid. If, therefore, there was no fund to exempt their dividend of 10 per cent. from this drawback, he should despair indeed; not that he should look upon the country as destitute of the means, but because he must conclude, that those who had the superintendence of their Indian empire, knew not how to apply them. He would now read his first resolution—"That this Court having duly considered the conditions imposed by the Legislature, in the recent renewal of the Charter of the East-India Company, and deeply impressed with the commercial advantages, the great and constant influx of wealth, and vast political importance derived by the nation at large from the possessions of the East India Company, and justly considering these circumstances, especially under the concessions now granted to the whole British commercial world by the regulations above referred to, are decidedly of opinion, that the Company possesses the strongest possible claim on the justice and gratitude of their country, and under this impression, that the compensation allowed them for the employment of their capital, by which all these advantages have been obtained, and are preserved, should at least be free from any di-

Mr. P. Moore. "minution of its moderate amount; this Court  
"do most earnestly recommend it to the Court  
"of Directors again to apply to His Majesty's  
"Ministers and to the Board of Commissioners  
"for the Affairs of India, to give their sanction to  
"such measures as shall be competent to autho-  
"rise the property tax on the dividends of the  
"capital stock, to be charged on those territorial  
"revenues which the said capital stock has ex-  
"clusively acquired, and to defray the amount as  
"an ordinary outgoing of the Company."—This  
proposition, he thought, was so very reasonable,  
that Ministers ought to comply with it, particu-  
larly when they could take the amount, which  
they would be called upon to give up, by remit-  
ting the property tax, out of any corner of that  
vast empire which the Company had gained, in  
the way which appeared to them most congenial  
with the interests of the country at large. With  
the resources of those territories at their com-  
mand (which had already shovelled such immense  
wealth into the treasury of the State) if proper  
care were taken, Ministers might not fear mil-  
lions of debt; they had, within their power, an  
engine which would produce whatever sums the  
necessity of the country might require. This was  
one of those boons, which, now the Charter was  
renewed, and there was no likelihood of an in-

crease of dividends, would, he hoped, be con- Mr. P. Moore.  
ceded to them. Such was the nature of his first  
resolution ; which he would now hand up to be  
read in the ordinary way.

The resolution was then read.

Mr. *Samuel Dixon* hoped that all the reso- Mr. S. Dixon.  
lutions intended to be submitted to the Court,  
would be read, before the question was put on the  
first.

Mr. *Plumer* was desirous of complying with Mr. Plumer.  
the pleasure of the Court ; and, if it were deter-  
mined that all the resolutions should be read, be-  
fore the first was put from the Chair, he would  
abstain from addressing the Proprietors at that  
moment.—(*Cries of no ! no !*)—Conceiving that  
that was not the case, he would proceed to second  
the motion ; and, in doing so, he should take the  
liberty of touching on the subject which had been  
brought under the consideration of the Court.  
However, before he entered on that subject, he  
felt it his duty to apologize to the Court, that so  
young a man, and so small a proprietor as he was,  
should, on such an important occasion, request  
their attention. But, trusting to their indulgence,  
and, conscious of the purity of those feelings and  
principles, which had induced him to stand for-  
ward, he now ventured to address them. He  
had an opportunity of communicating with his

**Mr. Plumer.** honourable friend (Mr. Moore) on the subject of the resolutions which had been brought forward, at the last Court. He then felt it a most desirable office to undertake that, which he was then about to perform ; although, at the same time, he was perfectly aware of its difficulty ; still, however, he would execute the task in the best manner which his ability would admit. Being incapable of separating a view of the interests of the East-India Company from those of the whole British Empire, it was on that ground that he was anxious to submit to the Court the observations he was about to make. Whoever had taken into consideration the events of the last twenty years, and they were of too great a magnitude to be overlooked, must perceive, that the immense resources and commanding situation which this country had attained, was almost entirely owing to its commercial advantages. They had seen the states of the world plunged into ruinous hostilities against each other ; they had witnessed a revolutionary war, the effects of which humanity would never cease to deplore, and the termination of which it was impossible to foresee. They had beheld Monarchs hurled from their thrones, and Usurpers, vaulting over the ruins of justice and liberty, into their places ; but, in the midst of these calamitous scenes. in the midst of these

perilous times, they had beheld the British Empire progressively flourishing! He hoped, however, that Europe was on the eve of being freed from the miseries which he had described! The spirit of independence was now awakened on the Continent, and if the struggle for freedom were successful, the great praise was due to this country, where the flame of liberty had never ceased to glow; where the great lesson of fortitude and perseverance had been taught to the surrounding nations; who now seemed determined to assert their rights! When they considered that the revenue of this country, before the French revolution, was annually not more than 15 or £16,000,000, and contrasted it with the present amount, which was upwards of £100,000,000; when they looked to the immense magnitude of our resources, by sea and land; the mind naturally inquired by what cause so great an alteration had been effected? To what could it be attributed, but to the extent of our commerce? And, when the commercial establishments of Great Britain were examined, it could not be doubted, that the heart's blood of those establishments was, in a very great degree, nourished by the East-India Company!—(*Applause.*)—The beginning of that Company was extremely small and inconsiderable: but wisdom

Mr. Plummer,

Mr. Plummer marked its origin ; and the same intelligence and ability which guided its first operations, continued to direct its affairs, till, at length, it obtained a respectable character in the eyes of Europe ! At that time, however, they were not paramount ; they did not hold the situation in which they now appeared ! Commerce was then their sole object ! They were confined to a small number of individuals, carrying on trade with a capital, considerably less than that which was now employed by many eminent merchants. But that stream, which was then so shallow and confined, had, by the exertions and enterprise of the Company, become a mighty river, flowing over the globe, and dispersing plenty and fertility wherever its course was directed ! The idea of such an extended commerce originated with the Company !—By their persevering wisdom it was given to the country ! That commerce could not be carried on by the usual and ordinary means. It was not open to mere adventurers ; it could not be achieved by common exertions : those commercial plans which had long been pursued, were useless here. In other cases, new plans would have been unnecessary ; but here they were indispensable. If they proceeded in the investigation, from the commencement of the Company down to the late negotiation for the renewal of

their Charter, they would find, that no body in Mr. Plummer. the Empire, he would say, no part of the Empire, had contributed so much to the strength, the greatness, and the glory of the state, as the East-India Company had done ! They would find, that, by them an Empire had been obtained for the nation, greater in extent than all the other conquests which had been achieved ; and greater in its commerce, so far as that commerce was legitimately and fairly carried on, than all our other possessions ! The government of that Empire was admirable. Instead of being tyrants and oppressors, the happiness of the people was completely secured under their beneficent sway ! Nothing could be conceived more unlike the conquests of those monarchs, whose tyranny history had handed down to them, than the situation of the inhabitants of India, under the Company's government ! It was not necessary for him to dilate farther on this topic. It was allowed, even by the enemies of the Company, that the Indian Empire had been brought to wonderful perfection. To what, then, were they to attribute such pleasing results ? In most countries, indeed in every country, the success which attended its measures, both with respect to foreign and domestic policy, might fairly be traced to the wisdom and good conduct of its executive govern-



Mr. Plummer. ment. The executive government who directed the Company's affairs, and under whose auspices so much good had been effected, he had then the honour of seeing before him. Their predecessors had first formed those salutary and comprehensive plans, which the Company afterwards called upon them to carry into effect. Under these circumstances it was, that they had become wealthy, prosperous, and powerful! The subject, at present under consideration, branched into two distinct points. The first respected the East-India Proprietors at large, as the object of it was to exempt them from the payment of the Property Tax on their dividends; the second was a proposition which related solely to the Court of Directors. As the resolution then before the Court, was that which respected their dividend, he would, in the first instance, confine himself to that point; but, he hoped he should be afterwards allowed to make a few observations on the second proposition. He thought, then, he might assume this broad and extensive principle, which Ministers had always acknowledged in *theory*, though not in *practice*, that whenever any institution was formed, such, for instance, as the Bank of England, or any other body, of which this country boasted so many, eminent for their wealth and greatness, there was a sort of tacit contract

between the Government and the persons thus Mr. Plummer. permitted to join together for particular purposes, that a certain part of the profits should be allowed to remain with those, whose capital, industry, and enterprize, were the means of producing the whole. The question, therefore, with reference to the Company in the present instance, was this:—"Are the advantages conferred by the Company on the nation at large, of such extent and description as to justify the demand of exempting their dividend from the payment of property tax?" Or, perhaps, rather, "Whether a tax, so levied, no matter what its amount, is not an anomaly in Legislature?" He certainly considered it as an anomaly. And every gentlemen must feel that there was a great degree of fallacy in saying to the Company, "You shall divide so much," and afterwards turning round and taking part of that profit from them, which they had been given to understand was to remain undiminished. He assumed this principle in the case of a provisional tax, which was liable to constant fluctuations. If a deduction of ten per cent. were made from their dividend, what was to prevent the same principle from being carried to 20, 30, 40, or even 50 per cent. ? Surely, there would be no justice in such a proceeding, and yet, by a parity of reasoning, the tax might be raised from 10 to 50 per cent. If the prin-

Mr. Plummer. ciple were admitted in one case, it could not be opposed in the other.

Without entering into all the circumstances of the late negotiation; without minutely detailing the alterations which had been made in the Company's system,—alterations which had occasioned a very considerable difference of opinion, but on which his own sentiments ever remained unchanged, having always considered the documents which proceeded from the Court of Directors as conclusive evidence on the subject,—he should state, most positively, what was even admitted by Ministers themselves, that a great concession of commercial privileges had been granted to the people at large. If, therefore, there was any one period, which, more than another, demanded the exercise of justice towards them, it was the present, when they had given up that which was worth so much. If they were even convinced that their dividend would remain at its present rate, he thought that this boon ought to be granted; but no person could state with certainty, that it would so remain. The concessions to which he had alluded might occasion a very material difference; but whatever the amount of their dividend was, it ought not to suffer any diminution by the payment of the Property Tax. The Company did not demand that the expense should be defrayed out of the treasury of Great

Britain; they did not desire that it should be advanced out of her resources; they only requested that, if the means of defraying it should fairly be found to exist then that it should be taken out of their own pockets; that it should be subtracted from that revenue, which they had procured by their own capital: he therefore hoped, that the Directors would exert their influence with His Majesty's Ministers, in the strongest manner, for the purpose of inducing them to comply with the application. He trusted that they would enforce the request, not only by abstract reasoning, but that they would point out how desirable it was, on every principle of justice, that such an arrangement should take place, now that the Company had given up so many valuable privileges to the empire in general. As to the existence of a sufficient fund for the purpose, no person who looked to the resources of India could doubt it. He knew a debt had been contracted there; but it was nothing when compared with the means which could be appropriated to its liquidation: let gentlemen only consider the extent and value of those acquisitions which had resulted in India from the expenditure in question compared with our other acquisitions, and the relative increase of the national debt at home during the same period, and he thought the balance would be decidedly in favour of Indian warfare compared with Indian

Mr. Plummer. debt. In short, looking at the subject in every point of view, he could perceive no good reason to induce His Majesty's Ministers to deny the concession now demanded; a concession most just and moderate. He hoped it would be granted with such alacrity, as would almost spare the Court of Directors even the trouble of asking for it. His honourable friend, he trusted, would not only be justified in bringing forward the motion; but that the Proprietors, on this, as on many former occasions, would feel themselves obliged to him for having submitted the proposition. It was in the knowledge of his honourable friend, that a supplementary, or explanatory act of parliament must yet be passed on the subject of the Company's Charter; therefore, it was more particularly necessary that the motion should be immediately brought forward; because, if they were successful in the application, a provision on the subject might be incorporated with the supplementary Bill, instead of having recourse to a separate enactment.

Mr. Plummer then shortly adverted to the proposition for increasing the salaries of the Directors. This, he contended, was not only right, from a feeling of gratitude, but no less so from a principle of abstract justice. It was a *theoretical* principle which should never be deviated from in *practice*, that a full remuneration, an adequate

provision should be granted to the Executive <sup>Mr. Plummer.</sup> Body. He would not occupy the attention of the Court longer upon this point, which, as well as the other, he hoped would be unanimously agreed to.

Mr. *Samuel Dixon* said, he could not plead, <sup>Mr. S. Dixon.</sup> though he wished he could do so, that he was a young man; but certainly he was not in the habit of speaking in that Court, and, therefore, he had a fair claim on their indulgence. He did not mean to give any offence to his worthy friend, who had just spoken; but he hoped he would excuse him if he said, that though he had made a very ingenious speech, yet nine tenths of it had nothing whatever to do with the subject before the Court. It was a very pretty speech, and very well delivered; but it did not bear on the question upon which the Proprietors were to decide. He never recollected to have seen any thing better managed than the business of that day. A vote of increased emolument to the Directors was preceded by a vote tending to increase the profits of the Proprietors. Of course, if, by the exertions of the Directors, the dividend was increased to 10 and  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. a step would be gained, which naturally called for an addition to the salaries of those who conducted their affairs. In that manner he interpreted the transaction. But he was

Mr. S. Dixon, exceedingly anxious to be instructed on one point, which the two gentlemen who had spoken appeared to have omitted. They had said a great deal about the wealth which, by the exertions of the Company, had been poured into the coffers of this country. Now he should be glad to know, notwithstanding all the benefits which the Empire had derived from the resources of India, notwithstanding all the riches which had been confined on the state, where any surplus cash, belonging either to the Company or the Government, was to be found? He had not been accustomed to read much, but he remembered an observation of one, who was allowed to be among the wisest, if he was not himself the very wisest of men, (he meant King Solomon) "*that there was a time for all things*;" and, in his estimation, a more injudicious, or a more improper time, could not have been selected for the present motion. If he did not know the gentlemen by whom the proposition was supported, he could have hardly believed they were in earnest, in bringing it forward, immediately after such statements had been made of the embarrassed situation of the Company's affairs; which proved, at once, the fallacy of pursuing the measure that had been recommended. If they wished to act as gentlemen would in their own immediate concerns, they ought to examine and satisfy

themselves perfectly that there were funds sufficient to meet this proposed increase. Would any individual in that Court call on his partner to share a greater profit than ordinary from his trade, unless he could lay before him a regular balance sheet, to justify the proposed dividend? Would the gentlemen who heard him, support the character of prudent men, by acting on the probability of a surplus to arise from the Indian revenue, at some time or another? If any honourable Proprietor could shew that there was a quantity of surplus cash in hand, either from the territorial revenue of India, or from their commercial profits, up to that moment, and thereby prove that the proposition was a reasonable one, he would most heartily go along with him; but, when he called on them to make out such a case, he believed he was placing before them a most difficult task indeed. They had been told, that His Majesty's Ministers had been already applied to, three or four times, on this very subject. Now what, in God's name, he would ask, had been advanced that day, to induce or give a reasonable cause of hope, that His Majesty's Ministers would now grant their consent, more than they had formerly done. He had nothing to guide him but a small share of common sense; but, as far as that enabled him to form a judgment, the

Mr. S. Dixon.



Mr. S. Dixon. proposition appeared to him most unreasonable, and, therefore, not at all likely to succeed. Viewing it in that light, he would oppose it, even if he stood alone.

It had been stated, and certainly there was but one opinion on the subject, that the conduct of the gentlemen in the Direction was worthy of every praise which could be bestowed upon it; but, 'if they agreed to this increase of salary, would it rest with the persons who had deserved it? Would it not go to those who had not contributed, in any degree, to support the rights of the Company, and who, therefore, had no claim upon them?—(*Mr. Dixon was here called to order, as the second proposition, to which he was speaking, was not then before the Court.*)—He certainly should not have taken the liberty of discussing that question, if the worthy gentleman, who seconded the motion, had not, in the latter end of his speech, mixed up the two subjects. Before he sat down, he had a request to make of the gentlemen behind the bar, which was by no means an unreasonable one. He should be glad to know, whether the proposition for an increase of salary had been laid before the Court of Directors? and if so, whether it had received the sanction of the *whole*, or of any *part* of the Court? He hoped, if it had come to the knowledge of

the Court of Directors, that any gentlemen who Mr.S.Dixon. had refused their consent to what was proposed, would stand forward and avow their sentiments. But he had a much better opinion of the gentlemen, whom he then saw in their places, than to suppose that they could be induced, by the paltry consideration of two or three hundred pounds, to give their sanction to such a measure. He was sure that little pecuniary interests did not weigh with the majority of the Directors. Whenever a fair statement of surplus cash was laid before them, that Court would have it in their power to grant a just and proper remuneration to the present, and to future Directors, and, when that time arrived, they would not be found slow in acting. But he could not agree that the present was the proper moment for making such provision. He should not, he believed, be singular in that opinion; and, therefore, it would be more pleasing to him, if the proposition were withdrawn, than that it should be met by a negative.

The *Chairman*, in answer to the question of The Chairman. Mr. Dixon, stated, that the honourable gentleman who brought those propositions before the Proprietary had made no communication whatever to the Court of Directors on the subject.

Mr. P. Moore. So I stated in my opening Mr.P.Moore. speech.

The Chair-  
man.

The *Chairman* said, that what he understood the honourable gentleman (Mr. Moore) to have observed in his speech, was perfectly true and correct. When he took the chair that day, he knew not what the intention of the honourable gentleman was ; and he begged farther to state, that those individuals who appeared favourable to the honourable gentleman's proposition, were all of them volunteers ; for no application had, or indeed could have been made to any of the Proprietors, either by him or his colleagues.

Mr. Lush-  
ington.

Mr. *Lushington*, M. P. was quite sure, that the worthy Proprietor (Mr. Dixon) would, on reflection, perceive the irregularity of the question which he had asked of the honourable Chairman. The proposition it conveyed went to fetter and bind the opinions of the Proprietors, who would be debarred from acting, unless the feelings and sentiments of the Directors were first ascertained. But when they were assembled by requisition, in a regular manner, his honourable friend (Mr. P. Moore), or any other Proprietor, had a right to come forward with the proposition which had been submitted to them, without communicating his intentions to any person. In the present instance, he thought his honourable friend might claim additional merit, for having introduced the subject without at all

consulting the Court of Directors. He was, however, rather inclined to complain that he had brought it forward in an *unsportsmanlike* manner, as he had compelled a number of gentlemen to come in from the country on a very particular day. Still, he would not find fault with him; because, he thought, no better opportunity could be selected for calling their attention to the services rendered to the Company by the Court of Directors, than at the close of a long and severe struggle for their rights; during the whole of which the conduct of the Executive Body had been marked by unabating zeal and extraordinary ability. At one time, apprehensions were entertained that the negotiation would terminate fatally for the Company: and so it undoubtedly would, had it not been for the sustaining wisdom of Parliament, which supported the honourable and enlightened views of the Directors, and prevented the voice of clamour from effecting the ruin of that system, which constituted the strength and the power of India.—(*Applause.*) The bold hand of innovation had been successfully resisted; and the Charter which had been obtained, was one, under which the prosperity of all parties might be safely and firmly placed. They had now to consider what was the conduct of those, who mainly obtained that Charter: and convinced, as they all

Mr. Lushington.

Mr. Lushington.

must be, of the unwearied assiduity and powerful talents displayed by the Court of Directors, he felt it just, (on the genuine principles of public economy, which called on them to reward national merit in a manner commensurate with the services performed,) that those who had managed their affairs, at such a critical moment, with diligence and integrity, should not now be neglected and forgotten.—(*Applause.*) Was it to be endured, that gentlemen performing such important functions should receive only the miserable pittance of £300 a year, a sum much less than was granted to the individuals nominated to offices in their disposal? Such a state of things was contrary to all the acknowledged principles of state policy; it militated against every hope they might indulge of procuring faithful and industrious servants. Let the Proprietors look to the duties their Directors had to perform. Let them consider the Imperial State, the management of which was confided to their care. Let them bear in mind the details of important business they had now to execute; and then he would ask, whether those who had so many duties to perform, could give to their own private affairs and interests, that part of attention which was necessary to the security and well-being of every man, who had private affairs and interests to which a

portion of his time ought to be devoted? Those who were thus situated, whose attention was thus diverted from their own concerns, were entitled to public remuneration. And, he would ask, was £300 per annum a just and fair remuneration? For the best-founded reason, the salary of offices, in various departments, had been augmented. And he was at a loss to conceive why those gentlemen who had so skilfully combatted the arguments of their adversaries, should not be adequately provided for.

Mr. Plummer.

The Rev. Mr. *Thirkwall* was extremely sorry to call the honourable gentleman to order. But he submitted to him, whether the business would not be greatly accelerated, if those who addressed the Court confined themselves to the point immediately before it. The other division of the subject would certainly become a matter of very serious discussion, when it was regularly brought under their consideration, which would be the case, when the first resolution was disposed of.

Rev. Mr. Thirkwall.

Mr. *Lushington* perfectly agreed that the course which the debate had taken was extremely irregular; because when his honourable friend had introduced his resolution, it was understood that it should be discussed alone; but all the gentlemen who addressed the Court, had deviated from

Mr. Lushington.

that rule, which induced him to pursue the example.

Rev. Mr.  
Thirlwall.

The Rev. Mr. *Thirlwall* admitted that irregularity had taken place, but the sooner it was corrected the better. The principle of *obsta principiis* ought to be followed.

[A short discussion, as to the point of order, here took place. The result of which was, that the two propositions should be discussed separately. Mr. *Lushington*, in consequence, declined offering any farther observations till Mr. *Moore* had submitted his second resolution.]

Mr. Lowndes.

Mr. *Lowndes* said, it certainly struck him, that the two propositions were links of the same chain, and ought to be discussed together. Although there was no understanding between the gentlemen behind the bar and those before it, with respect to the subject matter of the resolutions, yet the one was evidently a corollary of the other. The *first* of September was indeed a most extraordinary day to assemble them together. The honourable gentleman (Mr. *Lushington*) seemed to think, in consequence, that his honourable friend (Mr. *Moore*) was not much of a sportsman. Now he thought that his honourable friend was a sportsman, and a very successful one, though in a different field—the *field of cor-*

ruption.—(Laughter.)—He had no doubt, to use Mr. Lowndes, a couplet of Pope, somewhat altered, that his honourable friend came to the Court that day—

“ To shoot *corruption* as it flies,

“ And catch the manners living as they rise !”

This being the case, he thought they were assembled on a better occasion, than if they had met to shoot a parcel of poor partridges ; and, he thought they would be successful in their sport for

*Nil desperandum Moore dicit.*

But though he wished them success as to the property tax he could not agree with the proposition respecting the Court of Directors ; he could not agree in the principle, to be found in *The School for Scandal*, which encouraged us “ to be *generous* before we were *just* ;” and described Justice as an “ old, lame, hobbling belcham.”—It was their duty to conduct themselves on a very different principle, and to recollect that they were then over head and ears in debt. Let that debt be reduced to 14 or £15,000,000, and then the proposal might be made with a very good grace ; but, as they were then situated, it was most preposterous to call on



**Mr. Lowndes.** them to encrease their expenditure. He was aware that debt was necessary in India as well as in this country, to keep the political machine in regular order. It operated like the weights affixed to a jack, by which the wheels were kept in motion : but care ought to be taken to balance the weights properly, otherwise, the jack itself might be brought to the ground. A just and upright character was as necessary to a body, as to an individual. And, what would be thought of a man, who, being plunged in debt, should go to those to whom the management of his affairs had been committed, and demand 2 or £300 a year out of that money, which ought to be appropriated to the payment of his creditors? No reason had been adduced, sufficiently strong to justify them, at the present moment, in incurring any additional expenditures.

As to the Proprietors, he was always in favour of their interests, because prejudice had borne hard upon them. Their profits had been grossly mis-stated ; but, if those profits were compared with the gains of other persons in the State, they would appear inconsiderable. One hundred pounds laid out in lands, or in canal property, a century ago, produced five times as much now. The East-India Company's stock had risen from £100 to 175. But, let those who spoke of their

profits, look to landed property; let them look Mr. Lowndes. to houses, and they would find that a sixfold increase had taken place. Every description of property, except the three per cent. consuls, had risen in value. He had purchased into that stock, to the amount of £2,000, at 104, and it had now fallen nearly one half. He did not like envy to scan their profits with an invidious eye. Many gentlemen in the House of Commons, who talked so much of the exorbitant interest which the Company derived from their stock, were themselves making 20 per cent. by their lands. He thought, however, that the proposition respecting their dividends would not serve the Proprietors. If the motion were carried, the public would immediately say, "Now they have got their Charter, " when the watch is scarcely capable of going, " they come forward with a motion, to be generous to themselves, at the expense of the " country, to which they owe so much." With respect to any debt being due to Government, he utterly denied the fact; what they had received, was, in truth, nothing more than a part of the money, which Government owed to them: it was a portion of that £4,000,000 which they derived from the China trade. He never would consider it as a part of their £30,000,000 of debt: he should always separate the one from the other:

**Mr. Lowndes.** and he thought it was most uncandid to confound them. Government merely lent them their own money, as the Indian servant advanced cash to his lord and master, which he had just received from him. It was not from any aversion to the Company that he should oppose the motion, but because it would afford their enemies an opportunity of speaking against them. Mr. Lowndes was proceeding, amidst loud cries of *order!* to point out the necessity of remunerating the porters in a more adequate manner.—(*Order! order!*)

**Mr. P. Moore.** Mr. P. Moore assured the honourable Proprietor, that, on any other day, he would be very ready to hear what he had to offer on this point; but he hoped that he would not take up the time of the Court then, with observations on a subject not at all before them.

**Mr. Lowndes.** Mr. Lowndes contended, that his observations were called for by the motion. He wished to point out the necessity of being *just* before they were *generous*. He then proceeded to complain of some defect in the internal regulations of the House.

**Rev. Mr. Thirkwall.** The Rev. Mr. Thirkwall spoke to order: and the Chairman admonished the honourable Proprietor to speak to the question before the Court. There was a respect due to the deliberations of

a public body, which ought never to be lost sight of; but which the honourable Proprietor too often departed from. The Chairman.

Mr. *Lowndes* proceeded. The meeting of that day clearly proved the justice of the observations he had formerly made, that more than nine Proprietors ought to be required to constitute a Court. Mr. Lowndes.

Mr. *Hume* spoke to order. The matter under consideration related solely to their dividend, and had nothing to do with the forms by which the Court was constituted. Mr. Hume

Mr. *Lowndes* contended that he was in order. It was most improper that they should be called upon, in so thin a Court, to take money out of the public purse. Mr. Lowndes.

Mr. *Hume* wished to correct the honourable gentleman's assertion, that they were met to take money out of any person's pocket. They had merely assembled to recommend a certain proceeding to their Executive Body; and, when the honourable gentleman asserted, that they were about to put their hands into the public purse, he went much beyond what he had a right to do in that Court. Mr. Hume.

Mr. *Lowndes* inquired, if the recommendation were agreed to, would it not be carried into effect, without the intervention of another Court? Mr. Lowndes.

The Chair-  
man.  
Mr. Hume.

The *Chairman* replied, it certainly would.

Mr. *Hume* said, it was not his intention originally to have offered any observations on the present subject, but he found it necessary to make a few remarks, and he should, very shortly, state his sentiments. An honourable Proprietor (Mr. Dixon) seemed to think that the gentlemen who supported the motion, were desirous of committing the Court; and had asked, under what new circumstances the Company could stand forward and demand an addition of one per cent. to their profits; or that their dividends should be freed from the payment of 10 per cent. property tax? In answer to the interrogatory of the honourable Proprietor, he begged leave to inform him, that the new circumstances which gave weight to their application, were to be found in the state of public credit. It was well known, that, previous to the present arrangement, their stock was from 180 to 200 per cent. But, in consequence of the alarm which had prevailed, as to the renewal of the Company's Charter, it was now as low as 150. Something, therefore, should be done, to raise it to its proper price in the market. He saw nothing in the present moment which rendered their claim either improper or unreasonable. If His Majesty's

Ministers granted the boon, which was of such a moderate nature, as, he thought, would induce them to comply with the application, the credit of the Company would be increased: the whole body would become richer, and the Country would not be rendered poorer. He, therefore, hoped the measure would pass, (unanimously it could not, as two gentlemen were determined to oppose it,) but with so large a majority as would decidedly speak the sense of the Court.

Mr. *Samuel Dixon* wished to say a few words in explanation of the question he had put to the honourable Chairman. When he asked that question, he harboured no doubt of the truth of the honourable Mover's assertion, that the Directors were not acquainted with his intention; but, as he knew that a disposition existed to misrepresent the transactions of the Company; as busy minds were at work to place a wrong interpretation upon their conduct, he thought it would be better to have the fact publicly avowed, to prevent any erroneous reports; and, therefore, he had asked the question.

Mr. *Bosanquet* apprehended that it would appear very extraordinary to the Proprietors, if, on the motion which was then before the Court, no gentleman, on that side of the bar from which he had the honour to address them, offered an

Mr. Bosan-  
quet.

Mr. Bosan-  
quet.

opinion. He was no orator, and therefore he should deliver his sentiments in a plain unornamented manner. He would do so, because he should feel very sorry, if the Proprietors were induced to believe, in consequence of the silence of him and his colleagues, that any thing like a lukewarm disposition existed amongst them, on points connected with the general prosperity of the Company. He, however, begged the Proprietors to understand, that the motion came before them totally unconnected with any other proposition. And, considering it in that point of view, he could give a more decided opinion, than if the two propositions were discussed in conjunction. The motion before the Court, as he understood it, was simply this: that there was a claim on the public, by the Proprietors of East-India Stock, to be relieved from the pressure of the Income Tax on their dividends; and that the Executive Body should be instructed to advance and support that claim. He perfectly agreed with the honourable Mover in the justice of the demand; and he would be happy to exert himself, as far as possible, for the purpose of obtaining the boon; but he did not think it was in the power of His Majesty's Ministers to grant it, without the acquiescence of Parliament. This, however, he merely threw out, as a doubtful point. On a

former occasion, when the same subject was brought forward, he used his utmost efforts, both in public and private, to procure the countenance of His Majesty's Ministers to the request of the Company. Unfortunately he was not successful. He had been enabled, at the time to which he alluded, to take every possible step for the attainment of the object, in consequence of the situation which he held, and his having been in the habit of communicating confidentially with His Majesty's Ministers. From all he had observed, he begged leave to express very serious doubts as to the probability of the Company's claim being more favourably received at the present day; but he had no objection whatever as to the propriety of the application being made; nor did he conceive the period at which it was about to be pressed, was either injudicious or improper — (*Applause.*) An honourable Proprietor (Mr. Dixon) had asked, "Whether any difference existed between the present period and that in which the former application had been made?" In his mind, there was a very great difference indeed: at the former day they were embarrassed with negotiations; they were busy in extricating themselves from those difficulties by which they were surrounded. This was not now the case: an arrangement had been effected; and they were relieved from that pres-

Mr. Bosanquet.



Mr. Bosan-  
quet.

sure of affairs which had almost weighed them down. Still, however, his opinion was, that, even if His Majesty's Ministers were induced to support them in the endeavour to attain the object which the honourable Mover had in view, such were the unhappy circumstances in which they stood, with reference to the opinions of the public, that they would not, although thus aided and assisted, be successful. That was his sincere feeling; but he meant it not as an argument against making the experiment. As far as an individual could be instrumental in contributing to the success of the measure, his efforts were due, and should be devoted, to that body of men, who had placed him in that situation, which he then had the honour to hold.—(*Applause.*)

Mr. P. Moore,

Mr. P. Moore said, the reason why he wished to take the sense of the Court on the *first* proposition, was, because the *second* required the consideration of two Courts before it could be finally agreed to: and, looking to this circumstance, perhaps any discussion on the subject *then*, would only be losing time, as it must be debated at the next Court, appointed under one of their Bye Laws. After the explanation given by the honourable Proprietor (Mr. Dixon) of the motives which induced him to ask his extraordinary question, it was unnecessary to say more on that point. But, he hoped, when that honourable gentleman

again heard him disclaim any imputed fact, he Mr. P. Moore.  
 would pay to him the common tribute of complaisance, and give credit to his assertion, until something was adduced to throw a doubt upon it.—(*Applause.*) No human being was acquainted with the nature or scope of his resolutions before he entered the Court, except his honourable friend (Mr. Plummer), at whose private lodgings he had that morning drawn them up. He studiously abstained from making them known: it was from a feeling of delicacy that he did not practise the courtesy common on such occasions, and refrained from publishing his intentions; he would, therefore, tell those with whom the honourable gentleman might be in habits of communication, that, to accuse him with having secretly unfolded his design to the parties interested in it, was a gross calumny.

Mr. *Dixon* said, he had already declared that Mr. Dixon.  
 he entertained no doubt of the honourable gentleman's assertion; and, therefore, the observation was uncalled for.

Mr. *P. Moore* continued. He hoped the ho- Mr. P. Moore.  
 nourable Proprietor would, in future, defend his (Mr. Moore's) conduct, with the same alacrity, and with more success, than had marked his endeavour to malign it on the present occasion. .  
 Whatever he had to propose, however important,

Mr. P. Moore. he would bring forward in the face of day, leaving it completely open to fair and candid discussion.

He would now call the attention of the Proprietors to the situation in which they were placed. Very lately their Charter had been renewed—and it would be well to recollect what had taken place when the Charter of 1793 was granted to them. At that time they were allowed two per cent, so he understood, without drawback or diminution, as a remuneration for the sacrifices which the Company then made. Soon after, however, they found a part of what had been thus given them, taken away by act of Parliament. Great as was the sacrifice which they made in 1793, it was, when compared with what they had recently conceded, as *one* to *ten*. They were not, therefore, calling for an addition to their dividend—they were endeavouring to recover that of which they had been unjustly deprived. The subject had been fairly discussed: the sense of the Court was evident; and, he hoped, it would be followed up with energy and effect. The mode proposed was the only one by which they could make an application. As a Court of Proprietors, they might be said to exist; It was not in their power, standing in that capacity, to represent their situ-

ation to His Majesty's Ministers: it could alone Mr. P. Moore.  
 be done, in consequence of their instructions to  
 the executive body. If a deputation of Propri-  
 etors waited on His Majesty's Ministers, and  
 pointed out, amongst their number, names distin-  
 guished in the list-book of the Proprietary, with  
*three* and even with *four stars*—(and he believed  
 there were as many *four stars* then present, and  
 as great an amount of property represented, as  
 any Court could boast, for the last four or five  
 years, although a slur had been cast upon it, as  
 being extremely ill attended)—what would be  
 the answer given by Ministers to their applica-  
 tion? “O,” they would say, “that is a very  
 “good book; but still we don't know you: you  
 “do not exist as a body!” He made this ob-  
 servation with a view to shew the necessity of in-  
 structing those who could alone represent their  
 case; and he hoped they would remonstrate very  
 seriously with Ministers, as he had done else-  
 where. Perhaps the effort might be successful;  
 if it were not, he would consider the refusal as  
 setting aside the dictates of sound policy, and  
 outraging the principles of equity and justice.

Mr. Ferguson said, that, since the commence- Mr. Fergu-  
son.  
 ment of the Company, for every *pound* the Pro-  
 prietors had received, the country had obtained  
*nine*. He did not know that the question was

Mr. Ferguson. about to be discussed, or he would have substantiated this fact by documents.

The motion was then carried in the affirmative, with only *two* dissentients.

### AUGMENTATION OF DIRECTORS' SALARIES.

Mr. Lowndes. Mr. *Lowndes* proposed, that the honourable Proprietor should defer bringing forward his resolution on this subject till next March, when there would be a full attendance of members.

This proposal not meeting with any encouragement,

Mr. P. Moore. Mr. *P. Moore* again addressed the Court. He said, that the second resolution which he had to propose, appertained exclusively to their Executive Trust, as the other related to the interests of the Constituent Body. On the renewal of the Charter, it was absolutely necessary that they should revise their establishments; and regulate them in such a manner that due remuneration should be imparted to those who were appointed to transact the business of the Company. So much, however, had been said on this subject, by his honourable friend (Mr. Lushington) with all that elegance, force, and perspicuity which characterised his speeches, that it was unnecessary for him to address the Court at any length. An-

deed, he doubted whether it would be proper to Mr. P. Moore make any farther observations. It was his intention to *table* the second resolution, and to let it stand over for ultimate decision at a future Court ; and as two Courts were necessary before such a proposition could be adopted, the present might be considered as one of them. In framing this resolution, he was guided by the progressive increase which had taken place in the salaries of persons employed in offices of state, whose duties he could in any way assimilate to those performed by the East India Directors. He had consulted with many gentlemen on the subject, without stating his reason for the inquiry, and he found them generally dissatisfied. " We have," said some of them, " twelve or fifteen hundred pounds a year ; but we are so harrassed by business, " that we are rather inclined to resign than to go " on in the way we now do." The persons who thus complained, had very little to perform, in comparison with the duties which devolved on the members of their Executive Body : he was therefore desirous of increasing their salaries to a certain extent. What he should propose, he by no means considered as a *quantum meruit* : on that principle their services, could not be adequately remunerated ; but he wished to place the Directors, at least, on a level with gentlemen

Mr. P. Moore. who held public offices, in which there was comparatively little to do. He would instance the members of different Boards, who met merely to sign papers. They had handsome salaries; but they were strangers to that responsibility and anxiety which were inseparable from the situation of their Directors; and he had often expressed his astonishment, that their multifarious duties were discharged with so much regularity and precision. In the Boards of which he had spoken, regular hours were fixed for business. The members came at *one*, and went away at *four*, whether there was any business to transact or not; and it should not be forgotten, that, if any *additional duty* was necessary, they made a charge for *extra time*. In the India House, no such system prevailed; the idea of extra labour was unknown: if it had obtained a footing there, he must have heard of it. In collecting the sense of different individuals on the substance of his proposition, he found many who agreed completely in his view of the subject, others suggested alterations, not in the principle, but the detail—but, with respect to his leading points, he had not met a second opinion. He should not, on the present occasion, trespass longer on their time, as a proper opportunity would occur to enter fully into the subject at the next Court.

Mr. *Lowndes* wished to know when the next Court would be held? Mr. Lowndes

Mr. *P. Moore* answered, that the appointment of the day on which the next Court should assemble, did not rest with him. The honourable gentleman himself might make a motion on the subject. It had, however, been the general custom, to leave the nomination to their executive body; because the Proprietors could not be acquainted with the circumstances which might render the calling a Court either inconvenient or otherwise; while the gentlemen behind the bar must be perfectly cognisant of those circumstances. Mr. P. Moore

Mr. *Lowndes* said, that, when the object was to put money into the pockets of the Directors, they ought not to be consulted on any part of the proceedings. Mr. Lowndes

Mr. *P. Moore* begged the honourable Proprietor to reserve such observations as these, until necessity called for them. He must surely know that "*sufficient for the day is the evil thereof!*" When the proper period for discussion arrived, he hoped gentlemen would meet the question with good humour and with candour. He should be sorry to see them come forward to deliver their sentiments with minds poisoned, inflamed, and gangrened. Let the subject be properly con- Mr. P. Moore



Mr. P. Moore. sidered; but let not gentlemen be led away by causeless suspicions of secret influence.—(*Great applause.*)—Mr. Moore then read the following resolution—

“ That so much of the bye-law, chap. 6. sec. 11.  
 “ as ordains that the Chairman and Deputy Chair-  
 “ man of the Court of Directors shall each of them  
 “ be allowed five hundred pounds a-year, and  
 “ every other Director three hundred pounds  
 “ a-year, for his attendance upon the business of  
 “ this Company be, and the same is hereby re-  
 “ pealed; and that instead thereof it be, and  
 “ is hereby ordained, that the said Chairman and  
 “ Deputy, each of them, be allowed £1500 a-  
 “ year, and every other Director £1000 a-year,  
 “ for his attendance upon the business of this  
 “ Company.”

Mr. Lowndes. Mr. *Lowndes* inquired, whether, if this increase were granted, the Directors were to retain all their patronage?

Mr. P. Moore. Mr. *P. Moore* observed, a proper time would arrive for discussing that point.

Mr. S. Dixon. Mr. *Samuel Dixon* submitted to the honourable gentleman the propriety of merely giving notice, on that day, of his intention, at a future Court, to propose such a motion. It must be evident to him, that, whether the resolution were agreed to at that, or the next half-yearly Court, was a matter of very little moment.

After a few observations from Mr. *Bosanquet* and Mr. Alderman *Atkins*, on a point of order, namely, whether the resolution could at all be received by the Court under the existing circumstances, the motion was read by the clerk.

Mr. Bosanquet.  
Mr. Atkins.

Mr. *Lushington* then rose and said, that having already troubled the Court, in substance, with what he meant to offer in support of the resolution, he should intrude but for a very short time on their attention. He considered the proposition then submitted to them, to be of such immense importance to the interests of the Company, that no period should be permitted to pass, where an opportunity occurred, without discussing it. Whether they then agreed to the resolution, or let it lie over for discussion on another day, he thought, looking to the respectability of the Court, they could not do better than deliver their sentiments on it at that moment. It appeared to him, that this motion called for their warmest support, both with respect to the gentlemen who now filled the office of Directors, as well as with reference to those who might hereafter be placed in that elevated situation. The present Directors had every claim to their gratitude, respect, and esteem, on the ground of the services which they had performed; which were no less honourable to their attention and ability,

Mr. Lushington.

Mr. Lushington.

than they were beneficial to the general interests of the Company: and he must be a very inattentive observer of their conduct, who could form any other opinion.—(*Applause.*)—It was true, in that Court he had had very few opportunities of observing the manner in which they proceeded—but having witnessed it in another place, he could speak, most conscientiously, to their prudence, integrity and industry. Their conduct shewed that they were Statesmen—they acted upon principles of sound policy—they knew the *moment when* and the *manner in which* they should yield that which it was impossible for them to retain.—(*Applause*)—To their indefatigable exertions, aided by the sustaining wisdom and moderation of the King's Government, the Company owed their possession of that Charter, which, as he had already asserted, was favourable to the interests of all parties. Looking to the vigilance and ability they had displayed, he wished to do that which would be worthy both of the Proprietors and the Directors; but he would disdain to act on any private feeling: nothing but a great public principle should sway him. And, he would ask, conformably with that great public principle, was £500 or £300 per annum, an adequate reward for services performed in the most exemplary manner? Or was it an encou-

agement for those who were hereafter, to become members of the Executive Body?—(Ap-  
*plause*).

Mr. Lush-  
ington.

Much had been said, he would not say how justly, on the subject of another source of gratification, which the Directors were said to possess—he meant their *patronage*. But he would ask of those who were in the habit of giving away patronage, whether there was not at least as much dissatisfaction, as satisfaction, in the power? He would ask, must they not, in disposing of that patronage, disappoint *twenty persons* for *one* whom they pleased? and surely the anger of the former was more to be regretted than the gratification of the latter was to be prized!—(*Applause*.)—He really believed, that those who had the disposal of patronage considered it as no very enviable power.

In the view he took of the present question, the effect which the proposition, if carried, would have on those who hereafter might fill the situations which his hon. friend (Mr. Thornton) and the gentlemen around him then held, appeared to him to be the most material branch of the argument; because it must be evident to every gentleman who had given even ordinary attention to the subject, that the best and brightest talents, the most profound knowledge of the Company's

Mr. Lushington.

affairs,—were necessary for conducting, with success, the business of so immense an establishment. Men, possessing these qualifications, should be stimulated, by a prospect of fair and honourable remuneration, to come forward and devote their abilities to the service of the general body.—Though the storm was now gone by, might it not, he would ask, return with tenfold violence?—might it not return at a period when the government would not be so willing to assist the Company as they had recently been?—might they not again be assailed with that popular clamour which it was almost impossible to oppose?—might not that *civium ardor prava jubentium*, which *they* (for he had a share in the victory) most successfully resisted, again be directed to their ruin? what then was their duty? To take a distinct view of the great interests the Company had at stake, and to make such a liberal provision, as would encourage men of talents to accept of the highest offices amongst them. In the full confidence that this was the only mode by which the interests of the Company could be preserved, he should vote for the proposition of his hon. friend, which was every way to be commended. It gave to the Directors that to which they were entitled; and, at the same time, provided for the security of the Proprietors.—(Applause.)

Mr. *Bosanquet* wished to make a few remarks on a point of order. If the opinion of the General Court were against him, of course, they might proceed in the business; but if, on the other hand, it were apparent, that he was correct in the view he had taken of the matter, his honourable friend would see that the resolution could not now be entertained, and that it could not even lie on the table, as a motion, in conformity with the bye-laws. He had taken the liberty of offering himself before the motion was read, but, to save the time of the Court he had given way. He would now, however, state his objection. On looking to the bye-laws, page 42, section 4, the following provision would be found:—"That no motion shall in future be made in a General Court, to forgive offences committed by any of the Company's officers, or to make grants of any sums of money out of the Company's cash, without notice be given, and published by the Court of Directors, *fourteen days* previous to holding the General Court." Now, as the motion then before the Court was for rescinding a part of one of their bye-laws, by which the Chairman and Deputy Chairman were allowed £500 per annum, and every other Director, £300; and, for substituting, in lieu of that provision, the sum of £1,500 per annum to the two first mentioned officers, and

Mr. Bosanquet.

Mr. Bosanquet.

of £1,000 to the others ; for their attendance on the business of the Company,—he would ask his hon. friend and the Court, whether that was not a grant of the Company's cash? If the Proprietors were of opinion that it was, then, he thought, in point of form, notice should be issued.—He did not pretend to say, that the present proceeding was entirely without precedent. On a former occasion, a different course might have been adopted. But, if the application of the bye-law was such as he conceived it to be, looking at the object of the motion, and the extent to which it was intended to go, he thought the Court of Directors ought to be allowed to publish it to all the world, that those who were interested might attend if they chose it.—(*Applause*).—Whether the Court would agree that he was correct in his interpretation of the bye-law, he could not say ;—but, considering the amount of the sum proposed, considering all the circumstances of the case, he was firmly convinced, that, if they made a mistake in the course they pursued, it should rather be in favour of giving more notice than was necessary, than on the side of giving what might appear too little.

Mr. Lowndes. Mr. Lowndes said, no bye-law could tie up men's mouths. There was a very great difference between hearing a notice of a grant, and

acting on it. They were not then about to come to a decision—they were merely discussing the propriety of entertaining the motion on another day. So far from having any objection to the resolution, he had, two years ago, drawn up a plan for remunerating the Directors on a much more liberal scale; so far from his mind being inflamed, or poisoned, or gangrened, against his hon. friend, he still considered him as the same pure public character he had always thought him. Two years ago, he had formed a scheme to purify the Court; to do away that, which created all evil amongst mankind—he meant *temptation*. It was that which produced variance between man and man, and, therefore, it was said, “lead us not into temptation.” By the influence of that principle, men were led to swerve from their duty. He did not mean to say, that the Directors had abandoned theirs, but, as they were men, they also might be tempted. His idea was to allow the Chairman £5,000 per annum; the Deputy Chairman, 3,000; and every other Director, £2,000 —*Laughter.*)—And, he would contend, that these salaries were not more than they deserved. But, let them not suppose, that their bread was to be buttered on both sides. No, if they were thus remunerated, he expected they would give up their *patronage*. In consequence of that

Mr. Lowndes



Mr. Lowndes. patronage, great odium had been cast on the Company, and, till it was abandoned, that odium could never be got rid of. He would, on that condition, even double the grant to the Directors, but he would not be generous with other people's money. He was a very small Proprietor—he was not a *star* of the first magnitude—he was a very diminutive luminary indeed. But, for all that, he had a right to deliver his sentiments in that Court, in the same way that a forty-shilling freeholder, in a county, was authorized to advance his opinion in opposition to a man of £10,000 a year. They would not surely be guided by the quantity of stock a man held, but by his good intentions, and the wisdom which he displayed. Now, if his plan were carried into effect, it would not demand so much money as gentlemen might suppose. One thousand pounds, under his system, would go as far as £2,000 at present,—for he intended to reduce the number of Directors to 12 ; and, it was very well known that, even now, six Directors were set aside, every year, who did not act. The principle of his hon. friend, by which the salaries of the Directors should be increased, met with his warm concurrence. Let them have a liberal salary, but let the patronage be given up. That was the most effectual way of removing the sting of prejudice.

which had done them so much mischief; and Mr. Lowndes, but for which, he had no doubt, the Company would have obtained much more advantageous terms, in the renewal of their Charter. That patronage, like the tythes of the clergy, created dislike and dissatisfaction in the public mind. He had himself been told by several worthy clergymen, that they would much rather have £1,000 per annum in *glebe*, than £1,500 in *tythes*: now, as the chief use of riches was to procure respectability, he thought the Directors with £1,000, or, as he proposed, £2,000 a year, their patronage being given up, would attract to themselves, in the public mind, a much greater portion of that quality than they were at present supposed to possess. That subject ought never to be suffered to rest; like Homer, it ought to be studied by day, and pondered on by night.—(*Laughter.*)—It was that odious, detestable, abominable patronage, which had sunk the Company in the mud for so many years. (*Cries of order!*)—It was very hard that so much obloquy and complaint should be levelled at the Proprietors; it was most unjust that they should be loaded with all the odium and ill-will of the people—as if *they* fed upon *turtle* and *venison*, who could scarcely procure *bread* and *water*. It was very unfair that *they* should be amalga-

Mr. Lowndes. mated with the Directors, and accused with supporting an overwhelming monopoly, when, in fact, the whole patronage was swallowed up by the Executive Body. (*Order! order!*)—He could now see the drift of his honourable friend: they were beginning where they ought to begin; the idea was a good one, and he hoped it would be followed up with success, as it deserved to be. When gentlemen retired to their houses, he hoped they would consider what was proposed for their adoption; he hoped they would mark the spirit which had been called forth, and follow the *time*, instead of attempting to resist it. Looking to the strength of talent by which the motion was likely to be supported, in all human probability, unless sinister means were resorted to, it would be carried. The present exertion was as “a grain of mustard seed;” but, if cherished by the spirit of independence, it would, at length, become a great tree, overshadowing and protecting both the interests of the Directors and the Proprietors. The only tree of liberty, of which he could understand the meaning, was the tree of *purity*, and he now began to hope that they would eat of it till they were full. The present he declared to be the happiest period of his life, when reformation was about to be introduced. Like Thames water, the Company

would become more pure by being placed in a temporary state of fermentation. He would again declare to his honourable friend, that his mind was neither poisoned nor gangrened. He never entered that Court, *nolens volens*, to speak for or against a measure of which he knew nothing. He never came there to act against the Directors as a body; he came to contribute his widow's mite towards the downfall of corruption—he came to oppose the *measures* of their executive body, and not the *men* who composed it.

Mr. *Davies* begged to ask the Chairman whether, in point of fact, there was any question now before the Court? and whether the question proposed by the honourable gentleman (Mr. Moore) had been seconded? Mr. Davies.

The *Chairman* said he understood that the question had been seconded. The Chairman.

Mr. *Davies* then begged to ask whether, consistently with the bye-laws of the house, such a question could be entertained, without fourteen days notice thereof? Mr. Davies.

The *Chairman* said that the pleasure of the Court might be taken upon that question: but he understood that the motion of the honourable gentleman (Mr. Moore) had been seconded by another honourable gentleman (Mr. Lushington). The Chairman.

**Mr. P. Moore.** Mr. *Peter Moore* availed himself of this opportunity to assure his honourable friend (Mr. Lowndes), that when he (Mr. Moore) used the terms *acrimony* and *poison*, that he never meant to apply them to him (Mr. Lowndes). He thought it necessary to give this explanation, because his honourable friend seemed erroneously to conceive that they were meant to be applied to him personally.

**Mr. Lowndes** Mr. *Lowndes* was so well convinced of the purity of his honourable friend's mind, that he was sure he would not deliberately use expressions without well considering the justice of their foundation. As he (Mr. Lowndes) felt no disposition to be out of humour, he certainly did not think that the expressions were applicable to him.

**Mr. P. Moore.** Mr. *Moore* said, he was persuaded that no suspicion of that nature could apply to his honourable friend through the course of these proceedings: but, whether or not, he was willing now to give way upon the principle on which he stood from the beginning of this day's proceedings;—namely, that this was a question, in the consideration of which, the Court ought not to be taken by surprise. But, in the apparent error into which he had been led would be found sufficient proof, that he had not consulted, either directly

or indirectly, any one gentleman behind the bar, Mr.P.Mc upon the subject of his motion. No doubt if he had, they would have pointed out to him the error into which he had fallen. He hoped, however, the Court would now be convinced, that, in the line of conduct he had chalked out for himself, he was influenced by no other motive than a strictly conscientious adherence to what he thought was the justice of the case. It certainly had occurred to him, that a fitter opportunity than the present could not have been selected for the discussion of this subject : however, as there was no man more willing than himself to give way to the pleasure of the Court, he certainly would conform himself to the suggestion of the honourable gentleman behind the bar. Upon reading the bye-law to which the attention of the Court had been called, he confessed, for his own part, it did not appear to him to apply to the specific proposition he had made. If he had intended to make a motion which was to take £5,000, or any other sum of money, out of the Company's coffers, doubtless there would have been an impediment to the motion similar to that suggested, and then the bye law in question would apply ; but to this motion he apprehended, with humble deference, that law did not apply, because, at most, the resolution would go simply

**Mr. P. Moore.** to a declaration of the opinion of the Court upon such a proposition; and no practical consequence could take place upon it, without further and more detailed deliberation. In all events, two other Courts must necessarily be convened for its consideration, before the principle of it could be carried into operation. He was unwilling that the sense of the Court should be formally taken now upon the subject, after what had been just suggested. If the principle could be but recognized and established in the minds of gentlemen, he would be satisfied for the present, and leave the details of the proposition for future deliberation. Though he had somewhat taken the Court by surprise, according to the strict interpretation of the bye-law, still he was satisfied that the present discussion would do no harm to the cause he had at heart. All he had to request of gentlemen was, that having laid before the Court the outline of his plan, they would have the goodness to take it into their individual consideration, by the time of their next meeting. He hoped that this would be received as full notice and publication of his intention, under the provisions of the bye-laws. He should have no hesitation himself in coming to a decision upon the question this day; but sensible, as he was, of the respect that was due to the sense

of the Court, he should certainly withdraw the Mr.P.M. motion, and give fourteen days notice of his intention to bring it forward on some future occasion. He begged, however, to observe, in justification of his conduct in not having strictly followed the clause in the bye-laws, page 44, that he had entirely acted upon the precedent of the year 1793, when the Court came to a similar resolution, with only a difference in the amount of the sums. He had exactly copied that resolution, only altering the salaries to the amount now proposed to the Court. In that resolution of 1793, the salary of the Directors separately was £300 per annum, and that of the Chairman and Deputy Chairman £500 per annum. Instead of those sums, he had now substituted £1,000 per annum for the Directors, and £1,500 for the Chairman and Deputy Chairman. He had thought it fitting to put this resolution, as near as possible, upon the principle of *quantum meruit* for services so highly deserving the liberal remuneration of the Court. He was sure there was not an individual Proprietor who did not feel that a resolution somewhat similar to this was highly desirable; not simply upon principles of generosity, but of strict justice. Entertaining such an opinion, he confidently anticipated, if not the



Mr. P. Moore. unanimous concurrence of the Court in his motion, at least that it would be carried decisively in the affirmative. With the permission of the Court, he would now withdraw his motion, and take the most convenient opportunity of giving notice of a future discussion.

Mr. Bosanquet.

Mr. *Bosanquet* certainly thought that, without withdrawing his motion altogether, the honourable gentleman might, consistently with the bye-laws, submit the first part of it to the consideration of the Court. It was to the latter part of the resolution, respecting the amount of the salary proposed to be given to the Court of Directors, that he entertained objection, under the provisions of the bye-laws, which required fourteen days notice of its discussion. He hoped the Court of Proprietors would feel that in suggesting this objection he had acted from a sense of what he thought to be his duty. However, at the same time, he admitted that it was a matter which was perhaps subject to some little doubt and difficulty. He had himself felt the objection very forcibly, and therefore he had stated it in the beginning. He was free to confess that it was perfectly competent for the honourable gentleman to entertain the first part of the motion, at the present moment; but, at the same,

time, he did think that it was a question of which the fullest and most public notice ought to be given to the Proprietors. The Proprietors ought to be duly informed of the object of the motion which was intended to be made. It was the more necessary, because it related to an increase of the salaries of the Directors.

Mr. Bosanquet.

Mr. Moore was happy to be understood by the honourable Director who spoke last, in the view he entertained of this subject. He concurred in the difficulty of getting over the provision of the bye-law, with respect to the actual sum to be voted. All that he now wished was, that the justice of the remuneration he proposed should be recognized.

Mr. P. Moore

Mr. Bosanquet said, that it could only be considered as a motion, and must be subject to the consideration of two Courts, before it could be carried into effect.

Mr. Bosanquet.

Mr. Moore concurred in this observation; but, at the same time, saw no difficulty in entertaining this motion as it stood, with respect to the principle of the proposition, leaving the practical effect of it to the operation of another resolution. He was, for his own part, extremely anxious that the fullest discussion should take place upon the subject: and he felt perfectly satisfied that every opportunity would be afforded for that pur-

Mr. P. M.

**Mr. P. Moore.** pose. Sufficient publicity would be given, after the result of this day's proceedings, to the intention he had in view; and he hoped that those Proprietors who had not an opportunity of giving their attendance that day, would attend in their places when the subject was next brought forward. He flattered himself, that the apparent prematurity of the step he had taken, would not be attended with any bad consequences; on the contrary, he anticipated the most favourable result to his humble exertions.

**The Chairman.**

The *Chairman* said, that having communicated with the Company's solicitor, he was enabled to state, for the information of the Court, that the most proper course of proceeding, was to give notice of the intended motion, and to have two Courts afterwards for its discussion. For his own part, he should think, that upon a matter of so much consequence to the interests of the Proprietors, the longest and the fullest notice ought to be given: he supposed fourteen days, at least, to be indispensable on such an occasion, in order to ensure the fullest possible attendance.

**Mr. Lowndes.**

Mr. *Lowndes* rose (under a general cry of *order! order! spoke! spoke!*) and said, that as soon as the Court should dispose of the present motion, he should propose that the thanks of the Court should be given to his worthy friend,

Mr. Peter Moore, and to his honourable friend Mr. Lowndes. the seconder of this question.—(Cries of *order ! order !*)

Mr. *Hume* requested the attention of the Mr. *Hume*. Court for a few moments before his honourable friend, Mr. Moore, made the motion. It was his intention to submit for the consideration of the Court: a motion on the subject of the salaries of the servants of the East India House, and the motion of which he (Mr. Moore,) had intimated his intention to give notice was perfectly consistent with those sentiments he (Mr. Hume) had formerly expressed on another occasion upon the same subject. But, however, his own views were rather more extensive; and the principle of just remuneration was not merely confined to the higher servants of the Company, but to a body of men who, though not so prominent in their situations, had as just a claim as any persons connected with the Company, upon the generosity of the Court of Proprietors. They were men whose usefulness to the establishments of the Company the Court was too perfectly acquainted with to need any elucidation of his. At the last Court he had submitted a motion upon the subject; but that motion being considered as irregular, he did not press it. He would now take the liberty of reading the motion he had

Mr. Hume. then made, with the view of drawing the attention of the Court to it, as a part of his speech. He could have no manner of objection to augment the salaries of the Court of Directors; but he would submit to the Proprietors, that as the subject of remuneration to the Company's servants was proposed, whether they ought not to do equal justice to servants in more humble capacities, and take into their consideration the salaries and allowances now made to the numerous private servants of the Company.

It was notorious, that many persons who were now devoting their best labours and exertions for promoting the interests of the Company, were very inadequately remunerated for those services. There were many whose salaries were now utterly incompetent to maintain them at their advanced age of life, however adequate they might have been at a period when the necessities of life were more moderate in price. It was, therefore, with a view to avoid the appearance of partiality to any particular body of men, and to do justice to all the servants of the Company, that he wished, *de radice*, to reform the system by which the business of the Company's affairs were conducted, in the article of remuneration. With this view he would take the liberty of reading the proposition, by permission of the

Court, which he could have wished had been Mr. Hume.  
brought before them.

“That a Committee of twenty-one Proprietors  
“ be elected, by nomination, in the next General  
“ Court, to meet and enquire into the nature of  
“ the duty performed by the different officers be-  
“ longing to the East-India House, its Ware-  
“ houses, Wharfs, College, &c. the number of  
“ servants, and their salaries, and to report their  
“ opinions upon each to this Court. That the  
“ Committee shall have the power to send for all  
“ persons, books and papers, which they may  
“ deem requisite to enable them to point out the  
“ deficiency or excess of the servants, and their  
“ allowances, for the purpose of a seasonable in-  
“ crease or retrenchment of the same.”

This was one of the objects he had deeply at heart; and he would submit to his honourable friend (Mr. Moore), whether it would not be better to make a general motion upon the subject, without calling the attention of the Court to any particular class of individuals merely. He could not conceive any thing more reasonable, than to refer to such a committee, chosen out of the body of the Proprietors, the consideration of this important subject. They would be able to point out and report to the Court of Proprietors at large, what alterations ought to be made in the way of

Mr. Hume.

addition, and what deduction ought to be made in the way of retrenchment of expences, in the salaries of the different officers and servants of the Company: for it might happen in some instances, that persons received more remuneration than their services were entitled to; and that in others, the services were far above the remuneration. It was, therefore, desirable, in his opinion, to refer the whole subject to the consideration of a committee of twenty-one Proprietors, who would have authority to make such reports as occurred to them to be necessary; and to point out such alterations as, in their discernment, might seem expedient for the amelioration of the condition of those persons to whom he alluded.

With these observations he would submit the resolution he had read to the consideration of the Court, leaving it to the good sense of his honourable friend, whether he would embody the spirit of that resolution in his intended motion.

The Chairman.

The *Chairman* said, he was afraid the honourable gentleman (Mr. Hume) was a little irregular, as he (the Chairman) understood that the honourable gentleman who had made the motion now before the Court, wished to withdraw it. It would be impossible, therefore, to entertain the motion now proposed by the honourable gentleman by way of amendment. It would be more

orderly to suggest such an amendment when the motion of the other honourable gentleman came regularly before the Court.

Mr. *Hume* said, he did not propose it either as Mr. Hume.  
a motion or as an amendment. He simply introduced it as a suggestion, for the consideration of the Court, and of his honourable friend.

The *Chairman* repeated that, in fact, there was The Chair-  
no question before the Court. man.

Mr. *Lowndes* again rose, notwithstanding a general cry of *order! order!* and said, that though the remuneration of the Court of Directors for their important services was a paramount object with him, yet he must say that he highly approved of what the honourable gentleman (Mr. Hume) had said. He did, however, think, that the question of remuneration to the Court of Directors ought to be decided by itself, when it was considered that it was wholly unconnected with the interests of the other servants of the Company. No doubt the latter deserved the most serious attention of the Proprietors: but to avoid confusion, the former ought to be disposed of first. Mr. Lowndes.

Mr. Alderman *Atkins* begged to say one or Mr. Atkins.  
two words.) He did not, however, wish to trouble the Court with any observations upon the merits of the question, because it was now the



Mr. Atkins. understanding, that the honourable gentleman who moved it, meant to bring it forward again after due notice, on some future day. He was quite sure that, when that day arrived, it would receive that attention and consideration to which a question of so much importance was entitled: he should therefore reserve the declaration of his sentiments until a more fit occasion. He was aware that, although the honourable gentleman, whom he hoped he might be permitted to call his honourable friend (Mr. Moore) did not take the Court actually by surprise, yet he (Mr. Alderman Atkins) was one of those, who thought this question of so much importance, that the most ample notice ought to be given of its discussion. It would indeed be extremely hard upon the rest of the Proprietors who were not present, if the Court were this day to come to any thing like a decision, in the present state of the business. Every man present, he was sure, would be extremely reluctant that any thing like hurry or contrivance should mark the proceedings of the Court, on an occasion so interesting to the whole body of the Proprietors. He must therefore say, for his own part, that before he gave a decisive vote one way or the other, it must come fairly and fully under their consideration; and he must say, that as it was brought forward to day, it

was not likely to meet with such a consideration; Mr. Atkins. but at the same time that he deprecated every thing like haste, he did hope the honourable gentleman would not postpone it longer, than the convenience and the interests of the general body of Proprietors required: and whilst he gave sufficient notice of its consideration, he would not fail to remember the urgent reasons which pressed it upon the notice of the Proprietary.

Having said this, he would just beg leave to remark, that as it was proposed to give adequate remuneration to the Court of Directors, for the services performed by them, it was necessary to apprize them that the Proprietors would expect from them that assiduous personal attention to the interests of the Company, which was now become necessary more than ever, in consequence of the competition which the new position of the Company's affairs, in the eastern world, in the commercial transactions of India, would require. They would have to bear in mind, that their vigilance and activity were more than ever necessary to be put in execution. Indeed, their own interests, as well as the interests of those whose fortunes were entrusted to their guardianship, would sufficiently impress them with a due sense of the critical situation, in which they were placed; by that commercial competition to whose encroach-

Mr. Atkins.

ments they were now exposed. But the view of this question, which more than any other affected his mind, was the absolute necessity of introducing some defined and settled system for the remuneration of the Company's servants. Regularity and order were the soul of business; and they were the more necessary in an establishment like the East India Company, so multifarious and complex as it was in its arrangements. As the Court of Proprietors were called upon to give the sanction of their approbation to so considerable an increase of the Directors' salaries, it was of the highest importance that they should know, for *what services* and upon *what principle* that increase was to be granted. The Court should recollect, that they were now called upon to enter into a resolution, which was not merely to bind themselves, but which should be binding upon those who should hereafter stand in their places. The greatest caution and circumspection therefore were required at their hands, before they gave their final sanction to a step so important in its consequences. For his own part, if the duties which would be required of the Directors, by the new arrangement of the Company's affairs, were discharged as they ought to be, it was impossible to reward them too much: but then it was absolutely necessary that some systematic plan and

principle should be laid down for that purpose. Mr. Atkins.  
His hon. friend (Mr. Moore) should be prepared to come forward with sufficient considerations and arguments, in favour of the necessity of it, before he called upon the Court to adopt his resolution ; beside which, on the other hand, the Court of Directors should be prepared to meet the Court of Proprietors, upon the same liberal principles with which the Proprietors were ready to consider their claims upon the generous feelings of the representative body. They should be ready to say, that they were willing to make every sacrifice, consistently with the duties which they owed to themselves, for the benefit of those, whose interests were entrusted to their care. They should declare themselves ready to uphold, by every means in their power, the commercial interests of the Proprietors, against that influence which the new competition had a natural tendency to have upon their affairs. Under such a compact as this, the greatest willingness would be found, in the hearts of the Proprietors, to satisfy them, for the first demands which would then be made upon their liberality. He professed himself to be as ready, as any man in that Court, to reward the services of the Directors, in a manner fully adequate to their deserts ; but all he desired was, that whatever should be done

Mr. Atkins. upon this head, should be done systematically, and upon principles reconcilable to that good sense which ought always to characterize the proceedings of that Court. To enter upon a business of such importance without system would be the extreme of folly. He wished to understand clearly and distinctly, in the first instance, upon what principle it was this increase of salary was to be given—what services were to be expected at the hands of the Directors? Doubt and uncertainty upon this subject would lead to the greatest confusion and inconvenience. He wished also to understand what the whole remuneration was that the Directors were to receive, in their capacity of Directors. Hitherto, that point was involved in great obscurity. Their standing salary was known; but what their other emoluments were, could never be ascertained with any degree of certainty. It was well known that the patronage and influence which they possessed and exercised had subjected them to a great deal of odium and suspicion. Now, he wanted that they should have neither *influence* nor *patronage*. He wished that they should give up the whole of their time to their public duties, and that they should have for that sacrifice, a full and competent remuneration. If they gave up their time, certainly it was fair that they should have a com-

petent requital for their services. For his own Mr. Atkins, part, it would occur to him that the possession of that patronage which had subjected them to so much unpopularity and suspicion was an object which they would rather give up than retain. If they considered their own interests, he should think they would give up that, the possession of which could to them be only a source of anxiety and odium. He invited them to give up their patronage to the Court of Proprietors, who were capable of using it, in the first place, with quite as much advantage to the public service; and in the second place, with none of that partiality and private influence, which certainly had been attributed to the exercise of it by the Directory. He would recommend that the mode of exercising the patronage which he thus suggested the expediency of giving up to the Proprietors, should be assimilated to the practice of the governors of Christ's Hospital, when a presentation came to them for their approbation. By such an arrangement as this, none but persons of eligibility could be preferred to promotion. In this manner the properest persons would be chosen to fill the offices which should become vacant in the Company's establishments. It would occur to him that the most eligible mode of proceeding would be to form a committee of the Court of Proprietors, to whom the presentation or recom-

**Mr. Atkins.** mendment of the Directors might be referred for consideration and final approbation. By such an arrangement, the public service would, in the first place, sustain no injury; whilst the wise principle of giving promotion according to merit, would have full play, and would be attended with those good effects which never failed to give strength and stability to a free constitution. This was a circumstance certainly at which he aimed, when he recommended the propriety of adopting some system of remunerating the Court of Directors. There was no man, he was persuaded, in that Court who did not feel that it was of the highest importance to take this last suggestion into their most serious consideration. Upon this principle, he was willing to meet the proposition of his hon. friend, and he would conclude by observing, that although he was an advocate for economy, he thought liberality in rewarding public servants was not the least consideration that ought to influence the policy of a great body, like the India Company.

**Mr. Lowndes** Mr. Lowndes again rose (not however without a reiteration of the cry of *Order order!*) and said, that he had forgotten to mention that it was his intention to have proposed that the Directors should have a salary of £2,000 each instead of £1,000.

Mr. *Plummer* rose for the purpose, not of pro- Mr. *Plummer* longing the debate, but of correcting the statement made on the part of the hon. gent. (Mr. Alderman Atkins) who had just sat down, upon the subject of *surprise*. If he (Mr. *Plummer*) was not mistaken, that honourable gentleman had charged his hon. friend (Mr. Moore) with having taken him and the Court by surprise, in having brought forward this motion without notice. Now, if that honourable gentleman would have the goodness to recollect, that he (Mr. *Plummer*) himself had waited upon him, on the very subject of this debate, and brought with him a copy of the requisition which gave occasion to the meeting of this Court; that he (Mr. *Plummer*) explained to him the nature of the motion which was intended to be made; and that, so far from his (Mr. Atkins) being *surprized*, (as he now seemed to be) He appeared to treat the subject as one which he had rather expected, than otherwise, would be brought forward. He (Mr. *Plummer*) told him what the intention of his honourable friend was, and he appeared satisfied; and, at the same time, desired a fuller explanation of the object of the requisition. He (Mr. *Plummer*) therefore felt himself authorised in saying, that the honourable gentleman's statement of his being taken by surprise was most certainly incorrect. He begged



Mr. Plummer. to make one more observation. He did not wish now to join in the debate, because a great deal had been said ; and he should have another opportunity of submitting his sentiments to the Court upon the subject ; but he wished to state an opinion upon the subject of patronage, introduced as it had been in the course of this discussion, in a light, in his opinion extremely invidious, and, he must say, rather too personal. He would beg to ask of those gentlemen who seemed so hostile to patronage, what sort of executive government they would expect to find in this country, if the members of administration were deprived of the means of exercising that legitimate patronage which they possessed ? What, he would ask, would become even of that identical house of parliament, to whom the India Company had consented to submit their claims ? Without patronage, every man must know that it would be impossible for the executive government of the country to carry on the business of the state ; and when it came to be considered that there was a great deal of similarity in principle, between the executive government of the East India Company and the executive government of Great Britain, every reasonable man must admit, upon every principle of expediency and policy, that patronage and influ-

ence were as necessary in the hands of the former Mr. Plummer as they were in those of the latter. He confessed he was really surprised to hear men, such as those he had heard on this occasion, make such observations, as they had thought proper to urge, in condemnation of this principle. He would add one word more ; namely, that it was of the highest importance the Directors should be possessed of this patronage ; and if they did not possess it, he would be the first to propose that it should be put into their hands.

Mr. *Lowndes* again rose, and attempted to Mr. Lowndes. speak ; but was silenced by the cry of *order !*

Mr. *Lushington* said, he did not wish, at this Mr. Lushington. moment, to prolong the discussion ; and it was with the greatest reluctance he attempted again to trespass on the attention of the Court ; but he could not abstain, without violence to his own feelings, from taking the liberty of making one observation upon the manner in which the subject of *patronage* seemed to be entertained by some gentlemen. Notwithstanding all that had been said upon this subject, he would venture to assert, not merely upon the authority of his own experience, but upon the authority of every liberal minded man whom he had ever heard speak upon the subject, that it was impossible for the most suspicious minds, or for the most malignant

Mr. Lushington.

and illiberal disposition, to suggest an insinuation, in the remotest degree, to the prejudice of the Court of Directors upon the subject of patronage, merely looking at it as patronage. He could not join, therefore, as he was sorry many gentlemen had, in the opinion that the possession of patronage by the Directors, as such, was a possession of which they ought to be deprived; because, in his opinion, the possession of patronage by the Directors, was as much a source of advantage and benefit to the Indian empire, as any part of the system, by which the British empire in the East had been hitherto so admirably governed. He was persuaded, that to deprive the Court of Directors of patronage, would be to deprive them of the means of doing much of that good by which their conduct had been so long distinguished. He thought the manner in which they had always filled the appointments in their gift, in the civil and military departments of the Indian Empire, had established the purity of their intentions and the justice of their discernment, upon a basis which it was not in the power of any man to shake. He was aware, that the breath of malignity and the voice of clamour had attempted to sully their fame; but the impotence of such an assertion was amply recorded in the splendid fabrick of military and civil genius,

which had been raised in the East by the wise discernment of the government at home. Mr. Lushington.

Mr. *Lowndes* once more attempted to speak ; Mr. Lowndes.  
but was compelled to sit down by a general cry  
of *Order! order!*

Mr. *Peter Moore* said, with respect to the Mr. P. Moore.  
point of patronage, he had only to refer the honourable Alderman, in answer to every thing he had said, to the consequences which had arisen in India from the exercise of that patronage by the Court of Directors. If he looked there, he would find that it was from the wise use of that patronage that so much virtue, so much integrity, so much enlightened policy, so many statesmen, and so many generals had adorned the annals of that Empire, during the last fifty years. Beyond that period he would not ask him to look : and if he was not fully answered by such a reference, he (Mr. Moore) was ready to give the cause up as hopeless.

Now, with respect to the question before the Court. With the concurrence of his honourable friend, the seconder of the motion, he would beg leave to *table* the motion as a notice, either to be discussed at the next Court, or any other Court it should be the pleasure of gentlemen to entertain the question ; or in any other way that should be deemed most advantageous to

**Mr. P. Moore.** the general purpose in view. So far from his being disposed to take the Court by surprise, it would be recollected that he began by desiring to *table* it for another discussion; and he hoped and trusted the Court would consent to its now being recorded as a notice. (*Cries of no objection! no objection!*)—It being the pleasure of the Court, then, to consider this as a notice, the only thing now to consider, was what day should be fixed upon for discussion, the motion being *tabled* as a notice. By the bye-laws, as matter of course, it would be subject to two discussions, before it could be carried into effect.

**The Chairman.**

The *Chairman* requested the honourable gentleman would have the goodness to specify the time he would have the discussion to take place in; as he (the Chairman) conceived it to be the pleasure of the Court that the motion should be considered as tabled, and remain for discussion on a future day, to be named by the honourable gentleman. He concluded by apprizing the Court that there would be a Quarterly General Court on the 22d instant.

**Mr. Davies.**

Mr. *Davies* begged to explain, that the motive of his getting up, to enquire whether the motion was now actually before the Court, was because, as the honourable Director (Mr. Bosanquet) had read that part of the bye-laws, he was led to be-

lieve, in consequence of having read them him- Mr. Davies.  
self since, that the Court could not entertain the  
question again if it should now be withdrawn.  
As an individual, he was as prepared to go into the  
question now as at any other time : but whether  
this could be done without a proper notice of  
motion was his doubt, and that was the only mo-  
tive he had for rising to trouble the Court. .

After a short desultory conversation, as to the  
day for which the discussion should be fixed, be-  
tween Mr. Moore, Mr. Cotton, Mr. Hume, and  
Mr. Lowndes, it was agreed that the motion  
should be taken into consideration on Wednes-  
day the 6th of October, thus giving upwards of  
a month's notice of the question.

Mr. Lowndes rose again, amidst a general cry Mr Lowndes.  
of *Order! order!* to renew the debate; recapitu-  
lating some of the observations he had made  
in his first speech, and concluded by assuring  
the Court of Directors that it was his wish that  
they should have £2,000 instead of £1,000 per  
annum.

The *Chairman* reminded the honourable gen- The Chair-  
tleman, that the general subject of discussion had man.  
been disposed of, and that it was not orderly to  
bring it forward again, the pleasure of the Court  
having been signified that the further discussion  
should be postponed till the 6th of October. .

Mr.P.Moore. Mr. *Peter Moore* said, he understood that the motion was now to be considered as tabled, and that notice would be given of the General Court for the discussion of it as for a motion renewed.

The Chair-  
man. The *Chairman* answered affirmatively, and put the question, "that the consideration of this " question be adjourned till the 6th of October," which was carried unanimously.

Adjourned.

## APPENDIX.

*To the Honourable the Court of Directors for the  
Affairs of the United Company of Merchants  
trading to the East-Indies.*

GENTLEMEN,

We, the subscribing Proprietors of East-India Stock, being duly qualified according to law, request that you will be pleased to convene a General Court of Proprietors, when most convenient to yourselves, on special affairs.

We have the honour to be,

*London,*

Gentlemen,

*18th August, 1813.*

Your most obedient  
humble servants,

|                            |                             |
|----------------------------|-----------------------------|
| <i>Ken. Mackenzie,</i>     | <i>P. Moore,</i>            |
| <i>Joseph Hume,</i>        | <i>John Bush,</i>           |
| <i>T. Welch,</i>           | <i>Wm. Robertson,</i>       |
| <i>John Innes,</i>         | <i>Benjamin Shaw,</i>       |
| <i>Patrick Hadow,</i>      | <i>Charles Prischell,</i>   |
| <i>George Cumming,</i>     | <i>Thomas Plummer,</i>      |
| <i>John Clements,</i>      | <i>Jo. Dorin,</i>           |
| <i>Harriet Clements,</i>   | <i>Richard Chase,</i>       |
| <i>Edward Ravenscroft,</i> | <i>S. Drow,</i>             |
| <i>George Dallas,</i>      | <i>Jos. Du Pre Porcher,</i> |
| <i>Charles Cottrell,</i>   | <i>Thomas Redhead,</i>      |
| <i>Andrew Reid,</i>        | <i>H. Farcott,</i>          |
| <i>W. Lewis,</i>           | <i>R. C. Bazett,</i>        |



|                             |                           |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>W. Borradaile,</i>       | <i>James Quilter.</i>     |
| <i>B. Barnard,</i>          | <i>Valentine Conolly,</i> |
| <i>G. Wiltshire,</i>        | <i>Charles Morgan,</i>    |
| <i>Thomas Poynder, jun.</i> | <i>Kennard Smith,</i>     |
| <i>John St. Barbe,</i>      | <i>William Blair,</i>     |
| <i>Robert Sowerby,</i>      | <i>Thomas Blair,</i>      |
| <i>Thomas W. Plummer,</i>   | <i>H. Hurle,</i>          |
| <i>Mathew Chalie,</i>       | <i>R. Slade,</i>          |
| <i>James Davidson,</i>      | <i>William Slade,</i>     |
| <i>John Smith, New-st.</i>  | <i>John Neave,</i>        |
| <i>Spring-Gardens,</i>      | <i>George Simson,</i>     |
| <i>J. L. Minet,</i>         | <i>M. S. Moore,</i>       |
| <i>R. Borradaile,</i>       | <i>L. D. Moore,</i>       |
| <i>Robert Hudson,</i>       | <i>Francis Duncan,</i>    |
| <i>Joseph Gough,</i>        | <i>Thomas Graham,</i>     |
| <i>Alexander Ross,</i>      | <i>Edmund Pepys,</i>      |
| <i>Richard Knight.</i>      | <i>Henry Bonham,</i>      |
|                             | <i>Horatio Clagett,</i>   |

THE END.





